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FARMERS INSURANCE COMP ANY OF 
IDAHO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 41683 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
JEFFREY A. THOMSON 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
HONORABLE LYNN G. NORTON 
JON M. STEELE 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
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Date: 1/31/2014 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 12:28 PM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 4 Case: CV-OC-2013-08697 Current Judge: Lynn G Norton 
Peggy Cedillo vs. Farmers Insurance Company Of Idaho 
Peggy C~dillo vs. Farmers Insurance Company Of Idaho 
Date Code User Judge 
5/13/2013 NCOC CCVIDASL New Case Filed - Other Claims Lynn G Norton 
PETN CCVIDASL Petition for Confirmation of Arbitratiion Award and Lynn G Norton 
Award of Attorney Fees 
MEMO CCVIDASL Verified Memorandum of Costs Attorney Fees Lynn G Norton 
and Prejudgment Interest 
8/16/2013 AMEN CCSWEECE First Amended Petition for Confirmation of Lynn G Norton 
Arbitration Award, Award of Attorney Fees, 
Unenforceability of Offset Clause and Bad Faith 
SMFI CCSWEECE Summons Filed Lynn G Norton 
AMEN CCSWEECE Amended Verified Memorandum of Costs, Lynn G Norton 
Attorney Fees and Prejudgment Interest 
MOTN CCSWEECE Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and for Lynn G Norton 
Award of Costs, Attorney Fees, and Prejudgment 
Interest 
NOHG CCSWEECE Notice Of Hearing Lynn G Norton 
HRSC CCSWEECE Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/02/2013 02:45 Lynn G Norton 
PM) Motion to Confirm Arbitrators Award & 
Memo of Atty Fees & Costs & Prejudgment 
Interest 
8/23/2013 AFOS CCVIDASL Affidavit Of Service 8.20.13 Lynn G Norton 
8/30/2013 NOAP CCVIDASL Notice Of Appearance(Johnson for Farmers Lynn G Norton 
Insurance) 
9/9/2013 ANSW CCOSBODK Answer {Thomson For Farmers Insurance Lynn G Norton 
Company Of Idaho) 
9/11/2013 AFSM TCLAFFSD Affidavit Of Jon M Steele In Support Of Plaintiffs Lynn G Norton 
Motion To Confirm Arbitration Award, Costs, 
Attorney Fees, And Prejudgment Interest 
~/18/2013 MOTN CCBOYIDR Defendant's Motion for Modification and/or Lynn G Norton 
Correction of Arbitration Award 
AFFD CCBOYIDR Affidavit in Support of Defendant's Motion for Lynn G Norton 
Modification and/or Correction of Arbitration 
Award 
MEMO CCBOYIDR Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion Lynn G Norton 
for Modification and/or Correction of Arbitration 
Award 
NOHG CCBOYIDR Notice Of Hearing (10-2-13 @2:45 pm) Lynn G Norton 
Defendant's Motion for Modification and/or 
Correction of Arbitration Award 
MOTN CCBOYIDR Defendant's Motion to Disallow Costs and Lynn G Norton 
Attorney Fees 
AFFD CCBOYIDR Affidavit in Support of Defendant's Motion to Lynn G Norton 
Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees 
MEMO CCBOYIDR Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Lynn G Norton 
Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees 
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. Date: 1/31/2014 
·:·Time: 12:28 PM 
Page 2 of 4 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2013-08697 Current Judge: Lynn G Norton 
Peggy Cedillo vs. Farmers Insurance Company Of Idaho 
User: TCWEGEKE 
Peggy Cedillo vs. Farmers Insurance Company Of Idaho 
Date Code User Judge 
9/18/2013 NOHG CCBOYIDR Notice Of Hearing (10-2-13 @2:45pm) Lynn G Norton 
Defendant's Motion to Disallow Costs and 
Attorney Fees 
9/25/2013 MOTN CCNELSRF Motion to Strike Exhibit 7 Attached to the Affidavit Lynn G Norton 
of Jeffrey A. Thomsonin Support of Defs Motion 
to Disallow Costs and Atty Fees 
AFSM CCNELSRF Affidavit of Jon M. Steele In Support Of Plfs Lynn G Norton 
Motion to Strike 
RESP CCNELSRF Response in Opposition to Def s Motion for Lynn G Norton 
Modification and/or Correctio of Arbitration Award 
AFFD CCNELSRF Affidavit of Jon M. STeele in Opposition to Lynn G Norton 
Farmers Motion for Modification and /or 
Correction of Arbitration Award 
AFFD CCNELSRF Affidavit of Jon M. STeele in Opposition to Lynn G Norton 
Farmers Motion to Disallow Costs and Atty Fees 
REPL CCNELSRF Reply Memorandum in Support of Plfs Amended Lynn G Norton 
Verified Memorandum of Costs, Atty Fees and 
Prejudment Interest 
MOTN CCNELSRF Motion to Shorten Time Lynn G Norton 
NOHG CCNELSRF Notice Of Hearing (10/02/13 @2:45 pm) Lynn G Norton 
9/27/2013 MISC TCLAFFSD Defendant's Non-Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion Lynn G Norton 
To Shorten Time 
9/30/2013 MEMO CCKHAMSA Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion Lynn G Norton 
To Strike Exhibit 7 Of Thomson Affidavit in 
Support Of Defendant's Motion To Disallow Costs 
And Attorney Fees 
RPLY CCKHAMSA Reply Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Lynn G Norton 
Disallow Costs And Attorney Fees 
RPLY CCKHAMSA Reply Memorandum In Support Of Motion for Lynn G Norton 
Modification And/Or Correction Of Arbitration 
Award 
10/2/2013 DCHH DCKORSJP Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Lynn G Norton 
10/02/2013 02:45 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Christie Valcich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 Motion to Confirm 
Arbitrators Award & Memo of Atty Fees & Costs & 
Prejudgment Interest 
10/16/2013 NOSV CCHOLMEE Notice Of Service Lynn G Norton 
10/21/2013 NOTS CCSWEECE Notice Of Service of Discovery Lynn G Norton 
11/13/2013 NOTS MCBIEHKJ Notice Of Service Lynn G Norton 
11/14/2013 DEOP DCKORSJP Memorandum Decision and Order on Motions on Lynn G Norton 
Arbitration Award 
11/19/2013 AFFD CCMARTJD Affidavit of Interest Amount and Attorney Fee Lynn G Norton 
Amount Due 
11/25/2013 MOTN CCHEATJL Motion To Compel Lynn G Norton 
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.!ime: 12:28 PM ROA Report 
Page 3 of 4 Case: CV-OC-2013-08697 Current Judge: Lynn G Norton 
Peggy Cedillo vs. Farmers Insurance Company Of Idaho 
Peggy Cedillo vs. Farmers Insurance Company Of Idaho 
Date Code User Judge 
11/25/2013 AFSM CCHEATJL Affidavit Of Jon M Steele In Support Of Plaintiffs Lynn G Norton 
Motion 
BREF CCHEATJL Brief In Support Of Plaintiffs Motion To Compel Lynn G Norton 
HRSC CCHEATJL Notice Of Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel Lynn G Norton 
12/11/2013 02:45 PM) 
11/27/2013 NOTC CCHEATJL Notice Of Unavailability Lynn G Norton 
12/6/2013 AFFD CCHOLMEE Supplemental Affidavit of Jon M Steele in Suport Lynn G Norton 
of Motion 
12/9/2013 NOTS CCVIDASL Notice Of Service of Discovery Lynn G Norton 
AFFD CCVIDASL Affidavit of Peter J Johnson in Response to Lynn G Norton 
Motion to Compel 
MEMO CCVIDASL Defendants Memorandum in Response to Lynn G Norton 
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery 
12/10/2013 AFFD TCRUDZES Second Supplemental Affidavit of Jon M. Steele Lynn G Norton 
in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel 
12/11/2013 JDMT DCKORSJP Judgment Lynn G Norton 
APSC CCTHIEBJ Appealed To The Supreme Court Lynn G Norton 
NOTA CCTHIEBJ NOTICE OF APPEAL Lynn G Norton 
CDIS DCKORSJP Civil Disposition entered for: Farmers Insurance Lynn G Norton 
Company Of Idaho, Defendant; Cedillo, Peggy, 
Plaintiff. Filing date: 12/11/2013 
DCHH DCKORSJP Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled Lynn G Norton 
on 12/11/2013 02:45 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 
HRSC DCKORSJP Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel Lynn G Norton 
01/29/2014 03:15 PM) 
12/12/2013 ORDR DCKORSJP Order on Amendment of Judgment Lynn G Norton 
12/18/2013 MEMO CCNELSRF Defs Memorandum RE: Jurisdication Lynn G Norton 
12/20/2013 ORDR CCTHIEBJ Order Re: Final Judgment - Supreme Court Lynn G Norton 
Docket No. 41683 
1/2/2014 ORDR CCTHIEBJ Order to Withdraw Order Re: Final Judgment Lynn G Norton 
Dated December 19, 2013 - Supreme Court 
Docket No. 41683 
1/6/2014 RSPS TCRUDZES Response to Defendant's Memorandum RE: Lynn G Norton 
Jurisdication 
1/29/2014 DCHH DCKORSJP Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled Lynn G Norton 
on 01/29/2014 03:15 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: No Court Reporter (telephonic, in 
chambers) 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 
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Date: 1/31/2014 
Time: 12:28 PM 
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Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2013-08697 Current Judge: Lynn G Norton 
Peggy Cedillo vs. Farmers Insurance Company Of Idaho 
Peggy Cedillo vs. Farmers Insurance Company Of Idaho 
,. Date Code User 
1/29/2014 ORDR DCKORSJP Order Staying Proceedings 
STAT DCKORSJP STATUS CHANGED: inactive 




Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
000006
JOHN L. RUNFT (ISB # 1059) LYNN G. N0i=1i'ON 
NO,, ___ ---;:;:-=:--,.,~.,,....,,""t,._ 
AM. ____ FIL~-~- q ~ ;i(.J 
JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-9495 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
' Email: jsteele@runftsteele.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MAY 1 3 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By STEPHANIE VIDAK 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
) 











CASENO. CV o c 1308697 
PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION OF 
ARBITRATION AWARD AND AWARD 
OF ATTORNEY FEES 
Schedule: A-1 
Fee: $96.00 
COME NOW the above named Plaintiff, by and through her attorneys of record, Runft & 
Steele Law Offices, PLLC, and for causes of action against Defendant, complains and alleges as 
follows: 
PARTIES & JURISDICTION 
1. Plaintiff Peggy Cedillo (hereafter "Cedillo") at all times relevant to this action was 
and is a resid_ent of Ada County, Idaho. 
2. ,Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho (hereafter "Farmers"), was and is an 
insurance company authorized to do and actually doing business in Idaho. 
PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION A WARD AND A WARD OF ATTORNEY 
FEES, P. 1 , t 1 
ORIGINAL l 
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3. The Court has jurisdiction over this case because Farmers contracted to insure a 
person located within the state ofldaho or was otherwise doing business in the state ofldaho. 
4. The amount at issue exceeds $10,000, the jurisdictional minimums for this court. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
5. Cedillo seeks judicial confirmation of the Arbitrator's Final Award of an 
underinsured claim. 
6. Cedillo seeks a ruling that Farmers' set-off clause is inapplicable to the facts of 
this case and/or is unenforceable. 
7. Cedillo seeks an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-
1839. 
8. Cedillo seeks an award of attorney fees and costs incurred in bringing this action. 
FACTS 
9. There existed at all relevant times a contract of insurance between Farmers and 
Cedillo which obligates Farmers to compensate Cedillo for damages caused by an underinsured 
motorist (hereafter "UIM Contract"). 
10. Pursuant to the UIM Contract, the parties agreed to arbitrate Cedillo's legal 
entitlement to recovery and the amount of damages. 
11. On February 10, 2012 the Arbitrator entered his Pre-Hearing Order No. 1 Re: 
Scheduling attached as Exhibit A. 
12. The Arbitrator's Pre-Hearing Order No. 1 states at subparagraph 10 that "[t]he 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern this arbitration." 
PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION A WARD AND AW ARD OF ATTORNEY 
FEES, P. 2 
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13. On April 5, 2012 Plaintiff and Defendant entered into the Stipulation attached as 
Exhibit B. This Stipulation includes the following: 
the parties further agree that the following issues are not within the 
Arbitrator's jurisdiction: 
3. The enforceability of Farmers' setoff clause found in 
Endorsement El 179i. The parties hereby preserve and 
reserve the issue of enforceability of the setoff clause for 
determination by the District Court should Claimant wish 
to raise that issue, and failure to raise the issue before the 
Arbitrator has jurisdiction to apply Farmers' setoff clause 
found in Endorsement El 179i in arriving at his Final 
Award. The enforceability of Farmers' setoff clause found 
in Endorsement El 179i, even though applied by the 
Arbitrator in arriving at the Final Award, is preserved and 
reserved for determination by the District Court. The 
parties intend and agree that this issue is severable despite 
the presumption in favor of arbitration . The parties agree 
that this is an issue outside the scope of this arbitration and 
that the Arbitrator has no jurisdiction to determine the 
enforceability of Farmers' setoff clause 
14. On January 16, 2013, the Arbitrator entered his Interim Award (Exhibit C, 
attached) totaling $406,700.12 calculated as follows: 
l. Economic Damages: 
• Medical expenses: 
• Lost income: 
SUBTOTAL ECONOMIC DAMAGES: 
2. Noneconomic Damages: 
Pain and suffering, loss of quality of life, physical limitations, 




Right hand: $150,000.00 
TOTAL INTERIM AWARD: $406,700.12 
PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION A WARD AND AW ARD OF ATTORNEY 
FEES, P. 3 
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15. On April 29, 2013, the Arbitrator entered his Final Award of $203,468.41 in favor 
of Cedillo along with prejudgment interest at the rate of 12% per annum of $100,332.95 (Exhibit 
D, attached). 
COUNT I 
CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATOR'S AWARD 
16. Cedillo restates and realleges the preceding paragraphs and incorporates them 
herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
17. The Arbitrator's decision is binding on the reviewing court both as to questions of 
law and fact. Hughes v. Hughes, 123 Idaho 711, 851 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Ct. App. 1993). 
18. Cedillo, pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-911, seeks judicial confirmation of the 
Arbitrator's Final Award. 
19. Cedillo requests entry of judgment in the total amount due to her from Farmers. 
COUNT II 
FARMERS SET-OFF CLAUSE IS INAPPLICABLE/ UNENFORCEABLE 
20. Cedillo restates and realleges the preceding paragraphs and incorporates them 
herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
21. Defendants set-off clause was specifically addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court 
in the case of Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho v. Talbot, 133 Idaho 428, 987 P.2d 1043 
(1999) attached as Exhibit E. 
22. The Talbot court unanimously ruled that Defendants set-off clause found in its 
El 179i endorsement did not apply to the facts of that case. 
PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AW ARD AND A WARD OF ATTORNEY 
FEES, P. 4 
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23. A unanimous Idaho Supreme Court stated that Farmers' set-off clause " ... refers 






Cedillo's UIM contract contains the identical El 179i endorsement as addressed in 
As was the case in Talbot, Cedillo has no other UIM coverage. 
Defendant's set-off clause has no application to the facts of this case. 
Defendant's set-off clause is unenforceable under the facts of this case. 
28. As a result, Cedillo is entitled to an additional award of $105,000 plus 
prejudgment interest from August 25, 2009. 
COUNT III 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE§ 49-1839(1) 
29. Cedillo restates and realleges the preceding paragraphs and incorporates them 
herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
30. The Arbitrator determined as a matter of law that Cedillo provided Farmers her 
proof of loss on July 28, 2009. 
31. Farmers had thirty (30) days after proof of loss had been submitted to pay the 
amount justly due under the terms of the UIM Contract. 
32. If not paid within thirty days, Cedillo is entitled to an award of attorney fees and 
costs. 
33. Farmers did not pay the amount justly due under the UIM Contract within thirty 
(30) days of the proof ofloss date, July 28, 2009. 
PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION A WARD AND A WARD OF ATTORNEY 
FEES,P. 5 
000011
34. Cedillo is therefore entitled to a reasonable award of attorney fees and costs 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-183 9. 
COUNT IV 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE§§ 7-914 AND 12-123 
3 5. Cedillo restates and realleges the preceding paragraphs and incorporates them 
herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
36. Cedillo is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs incurred in bringing this 
action pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 7-914 and 12-123. 
WHEREFORE, Cedillo prays for judgment against Farmers as follows: 
1. As to Count I, that the Court confirm the Arbitration Award and enter 
judgment in favor of Cedillo for the total amount due. 
2. As to Count II that the Court issue its ruling that Defendant's set-off clause is 
unenforceable and that as a result Cedillo is entitled to an additional $105,000 
plus prejudgment interest. 
3. As to Count III, that Cedillo be awarded attorney fees and costs incurred in 
arbitration pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-1839; 
4. As to Count IV, that Cedillo be awarded attorney fees and costs in this action. 
5. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
6. In summary, Cedillo requests that Judgment be entered in her favor for the 
amount of the unpaid arbitration award, the additional amount of $105,000 as a 
result of the inapplicable / unenforceable set-off clause, attorney fees and costs 
incurred in the arbitration, attorney fees and costs incurred in this action. and 
prejudgment interest. 
PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AW ARD AND AW ARD OF ATTORNEY 
FEES, P. 6 
000012
DATED this \3 day of May 2013. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By:_~--~--a--~-------JON 1J. STEELE 
Attorney for Peggy Cedillo 
PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AW ARD AND AW ARD OF ATTORNEY 
FEES, P. 7 
000013
. ,. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
VERIFICATION 
PEGGY CEDILLO after being first duly sworn, deposes and says as 
follows: · · 
That she is the Plaintiff in the foregoing PETITION FOR 
CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AW ARD AND AW ARD OF 
ATTORNEY FEES, that she has read the foregoing and believes the facts stated 
therein are true based upon her own information and belief. · 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Plaintiff has set her hand and seal the day and year 
first above written 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this !Ji, day of May 2013. 
, V:ffisT,_ ')= ~ 
Notary Public fo~~daho 
Residing at: t otY\.~ 
Commission expires A -}3 

























Case No. 81700-0040 
PRE-HEARING ORDER NO. I. RE: 
SCHEDULING 
A preliminary scheduling conference was held. in this matter by telephone on 
February 8, 2012 with the arbitrator Merlyn. W. Clark. JON STEELE, Run.ft & Steel Law 
Of.fices, PLLC, appeared on behalf of the Claimant~ PEGGY CEDILLO. JEFFREY A. 
THOMSON, Elam &Burke, P.A., appeared on behalfofRespondent, FARMERS INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF IDAHO. During the scheduling conference, the parties agreed as follows: 
1. All parties who are necessary to complete the resolution of the dispute are 
participating in the arbitration. 
2. The arbitrator has concluded that he does not have a non-waivable conflict 
of interest with the parties in this matter. Farmers was an insurer of firm clients in the past a[1d 
the Arbitrator has mediated two mediations in which Farmers was involved, both are closed and 
the Arbitrator has no immediate recollection of the matters. Farmers Insurance was involved in 
an Arbitration in 2009 that was arbitrated by the Arbitrator. Both paities have waived any 
potential conflict of interest. 
PRE-HEARING ORDER NO. 1 RE SCHEDULING - 1 
A17nn Ull.lM .,..,. .... .,..,n 1 
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Counsel for the parties shall notify the arbitrator within 10 days, the names of 
representatives of parties and potential witnesses who will be involved in the arbitration 
proceeding so the arbitrator can dete1mine whether any conflict of interest exists with said 
persons. 
3. The nature of the dispute to be arbitrated involves an underinsured 
motorist claim for personal injuries arising out of a motor vehicle accident in Ada County, Idaho 
in May of 2008. 
4. The dispute is being submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the 
Arbitration Clause in the Insurance Policy issued by Respondent and by agreement of the parties 
through their respective legal counsel. Counsel shall submit to the Arbitrator a formal Demand 
for Arbitration and Response to Demand within 10 days. 
5. Counsel have stipulated that whether or not there have been payments by 
,/ 
Respondent to Claimant will not be disclosed nor taken into consideration by the Arbitrator and a 
written Stipulation so stating shall be provided to the Arbitrator by Counsel. 
6. Merlyn W. Clark shall serve as sole arbitrator. 
7. Sherry Montosa, legal assistant to Merlyn W. Clark, will serve as case 
administrator of the arbitration proceeding. Communications relating to the arbitration 
proceedings should be directed to Mrs. Montesa. Her direct dial number is 208-388-4881. Her 
fax number is 208-954-5243 and her e-mail address is smontosa@haw1eytroxell.com. 
8. The scope of the arbitrator's jurisdiction to enter an award is governed by 




A stenographic record of the hearing will not be made. 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern this arbitration 
proceeding. The admissibility of evidence shall be controlled by the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
PRE-HEARING ORDER NO. 1 RE SCHEDULING - 2 
000017
' i 
11. Discovery will be conducted pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil 
.Procedure. All discovery shall be completed on or before April 30, 2012. 
The parties have agreed to exchange exhibit lists, exhibits and witness lists on or 
before l\'Iay 16, 2012. A copy of the exhibit lists, witness lists and exhibits will be provided to 
the arbitrator. 
Claimant will disclose experts on or before April 30, 2012. Respondent will 
disclose experts on or before May 16, 2012. Claimant's Rebuttal expert witness disclosures are 
due on or before May 23, 2010. The disclosure of experts shall include the name, qualifications 
of the expert and a brief summary of their expected testimony and the basis for such testimony. 
12. The arbitrator does not require prehearing briefs but they may be 
submitted if the parties desire. Prehearing briefs, if submitted, shall contain a statement of 
claims, damages and defenses, issues and the respective positions of the parties on each issue, 
and any legal authority deemed applicable and shall be simultaneously submitted to the arbitrator 
by May 16, 2012. Response briefs, if submitted, shall be due on or before May 23, 2012. 
13. Any prehearing motions shall be filed and heard on or before May 23, 
2012. 
14. The arbitrator is prepared to issue subpoenas for the appearance of 
witnesses upon request by any party. 
15. The fact witnesses, except parties, will be excluded prior to giving 
testimony. 
16. The hearing is scheduled to commence at 9:00 a.m. on May 30 and May 
31, 2012 at the offices of HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, in Boise, Idaho, and 
shall continue as necessary until completed. It is anticipated that the hearing will require 2 days. 
The Arbitrator is reserving June 1, 2012 if needed. 
PRE-HEARING ORDER NO. I RE SCHEDULING - 3 
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17. Claimant shall pre-mark exhibits beginning with number 1. Respondent 
shall pre-mark exhibits beginning with number 1001. Prior to the hearing the parties shall 
attempt to agree on exhibits that may be admitted by stipulation. 
18. Subject to approval of the arbitrator, the parties will determine at the 
closing of the hearing whether written or oral closing arguments will be presented. If written 
closing arguments are required, a schedule for them will be discussed and decided at the hearing. 
19. The compensation and expenses of the arbitrator will be paid at the rate of 
$250 per hour. The compensation and expenses of the Arbitrator wiIJ be divided and paid one-
half by Claimant and one-half by Respondent. 
20. The parties have agreed that service may be made by e-mail, as well as by 
mail, facsimi.le or in-person delivery. 
DATED this 10th day of February, 2012. 
PRE-HEARING ORDER NO. 1 RE SCHEDULING - 4 
000019
I , 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this I 0th day of February, 2012, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing PRE.HEARING ORDER NO. 1 RE: SCHEDULING by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Jon Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 1020 W. Main 
Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
j stee le(@,runftstee le. com 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
iat@elamburke.com 
PRE-HEARING ORDER NO. 1 RE SCHEDULING - 5 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
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Exhibit B 
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208 Elam and Burke ELAM AND BURKE 08: a.m. 04-05-2012 
, '·M~/U4/LUIL/l'll!U u::i:jo roo 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
ELA.lv! & BURKE, P.A. 
25 I E. Front St., Ste. 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ldaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
jat@elamburke.com 
ISB #3380 
Attorneys for Farmers Insurance 
Company of Idaho 
f/\A l~U. ( 
INRE: MATTER OF ARBITRATION 
PEGGY CEDILLO 
and 
FAR1V.IERS INSURANCE COMP ANY OF 
IbAHO 
Arbitration Case No. 81700-0040 
STIPULA TrON 
r, UUI 
Farmers Insurance Company of [daho (''Farmers"), by and th.rough its attomey of record, 
Jeffrey A. Thomson, and Peggy Cedillo, by and through her attorney ofrecord, Joa M. Steele 
hereby stipulate and agree that any evidence of or information relating to the following matters 
be deemed inadmissible and cannot be mentioned or commented upon either before or during the 
arbitration: 
l . Any and all evidence, testimony, comments or documents related to the amonnts 
paid (if any) to Peggy Cedillo or her healthcare providers by Jon Steele (the llnderinsured 
motorist) or his insurer (Progressive) pw:suant to any insurance policy or other assets of Steele. 
2. Any and all evidence, testimony, comments or documents relating to amounts 
paid (if any) to Cedillo or her healthcare providers by Farmers under its UIM coverage. 





Elam and Burke 
ar,/U4/LUIZ/W~U u~:jb rM 
ELAM AND BURKE oa;r a.m. 04-05-2012 
r/\fi. NO, ( r. UUL 
3. AJJ.y nnd all evidence, testimony, comments or documents relating to policy limit 
amounts of Steele's (the underinsured motorist) insurance policy or Fanners' UIM limits. 
4. Any and all evidence, testimony, comments or documents relating to amotmts 
demanded by Cedillo in settlement of her claim against Steele (the underinsured motorist), his 
insurer (Progressive) or Fanners. 
5. Any and all evidence, testimony, comments or documents that Cedillo was or was 
not insiu-ed under any health instll'ance policy. 
6. Any nnd all evidence, testimony, comments or documents that Cedillo has or has 
not made a prior claim against Farmers or any other insurance carrier. This does not preclude, 
however, any evidence, testimony, comments or documents relating to any prior injuries or 
treatment. 
7. Any reference whatsoever to attorney fees which might be received by Cedilla's 
llttomeys. 
The parties further stipulate and agree that the following issues are not within the 
Arbitrator's jurisdiction: 
l. Farmers' liability tmderits UIM coverage; ..,/' 
2. Farmers' denial of medical expense coverage to Cedillo;,/' 
3. The enforceability of Farmers' setoff clause found in Endorsement Ell 79i. The 
parties hereby preserve and reserve the issue of enforceability of the setoff clause for 
determination by the District Court should Claimant wish to raise that issue, and failure to raise 
the issue before the Arbitrator will not be consjdered a waiver. The parties further agree that the 
Arbitrator has jurisdiction to apply Farmers' setoff clause fOlmd in Endorsement E 1 l 79i in 
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arriving at his Final Award. The enforceability of Farmers' setoff clause found in Endorsement 
Ell 79i, even though applied by the Arbitrator in aniving at ~e Final Award, is preserved and 
reserved for detennination by the District Court. The parties intend and agree that this issue is 
severilble despite the presumption in favor of arbitration. The parties ngree that this is an issue 
outside the scope of this arbitrntiou and that the Arbitrator has uo j\l.risdiction to determine the 
enforceability of'Fanners • setoff clause; 
4. Any contention of comparative negligence; 
5. Any award ofattorney fees and costs; lllld 
6. Any claim of bad faith. 
Claimnnt further agrees and stipulates that she will not seek a detennination by the 
Arbitrator of the amount of damages couched in terms of "amount justly due". The parties 
acknowledge that this is a phrase with meaning and relevance only to the issue of attorney fees to 
be preserved for deteTinination by the District Court. 
Claimant further agrees nn.d stipulates that she will not seek damages for any alleged 
injury to her credit as this issue is also preserved and relevant only in the event of a claim of bad 
faith. 
Claimant further agrees that any claim of privilege relating to Rule 503 is withdrawn and 
will not be asserted in arbitration. 
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DATED this 5_ day of April, 2012. 
ELAM & 'BmlKE, !>.A . 
. Thomson, of the finn 
meys for Farmers Insurance 
mpany ofldaho 
DA TED this _±_ day of April, 2012. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By, J1t5t-u1· 
Jon M Steele, of the firm 
Attorneys for Peggy Cedillo 
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Jon M. Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Ma.in Street, Suite 400 
l3oise, Idaho 83702 
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Case No. 81700-0040 
ARBITRATOR'S DECISION AND 
INTERIM AW ARD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This arbitration involves claims for damages under the underinsured motorist provisions 
of a policy of insurance that was issued by Respondent, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho to 
Claimant, Peggy B. Cedillo. The claims are disputed by Respondent. The dispute has been 
submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the agreement to arbitrate, which is contained in the 
insurance policy. The agreement to arbitrate, the Idaho Unifmm Arbitration Act, Idaho Code§ 7-
901, et seq., the Pre-Hearing Orders that were entered by the arbitrator in this matter, and the 
Stipulations of the Parties dated February 22, 2012 and April 5, 2012 govern these proceedings. 
An evidentiary hearing was commenced on November 20, 2012 in Boise, Idaho before 
the duly appointed arbitrator, Merlyn W. Clark. Claimant, Peggy B. Cedillo, appeared in person 
represented by her attorney, Jon M. Steele, Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC. Jeffrey A. 
Thomson, Elam & Burke, P.A., appeared with Ron Ramsey, a representative of Respondent, on 
behalf of Respondent. Oral and documentary evidence was presented by the parties. The 
evidentiary hearing was completed on November 21, 2012. At the close of the hearing the parties 
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stipulated to submit simultaneous written closing arguments on or before December 10, 2012 and 
simultaneous written responses on or before December 17, 2012. The written closing arguments 
have been submitted and the matter is npw fully submitted for a decision and interim award. 
II. ISSUE FOR DECISION 
The issue to be decided by this arbitration is the amount of payment due under the 
underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage in the policy of insurance that was issued to Claimant 
by Respondent. The parties have agreed that an Interim Award will be issued reflecting a gross 
award of damages as would be recoverable for bodily injury caused by Jon Steele's negligence in 
operating his motorcycle. See Prehearing Order No. 2, p.2. After the issuance of an Interim 
Award, a Final Award will be issued reflecting any setoffs, collateral source reductions, 
subrogations or prejudgment interest. Id. 
Because the insurance clause in the insurance policy that covers Claimant expressly 
provides that "[t]he expense of the arbitrator and all other expenses of arbitration will be shared 
equally" by the parties and "[a]ttomey's fees and fees paid for the witnesses are not expenses of 
arbitration and will be paid by the party incurring them," this Arbitrator has no authority to 
award expenses of arbitration or attorney fees and costs to either party in this proceeding. 
III. EVIDENCE, FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND DECISIONS 
A. The Insurance Coverage. 
1. Claimant is insured under a policy of insurance that was issued by Respondent. The 
policy provided underinsured motorist coverage to Claimant on May 25, 2008. 
2. Claimant was injured in a motorcycle accident on May 25, 2008 and has made a claim for 
damages under the underinsured rnotori~t coverage of the policy. The claim is disputed by the 
insurer. 
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3. The policy of insurance contains an arbitration clause, which provides for binding 
arbitration if the insurer and insured disagree whether the insured is legally entitled to recover 
damages from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle or the amount thereof. 
The arbitration clause further provides: 
In that event, an arbitrator will be selected by the insured person and us. If 
agreement on an arbitrator cannot be reached within (30) days, the judge of a 
court having jurisdiction will appoint the arbitrator. The expense of the arbitrator 
and all other expenses of arbitration will be shared equally. Attorney's fees and 
fees paid for the witnesses are not expenses of arbitration and will be paid by the 
party incurring them. 
The arbitration will take place in the county where the insured person lives. Local 
court rules governing procedures and evidence will apply. The decision in writing 
of the arbitrator will be binding subject to the terms of this insurance. Formal 
demand for arbitration shall be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction. The 
court shall be located in the county and state of residence of the party making the 
demand. Demand may also be made by sending a certified letter to the party 
against whom arbitration is sought, with a return receipt as evidence. 
See the Insurance Policy. 
B. The Motorcycle Accident. 
4. On May 25, 2008, Claimant was injured while riding as a passenger on a motorcycle that 
was being operated by Jon Steele ("Steele"), who is now her husband. They were mruTied on 
December 8, 2008. The accident happened on Warm Springs Ave., below the Mesa area, east of Boise 
in Ada County, Idaho. The cycle, which was being driven by Steele in an easterly direction at a speed of 
about 30 mph, drifted to the right side of the road and sideswiped a concrete barrier, known as a Jersey 
barrier, which was situated on the south side of the road. Steele's actions were the sole cause of the 
accident because he failed to control the cycle and allowed it to drift to the right and into the barrier. 
5. When the cycle accident occurred on May 25, 2008, Claimant was sitting in the passenger seat 
behind the driver. Her back was supported by a backrest. Claimant's right side, including her hand, arm 
and hip came in contact with the barrier. Claimant suffered abrasions and contusions on her right hand, 
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which remains scarred. There were no abrasions on Claimant's elbow or shoulder. The contact with the 
barrier rotated Claimant's upper torso in a clockwise direction during the collision. 
6. When the cycle accident occurred, Claimant was not wearing protective clothing such as leathers, 
gloves or a helmet, but there is no evidence that the injuries she suffered, except perhaps the injury to the 
back of her hand, would have been materially reduced by such protective wear. 
7. The collision with the barrier damaged the gas tank, foot pegs and other areas on the right side of 
the cycle. The cycle remained operable after the collision. The driver brought the cycle to a controlled 
stop and then drove the cycle and Claimant to Steele's residence. Claimant then drove herself home. The 
accident was not reported to law enforcement authorities. 
c. Claimant's Medical History. 
8. The extent of injuries suffered by Claimant in the accident and the cause of such injuries are 
disputed by the Respondent, which makes certain aspects of Claimant's prior physical condition and 
medical history relevant. 
1. Claimant's Pre-Accident Medical History. 
9. In 2000, Claimant was strnck in the right shoulder by the min-or on her motor vehicle 
when a passing motorist strnck the miITor and it broke off and flew through an open window into 
her right shoulder. 
10. On Febrnary 1, 2001, Claimant was in a motor vehicle accident during which her vehicle, a 
Dodge Durango, was struck from the rear by a pickup truck going about 50 mph. Claimant was injured in 
that collision. 
11. Claimant was seen on February 1, 2001 by Dr. Terry Little, M.D., ("Dr. Terry Little") for the 
injuries Claimant suffered in the February l, 2001 accident. 
12. On March 19, 2001, Dr. David Price, D.C., ("Dr. Price") saw Claimant on referral from Dr. 
Terry Little for injuries from the February 1, 2001 accident. She told Dr. Price she had a history of a prior 
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accident involving her right shoulder. She told him that in June of 2000, she was driving a motor vehicle 
with the window rolled down and was sideswiped by another vehicle, breaking the mirror off and 
throwing it against Claimant's right shoulder. She was being treated by Dr. Welker for the 2000 accident. 
Claimant told Dr. Price she was substantially better from a pain standpoint and was almost back to full 
function, estimating she was probably 90 - 95% recovered from the prior injury. 
13. On March 19, 2001, Dr. Price reported that Claimant "reports pain in her head that is 
predominantly in the temple, frontal and sinus areas and has a constant headache since the time of the 
accident. It is variable -- it is of variable intensity. Generally, she feels the headaches have probably 
worsened slightly." Dr. Price also reported in 2001 "patient [Claimant] has pain in the cervical spine that 
is presently bilaterally. This is a deep aching pain, stiffness, and soreness with sharpness on movements in 
extension or toward the right side." Dr. Price also reported in 2001, "The patient [Claimant] has been 
experiencing symptoms of pain, numbness and tingling down the right lateral upper arm, crossing into the 
medial forearm and into the #4 and 5 digits on the right hand." Claimant told Dr. Price that following the 
February 1, 2001 accident she had immediate onset of headache and neck pain. She reported she has new 
pains and an exacerbation of her old pains and feels like she is now worse than even right after the 
accident, as her condition has continued to deteriorate. 
14. Dr. Price examined Claimant on March 19, 2001 and made the following diagnoses: 
• Cervical thoracic acceleration/deceleration sprain/strain injury with posttramatic 
biomechanical dysfunction, muscular spasming; 
• Lumbrosacral and sacroiliac sprain/strain injury with posttraumatic bio mechanical 
dysfunction, muscular spasming; and 
• Right shoulder sprain/strain injury that involved the rotator cuff muscle with possible 
impingement, and right upper extremity symptoms. 
Dr. Price treated Claimant for these injuries until December of 2002. 
15. On August 30, 2001, an MRI scan was performed on Claimant. The scan demonstrated intact 
rotator cuff; an extensive tear of the superior labium that is comparable to a slap tear; right 
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shoulder diffuse parascapular strain syndrome; and component of clinical rotator cuff tendinitis 
impingement type syndrome. 
16. On September 25, 2001, on referral from Dr. Michael O'Brien, M.D., Claimant saw Dr. 
Thomas Goodwin, M.D., ("Dr. Goodwin"), an orthopedic surgeon at Boise Orthopedic Clinic for 
some complaints regarding her right shoulder; pain limitations in motion, and weakness in her 
right shoulder attributed to the accident on February 1, 2001. Upon examination, Dr. Goodwin 
diagnosed: 1) right shoulder diffuse parascapular strain syndrome 2) superior glenoid labral tear 
and 3) component of clinical rotator cuff tendinitis impingement type syndrome. He 
recommended nonsurgical management of her condition. 
17. On April 15, 2002, Claimant again saw Dr. Goodwin with complaints of pain in her right 
shoulder, she complained it was getting worse with light activities, such as riding a bicycle. He again 
recommended nonsurgical management of the condition. 
18. On July 25, 2002, Dr. Goodwin again saw Claimant. He examined her and made the following 
diagnoses: 1) right shoulder rotator cuff tendinits and impingement; 2) right shoulder labral tear; 3) 
posterior perilabral cyst extending into spinoglenoid notch of scapula with potential compression of 
suprascapular nerve. This time he recommended surgery. 
19. On July 26, 2002, Claimant had surgery on her right shoulder performed by Dr. Goodwin at 
Healthsouth Treasure Valley Hospital. The preoperative diagnoses were: 1) right shoulder labral tears; 2) 
rotator cuff impingement syndrome; and 3) Acromioclavicular joint osteoarthritis and chondromalacia. 
The postoperative diagnoses were the same. 
20. Dr. Price continued to treat Claimant. On November 18, 2002, Dr. Price gave a prognosis that he 
expected in her cervical spine she would have episodes of symptomatic and functional regression 
occurring most probably about once a quarter and that these would involve tightening through the 
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suboccipital region, which is at the base of the skull, leading to headaches and stiffness in the upper 
cervical spine and that it would probably take her anywhere from two to up to four treatments to get her 
past that. Dr. Price also noted that she may have some residuals in the mid-back area between the 
shoulder blades and that she would be more susceptible to premature degenerative change in her cervical 
spine related to the altered mechanics because of the accident on February 1, 2001. 
21. On November 25, 2002, Claimant saw Dr. Price, claiming she had turned her head and had a 
sudden onset of sharp pain in the cervical area he had been treating. Dr. Price continued to treat her for 
this condition, which he relates to the February 1, 2001 accident, until December 11, 2002. At this time 
she had residual cervical thoracic pain that was spreading from her trapezius ridge area upward into the 
base of her occiput. Also, mid-back pain predominantly across the bra line area that affected some of her 
endurance when she would be exercising. Dr. Price did not see Claimant again until 2006. 
22. On February 15, 2006, Dr. Price saw Claimant. She indicated she was having some headaches 
and neck pain, and she thought it was from sleeping wrong. She reported she was not having upper 
extremity symptoms but was sore through her shoulders with dominance on the left and that previously it 
had been more dominant toward the right side. Dr. Price gave a diagnosis that she had a cervical facet and 
a costovertebral impingement with a cervical torticollis, muscular spasming, myofascitis, and 
compensatory thoracolumbar mechanical strain. He saw her and treated her on two occasions after that. 
23. On June 20, 2007, Dr. Price next saw Claimant. She presented for evaluation and treatment of 
primary left-sided hip pain and cervical thoracic pain. She reported she had been on a backpacking trip 
and had felt that probably her cervical thoracic pain was related to that. The pain was extending up into 
the suboccipital region, which Dr. Price in 2002 had anticipated would probably happen to her. She 
reported herself experiencing a generalized pain, numbness, and tingling in both upper extremities with 
dominance on the right side, but she did not have focal weakness. She did have some·endurance weakness 
that Dr. Price thought was related to some rotator cuff muscle impingement point problems that she was 
having. She also tested positive for some thoracic outlet syndrome symptoms and she possibly had some 
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underlying disk etiology for radicular type symptoms. Dr. Price treated her for this condition on five 
occasions. 
24. On October 24, 2007, Claimant presented to Dr. Price because of tightness in her cervical 
thoracic region. He saw her and treated her on five occasions for that condition. The last treatment was 
on November 1, 2007. 
25. On January 14, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Price with right-sided dominant cervical thoracic 
pain and muscular tightness and spasm. She also complained of pain throughout the trapezius ridge and 
into the right Ievator scapula. She was treated on two occasions for this condition. She was scheduled for 
two more treatments on May 15 and 22, 2008 but did not appear for those. At this time Dr. Price 
suspected she could have a C6 disk that could be causing her some nerve root irritation, but she did not 
have hard or progressive neurologicals that would be supportive of nerve root compression. 
26. On February 27, 2008, Dr. Price tr~ated Claimant for paracervical thoracic muscular pain, 
tightness and spasm. She also had pain throughout the trapezius ridge and into the right levator scapula. 
He noted "C6 disk- weak right triceps" and C5-C6-C7 dysfunction resulting from the 2001 accident. Dr. 
Price treated Claimant for this condition on five occasions in March and four occasions in April of 2008. 
Dr. Price started Claimant on some home traction for self-maintenance because of the underlying 
degenerative changes that she had. He noted that she had improved to the point that by the end of April 
his plan was to work with her one time per week for about two weeks and then go to a two-week interval. 
The plan was for her to begin her regular workouts again at the gym on May 8, 2008. 
27. On May 15, 2008, Claimant saw Dr. Price who noted her right cervical thoracic region was 
continuing to improve and he expected her to be on her workout regimen and able to take care of herself. 
28. Prior to the cycle accident on May 25, 2008, Claimant was being treated by Dr. Price for 
muscular spasming and pain through the cervical thoracic region extending into the right shoulder. 
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2. Claimant's Post-Accident Medical History. 
29. When the cycle accident occurred on May 25, 2008, Claimant was sitting in the passenger seat 
behind the driver. Her back was supported by a backrest. Claimant's right side, including her hand, arm 
and hip came in contact with the barrier. Claimant suffered abrasions and contusions on her right hand, 
which remains scarred. There were no abrasions on Claimant's elbow or shoulder. The contact with the 
barrier rotated Claimant's upper torso in a clockwise direction during the collision. Following the 
accident, Claimant was not feeling well. She experienced problems, including spasms, pain in her neck 
and her right shoulder, and she suffered from headaches. 
30. On May 26, 2008, Claimant presented at McMillan Medical Clinic and was seen by Dr. Natalie 
A. Domangue-Shiflett, M.D., ("Dr. Shiflett") for an open wound on her right hand. The Clinic personnel 
scrubbed the debris from her hand, which was painful and treated it. Claimant returned to McMillan 
Medical Clinic on May 27, 2008 for follow-up treatment of her right hand injury. 
31. On May 29, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Price for injuries suffered during the cycle accident. 
Dr. Price noted that her hand and side had been impacted into the barrier and her body, head, and shoulder 
had been violently swung backwards. Dr. Price reported on May 29, 2008, "[t]he patient [Claimant] 
reports that she has headache pain in the occipital region traveling to the frontal area, but predominantly 
in the occipital portion of the head. It has been constantly present since a short time following the 
accident, but it is of variable intensity." Upon Examination of Claimant, Dr. Price reported he found: 
• She had posterior paracervical muscular spasming that was extending from the upper 
portion of the neck in the suboccipital region down through the cervical-thoracic 
junction, and outward into the shoulders, downward into the shoulder blades or scapulae. 
• When Dr. Price stimulated or tested the suboccipital trigger points they reproduced her 
headache pains that she was complaining of and when it was done to the musculature, it 
substantially intensified the pain into the neck, out to the shoulders, down into the 
shoulder blades. There was radiation into the right shoulder and into the right scapula or 
shoulder blade. 
• Claimant was decreased in her extension or bending backwards of the neck by about 
25%, and this produced a middle-to-low pinching pain in the cervical spine. She could 
force through that but it was with marked pain intensification. 
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• Claimant was decreased in her rotation to the right side by about one-third but it was 
full to the left side. 
• Claimant's lateral flexion to the left was decreased about 50% and to the right about 
25%. The end points of those motions were accompanied by substantial pain. 
• When Claimant had a cervical distraction test, pulling up on her neck, it was painful in 
the suboccipital region. 
• When Claimant had a shoulder depression test, it was painful on the opposite side with 
dominance on the right. 
• When Claimant had a foraminal compression test, which would be pressing down on 
the cervical spine vertically, it was painful, but if an extension or lateral flexion 
component was added, the pain intensified and was dominantly painful to the right side, 
causing radiation into the shoulder and shoulder blade itself. The function on her left 
shoulder in movement was normal and painless. 
• The function on her right shoulder in movement was restricted and painful in the upper 
portions of that movement. The right shoulder blade or scapula was hypomobile, showing 
significant decrease in mobility compared to normal. 
• The reduction of the circumduction or circular movement of the right shoulder was 
restricted about one-third in comparison to what was able to be accomplished on the left 
side; that abduction of the right shoulder was decreased about one-third on the right wide, 
or in other words lifting it up, in comparison to the left. 
• Internal rotation or bringing the shoulder -- the hand back behind the back was 
decreased about 25% on the right side in comparison to the left. 
• The insertion point of the common tendon of the rotator cuff muscle group was very 
painful to palpation. 
• The rhomboid muscles or the muscles between the shoulder blades were spasmed 
bilaterally, extending into the spinal muscles. 
• The part of the rotator cuff muscle group in the teres minor and the infraspinatus 
muscles, which are on the back of the shoulder blade, were spasmed and painful. If those 
trigger points were tested or pressed on or stimulated, they reproduced paraesthesia and 
pain down the right upper extremity. 
• Claimant also had indication of possible thoracic outlet syndrome with positive testing 
with scalenus muscle involvement through a part of the cervical spine that reproduced 
some pain and paresthesia in the right upper extremity. 
• Claimant had substantial abrasions on the hand/wrist area. 
• Claimant showed significant endurance weakness in the triceps muscle on the right side, 
and the top two segments in her neck. 
• The CS through 7 segments in her cervical spine showed significant restriction 
biomechanically. 
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• Between her shoulder blades the spinal segments involved in that area showed 
significant abnormal movement. 
• The musculature in the front of the cervical spine was strained and painful and weak on 
strength testing, especially if it was tested from an angle--a 45 degree angle from the 
patient's right or left. 
• In testing of the low back the Claimant was very flexible in that she could reach her 
mid-shin area with some pulling pain across her low back but her extension was not so 
flexible as she was limited about 50% because of low back pain. 
• Lateral flexion on side bending to the side toward the right was decreased about one-
third but it was full to the left. 
• Rotation to the right was decreased about 20% but full to the left. These restricted 
motions produced pain across the lumbosacral region but did not cause lower extremity 
symptoms. 
• The buttocks musculature was spasmed, particularly on the right side. Stimulation of 
trigger points there reproduced some of her pains in the lower extremities, like a sciatic 
neuralgia type of pain and it radiated grade 2, which would mean down to the knee. 
• When laying in a prone or face-down position, Claimant was restricted in lifting the 
right lower extremity, indicating sacroiliac joint dysfunction and lumbosacral pain. 
• In a sitting position, when she straightened her legs bilaterally with both legs going up, 
the chin brought to her sternum, and a straining maneuver performed, it significantly 
increased the pain the neck/upper back area. 
• In the lower extremities the anterior tibiallis muscle, which is the muscle that lifts the 
foot up toward the knee, showed significant weakness with endurance. 
• When Claimant bent backwards and to the right and to the left, she had significant 
increase in her low back pain but it did not cause lower extremity radiations. Her 
parathoracolumbar musculature was spasmed and weak when tested in both a clockwise 
and counterclockwise rotational direction. 
32. Many of these findings that were reported by Dr. Price on May 29, 2008, had also been 
reported upon examination of Claimant by Dr. Price on March 19, 200 l when he treated her for 
the injuries she suffered from the rear-end collision. Under conclusions in the 2008 report, it says, 
"A cervicotharacic sprain/strain injury with posttraumatic biomechanical dysfunction and 
muscular spasming." This is almost identical to the conclusions in the 2001 report. Under 
conclusion #3 in 2008 report, it refers to "the lumbosacral/sacroiliac sprain/strain injury with 
posttraumatic biomechanical dysfunction and muscular spasming" and it says word for word the 
same thing in the 2001 report. Under conclusion #4 in the 2008 report, it states: "indications of 
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present sclerogenic right upper extremity pain/paraesthesia related to a rotator cuff injury and 
sclerogenic· referral points being active ... " In the 2001 report at conclusion No. 4, it states, 
"Right upper extremity symptoms that could have a radicular component, but most probably 
involved sclerogenic symptoms related to the right shoulder." 
33. On May 29, 2008, Dr. Price took x-rays of Claimant that showed she had discogenic spondylosis 
or, in other words some wear and tear type of arthritis at the C5-C6-C7 levels, which are the bottom three 
segments in the cervical spine and there was clear mechanical dysfunction in her neck between a forward 
flexion and extension template view of her neck. In the 2001 x-ray report of Claimant, Dr. Price reported: 
"These x-rays show the patient to have mild discogenic spondylosis at the C6-7 level." 
34. On May 29, 2008, Dr. Price also x-rayed the low back area and it showed that she had a tilt of the 
lumbar spine toward the left side and some torqueing or what is called obliquity of the pelvis and some 
inferior tilting of the sacral base toward the left side. 
35. Dr. Price opined that the injuries he found and reported when he examined Claimant on May 29, 
2008, were related to the motorcycle accident. 
36. On May 29, 2008, Dr. Price referred Claimant to Dr. James Bates, a physical medicine 
rehabilitation physician, for assistance medically. In a letter to Dr. Bates, Dr. Price states: 
• Claimant had a prior history of cervical disk involvement in the C5-6-7 areas; 
moderate discogenic spondylosis at those levels; he had recently seen her because of her 
C5-C6 disk. 
• She was doing home traction and was essentially pain free in the cervicothoracic 
region, with some residual tightness in the trapezius ridge and levator scapula muscles, 
and some intermittent radiation in the superior and medial scapulae. 
•Dr.Price was concerned about the flare up in the right upper extremity. Dr. Price was 
referring to the fact that the shoulder was now very symptomatic. By "upper extremity" 
Dr. Price was talking about the shoulder and down the arm. 
37. On June 6, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Bates for consultation and treatment. Dr. Bates 
treated Claimant with injections of Cortisone, which provided only temporary relief and he prescribed 
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pain killers and pain patches for Claimant. She saw Dr. Bates in June, July, August, September and 
October of 2008. The last visit was October 9, 2008. 
38. On August 27, 2008, Dr. Price reevaluated Claimant. She presented complaining that she went 
out of town on vacation and that her shoulder pain had gradually intensified, spread into the right side, 
middle to low shoulder blade area and that she was having difficulty sleeping, and was frustrated. She 
requested that something be done to ease her pain. Dr. Price recommended an MRI to determine the 
extent of her cervical disk injuries and possible nerve root impingement. She also complained of having 
substantial pain through part of the rotator cuff muscle group and Dr. Price suspected she might have a 
tear in the labrum of her shoulder. 
39. On September 8, 2008, an MRI was performed on Claimant which showed a "new disk extrusion 
arising from the dorsal right disk margin at C7-Tl measuring approximately 9x3x4 millimeters in 
transverse and anterior to posterior and cranial to caudal height." Dr. Price explained that an "extrusion" 
is a type of herniation that has progressed to the point that the disk material has escaped the outside 
circumference of the disk and has migrated somewhat in a lobular type of fashion in some direction away 
· from the disk and it has extruded or extended past the disk margin and creates somewhat of a lobular type 
of appearance. It may compress a nerve or it may be painful for the disk itself but not compress the nerve. 
40. Dr. Price opined that in Claimant's case, the extrusion was large enough to be causing nerve root 
compression. 
41. Dr. Price explained that the MRI showed a disk extrusion from the C7-Tl space that was not 
present when the x-ray was taken of that area on May 29, 2008 and that the x-ray taken on May 29, 2008 
showed a comparatively normal disk space and did not show significant arthritic change or degenerative 
change at the C7-Tl level. 
42. Dr. Price explained that he suspected a tear in Claimant's labrum in the right shoulder because 
she was continuing to have substantial pain in a portion of her range of motion and on circumduction, 
abduction, internal and now external rotation. He noted the combining of the mechanism of injury where 
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her shoulder was pulled back and in that way forced backwards and into the shoulder socket itself along 
with the continued symptomatology in spite of the injection into the shoulder to try to relieve some of the 
rotator cuff tendinitis and impingement pain led him to believe from this experience that there may be a 
tear of the labrum itself. 
43. On September 14, 2008, Claimant presented to Alderman Medical Acupuncture of Idaho for 
acupuncture treatments. She received 10 acupuncture treatments between September 14, 2008 and 
October 27, 2008. They did not resolve her pain issues. 
44. On October 29, 2008, on referral from John Alderman, OMD, L.L.C., Claimant presented to Dr. 
Kenneth M. Little, M.D., ("Dr. Little") a Neurological surgeon with Neuroscience Associates, Boise, 
Idaho, for consultation regarding a chief complaint of neck pain, trapezius pain, and right shoulder pain. 
This was the initial visit with Dr. Little, who noted that Claimant reported having neck pain, trapezius 
pain, right shoulder, and right mid scapular pain since the accident on May 25, 2008. She has not noticed 
any weakness in her arms. She initially had some right arm numbness and tingling involving her right 
radial forearm, index finger, and middle finger, which has subsided. She has been experiencing 
headaches. 
45. Dr. Little reported the MRI dated September 8, 2008 shows a new C7-Tl soft disc extrusion 
extending into the right ventral epidural space abutting the ventral dural sac adjacent to the anterior root 
of the right C8 nerve root. He noted that at C5-6 there is a loss of disc space height with mild to moderate 
broad based spondylitic ridging abutting the ventral cord surface. There is minimal neural foraminal 
narrowing, left greater than right at CS-6. At C6-7 there is disc space narrowing with mild circumferential 
broad based osseus spondylotic ridging. There is a small perineural cyst in the left neural foramina." Dr. 
Little's impression was "likely has right CS radiculitits secondary to a dramatic disc protrusion at C7-TL" 
"Complicating her symptomatology is a history of shoulder problems. Though I suspect her symptoms are 
not coming from her shoulder, it does remain a possibility." Dr. Little recommended a C7-TI 
transforaminal epidural steroid injection" at C6 and suggested a "decompression of the CS nerve root by 
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way of anterior cervical approach." Because the injection at the C6 distribution eased Claimant's pain, Dr. 
Little opined the neck pain and radicular type arm pain was specifically in the C6 distribution. 
46. On November 24, 2008, Claimant had a C7-Tl anterior cervical decompression and fusion with 
iliac crest bone graft that was performed by Dr. Little. The preoperative diagnosis was right C8 
radiculopathy secondary to right C7-Tl traumatic herniated nucleus pulposus. The post-operative 
diagnosis was right C8 radiculopathy secondary to right C7-Tl traumatic herniated nucleus pulposus. 
47. Dr. Little opined that Claimant's injuries (the disk herniation) were caused by the cycle accident, 
based upon the MRI which showed mild degenerative changes at C7-Tl with a new disk extrusion plus 
the observation on the MRI that the disk extrusion was associated with quite a bit of edema or swelling, 
meaning it is more likely recent rather than old, and given that just prior to the accident she had not had 
neck pain and did not have radicular sympt?ms, nerve root impingement symptoms. 
48. On December 3, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Little post operation. She reported she was 
doing well and without arm pain. 
49. On December 31, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Little for followup. She reported she was 
doing very well, with no radicular arm pain, but she did complain of trapezius pain and posterior neck 
pain. 
50. On January 9, 2009, Claimant presented at Hands-On-Physical Therapy for therapy prescribed 
by Dr. Little. She continued to receive physical therapy on a regular basis from January 9, 2009 to March 
25, 2009 and from May 11, 2010 to June 3, 20IO. 
51. On March 26, 2009, Claimant presented to Dr. Little for further followup. She reported 
improvement in much of her neck pain with resolution of the pain radiating into her face and well as the 
headaches. She complained of pain over het lateral right trapezius, under her right scapula and just below 
her right clavicle after rearranging clothes in her closet for over an hour. 
52. On April 27, 2010, on referral from Dr. Little, Claimant presented at Idaho Sports Medicine 
Institute and was seen by, Dr. Scot Scheffel, M.D. ("Dr. Scheffel") with complaints of right shoulder 
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pain and intermittent right arm numbness. Dr. Scheffel noted Claimant had "long standing right trapezius 
pain, some of which preceded her surgery and has persisted since then. She was doing relatively well, but 
then started increasing a workout program and was doing a lot of overhead activity and noticed increasing 
pain in her trapezius and also began having right arm numbness in the hand. The numbness is worse at 
night. Dr. Scheffel opined the trapezius and rhomboid pain was coming from some poor shoulder 
mechanics and recommended physical therapy. 
53. On August 18, 2011, Claimant presented to Dr. Scheffler for follow-up to recheck neck and 
shoulder pain. Her chart shows she had not really gotten any improvement with her exercises through 
physical therapy and she continued to have significant right-sided neck pain into the right trapezius that is 
much worse with heavy shoulder activity. She had grinding and popping in both shoulders. Dr. 
Scheffler's impression was persistent right shoulder and neck pain, question secondary to 
acromioclavicluar joint etiology versus other shoulder pathology. He prescribed and administered 
injections in the right AC joint with 1 cc of lidocaine and 1-1/2 cc of Kenalog. Claimant continued 
treating with Dr. Scheffler from September 20, 201 l until November 4, 2011. 
54. On October 3, 2011, Claimant had an MRI taken of her right shoulder. Dr. Price explained that 
the MRI of the shoulder that was taken on October 3, 2011 verified that Claimant had a tear in the labrum 
in the right shoulder. He explained that the MRI report showed a "non-displaced superior labral tear 
extending into the upper aspect of the anterior labrum" and also a "mild tendinosis involving the 
supraspinatus tendon without disruption." 
55. Dr. Price explained that the cartilage type of cushion inside the shoulder socket, that is called the 
labrum, was torn and there was a tendinitis, swelling, and inflammation of one of the rotator cuff muscle 
tendons called the supraspinatus muscle. 
56. On November 30, 2011, upon referral from Dr. Little, Claimant was seen by Dr. Thomas 
Goodwin for complaints of right shoulder pain, weakness and loss of range of motion. Claimant reported 
to Dr. Goodwin that her shoulder had done well since the prior surgery until the cycle accident and that 
ARBITRATOR'S DECISION AND INTERIMAWARD-16 
81700.0040.5517163.2 
000042
she had developed increasing shoulder and scapular pain. Claimant reported that she had to back off on 
her weightlifting activity as a result. 
57. Dr. Goodwin opined that the delay between the accident in May of 2008 and seeking treatment 
from him on November 30, 2011 is not uncommon. Dr. Goodwin's diagnosis was probable recurrent 
superior labral tear of her right shoulder and partial thickness rotator cuff tear of her right shoulder. 
58. On February 15, 2012, Claimant had a C5-6 anterior cervical discectomy and fusion with left iliac 
crest bone graft performed by Dr. Little at St. Luke's Regional Medical Center. The preoperative 
diagnoses were: C5-6 spondylosis, degene~ative disk disease and foraminal stenosis. The postoperative 
diagnoses were the same. Dr. Little reported that the surgery went well and Claimant recovered better 
than the first surgery. She wore a hard collar, then a soft collar during the period of recovery. 
59. On March 27, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was 
satisfactory unchanged anterior C5-C6 and C7-Tl fusions; C6-7 degenerative disease. 
60. On March 28, 2012, Claimant presented to Dr. Little with complaints of severe neck spasms, 
throbbing and paresthesias in her left arm after a walk. Her arm symptoms involve her posterior shoulder, 
triceps, ulnar forearm and hand, consistent with the C7 distribution. Dr. Little charted that he would keep 
her off work an additional two weeks. Dr. Little issued a prescription that required Claimant to remain off 
work through April 13, 2012. 
61. On April 12, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was CS-6 
and C7-l fusion with no change in alignment or evidence of hardware complication; persistent C6-7 
degenerative disk disease. 
62. Dr. Little prescribed return to work with restrictions on April 13, 2012, with limitation on 
reaching overhead or lifting with her right arm, no repetitive movement with her right hand; also to wear 
a hard collar as necessary and avoid repetitive motions of her head. 
63. On May 7, 2012, Claimant was seen again by Dr. Goodwin. He recommended that she have 
surgery to repair her right shoulder. 
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64. On May 22, 2012, c;taimant had surgery on her right shoulder by Dr. Goodwin at Treasure Valley 
Hospital. The preoperative diagnoses were: 1) right shoulder partial thickness rotator cuff tear; 2) superior 
labral tear, right shoulder, extending most likely into biceps tendon. The postoperative diagnoses were: 1) 
right shoulder partial thickness rotator cuff tear; 2) superior Iabral tear, right shoulder, extending most 
likely into biceps tendon; 3) humeral head and glenoid chondromalacia; 4) subdeltoid subacromial bursa! 
adhesions. 
65. Dr. Goodwin reported that the labral tear that Dr. Goodwin saw in this surgery was in the same 
location but more macerated, more tom, and it extended into the biceps tendon where the biceps attaches 
in the shoulder at the upper part of the labrum; it was in the same location but more significant. 
66. Dr. Goodwin explained that in 2002, he just took a little shaver to smooth off the labrum and 
make it smooth again. In 2012 he made an incision lower on the shoulder to reattach the biceps lower 
down with a polyethyiene anchor screw. Comparing the 2002 and 2012 rotator cuff problem or 
impingement, the findings at the 2012 surgery were in the same location of the rotator cuff but more 
advanced. 
67. On July 19, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was 
satisfactory appearance anterior discectomy and fusion procedure C5-6 and C7-Tl; no abnormal 
movement or fusion levels; and mild movement at C3-4 and C4-5. 
68. On September 27, 2012, Dr. Little referred Claimant to a pain doctor. He reported her pain was 
improving but she needed further care by a pain specialist. Her pain has never completely resolved. 
D. Claimant's Claimed Injuries. 
1. Scrapes and Abrasions. 
69. Claimant was injured in the motorcycle accident and, as conceded by Respondent, she suffered 
scrapes and abrasions to her right hand and right hip, and is entitled to compensation for these injuries, 
without any deduction for contributory fault. 
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2. Right Shoulder. 
70. There is disagreement in the testimony and medicfll records whether the motorcycle accident 
caused the labral and rotator cuff tears in her right shoulder. The evidence clearly establishes that 
Claimant had preexisting right shoulder pathology, particularly resulting from the motor vehicle accident 
in 2001 when she suffered right shoulder sprain/strain that involved the rotator cuff muscle with possible 
impingement, and right upper extremity symptoms. 
71. The MRI scan taken on August 30, 200 I demonstrated intact rotator cuff; an extensive tear of the 
superior labrum that is comparable to a slap tear; right shoulder diffuse parascapular strain syndrome; and 
component of clinical rotator cuff tendinitis impingement type syndrome. 
72. On July 25, 2002, Dr. Goodwin examined Claimant and made the following diagnoses: 1) right 
shoulder rotator cuff tendinits and impingement; 2) right shoulder labral tear; 3) posterior perilabral cyst 
extending into spinoglenoid notch of scapula with potential compression of suprascapular nerve. Dr. 
Goodwin prescribed surgery. 
73. On July 26, 2002, Claimant had surgery on her right shoulder performed by Dr. Goodwin at 
Healthsouth Treasure Valley Hospital. The ·postoperative diagnoses were: 1) right shoulder labral tears; 2) 
rotator cuff impingement syndrome; and 3) Acromioclavicular joint osteoarthritis and chondromalacia. 
74. Claimant testified that she recovered fully from the shoulder surgery and resumed her normal 
activities, which included mountain biking, golfing, weight lifting, hiking, snowshoeing, spin classes, 
Yoga and Pilates workouts. The relevant medical records support Claimant's testimony that she was 
asymptomatic with respect to her right shoulder prior to the cycle accident. 
75. Dr. Williams opined that the right shoulder conditions did not exist immediately following the 
cycle accident and therefore were not caused by it. The evidence does not support Dr. Williams' opinion. 
When Dr. Price examined Claimant on May 29, 2008, he reported, among other findings: 
• She had posterior paracervical muscular spasming that was extending from the upper 
portion of the neck in the suboccipital region down through the cervical-thoracic 
junction, and outward into the shoulders, downward into the shoulder blades or scapulae. 
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• When Dr. Price stimulated or tested the suboccipital trigger points they reproduced her 
headache pains that she was complaining of and when it was done to the musculature, it 
substantially intensified the pain into the neck, out to the shoulders, down into the 
shoulder blades. There was radiation into the right shoulder and into the right scapula or 
shoulder blade. 
• Claimant was decreased in her rotation to the right side by about one-third but it was 
full to the left side. 
• When Claimant had a shoulder depression test, it was painful on the opposite side with 
dominance on the right. 
• The function on her right shoulder in movement was restricted and painful in the upper 
portions of that movement. The right shoulder blade or scapula was hypomobile, showing 
significant decrease in mobility compared to normal. 
• The reduction of the circumduction or circular movement of the right shoulder was 
restricted about one-third in comparison to what was able to be accomplished on the left 
side; that abduction of the right shoulder was decreased about one-third on the right wide, 
or in other words lifting it up, in comparison to the left. 
• Internal rotation or bringing the shoulder -- the hand back behind the back was 
decreased about 25% on the right side in comparison to the left. 
• The insertion point of the common tendon of the rotator cuff muscle group was very 
painful to palpation. 
• The part of the rotator cuff muscle group in the teres minor and the infraspinatus 
muscles, which are on the back of the shoulder blade, were spasmed and painful. If those 
trigger points were tested or pressed on or stimulated, they reproduced paraesthesia and 
pain down the right upper extremity. 
76. On August 27, 2008, Dr. Price reevaluated Claimant. She presented complaining that her 
shoulder pain had gradually intensified, spread into the right side, middle to low shoulder blade area and 
that she was having difficulty sleeping and was frustrated. She also complained of having substantial pain 
through part of the rotator cuff muscle group and Dr. Price suspected she might have a tear in the labrum 
of her shoulder. 
77. Dr. Price explained that he suspected a tear in Claimant's labrum in the right shoulder because 
she was continuing to have substantial pain in a po1tion of her range of motion and on circumduction, 
abduction, internal and now external rotation. He noted the combining of the mechanism of injury where 
her shoulder was pulled back and in that way forced backwards and into the shoulder socket itself along 
with the continued symptomatology in spite of the injection into the shoulder to try to relieve some of the 
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rotator cuff tendinitis and impingement pain led him to believe from this experience that there may be a 
tear of the lab rum itself. 
78. On September 14, 2008, Claimant presented to Alderman Medical Acupuncture ofldaho for 
acupuncture treatments. She received 10 acupuncture treatments between September 14, 2008 and 
October 27, 2008. They did not resolve her pain issues. 
79. On October 29, 2008, on referral from John Alderman, OMD, L.L.C., Claimant presented to Dr. 
Kenneth M. Little, M.D., neurological surgeon with Neuroscience Associates, Boise, Idaho, for 
consultation regarding a chief complaint of neck pain, trapezius pain, and right shoulder pain. Dr. Little 
noted that Claimant reported having neck pain, trapezius pain, right shoulder, and right mid scapular pain 
since the accident on May 25, 2008. She has nof noticed any weakness in her arms. She initially had some 
right arm numbness and tingling involving her right radial forearm, index finger, and middle finger, 
which has subsided. 
80. On April 27, 2010, on referral from Dr~ Little, Claimant presented at Idaho Sports Medicine 
Institute and was seen by, Dr. Scot Scheffel, M.D. ("Dr. Scheffel") with complaints of right shoulder 
pain and intermittent right arm numbness. Dr. Scheffel noted Claimant had "long standing right trapezius 
pain, some of which preceded her surgery and has persisted since then. She was doing relatively well, but 
then started increasing a workout program and was doing a lot of overhead activity and noticed increasing 
pain in her trapezius and also began having right arm numbness in the hand. The numbness is worse at 
night. Dr. Scheffel opined the trapezius and rhomboid pain was coming from some poor shoulder 
mechanics and recommended physical therapy. 
81. On August 18, 2011, Claimant presented to Dr. Scheffler for followup to recheck neck and 
shoulder pain. Her chart shows she had not really gotten any improvement with her exercises through 
physical therapy and she continued to have significant right-sided neck pain into the right trapezius that is 
much worse with heavy shoulder activity. She had grinding and popping in both shoulders. Dr. 
Scheffler's impression was persistent right shoulder and neck pain, question secondary to 
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acromioclavicluar joint etiology versus other shoulder pathology. He prescribed and administered 
injections in the right AC joint with 1 cc of lidocaine and 1-1/2 cc of Kenalog. She continued treating 
with Dr. Scheffler from September 20, 2011 until November 4, 2011. 
82. On October 3, 2011, Claimant had an MRI taken of her right shoulder. Dr. Price explained that 
the MRI of the shoulder that was taken on October 3, 2011 verified that Claimant had a tear in the labrum 
in the right shoulder. He explained that the MRI report showed a "nondisplaced superior labral tear 
extending into the upper aspect of the anterior labrum" and also a "mild tendinosis involving the 
supraspinatus tendon without disruption." 
83. Dr. Price explained that the cartilage type of cushion inside the shoulder socket, that is called the 
labrum, was torn and there was a tendinitis; swelling, and inflammation of one of the rotator cuff muscle 
tendons called the supraspinatus muscle. 
84. Dr. Price opined the tear in the labrum in the right shoulder and the trauma to the shoulder 
involving the rotator cuff muscles resulted from the motorcycle crash. Dr. Price explained that a labral 
tear is always undiagnosed until you see it on MRI or during a surgical procedure. 
85. Dr. Price deferred to Dr. Goodwin's opinion with respect to the prognosis on the shoulder. 
86. Upon referral from Dr. Little, on November 30, 2011, Claimant was seen by Dr. Thomas 
Goodwin for complaints of right shoulder pain, weakness and loss of range of motion. Claimant reported 
to Dr. Goodwin that her shoulder had done well since the prior surgery until the cycle accident and that 
she had developed increasing shoulder and scapular pain. Claimant reported that she had to back off on 
her weightlifting activity as a result. 
87. Dr. Goodwin opined that the delay between the accident in May of 2008 and seeking treatment 
from him on November 30, 2011 is not uncommon. 
88. Dr. Goodwin's diagnosis on November 30, 2011, was probable recurrent superior labral tear of 
her right shoulder and partial thickness rotator cuff tear of her right shoulder. He did not recommend 
surgery at that time. 
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89. Claimant was seen again by Dr. Goodwin on May 7, 2012. He recommended that she have 
surgery to repair her shoulder. 
90. On May 22, 2012, Claimant had surgery on her right shoulder by Dr. Goodwin at Treasure Valley 
Hospital. The preoperative diagnoses were: 1) right shoulder partial thickness rotator cuff tear; 2) superior 
labral tear, right shoulder, extending most likely into biceps tendon. The postoperative diagnoses were: l) 
right shoulder partial thickness rotator cuff tear; 2) superior labral tear, right shoulder, extending most 
likely into biceps tendon; 3) humeral head and glenoid chondromalacia; 4) subdeltoid subacromial bursa[ 
adhesions. 
91. Dr. Goodwin reported that the labral tear that Dr. Goodwin saw in this surgery was in the same 
location but more macerated, more torn, and it extended into the biceps tendon where the biceps attaches 
in the shoulder at the upper part of the labrum; it was in the same location but more significant. 
92. In 2002, Dr. Goodwin just took a little shaver to smooth off the Iabrum and make it smooth again. 
In 2012 he made an incision lower on the shoulder to reattach the biceps lower down with a polyethylene 
anchor screw. Comparing the 2002 and 2012 rotator cuff problem or impingement, the findings at the 
2012 surgery were in the same location of the rotator cuff but a bit more advanced. 
93. Dr. Goodwin opined that what he saw in Claimant's shoulder in 2012 was more than just a 
degenerative wear and tear process; it was consistent with traumatic injury. 
94. Dr. Goodwin opined that Claimant's shoulder injuries were compatible with the type of injuries 
she would have sustained in the cycle accident in 2008. 
95. Dr. Goodwin opined that her shoulder injuries were caused by the cycle accident in 2008. 
96. Dr. Goodwin opined that based on his review of Dr. Price's records of treating Claimant, she was 
not asymptomatic regarding her upper back, the rhomboid, trapezius, and levator scapulai for which she 
was receiving treatment; but it could have been a stand-alone issue or it could have been related to 
shoulder or neck pathology, either one. It does not change his opinion relating to what he saw of her 
shoulder. 
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97. Dr. Goodwin opined that Claimant was symptomatic in the back of her shoulder on the date of the 
accident based on Dr. Price's records. Dr. Goodwin has doubts whether the cycle accident was the sole 
cause of her shoulder condition that he observed in 2012. He opined that the cycle accident could have 
aggravated a pre-existing condition. 
98. Dr. Goodwin opined that weight training by Claimant could possibly have played into some of 
this (complaints of pain in her right shoulder and neck, and parascapular pain) in 2012. He also opined 
that the· weight training could possibly have caused the labrum tear. 
99. Dr. Goodwin opined that now knowing that she had the pretreatment or the history before the 
accident and now knowing that she had these difficulties with weight lifting several years after the 
accident before she had her surgery, he cannot say with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the 
cycle accident was the sole and only cause of the condition he repaired in 2012. He did not offer an 
opinion of apportionment. 
100. Dr. Goodwin opined the torn labrum was the primary reason for the surgery he performed. 
101. The Arbitrator will not make a finding of causation or apportionment based on possibilities that 
exercise weight training could have caused or contributed to Claimant's injuries in her right shoulder. 
102. It is the finding of the Arbitrator that the evidence establishes that the cycle accident was the 
cause of the labral tear and rotator cuff tear. in the Claimant's right shoulder and the evidence does not 
support a finding that there should be an apportionment of causation or damages resulting from these 
injuries. Claimant has met her burden of proof showing the cycle accident caused these injuries to her 
right shoulder and she is entitled to compensation for these injuries. 
3. C7-Tl Neck Surgery. 
103. On May 29, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Price for the injuries she suffered during the cycle 
accident. He performed a complete examination of Claimant as related above. 
104. Dr. Price explained that the only part of the injuries he observed when he examined Claimant 
following the motorcycle accident that predated the motorcycle crash would have been the C5, 6 and 7 
discogenic spondylosis. 
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l05. Dr. Price did not find any preexisting degenerative condition in the C7-Tl level of Claimant's 
spine. 
I 06. On September 8, 2008, an MRI was performed on Claimant, which showed a "new disk extrusion 
arising from the dorsal right disk margin at.C7-Tl measuring approximately 9x3x4 millimeters in 
transverse and anterior to posterior and cranial to caudal height." Dr. Price explained that an "extrusion" 
is a type of herniation that has progressed to the point that the disk material has escaped the outside 
circumference of the disk and has migrated somewhat in a lobular type of fashion in some direction away 
from the disk and it has extruded or extended past the disk margin and creates somewhat of a lobular type 
of appearance. It may compress a nerve or it may be painful for the disk itself but not compress the nerve. 
107. Dr. Price explained that in Claimant's case, the extrusion was large enough to be causing nerve 
root compression. 
108. Dr. Price explained that the MRI showed a disk extrusion from the C7-Tl space that was not 
present when the x-ray was taken of that area on May 29, 2008 and that the x-ray taken on May 29, 2008 
showed a comparatively normal disk space ·and did not show significant arthritic change or degenerative 
change at the C7-Tl level. 
I 09. Dr. Price opined that the disk extrusion at the C7-TI level was the result of the May 25, 2008 
motorcycle crash. He also opined that the prognosis for that area is going to be one of continual problems 
because of the altered mechanics associated with the fusion. Dr. Price explained that Claimant will have 
an acceleration of the degenerative changes in the cervical spine as a result of the motorcycle accident and 
the multilevel surgery on her cervical spine above and below the surgical fusion. 
110. Dr. Price deferred to Dr. Little on the prognosis of the surgical fusion. 
111. On October 29, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Little for consultation regarding a chief 
complaint of neck pain, trapezius pain, and right shoulder pain on referral from John Alderman, OMD, 
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L.L.C. Dr. Little noted that Claimant reported having neck pain, trapezius pain, right shoulder, and right 
mid scapular pain since the accident on May 25, 2008. She has not noticed any weakness in her arms. She 
initially had some right arm numbness and tingling involving her right radial forearm, index finger, and 
middle finger, which has subsided. She has been experiencing headaches. 
112. Dr. Lillie reported the MRI dated September 8, 2008 shows a new C7-Tl soft disc extrusion 
extending into the right ventral epidural space abutting the ventral dural sac adjacent to the anterior root 
of the right C8 nerve root. At CS-6 there is a loss of disc space height with mild to moderate broad based 
spondylitic ridging abutting the ventral cord surface. There is minimal neural foraminal narrowing, left 
greater than right at CS-6. At C6-7 there is disc space narrowing with mild circumferential broad based 
osseus spondylotic ridging. There is a small perineum! cyst in the left neural foramina." Dr. Little's 
impression was "likely has right CS radiculitits secondary to a dramatic disc protrusion at C7-Tl." 
"Complicating her symptomatology is a history of shoulder problems. Though I suspect her symptoms are 
not coming from her shoulder, it does remain a possibility." Dr. Little recommended a C7-Tl 
transforaminal epidural steroid injection" at C6 and suggested a "decompression of the C8 nerve root by 
way of anterior cervical approach." Because the injection at the C6 distribution eased Claimant's pain, Dr. 
Little opined the neck pain and radicular type arm pain was specifically in the C6 distribution. 
113. On November 24, 2008, Claimant had a C7-T I anterior cervical decompression and fusion with 
iliac crest bone graft that was performed by Dr. Little. The preoperative diagnosis was right C8 
radiculopathy secondary to right C7-Tl traumatic herniated nucleus pulposus. The post-operative 
diagnosis was right C8 radiculopathy secondary to right C7-Tl traumatic herniated nucleus pulposus. 
114. Dr. Little opined that Claimant's injuries (the disk herniation) were caused by the cycle accident, 
based upon the MRI which showed mild degenerative changes at C7-Tl with a new disk extrusion plus 
the observation on the MRI that the disk extrusion was associated with quite a bit of edema or swelling, 
meaning it is more likely recent rather than old, and given that just prior to the accident she had not had 
neck pain and did not have radicular symptoms, nerve root impingement symptoms. 
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115. Dr. Little opined that Claimant's injuries were a combination of her condition prior to the 
accident and her symptoms afterwards. 
116. Dr. Little had no knowledge of the existence of symptoms at C7-Tl prior to the cycle accident or 
the treatment she was getting from Dr. Price. He based his opinion that the accident led to the surgery on 
a lack of prior symptoms. 
117. Dr. Little opined that the existence of prior symptoms would indicate that the accident aggravated 
the prior condition, but was not the sole cause of the condition. Dr. Little opined that he does not have 
enough information to opine on the apportionment of the prior condition at C7-T1. 
118. Dr. Wilson opined that Claimant's treatment and surgery at C7-Tl should be apportioned 50% to 
a preexisting condition and 50% to the cycle accident. The Arbitrator finds that Dr. Wilson's opinion is 
based on speculation. The medical evidence presented by the attending physicians, Dr. Price and Dr. 
Little, does not support this conclusion. Both opined and the medical evidence supports their opinions 
that the extrusion at C7-Tl was a new condition that was caused by the cycle accident and was the cause 
of the symptoms that required the surgery. 
119. The evidence as explained by Dr. price when he compared the results of the MRI with the prior x-
ray of Claimant, clearly establishes that the extrusion was not a preexisting condition. The x-ray taken on 
May 29, 2008 showed a comparatively normal disk space and did not show significant arthritic change or 
degenerative change at the C7-T 1 level. Thus, the Arbitrator finds that the evidence does not support a 
finding that the cycle accident aggravated any preexisting condition at C7-Tl, which required the surgery. 
No apportionment can reasonably be made by the Arbitrator and the Respondent is liable for the entire 
damage for this injury. 
4. C5-C6 Neck Surgery. 
120. The evidence establishes that Claimant suffered C5-C6-C7 dysfunction resulting from the 2001 
accident for which Claimant received treatment from Dr. Price up to and including in April of 2008. The 
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plan was for her to continue treatments from Dr. Price one or two times per week and return to her regular 
workouts at the gym on May 8, 2008. The last visit to Dr. Price prior to the cycle accident was on May 
15, 2008. He noted that her right cervical thoracic region was continuing to improve and he expected her 
to return to her workout regimen and be able to take care of herself. He opined that at that point she was 
probably 90% - 95% asymptomatic from the injuries she received in the 2001 accident. 
121. Dr. Price opined that some of the injuries suffered by Claimant in the cycle accident were 
probably similar to those she had in 2001 when she had sustained a sprain/strain injury to her cervical 
spine and this time sustained a sprain and a strain injury to her cervical spine. 
122. Dr. Price opined that the injuries he found when he examined Claimant on May 29, 2008, were 
related to the cycle accident. Dr. Price opined that the only part of the injuries he observed when he 
examined Claimant following the motorcycle accident that predated the motorcycle crash would have 
been the CS, 6 and 7 discogenic spondylosis. 
123. The x-rays taken by Dr. Price on May 29, 2008 showed that Claimant had discogenic spondylosis 
at the CS, 6 and 7 levels and there was clear mechanical dysfunction in her neck between a forward 
flexion and extension template view of her neck. Dr. Price opined that there was an aggravation of disk 
problems in her cervical spine in the C6 region that were causing some radicular patterns, and that is the 
part that he felt was related to the old sprain injury because she had some pre-existing discogenic 
spondylosis or arthritis in that region that probably caused her some nerve root irritation and some 
patterns of pain that were similar in pattern to what she had before. 
124. Dr. Price opined that the injuries themselves were new but the areas of involvement in the C6 
region were similar through CS, 6 and 7. 
125. Dr. Price opined that the trauma Claimant had in 2000 and in 2001 had an accelerating effect 
upon the degeneration in her CS, 6 and 7 regions. These were evident in the x-rays that Dr. Price took in 
2001 and repeated in 2008. They are the wear and tear type of thinning and spurring and arthritic changes 
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that one would expect to occur from trauma and age. Dr. Price used the two x-rays to illustrate his 
testimony showing narrowing and spurring that occurred between 2001 and 2008 at C5, 6 and 7. He 
opined that they are not substantial increases but they are increased. He further opined that the 2008 x-
rays show the normally expected mild progression of the degenerative change that he thought would 
happen at the CS, 6 and 7 levels. 
126. Dr. Price opined that because of the prior history of trauma and their anatomical positioning in 
the cervical spine, the C5, 6 and 7 areas were very susceptible to injury in these type of snapping type 
injuries, and that the injuries would have been a major aggravation to those segments at C5, 6 and 7. Dr. 
Price explained that by "aggravation" he means that it is something that a new insult, injury or trauma has 
been superimposed upon an area that may previously have been symptomatic but that the trauma was 
sufficient to re-injure or create new trauma on that same tissue again. 
127. On May 29, 2008, Dr. Price refe1Ted Claimant to Dr. James Bates, a physical medicine 
rehabilitation physician, for assistance medically. In a letter to Dr. Bates, Dr. Price states, in relevant part 
• Claimant had a prior history of cervical disk involvement in the C5-6-7 areas; moderate 
discogenic spondylosis at those levels; he had recently seen her because of her C5-C6 
disk. 
128. On June 6, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Bates for consultation and treatment. Dr. Bates 
treated Claimant with injections of Cortisqq.e, which provided only tempora1y relief and he prescribed 
pain killers and pain patches for Claimant. She saw Dr. Bates in June, July, August, September and 
October of 2008. The last visit was October 9, 2008. 
129. On October 29, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Little for consultation regarding a chief 
complaint of neck pain, trapezius pain, and right shoulder pain. Dr. Little noted that Claimant reported 
having neck pain, trapezius pain, right shoulder, and right mid scapular pain since the accident on May 
25, 2008. She has not noticed any weakness in her arms. She initially had some right arm numbness and 
tingling involving her right radial forearm, index finger, and middle finger, which has subsided. She has 
been experiencing headaches. 
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130. Dr. Little was aware of the neural foraminal narrowing at CS-6-7. He reported: "the MRI dated 
September 8, 2008 shows a new C7-Tl soft disc extrusion extending into the right ventral epidural space 
abutting the ventral dural sac adjacent to the anterior root of the right CS nerve root. At C5-6 there is a 
loss of disc space height with mild to moderate broad based spondylitic ridging abutting the ventral cord 
surface. There is minimal neural foraminal narrowing, left greater than right at C5-6. At C6-7 there is disc 
space narrowing with mild circumferential broad based osseus spondylotic ridging. There is a small 
perineum! cyst in the left neural foramina." Dr. Little's impression was "likely has right CS radiculitits 
secondary to a dramatic disc protrusion at C7-Tl." "Complicating her symptomatology is a history of 
shoulder problems. Though I suspect her symptoms are not coming from her shoulder, it does remain a 
possibility." Dr. Little recommended a C7-Tl transforaminal epidural steroid injection" at C6 and 
suggested a "decompression of the CS nerve root by way of anterior cervical approach." Because the 
injection at the C6 distribution eased Claimant's pain, Dr. Little opined the neck pain and radicular type 
arm pain was specifically in the C6 distribution. 
131. Dr. Little treated Claimant's C5-6 level and opined her condition was a combination of her 
condition prior to the accident and symptoms afterwards. 
132. Dr. Little opined the C5-6 disk problem was not a herniation; it was spondylosis impingement of 
the nerve that was creating pain. Dr. Little explained that the impingement of the nerve came from the 
process of spondylosis. Dr. Little opined that an MRI done in 2000 shows pre-existing spondylosis and 
bone spurring at the C5-6. He testified spondylosis is a progressive disease. Dr. Little opined that the 
spondylosis probably worsened between 2000 and the accident in 2008. 
133. On February 15, 2012, Claimant had a C5-6 anterior cervical discectomy and fusion with left iliac 
crest bone graft performed by Dr. Little at St. Luke's Regional Medical Center. The preoperative 
diagnoses were: C5-6 spondylosis, degenerative disk disease and foraminal stenosis. The postoperative 
diagnoses were the same. Dr. Little reported that the surgery went well and Claimant recovered better 
than the first surgery. She wore a hard collar, then a soft collar during the period of recovery. 
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134. On March 27, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was 
satisfactory unchanged anterior C5-C6 and C7-Tl fusions. 
135. On March 28, 2012, Claimant presented to Dr. Little with complaints of severe neck spasms, 
throbbing and paresthesias in her left arm after a walk. Her arm symptoms involve her posterior shoulder, 
triceps, ulnar forearm and hand, consistent with the C7 distribution. Dr. Little charted that he would keep 
her off work an additional two weeks. Dr. Little issued a prescription that required Claimant to remain off 
work through April 13, 2012. 
136. On April 12, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was C5-6 
and C7-L fusion with no change in alignment or evidence of hardware complication; persistent C6-7 
degenerative disk disease. 
137. Dr. Little prescribed return to work with restrictions on April 13, 2012, with limitation on 
reaching overhead or lifting with her right arm, no repetitive movement with her right hand; also to wear 
a hard collar as necessary and avoid repetitive motions of her head. 
138. On July 19, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was 
satisfactory appearance anterior discectomy and fusion procedure C5-6 and C7-Tl; no abnormal 
movement or fusion levels; and mild movement at C3-4 and C4-5. 
139. Dr. Little opined that the MRis of Claimant that were performed in September 2000, August 2008 
and October 3, 2011, all show C6-C7 to have problems, including disk space narrowing and bone 
spurring like the C5-C6. 
140. Dr. Little opined that after reviewing Dr. Price's report, Claimant's symptoms were almost 
resolved and essentially pain free with residual tightness in the trapezius of her scapula muscles and some 
intermittent radiation into the superior and medial scapula, but that she was not resolved prior to the cycle 
accident. 
141. Dr. Little opined that his operative findings at C5-6 were consistent with a long-standing 
preexisting C5-6 spondylosis. 
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142. Dr. Little opined that the injury and surgery at the C5-6 level was caused by the cycle accident. 
He treated Claimant for her C5-6 foraminal stenosis (bone spur was narrowing the nerve opening). Dr. 
opined there were degenerative changes as shown by the MRI that were not symptomatic, which was 
aggravated and became symptomatic following the cycle accident. 
143. Dr. Little could not say the cycle accident was the sole and only cause of Claimant's symptoms 
and need for surgery because of the underlying spondylosis that existed prior to the cycle accident. Dr. 
Little could not give an opinion of app01tionment between the condition or disability prior to the accident 
and the condition or disability caused by the accident. 
144. On September 27, 2012, Dr. Little referred Claimant to a pain doctor. He repo1ted her pain was 
improving but she needed further care by a pain specialist. Her pain had never completely resolved. Dr. 
Little opined that Claimant's pain was the result of the cycle accident. 
145. It is the finding of the Arbitrator that the evidence establishes that Claimant had a long standing 
preexisting C5-6 spondylosis that was not symptomatic prior to the cycle accident, but was aggravated 
and became symptomatic following the cycle accident. The evidence also establishes that Claimant was 
injured in the C5-6 area in the 2001 rear-end accident and as reported by Claimant and Dr. Price, was 
only 90-95% recovered from the 200 I rear-end accident when she was injured in the cycle accident. This 
condition was symptomatic and Claimant was still receiving treatment from Dr. Prior up to the time of the 
accident. 
146. Dr. Wilson opined that based on his review of the MRis, Claimant would have had surgery at C5-
6 even had there been no accident because the MRI findings were consistent with a natural progression of 
her preexisting spondylosis. It may be that someday the spondylosis would progress to the point where 
surgery would be advisable, but there is no evidence that establishes that it would have been required on 
February 15, 2012 or when that date would arrive. The evidence does establish that it had not arrived on 
the date of the accident because the condition was asymptomatic on the date of the accident. The 
Arbitrator does not accept the opinion of Dr. Wilson that the spondylosis alone caused the need for the 
surgery at CS-6. 
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147. The evidence establishes that the cycle accident aggravated the preexisting injury and spondylosis 
condition and was the major cause of the need for the surgery at the C5-6 level. 
148. The Arbitrator finds that the preexisting condition at C5-6 was aggravated by the cycle accident 
and that an apportionment can reasonably be made. The Arbitrator finds that 25% of the cost of surgery 
for the C5-6 area should be app011ioned to the pre-existing condition and 75% should be apportioned to 
the injury at C5-6 that was caused by the accident. 
5. Lost Income. 
149. Claimant has asserted a claim for lost income from the date of the accident to the present in the 
amount of $135,000. Claimant has the burden of proving that she actually lost income as a result of the 
accident and the amount thereof. 
150. Claimant testified that following the accident in 2008, she did not feel well and was unable to 
work at the same level she had been working prior to the accident. She also missed work while attending 
medical appointments with Dr. Price, Dr. Bates, Dr. Alderman, Dr. Little, and during the neck surgery on 
November 24, 2008. Following the neck surgery in November of 2008, she was unable to work during the 
recovery period. She also missed substantial work hours for medical appointments with Dr. Price and Dr. 
Little in 2009, 2010 and 2011, therapy appointments with Hand-On Physical Therapy in 2009 and therapy 
appointments with Idaho Sports Medicine Institute in 2010 and 2011. Claimant also missed work for 
medical appointments with Dr. Goodman in 2011. Following the second surgery on February 15, 2012, 
Claimant was unable to work during the recovery period and she missed additional substantial work hours 
for medical and therapy appointments following the surgery. Claimant also missed work during and 
following the shoulder surgery on May 22, 2012. Following the shoulder surgery she was unable to work 
during the period of recovery. She continued to lose work during medical visits with Dr. Little in 2012. 
The evidence establishes that Claimant made a reasonable effort to work when she was able to do so, 
including working a second job at BCBG doing part-time retail sales beginning in 2009. The Arbitrator 
finds no evidence to support any claim that Claimant failed to mitigate her loss of income following the 
cycle accident. 
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151. Dr. Nancy J. Collins, PhD CRC, ("Dr. Collins"), a vocational rehabilitation specialist in Boise, 
Idaho, opined that Claimant lost income of $135,000 during the 4.5 years following the cycle accident to 
the present. Dr. Collins also opined that Claimant may have some reduced income in the future but she 
did not project or opine on the amount. Thus, the Arbitrator will not award future lost income. 
152. Shannon Purvis, a vocational rehabilitation specialist in Boise, Idaho, opined that Claimant 
possessed the capacity to work following the cycle accident and that no objective evidence proved any 
loss of income by Claimant from the date of the accident to the date of the hearing. She criticized Dr. 
Collins opinion of lost income as being based only of production factors and not other factors, such as the 
recession. Ms. Purvis testified she would limit the loss income to the periods of recovery from surgery 
that Claimant experience, but she did not quantify the amounts lost. The opinions of Ms. Purvis are not 
based on or supported by the relevant evidence. 
153. The Arbitrator finds that Claimant lost income as a result of the cycle accident in the amount of 
$135,000. Dr. Collins explained that she based her opinion on the actual lost earnings that Claimant 
suffered and had taken into account other factors such as the loss of earnings opportunities relating to the 
recession and the reduction in real estate sales in Ada County during the relevant period of time. 
6. Medical Expenses. 
154. Claimant has asserted a claim for medical expenses that can be summarized as follows: 
• Alderman Medical Acupuncture of Idaho 
• Boise Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Clinic (Carpal Tunnel) 
• David N. Price, D.C. 
• Hands-On-Physical Therapy 
• Kenneth M. Little, M.D., Idaho Neurological 
• Idaho Neurological, Charisse H. Mack, P.A. 
• Idaho Sports Medicine 
• Primary Health 
• Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
• Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
• The Shoulder Clinic, Dr. Goodwin 
• Boise Anesthesia, P.A. 
• James H. Bates, M.D. 
• Gem State Radiology 
• Intermountain Medical Imaging 
• Anesthesia Associates of Boise 
• Walgreens 




















• McMillan Medical Center 
•St.Luke's RMC 
• Biomet 
• A Caring Hand 
• Treasure Valley Hospital 
• Physical Therapy of Idaho 








155. Dr. Price reviewed a summary of his billings for treating Claimant following the 2008 motorcycle 
crash in the amount of $6,108.58 and opined that the treatments were all necessary and the amount 
charged for the treatments was reasonable .. 
156. Dr. Little opined that his treatment of Claimant was necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
157. Dr. Little opined that the treatments by Hands-On Physical Therapy, which he prescribed, were 
necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
158. Dr. Little opined that the services ofldaho Sports Medicine physician, Dr. Sheffield, were 
necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
159. Dr. Little opined that the services of Boise Anesthesia, P.A. were necessary and the charges are 
reasonable. 
160. Dr. Little opined that the services of St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center were necessary and 
the charges are reasonable. 
161. Dr. Little opined that the services oflntermountain Medical Imaging were necessary and the 
charges are reasonable. 
162. Dr. Little opined that the services of St. Luke's Regional Medical Center for the second fusion 
were necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
163. Dr. Little opined that the services of St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center for lab work were 
necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
164. Dr. Little opined that the services of Anesthesia Associates for the second surgery were necessary 
and the charges are reasonable. 
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165. Dr. Little opined that the prescriptions listed in the summaries of prescriptions from Walgreens 
were necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
166. Dr. Goodwin opined that Claimant's treatment by Dr. Goodwin was necessary and the costs that 
are associated with that treatment are reasonable. 
167. Dr. Goodwin opined that the physical therapy Claimant received was necessary and the costs are 
reasonable. 
168. Dr. Goodwin opined that the MRI scan of Claimant's shoulder in 2011 and the dye injected to 
better delineate shoulder pathology was necessary and the costs are reasonable. 
169. Dr. Goodwin opined that the services of Treasure Valley Hospital were necessary and the costs 
are reasonable. 
170. Dr. Goodwin opined the Biomet shoulder pack that was obtained from Biomet for Claimant was 
necessary and the cost is reasonable. 
171. Dr. Goodwin opined that the services of Physical Therapy of Idaho were necessary and the costs 
are reasonable. 
172. The Arbitrator finds that the medical services and costs summarized above in the amount of 
$134,223.63 are reasonable and necessary and were caused by the cycle accident, except as follows: 
• Boise Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Clinic for carpal tunnel treatment 
• Idaho Neurological, K. Little (25% of the 2012 costs of $13,321.19) 
• Idaho Neurological, C. Mack (25% of 2/15/12 cost of $2,812.57) 
• Anesthesia Associates of Boise (25% of 2/15/12 cost of $1,969.00) 
• Wal greens (25% of 2012 costs of $412.59) 
•St.Luke's RMC (25% of 2/15/12 cost of $26,526.65) 
• A Caring Hand (25% of 2012 costs of $668.00) 









173. The Arbitrator finds that Claimant is entitled to an interim award of medical costs in the amount 
of $121,700.12. 
174. Claimant made a claim for future medical expenses of $5,000.00. Dr. Collins opined that 
Claimant may have future medical expenses in the amount of $5,000.00 but did not provide any basis for 
such opinion. Thus, the Arbitrator will not award future medical expenses. 
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175. The evidence does not support a claim for household cleaning services and none will be awarded. 
7. General Damages. 
176. Claimant is entitled to an interim award of general damages for pain and suffering, loss of quality 
of life, physical limitations, aggravation to any preexisting condition and scaring on her Right hand, after 
disallowing general damages relating to the 25% apportionment for the CS-6 preexisting condition, in the 
amount of$ 150,000.00. 
IV. INTERIM AW ARD 
As its Interim Award, the Arbitrator assesses the amount of damages for bodily injury suffered 
by Claimant in the motorcycle accident on May 25, 2008 as follows: 
L Economic Damages: 
• Medical expenses: 
• Lost income: 
SUBTOTAL ECONOMIC DAMAGES: 
2. Noneconomic Damages: 
Pain and suffering, loss of. quality of life, physical limitations, 




Right hand: $150,000.00 
TOT AL INTERIM AW ARD: $406,700.12 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 16th day of January, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of January, 2013, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing ARBITRATOR'S DECISION AND INTERIM AW ARD by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Jon Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
jsteele@runftsteele.com 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
jat@elamburke.com 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-mail 
__ Telecopy 

























Case No. 81700-0040 
ARBITRATOR'S FINAL AWARD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This arbitration involves claims for damages under the underinsured motorist provisions 
of a policy of insurance that was issued by Respondent, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho 
("Farmers") to Claimant, Peggy B. Cedillo. The claims are disputed by Respondent. The dispute 
has been submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the agreement to arbitrate, which is 
contained in the insurance policy. The agreement to arbitrate, the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act, 
Idaho Code§ 7-901, et seq., the Pre-Hearing Orders that were entered by the arbitrator in this 
matter, and the Stipulations of the Parties dated February 22, 2012 and April 5, 2012 govern 
these proceedings. 
An evidentiary hearing was commenced on November 20, 2012 in Boise, Idaho before 
the duly appointed arbitrator, Merlyn W. Clark. Claimant, Peggy B. Cedillo, appeared in person 
represented by her attorney, Jon M. Steele, Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC. Jeffrey A. 
Thomson, Elam & Burke, P.A., appeared with Ron Ramsey, a representative of Respondent, on 




behalf of Respondent. Oral and documentary evidence was presented by the parties and the 
matter was submitted for a decision and interim award. 
The Arbitrator's Decision and Interim Award was issued January 16, 2013. The Interim 
Award assessed the amount of damages for bodily injury suffered by Claimant in the motorcycle 
accident on May 25, 2008 as follows: 
I • Economic Damages: 
• Medical expenses: 
• Lost income: 
SUB TOT AL ECONOMIC DAMAGES: 
2. Noneconomic Damages: 
Pain and suffering, loss of quality of life, physical limitations, 




Right hand: $150,000.00 
TOTAL INTERIM AWARD: $406,700.12 
II. ISSUE FOR DECISION 
The parties have agreed "that following issuance of the Interim Award, the arbitrator will 
conduct post Interim Award proceedings to determine what, if any, adjustments would be made 
in the amount of the Interim Award for prejudgment interest, setoffs or collateral sources and 
subrogation issues prior to issuance of the final award by the arbitrator." (Prehearing Order No. 
2.) This is the Final Award that assesses the amounts for adjustments in the amount of the 
Interim A ward. 
The parties, through their respective counsel, submitted memoranda and exhibits stating 
the positions of the parties with respect to adjustments to be made in the Interim Award. A 
hearing was held on February 26, 2013, during which counsel for the parties presented oral 
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arguments in support of their respective positions. The matter is now fully submitted for entry of 
the Final A ward. 
Because the insurance clause in the insurance policy that covers Claimant expressly 
provides that "[t]he expense of the arbitrator and all other expenses of arbitration will be shared 
equally" by the parties and "[a]ttomey's fees and fees paid for the witnesses are not expenses of 
arbitration and will be paid by the paity incurring them," this Arbitrator has no authority to 
award expenses of arbitration or attorney fees and costs to either party in this proceeding. 
III. FACTS, ANALYSIS AND DECISIONS 
A. Adjustments for Payments Made on Behalf of the Tortfeasor, Mr. Steele. 
1. Payments by Progressive Insurance. Progressive paid Claimant $100,000 plus 
medical payment coverage benefits of $5,000 on behalf of its insured, Mr. Steele. Farmers is 
entitled to credit for the amounts paid by Progressive. The Interim Award does not factor in these 
payments and it must be adjusted to do so. 
2. UIM Payments by Farmers. Farmers paid Claimant UIM benefits of $25,000 on 
August 25, 2009 and an additional $155,000 in UIM benefits on October 18, 2012, for which 
Farmers is entitled to credit. The Interim Award does not factor in this payments and it must be 
ad justed to do so. 
3. Adjustment for Contractual Reductions. The medical "cost" summary 
submitted by Claimant was for the amount billed by the caregivers. The evidence establishes that 
the amount billed for some of the medical expenses was reduced prior to payment. To avoid a 
"windfall" Claimant is entitled to recover only the amount of medical expenses actually paid. 
The Interim Award disallowed the charges incurred at Boise Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation Clinic and reduced the charges of (1) Idaho Neurological for K. Little, (2) Idaho 
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Neurological for C. Mack, (3) Anesthesia Assodates and (4) St. Luke's for charges related to the 
February 15, 2012 surgery by 25%. Contractual adjustments for the services provided by these 
entities were reduced proportionately. Respondent has submitted evidence that supports a 
finding that the amount of contractual adjustments made to the amount billed, minus the 25% 
reduction for those charges having contractual adjustments, totals $19,234.81. (See Kathryn 
Brandt Affidavit, 'II 7 and Ex. A attached thereto.) The Arbitrator finds and concludes that the 
Interim Award should be reduced by this amount. 
4. Adjustment for Further Reductions to Medical Expenses Awarded Due to 
25 % Apportionment for C5-C6 Preexisting Condition. 
In calculating the Interim Award, the Arbitrator apportioned 25% of the cost of the C5-
C6 treatment to Claimant's preexisting condition. (Arbitration Decision and Interim Award, p. 
33.) Based on that finding the Arbitrator reduced by 25% the medical expenses associated with 
treatment of the C5-C6 medical issue. The following medical expenses were not reduced but the 
evidence indicates that they are also related to treatment of Claimant's C5-C6 disk and should be 
reduced by 25%. 
a. February 8, 2012, St. Al's bill in the amount of $1,036.00, portions of Exs. 17 and 
40 show that this bill is related to the pre-exiting preparation for C5-C6 surgery. 
25% of the $1,036.00 in medical expenses results in a reduction of $259.00. 
b. Physical Therapy of Idaho. Exhibit 50 shows that the physicahherapy was for 
both the C5-C6 and the C7-Tl issue. Attributing 50% of this $2,893.00 bill 
(Exhibit 24)) to C5-C6 and reducing that amount by 25% results in a further 
reduction of $361.63. 
c. Idaho Sports Medicine treatment from April 27, 2010 to November 18, 2011. 
Exhibit 32 shows that part of the treatment given relates to C5-C6, including a 
right C6 nerve block. Apportioning the $3,003.00 bill (Ex. 11) one-half to C5-C6 
and one-half to the shoulder and making a further reduction of 25% equals a 
reduction of $375.38. 
d. Primary Health visit on September 9, 2011. Exhibit 39 shows that this visit was 
for the C5-C6 problem. A reduction of 25% to the $113.00 bill equals $28.25. 
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e. Intermountain Medical Imaging. Exhibit 12 shows that on October 3, 2011 the 
imaging was related to C5-C6. A 25% reduction of the $1,206.80 bill equals 
$301.70. 
f. St. Luke's visit dated January 11, 2012. Portions of Exhibits 20 and 45 show that 
this visit was for the C6 nerve root block. The $1,221.58 bill should be reduced by 
25% leading to a further reduction of $305.40. 
The total reductions due to the application of the 25% apportionment calculated above is 
$1,631.36. The Arbitrator finds and concludes that this correction should be made to the Interim 
Award. It reduces the Interim Award $1,631.36. 
5. Payments Purportedly Made by Mr. Steele. 
Some argument has been presented that the Arbitrator should also credit Farmers with 
any payments that were made by Mr. Steele directly to Claimant's caregivers. There is no 
evidence that allows the Arbitrator to make this calculation. Moreover, some of the purported 
payments were allegedly made while Mr. Steele and Claimant were married, and thus were likely 
made from community funds, which would entitle her to recover such payments or include them 
in her claim against Farmers. 
6. Adjustment for Award of "A Caring Hand" Bill. 
The Arbitrator awarded medical expenses in the amount of $668.00 for a bill from "A 
Caring Hand." (See Ex. 21.) The Arbitrator finds that the award of this amount is not supported 
by the evidence and the amount of $668.00 minus the 25% reduction already applied by the 
Arbitrator of $167.00 should be reduced from the Interim Award in the amount of $501.00. 
7. The Regence Blue Shield Subrogation Interest. 
The subrogation claim of Regence Blue Shield is a matter between Regence Blue Shield 
and Claimant. It is not within the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to make any adjustment for this 
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subrogation claim. Moreover, the Arbitrator has no jurisdiction or authority to direct how 
payment of the Regence claim should be made and will not attempt to do so. 
8. Collateral Source Rule. 
Respondent, through its counsel, has informed the Arbitrator that Respondent is not 
seeking an offset under the collateral source rule in this proceeding and it will not be considered 
by the Arbitrator in this Final A ward. 
9. The Adjusted Interim Award. 
The Interim Award must be reduced by the amount of payments made by Progressive on 
behalf of Mr. Steele ($105,000.00); the amount of the prior UIM payments made by Farmers 
($180,000.00); the amount of the contractual adjustments made to the medical expenses 
($19,234.81); the amount represented by a uniform application of the 25% apportionment to all 
C5-C6 related medical expenses ($1,631.36); and the amount of the adjustment for the "A Caring 
Hand" bill ($501.00). The Arbitrator finds that after making the adjustments, the adjusted Interim 
Award is $100,332.95 plus the award of prejudgment interest. 
B. Prejudgment Interest. 
1. Commencement of Prejudgment Interest. An award of prejudgment interest 
upon a claim for underinsured motorist ("UIM") benefits is governed by Idaho Code§ 28-22-104 
and Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 
1127 (2006). Section 28-22-104 provides, in relevant part, that when there is no express contract 
in writing fixing a different rate of interest, interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents (12¢) on 
the hundred by the year. on money after the same becomes due. 
In Greenough, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that under Idaho Code§ 28-22-104, 
prejudgment interest can be awarded as a matter of law from the date the sum became due in 
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cases where the amount claimed, even though not liquidated, is capable of mathematical 
computation. The Court further stated that in insurance cases money becomes due as provided 
under the express terms of the insurance contract; therefore, the insured is not entitled to 
prejudgment interest until he or she complies with the applicable contract provisions. 
Greenough, 142 Idaho at 592, 130 P.3d at 1130. 
The Greenough Court held that prejudgment interest began to accrue sixty days after 
submission of sufficient proof of loss, not on the date of the accident, because the applicable 
insurance policy required payment within 60 days after receipt of a signed, sworn proof of loss. 
The Greenough Court also held that a submitted proof of loss is sufficient when the insured 
provides the insurer with enough infonnation to allow the insurer a reasonable opportunity to 
investigate and determine its liability and that the amount of information that should be provided 
in a proof of loss is proportional to the amount reasonably available to the insured. When 
enough information is provided in a proof of loss, the insurer is obligated to investigate and/or 
determine its rights and liabilities in a fair and accurate manner. Greenough, 142 Idaho at 593, 
130 P.3d at 1131. 
The policy of insurance that was issued to Claimant contains no provision requiring a 
proof of loss to initiate a claim under the policy. Thus, adopting the rationale of the Greenough 
decision, it is the finding and conclusion of this Arbitrator that prejudgment interest began to 
accrue in this case when Claimant provided the insurer with enough information to allow the 
insurer a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability. 
Claimant notified Farmers of her underinsurance claim on June 5, 2009. On that date, 
she advised Farmers that she had made a demand for Mr. Steele's policy limits of $100,000 and 
that she would be making a claim under her policy of underinsurance. On June 17, 2009, 
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Farmers acknowledged the receipt of Claimant's demand letter to Mr. Steele's insurer and notice 
that she sought Mr. Steele's policy limits. 
On July 9, 2009, Claimant advised Farmers that she had settled her claim against Mr. 
Steele for his policy limits of $100,000. Claimant, by Farmers' letter dated July 27, 2009, was 
then directed to correspond with Mr. Ron W. Ramsey, Senior General Adjuster for Farmers. On 
July 28, 2009, Claimant by letter addressed to Mr. Ramsey, again advised Farmers that she had 
settled her claim against Mr. Steele for his policy limits of $100,000 and an additional $5,000 in 
medical coverage. She informed Farmers that her medical records and reports which documented 
her injuries had previously been submitted to her local agent, Mr. Jay Reinke. She also enclosed 
a copy of her demand letter to Progressive Northwest Insurance, Mr. Steele's insurer, the Full 
Release of All Claims with Indemnity against Mr. Steele, and her previous letters addressed to 
Farmers Insurance. She also informed Farmers that her medical expenses at that time totaled 
$53,048.62. She stated "[i]n light of my continuing pain, discomfort, ongoing medical treatment, 
the effects upon my daily life, and my future life expectancy, I hereby demand that you pay me 
policy limits [$500,000] and medical coverage." She stated that the enclosed documents had all 
been previously delivered to Fanners Insurance, contained a detailed account of her injury, 
medical care, medical expenses, her painful recovery and her damages. She also informed 
Farmers that she and Mr. Steele were then married and that she understood Farmers would 
conduct an investigation of Mr. Steele's financial condition before resolving her claim. She 
asked that the claim be resolved within the next thirty days. (See letter to Mr. Ron Ramsey, 
Farmers Insurance, dated July 28, 2009.) By letter dated July 29, 2009, from Farmers to 
Claimant, Farmers acknowledged receipt of her claim for injuries arising from the accident on 
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May 25, 2008, while riding as a passenger on a motorcycle driven by Mr. Steele. Her claim for 
medical expenses was denied. 
Subsequently, following further investigation, Farmers sent Claimant a check for $25,000 
with a letter dated August 25, 2009. In the letter, Farmers explained that the check represented 
Farmers' valuation of the amount due Claimant under the Underinsured Motorist coverage of her 
policy based upon her letter dated July 28, 2009 and the information provided. Farmers informed 
Claimant that she had provided no information about a wage loss claim, so none was included in 
the valuation. Farmers informed Claimant that she could submit additional information for its 
consideration. Farmers also claimed an offset for the settlement funds paid by Progressive 
Insurance Company, Mr. Steele's insurer for Bodily Injury coverage and medical payments of 
$5,000. (See Letter dated August 25, 2009.) 
Claimant asserts that the date for commencement of prejudgment interest on her claim is 
August 25, 2009. Based on the foregoing facts, this Arbitrator finds that Claimant provided 
enough information to obligate Farmers to investigate and determine its rights and liabilities in a 
fair and accurate manner prior to and with her letter dated July 28, 2009, and concludes as a 
matter of law that prejudgment interest began to accrue in this case on August 25, 2009, which is 
the date that Farmers provided Claimant with its valuation of the amount due under the 
Underinsured Motorist coverage of her policy. 
Respondent's contention that Claimant should be required to file a new proof of loss for 
each surgery she received is rejected. No such requirement is imposed by law or the insurance 
contract that was issued to Claimant and there is no public policy reason why a new proof of loss · 
should be required for each new medical procedure received by Claimant. 
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2. Methodology for Calculation of Prejudgment Interest. 
This Arbitrator cannot accept Claimant's contention that the award of prejudgment 
interest applies to the damage award of $406,700.12 commencing on the proof of loss date, 
August 25, 2009, because it would not account for payments that were made by Progressive or 
by Fanners. Claimant cites American Foreign Insurance Company v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 
400, 94 P.3d 699, 705 (2204) as authority for her contention. This Arbitrator was the arbitrator in 
the Reichert case. In Richert the arbitrator was restricted under the terms of an agreement 
between the parties that prevented the arbitrator in Reichert from considering the worker's 
compensation offset and subrogation issues in the calculation of prejudgment interest. In 
Reichert the arbitrator erroneously included the issues in the calculation of the final award. The 
Supreme Court held that the Reichert arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to do so because of the 
restrictive agreement. No such agreement or restriction applies in this case that is now before the 
Arbitrator. In this matter, the patties have agreed to allow the Arbitrator to consider these issues 
in detennining the Final Award. 
As noted by Respondent in its Response to Claimant's Brief in Support of Final Award, 
Reichert supports Farmers' position that prejudgment interest is calculated on the Final Award 
and from a date that avoids a windfall to the Claimant. In Reichert, because the Arbitrator did not 
have jurisdiction over the issues, the district court was tasked with handling the issues of the 
worker's compensation offset and subrogation. 140 Idaho at 404, 94 P.3d at 709. The Supreme 
Court upheld the district court's prejudgment interest calculation, ruling that offsets for money 
already received shall be deducted from the arbitration award and the prejudgment interest shall 
be recalculated based on a reduction to the gross award of the amounts paid by the worker's 
compensation insurer. 140 Idaho at 402, 94 P.3d at 707. The Supreme Court noted that the 
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purpose of the offset provisions is consistent with the public policy against double recovery and 
these provisions are valid. 140 Idaho at 400, 94 P.3d at 705. The Court concluded that recovery 
of prejudgment interest on amounts paid would result in a windfall to the insured. Id. 
Section 28-22-104 provides that interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents on the 
hundred by the year on "money after the same becomes due." (l.C. § 28-22-104(1)2.). Thus, it is 
incumbent on this Arbitrator to determine when payments were due from Farmers to Claimant 
and the amounts thereof as interest accrued on said amounts. In other words, Claimant was 
entitled to interest on the money that was owed to her by Farmers and unpaid from the dates it 
was due and owing, but unpaid, to the extent that said amounts are capable of mathematical 
computation. (See Dillon v. Montgomery, 138 Idaho 614,617, 67 P.3d 93, 96 (2003).) 
The policy of insurance at issue in the setoff clause provides that the amount owed to 
Claimant under the UIM coverage is the amount of damages established but not otherwise 
recovered from the person legally liable for the bodily injury. (See Insurance policy, p. 8, 
Endorsement El 179i.) Thus, logic dictates that the determination of the amounts due and owing 
to Claimant under the UIM coverage for the purpose of computing prejudgment interest, are any 
amounts that accrue over and above the payments of $105,000 that were made by the insurer for 
Mr. Steele. In other words, the payments made by Mr. Steele's insurer must be taken off the 
front end of the Farmer's obligation rather than the back end, i.e., the Final Award, as proposed 
by Claimant. Thus, the obligation of Farmers to pay the medical expenses of Claimant did not 
begin to accrue until the unpaid medical expenses exceeded $105,000. Also, Farmers is entitled 
to credit for payments made by Farmers as of the date the two payments were actually made. 
Claimant has asserted that this setoff clause is not enforceable and should not be applied 




Fanners, 133 Idaho 428, 987 P.2d 1043 (1999) is applicable in this case because the facts of this 
case are distinguishable from those in Talbot. Moreover, the parties have agreed by stipulation 
that the Arbitrator does not have jurisdiction to determine the validity/enforceability of the setoff 
provision found in Endorsement El 179i of the policy at issue. The parties stipulated to "reserve 
the issue of enforceability of the setoff clause for determination by the District Court should 
Claimant wish to raise that issue .... " The parties further agreed that "the Arbitrator has 
jurisdiction to apply Farmer's setoff clause found in Endorsement El 179i in arriving at his Final 
Award. (See Stipulation dated April 5, 2012, pp.2-3.) Thus, the Arbitrator will apply the set off 
provision in determining the Final Award. 
Because it is not feasible to calculate the accrued amounts due for each and every invoice 
Claimant received as of the date of receipt thereof, the Arbitrator will not attempt to do so. 
Rather, the Arbitrator will calculate the prejudgment interest based on an adjusted amount of the 
final award from the date of the proof of loss less the payments that were received by Claimant 
as of the dates such payments were received by Claimant. 
3. Calculation of Prejudgment Interest. 
The Interim Award after the adjustments are made to reduce the Interim Award for the 
contractual adjustments made to the medical expenses ($19,234.81); the amount represented by a 
uniform application of the 25% apportionment to all C5-C6 related medical expenses 
($1,631.36); and the amount of the adjustment for the "A Caring Hand" bill ($501.00) is 
$385,784.01, the "Initial Amount" for calculating prejudgment interest. 
Payments were received from Progress Insurance Company by Claimant in the amount of 




payment of $25,000.00 was received by Claimant from Farmers on August 25, 2009, the date of 
proof of loss, which further reduces the Initial Amount to $255,784.01. 
The Arbitrator finds and concludes that prejudgment interest at the rate of 12% per 
annum commenced on the Initial Amount of $255,784.01 and accrued at the rate of 12% per 
annum from August 25, 2009 to October 18, 2012 (1,150 days), when Claimant received a UIM 
payment from Farmers of $155,000, which reduced the Initial Amount to $100,784.01. 
Prejudgment interest at the rate of 12% per annum accrued on the reduced Initial Amount of 
$100,784.01 from October 18, 2012 to the date of the Final Award, April 30, 2013 (194 days). 
The amount of prejudgment interest from August 25, 2009 to October 18, 2012 is 
$96,707.38. The amount of prejudgment interest from October 18, 2012 to April 30, 2013 is 
$6,428.08. The total amount of prejudgment interest is $103,135.46. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND FINAL AW ARD 
The Final Award to Claimant against Farmers is TWO HUNDRED THREE 
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT DOLLARS AND FORTY-ONE CENTS 
($203,468.41). 
Prejudgment interest at the rate of twelve percent per annum ( 12 % ) shall continue to 
accrue on the adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 until the Final Award is affirmed by a 
Judgment or paid, whichever sooner occurs. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 29th day of April, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of April, 2013, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing ARBITRATOR'S FINAL AWARD by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
Jon Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
jsteele@runftsteele.com 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
jat@elamburke.com 
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Sept. 14, 1999. 
Automobile insurer sought a declaration that it was 
entitled to set off the amount that an injured insured had 
received from the tortfeasor's liability insurer in deter-
mining the limit of the insured's underinsured motorist 
(UIM) coverage. The District Court, Ada County, N. 
Randy Smith, J., granted summary judgment to the in-
sured, and the insurer appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Schroeder, J., held that: (1) a setoffprovision appearing in 
the policy's "Other Insurance" section did not apply; (2) as 
a matter of first impression, a "Dear Policyholder" notice 
sent by the insurer to the insured concerning the amount of 
UIM coverage was part of the parties' contract; and (3) the 
notice created an ambiguity which had to be construed 
against the insurer. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
ill Appeal and Error 30 ~863 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in Gen-
eral 
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on Nature 
of Decision Appealed from 
30k863 k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
When the Supreme Court reviews the district court's 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it employs the 
same standard properly employed by the district court 
when originally ruling on the motion. Rules Civ.Proc .. 
Rule56(c). 
ill Judgment 228 ~185(6) 
228 Judgment 
Page 1 
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding 
228kl 82 Motion or Other Application 
228kl 85 Evidence in General 
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fact issue. Most Cited Cases 
Where both parties file motions for summary judg-
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parties essentially stipulate that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact which would preclude the district court from 
entering summary judgment and leave the district court 
free to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon 
the evidence before it and grant summary judgment, de-
spite the possibility of conflicting inferences. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 56(c). 
ill Appeal and Error 30 ~863 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
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of Decision Appealed from 
30k863 k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
When questions of law are presented on appeal from 
summary judgment, the Supreme Court exercises free 
review and is not bound by findings of the district court, 
but is free to draw its own conclusions from the evidence 
presented. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(c). 
ill Insurance 217 ~1832(1) 
217 Insurance 
2 l 7XIII Contracts and Policies 
217XIII(G) Rules of Construction 
217kl 830 Favoring Insureds or Beneficiaries; 
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As a general rule, any ambiguity that exists in an in-
surance contract must be construed most strongly against 
the insurer. 
Ifil Appeal and Error 30 ~842(8) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in Gen-
eral 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(8) k. Review where evidence 
consists of documents. Most Cited Cases 
Whether an insurance policy is ambiguous is a ques-
tion of law over which the Supreme Court exercises free 
review. 
Ifil Insurance 217 ~1808 
217 Insurance 
217XIII Contracts and Policies 
217XIII(G) Rules of Construction 
217kl808 k. Ambiguity in general. Most Cited 
To determine whether a policy is ambiguous, the court 
must ask whether the policy is reasonably subject to con-
flicting interpretation. 
ill Insurance 217 ~806 
217 Insurance 
2 I 7XXII Coverage--Automobile Insurance 
217XXII(D) Uninsured or Underinsured Motorist 
Coverage 
2 l 7k2804 Credits, Deductions, and Offsets 
2 l 7k2806 k. Recovery under other insur-
ance. Most Cited Cases 
Setoff provision which appeared in the "Other Insur-
ance" section of an automobile policy and provided that 
the amount of underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage 
would be "reduced by the amount of any other bodily 
injury coverage available to any party held to be liable for 
the accident" applied only to situations where there was 
other UIM coverage. 
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lfil Insurance 217 ~795 
217 Insurance 
2 l 7XXII Coverage--Automobile Insurance 
217XXII(D) Uninsured or Underinsured Motorist 
Coverage 
217k2794 Amount of Coverage 
217k2795 k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
"Dear Policyholder" notice sent by an automobile 
insurer to its insured indicating that the amount of under-
insured motorist (UIM) coverage was measured by the 
difference between the total amount paid by the other 
driver's liability insurance and the amount of the insured's 
damages, up to the limits of the coverage, had to be con-
sidered part of the parties' contract, where it varied the 
policy's limit of liability clause, which measured the 
amount of UIM coverage by the difference between the 
amount paid in damages to the insured and the limit of 
UIM coverage, and where it nowhere stated that it was a 
cover letter provided for informational purposes only. 
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217 Insurance 
217XIJI Contracts and Policies 
2 l 7XIII(G) Rules of Construction 
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Policies 
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217XIII(J) Modification of Policies 
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Generally, if an insurer does not wish for a particular 
document to become part of the insurance contract, the 
insurer should make it clear that it is provided for infor-
mational purposes only and that its contents are not in-
tended to amend, alter, or change any of the terms and 
conditions of the policy. 
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217:XXII(D) Uninsured or Underinsured Motorist 
Coverage 
217k2794 Amount of Coverage 
217k2795 k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
Court was free to consider the insured's reasonable 
understandings in determining whether a "Dear Policy-
holder" notice sent by an automobile insurer to its insured 
concerning the amount of underinsured motorist (UIM) 
coverage should be treated as part of the insurance con-
tract. 
I!1l Insurance 217 ~796 
217 Insurance 
217:XXII Coverage--Automol;,ile Insurance 
217XXII(D) Uninsured or Underinsured Motorist 
Coverage 
217k2794 Amount of Coverage 
217k2796 k. Policy limits. Most Cited Cases 
Where a "Dear Policyholder" notice sent by an au-
tomobile insurer to its insured attempted to limit underin-
sured motorist (UIM) coverage in one manner and the 
policy's limit of liability clause attempted to limit UIM 
coverage in a different manner, an ambiguity existed which 
had to be construed against the insurer. 
**1044 *429 Elam & Burke, P.A., Boise, for appellant. 
Bobbi K. Dominick argued. 
Comstock & Bush, Boise, for respondent. John A. Bush 
argued. 
SCHROEDER, Justice. 
This automobile insurance case concerns underin-
sured motorist (UIM) coverage. Farmers Insurance Com-
pany of Idaho (Farmers) brought a declaratory judgment 
seeking a determination that it is entitled to set off the 
amount that the insured, Adelyn Talbot (Talbot), received 
from the tort-feasor's insurance company from Talbot's 
maximum UIM liability limit. The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Talbot, ruling that language 
in the "Dear Policyholder'' notice which accompanied the 
endorsement for UIM coverage conflicted with the limita-
tion of liability and setoff provisions in the endorsement, 
and, therefore, the endorsement was ambiguous. Because 
Page 3 
the endorsement was ambiguous, the district court held 
that Farmers was prohibited from enforcing the limitation 
of liability and setoff provisions contained in the en-
dorsement. This Court affirms the district court's decision. 
I. 
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
Talbot was involved in an automobile accident with a 
vehicle driven by Dave L. Shield (Shield). Talbot was 
injured in the accident. At the time of the accident, Talbot 
had an automobile insurance policy with Farmers which 
included VIM coverage provided through an endorsement 
to the policy. The endorsement for UIM coverage reads in 
relevant part as follows: 
PLEASE KEEP THIS 
ENDORSEMENT 
WITH YOUR POLICY 
Dear Policyholder: 
This endorsement adds UNDERinsured Motorist 
Coverage to your policy. It applies when the driver of 
another vehicle not owned by you, who is liable to you for 
damages **1045 *430 because of an automobile accident, 
is insured for liability coverage in amounts less than your 
actual damages. UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage will 
pay the difference of the total amount paid by that driver's 
liability insurance and the amount of your damages, up to 
the limits of the coverage [This underlined portion is 
hereinafter referred to in this opinion as the " 'Dear Poli-
cyholder' language"]. The limits of your UNDERinsured 
Motorist Coverage are the same as shown in the Declara-
tions for Uninsured Motorist Coverage. 
UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage should not be 
confused with Uninsured Motorist Coverage, which only 
applies when the owner or operator of the other car has no 
liability insurance coverage. Your policy has both UN-
DERinsured and Uninsured Motorist Coverage. However, 
like Uninsured Motorist Coverage, UNDERinsured Mo-
torist insurance applies only to bodily injury. It does not 
cover damage to your car, or any other damages not part of 
the bodily injury. 
If you have any questions, please contact your Farm-
ers Agent. 
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP OF COMPANIES 
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Coverage C-1 UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage 
For an additional premium it is agreed that UNDER-
insured Motorist Coverage C-1 is added to Part II of your 
policy. 
We will pay all sums which an insured person is le-
gally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or 
operator of an UNDERinsured motor vehicle because of 
bodily injury sustained by the insured person. 
Limits of Liability 
a. Our liability under the UNDERinsured Motorist 
Coverage cannot exceed the limits of the UNDERinsured 
Motorist Coverage stated in this policy, and our maximum 
liability under the UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage is 
the lesser of: 
I. The difference between the amount paid in damages 
to the insured person by and for any person or organi-
zation who may be legally liable for the bodily injury, 
and the limit of UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage: 
[This underlined portion is hereinafter referred to in this 
opinion as the "limitation of liability clause"]; or 
2. The amount of damages established but not recovered 
by any agreement, settlement, or judgment with or for 
the person or organization legally liable for the bodily 
injury. 
b. We will pay up to the limits ofliability shown in the 
schedule below as shown in the Declarations .... 
Additional Definitions Used In This Part Only 
c. Underinsured Motor Vehicle-means a land motor 
vehicle when: 
I. the ownership, maintenance or use is insured or 





2. its limit for bodily injury liability is less than the 
amount of the insured persons damages. 
Other Insurance 
2. The amount of UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage we 
will pay shall be reduced by the amount of any other bod-
ily injury coverage available to any party held to be liable 
for the accident [This underlined portion is hereinafter 
referred to in this opinion as the "setoffprovision"]. · 
This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes 
and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise sub-
ject to all other terms of the policy. 
(Emphasis added). Under Talbot's policy, the maxi-
mum limits of her UIM coverage were $25,000 per per-
son/$50,000 per occurrence. 
Talbot entered into a settlement agreement with Shield 
and his insurer, Allstate, **1046 *431 for the amount of 
$50,000, which was Shield's limit of liability under All-
state's policy. Because Talbot's damages exceeded 
$50,000, Talbot made a claim for $25,000 ofUIM benefits 
under her policy with Farmers. Farmers denied the claim 
based on its belief that the policy required a setoff of the 
amount paid by Shield against Talbot's maximum UIM 
limit of $25,000, resulting in no money owed to Talbot. 
Farmers filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief 
seeking a determination that the policy issued to Talbot did 
not obligate Farmers to pay Talbot UIM benefits. Talbot 
filed an Answer and Counterclaim in which she alleged a 
breach of contract and bad faith. She also sought class 
certification, claiming that the UIM coverage was illusory. 
Farmers moved for summary judgment on its claim for 
declaratory judgment, and Talbot filed a cross motion for 
partial summary judgment on the issue of her entitlement 
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to payment ofUIM benefits. 
The district court granted Talbot's cross motion for 
partial summary judgment and denied Farmers' motion for 
summary judgment. The district court held that Talbot's 
policy was ambiguous because of the conflicting inter-
pretation between the "Dear Policyholder" language and 
the limitation of liability and setoff provisions. Construing 
the ambiguity strongly against Farmers, the district court 
held that Farmers could not offset the amount Talbot re-
ceived from Shield and that Talbot was entitled to UIM 
coverage for damages she incurred that are in excess of 
Shield's liability policy limits ($50,000), up to her UIM 
coverage limit of$25,000. 
Following the district court's decision, the parties 
stipulated to a dismissal with prejudice of Talbot's re-
maining counterclaims, and the district court certified its 
Memorandum Decision and Order as final under I.R.C.P. 
54(b). Farmers filed a timely appeal, challenging the dis-
trict court's determination that the policy for UIM coverage 
is ambiguous. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1)[2][31 When this Court reviews the district court's 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it employs the 
same standard properly employed by the district court 
when originally ruling on the motion. Smith v. Meridian 
Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2. 128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583, 
587 (1996): City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello. 127 
Idaho 198, 200, 899 P.2d 411, 413 (1995). Summary 
judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of ma-
terial fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matteroflaw. I.R.C.P. 56(c): Mutual of Enumclaw v. Box. 
127 Idaho 851, 852, 908 P.2d 153, 154 0995). Normally, 
both this Court and the district court will liberally construe 
the record in favor of the party opposing the motion for 
summary judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences and 
conclusions supported by the record in favor of that party. 
City of Chubbuck. 127 Idaho at 200, 899 P.2d at 413. 
However, 
[w]here, as in this case, both parties file motions for 
summary judgment relying on the same facts, issues and 
theories, the parties essentially stipulate that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact which would preclude the 
district court from entering summary judgment. As the 
trier of fact, the district court is free to arrive at the most 
probable inferences based upon the evidence before it 
and grant summary judgment, despite the possibility of 
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conflicting inferences. As the trier of fact, the district 
court is responsible for resolving the possible conflict 
between inferences. 
Brown v. Perkins. 129 Idaho 189. 191-92, 923 P.2d 
434, 436-37 0996) (citations omitted). "When questions 
oflaw are presented, this Court exercises free review and is 
not bound by findings of the district court, but is free to 
draw its own conclusions from the evidence presented." 
Box. 127 Idaho at 852, 908 P.2d at 154. 
III. 
THE ENDORSEMENT CONTAINING UIM COV-
ERAGE IS AMBIGUOUS AND IS STRONGLY 
CONSTRUED AGAINST THE INSURER 
[4][5][61-The sole issue before this Court is whether 
the district court erred by determining**l047 *432 that 
Talbot's policy concerning UIM coverage is ambiguous. 
The general rule is that, because insurance contracts are 
adhesion contracts, typically not subject to negotiation 
between the parties, any ambiguity that exists in the con-
tract "must be construed most strongly against the insurer." 
Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Roberts. 128 Idaho 232, 
235, 912 P.2d 119, 122 (1996). The question of whether a 
policy is ambiguous is a question of law over which this 
Court exercises free review. Baker v. Farm Bureau Mut. 
Ins. Co. ofldaho. Inc .• 130 Idaho 415, 416-17, 941 P.2d 
1316, 1317-18 (Ct. App.1997). "To determine whether a 
policy is ambiguous, the Court must ask whether the policy 
'is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation.' " Box. 
127 Idaho at 853, 908 P.2d at 155. (quoting Citv of Boise v. 
Planet Ins. Co .• 126 Idaho 51, 55, 878 P.2d 750, 754 
(1994)). 
The district court concluded that the "Dear Policy-
holder" language was part of the UIM endorsement. It then 
concluded that there was a conflicting interpretation be-
tween the "Dear Policyholder" language and the limitation 
of liability and setoff provisions, thus, making the en-
dorsement ambiguous. This Court agrees that the "Dear 
Policyholder'' language is part of the endorsement for UIM 
coverage and that there is a conflicting interpretation be-
tween the "Dear Policyholder'' language and the limitation 
of liability clause which makes the endorsement ambigu-
ous. However, the setoff provision, which is located under 
the section entitled, "Other Insurance," does not apply to 
the facts of this case, and, therefore, has no bearing on the 
Court's ambiguity analysis. Cf Sublimity Insurance Co. v. 
Shaw. 127 Idaho 707, 905 P.2d 640 (1995) (utilizing ap-
plicable rationale). 
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A. The setoff provision does not apply to this case. 
ill In Shaw, the insured argued that a clause found 
under a section entitled "OTHER INSURANCE" con-
flicted with the limitation of liability clause found in the 
portion of his policy concerning UIM coverage. 127 Idaho 
at 708, 905 P .2d at 641. The Court in Shaw determined that 
the OTHER INSURANCE clause did not apply in that 
particular circumstance because the OTHER INSUR-
ANCE clause referred only to situations where there is 
other UIM coverage. Because there was no other UIM 
coverage in that case, the Court held that the OTHER 
INSURANCE clause was inapplicable and, therefore, 
there was no resulting ambiguity. Id 
In the present action, the setoff provision in Talbot's 
policy is found in the "Other Insurance" section which 
reads: "The amount ofUNDERinsured Motorist Coverage 
we will pay shall be reduced by the amount of any other 
bodily injury coverage available to any party held to be 
liable for the accident." (Italicized emphasis added). The 
other provisions found under the "Other Insurance" section 
in Talbot's policy are similar to the provisions found in the 
OTHER INSURANCE section of the policy in Shaw. The 
setoffprovision in Talbot's policy refers only to situations 
where there is other UIM coverage. Because there is no 
other UIM coverage at issue in the present case, the setoff 
provision is inapplicable and will not be considered by this 
Court in its analysis. 
B. The "Dear Policyholder" language is a part of the 
contract for UIM coverage . 
.(fil Whether language in a "Dear Policyholder" notice 
may be considered part of the contract for insurance is a 
question of first impression in Idaho. Several other states 
have either addressed this specific issue or a related issue. 
Those jurisdictions which have addressed whether separate 
documents are a part of a contract for insurance focus 
upon: (1) whether the document is physically attached to 
the policy, (2) whether the policy specifically refers to the 
document, (3) whether the document amends, alters or 
changes any of the terms and conditions in the policy. See 
Shunga Plaza, Inc. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 206 
Kan. 16,476 P.2d 642, 644-45 0970) (cover letter which 
accompanies an endorsement which is to be attached to 
insurance policy and which deletes one item of property 
will control as to the time and conditions of payment of the 
return premium and the necessity for confirrnation**1048 
*433 of cancellation by insurer where the endorsement is 
silent on such matters); Thompson v. Harold Thompson 
Trucking, 12 Kan.App.2d 449, 748 P.2d 430, 433 (1987) 
("Unless specifically included by reference, th~ declara-
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tions page to an insurance contract is not an actual part of 
the contract."); 2 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. 
SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D 18:23 0995) 
("Separate documents may become a part of a contract of 
insurance by law, by being annexed or attached to the 
policy, or by a clear reference in the policy that they are 
intended to be a part thereof."). See also Brown v. Finan-
cial Serv. Corp., Int'!, 489 F.2d 144, 149-50 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(cover letter should have been considered as part of the 
parties' stock purchase agreement where the cover letter: 
(1) summarized in writing the content of a telephone 
conversation concerning the purchase agreement, (2) spe-
cifically discussed and modified certain terms of the pur-
chase agreement, and (3) accompanied and served as a 
cover to the signed purchase agreement); Richardson 
Eng'g Co. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp .. 554 F.Supp. 
467,470 (D.Vt.1981) (where cover letter sent by subcon-
tractor to general contractor along with executed subcon-
tract in some respects attempted to modify subcontract that 
it accompanied, subcontract was not complete integration 
of parties' understanding and consideration of cover letter 
did not, therefore, violate parol evidence rule). 
Colorado has addressed the specific question of 
whether language in a "Dear Policyholder'' notice consti-
tutes part of the insurance contract. Brennan v. Farmers 
Alliance Mut. Ins. Co .• 96 l P.2d 550 (Colo. Ct. App.1998). 
In that case, the Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that 
the following "policyholder notice" did not constitute part 
of the insurance contract: 
POLICYHOLDER NOTICE 
ADDED PERSONAL INJURY 
PROTECTION 
Your automobile policy has been renewed with the same 
Personal Injury Protection (PIP) work loss benefit 
amounts as last year. However, a recent language inter-
pretation of the Colorado Revised Statute Section 
10-4-710(2)(a) provides that Added Personal Injury 
Protection (PIP) benefits shall be offered "at the option 
of the insured." You therefore have the option to choose 
any or all of the three Added Personal Injury Protection 
benefits as desired: 
If you desire to change your Personal Injury Protection 
benefit coverage or you need more information, please 
contact your agent. 
Id at 554-55. The Colorado Court of Appeals recog-
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nized that 
this document ... [was] not an endorsement. Unlike the 
other attachments to the policy which [were] referred to 
as "endorsements," it plainly is entitled "policyholder 
notice." Furthermore, its specific language does not alter 
the policy. To the contrary, it requires the insured to 
contact a Farmers agent in order to change coverage. 
Id. at 555 (emphasis added). 
Unlike the policyholder notice in Brennan, the lan-
guage in the policyholder notice in the instant matter ap-
pears to alter or modify the endorsement with respect to 
how UIM benefits are measured. The limitation of liability 
clause in the endorsement provides fliat UIM benefits are 
measure · erms of"[t]he difference between the a t 
paid in damages to the msure person by ... any prni ... 
legally liable for the bodily injury, and the limit of l]hl-
DERinsured M.otereit ~¥erage." Under this clause, the 
calculation is $25,000 (Talbot's UIM limit) minus $50,000 
(amount received from Shields), which leaves negative 
$25,000. The "Dear Policyholder" language, on the other 
hand, measures UIM benefits in terms of"the difference of 
the total amount paid by [the other] driver's liability in-
surance and the amount of [the insured's] damages, up to 
the limits of the coverage." Under this clause, the calcula-
tion is at least $75,000 (the total amount of Talbot's dam-
ages) FNt minus $50,000 *434 **1049 (amount received 
from Shields), which leaves $25,000 (Talbot's maximum 
UIM limit) due and owing. 
FN I . Although it is unclear from the record the 
exact extent of Talbot's total damages, it is un-
disputed that her damages were at least $75,000. 
121 The policyholder notice in the present case does 
not contain a designation that it is simply a notice, instead 
"it explains what UIM coverage the insured has, as well as 
the uninsured motorist [UM] coverage, and states that the 
limits of the UIM and UM coverage are the same." Gen-
erally, if an insurer does not wish for a particular document 
to become part of the insurance contract, "the insurer 
should make it clear that it is provided for informational 
purposes only and that its contents are not intended to 
amend, alter or change any of the terms and conditions, of 
the policy." 2 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, 
COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 18:23, cmt. (1995). No 
such language is found in this policyholder notice. As the 
district court noted, a reasonable person would deem the 
policyholder notice as part of the contract for UIM cov-
erage and not just a mere cover letter. 
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ilQl Farmers interprets Talbot's legal argument as one 
based upon the "doctrine of reasonable expectations." 
Because Idaho does not recognize the doctrine of reason-
able expectations, Farmers argues that Talbot's argument 
must fail. Farmers' argument is misplaced. 
The doctrine of reasonable expectations (also known 
as the doctrine of adhesion contracts) is based on the un-
derstanding that insurance contracts are adhesion con-
tracts, and because they are adhesion contracts, the court 
will construe the contract as providing the type of coverage 
the insured reasonably expected the contract to provide, 
regardless of whether the contract in fact provides such 
coverage. See Corgatelli v. Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co., 
96 Idaho 616. 619,533 P.2d 737, 740 (1975), overruled by 
Caseyv. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505,600 P.2d 1387 
{1979). According to the Court in Corgatelli, the doctrine 
ofreasonable expectations applied regardless of whether or 
not ambiguity was present in the insurance contract. 96 
Idaho at 620, 533 P.2d at 741. In Casey v. Highlands In-
surance Co., 100 Idaho 505, 509, 600 P.2d 1387, 1391 
{1979), this Court expressly rejected the doctrine of rea-
sonable expectations in favor of traditional rules of con-
tract construction. See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 100 
Idaho 883, 888, 606 P.2d 987, 992 {1980). Following 
Casey, Idaho courts may only consider an insured's rea-
sonable understandings after it has been determined that 
the insurance contract is ambiguous. See Foremost Ins. Co. 
v. Putzier, 102 Idaho 138, 142,627 P.2d 317,321 (1981) 
("[I]n the case of ambiguously written insurance policies, 
to effectuate the intent of the parties, the test is what a 
reasonable person in the position of the insured would have 
understood the language of the contract to mean."). The 
question in this case is, what documents constitute the 
insurance contract? This Court is free to consider Talbot's 
reasonable understandings in determining whether the 
policyholder notice should be treated as part of the insur-
ance contract. 
The Court concludes that the "Dear Policyholder" 
language is a part of the contract for UIM coverage on the 
bases that: (I) the "Dear Policyholder" language alters or 
modifies the limiting language in the UIM endorsement, 
and (2) the "Dear Policyholder" language contains no 
designation that the document is a cover letter provided for / 
informational purposes only and is not intended to alter or 
amend the terms of the policy. Based on these factors, it 
was reasonable for Talbot to assume that the "Dear Poli-
cyholder" language was a part of the contract for UIM 
coverage. 
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The next question the Court must resolve is whether 
the conflict between the "Dear Policyholder'' language and 
the limitation of liability clause creates an ambiguity 
within the policy such that the policy should be strongly 
construed against Farmers. 
C. The conflicting interpretation between the "Dear 
Policyholder" language and the limitation of liability 
clause makes the policy ambiguous. 
lli1 Farmers argues that even if the "Dear Policy-
holder" language is considered a part of the contract, the 
fact that that language**1050 *435 conflicts with the lim-
itation of liability clause does not make the policy am-
biguous. Relying on Meckert v. Transamerica Insurance 
Co.. I 08 Idaho 597, 70 l P.2d 217 (1985), Farmers con-
tends that as long as a clause which limits the insurer"s 
liability contains clear and unambiguous language, the 
limitations clause is enforceable, irrespective of whether 
the limitations clause conflicts with other language in the 
policy. Farmers reads Meckert to mean that a court can 
only refuse to enforce a limitations clause if either: ( 1) the 
clause violates public policy, or (2) the language in the 
clause itself is not clear. Since there are no public policy 
considerations associated with UIM coverage, see Farmers 
Insurance Co. ofldaho v. Buffa. 119 Idaho 345. 347, 806 
P.2d 438,440 (1991), and the language of the limitation of 
liability clause in Talbot's policy is clear and unambiguous, 
Farmers claims that this Court is compelled to enforce the 
limitation of liability clause as written. 
Farmers' argument applying the Meckert rule to the 
facts of this case is misplaced. Meckert stands for the 
proposition that a limitations clause in an insurance con-
tract is valid and enforceable even if it conflicts with other 
provisions in the contract which grant coverage. The pol-
icy in Meckert provided that the insurer would "pay 
damages which a covered person is legally entitled to 
recover from the owner ... of an underinsured motor vehi-
cle because of bodily injury sustained by a covered person 
and caused by an accident" (coverage-granting clause), but 
then excluded UIM coverage if the insured was injured 
while driving a motor vehicle not covered under the policy 
(limitations clause). 108 Idaho at 599. 701 P.2d at 219 
(emphasis deleted). The Meckert court found no ambiguity 
between the granting clause and the limitations clause. It · 
held: 
An insurance carrier has the right to limit its coverage of 
risk and its liability, and in so doing may impose condi-
tions and restrictions upon its contractual obligations 
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which are not inconsistent with public policy. 
[A]n insurer must use clear and precise language if it 
wishes to restrict the scope of its coverage. We hold that 
[the insurer] has met its burden of clarity and precision. 
In the absence of ambiguity, the words used in an in-
surance policy are to be given their plain, ordinary and 
popular meaning. 
Id at 600-0 l, 70 l P.2d at 220-21 ( citations omitted). 
In the present case, the provisions at issue are not a 
sranting clause and a limitations clause. Unlike Mec~ert, 
the Rrovisions at issue in this case (i.e., the "Dear Pohcy-
holder'' language and the Iim1tatjon of liability clause) are 
each limifations clauses. The "Dear Policyholder" lan-
guage attempts to limit Talbot'sUIM covera e in one 
manner while t e umtat1on o 1abili clause attem ts to 
hm1t T~lbot"s UIM coverage in a different manner. _ e-
c'ause the proyjsions attempt to limit Talbot's DIM cov,er-
<ige in two different ways, ambiguity exists. Because am-
oioui exists the ·f rule of constructio -0 
p ies-i.e., the insurance contract must be construed, 
strongly against the insuG!r. Roberts. 128 Idaho at 235. 912 
P.2d at 122. Contrary to Farmers' argument, Meeker! does 
not chancre the traditional rule of construction that where 
ambigui; exists in an insurance contract, the ambiguity 
should be construed strongly against the insurer. 
Farmers' reliance on other Idaho cases wherein this 
Court upheld an insurer's right to set off the amount re-
ceived from a tort-feasor"s insurance compan'y°against the 
insured"s UIM limits is also misplaced. The insuraoc~ 
policies at issue in those articu · · he 
"Dear o icyho der" language which is present in the in-
st~t case. The presence of the "Dear Palicyba]der" lan-
guage is what makes the policy in this case ambiguOIJS; 
thus this case 1s distinouishable from the other Idaho cases 
~ 0 
rehed upon by Farmers. 
This Court affirms the district court's determination 
that the policy is ambiguous and that, as a matter of law, 
Talbot is entitled to summary judgment. 
**1051 *436 IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's decision to grant summary judg-
ment in favor of Talbot and against Farmers is affirmed. 
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Neither party is entitled to an award of attorney fees on 
appeal. Costs are awarded to Talbot. 
Chief Justice TROUT and Justices SILAK, WALTERS 
and KIDWELL concur. 
Idaho, 1999. 
Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Talbot 
133 Idaho 428, 987 P.2d 1043 
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CASE NO. CV OC 1308697 
FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR 
CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION 
AWARD, AWARD OF ATTORNEY 
FEES, UNENFORCEABILITY OF 
OFFSET CLAUSE AND BAD FAITH 
COMES NOW the above named Plaintiff, by and through her attorneys of record, Runft & 
Steele Law Offices, PLLC, and for causes of action against Defendant, complains and alleges as . ,. 
follows: 
PARTIES & JURISDICTION 
1. Plaintiff Peggy Cedillo (hereafter "Cedillo") at all times relevant to this action was 
and is a resident of Ada County, Idaho. 
2. . Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho (hereafter "Farmers'), was and is an 
insurance company authorized to do and actually doing business in Idaho. 
FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AW ARD, 
A WARD OF ATTORNEY FEES, UNENFORCEABILITY OF OFFSET CLAUSE AND BAD 
FAITH, P. 1 
ORIGINAL ' J 
l 
000090
3. The Court has jurisdiction over this case because Farmers contracted to insure a 
person located within the state of Idaho or was otherwise doing business in the state of Idaho. 
4. The amount at issue exceeds $10,000, the jurisdictional minimums for this court. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
5. Cedillo seeks judicial confirmation of the Arbitrator's Final Award of an 
underinsured claim. 
6. Cedillo seeks an award of attorney fees and costs as a result of the arbitration. 
7. Cedillo seeks a ruling that Farmers' offset clause is inapplicable to the facts ofthis 
case and/or is unenforceable. 
8. Cedillo seeks an award of attorney fees and costs incurred in bringing this action. 
9. Cedillo seeks to recover damages as the result of Farmers' bad faith.· 
FACTS 
10. There existed at all relevant times a contract of insurance between Farmers and 
Cedillo which obligates Farmers to compensate Cedillo for damages caused by an underinsured 
motorist (hereafter "UIM Contract"). 
11. The underinsured motorist coverage is found in El 179i (1 st Edition). See, Exhibit 
A attached. 
12. As the result of a crash, Cedillo suffered serious "bodily injury." 
13. On or about June 5, 2009, Cedillo made a claim for damages under the UIM 
Contract. 
FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD, 




14. Pursuant to the UIM Contract, the parties agreed to arbitrate Cedillo's legal 
entitlement to recovery and the amount of damages. 
15. On February 10, 2012 the Arbitrator entered his Pre-Hearing Order No. 1 Re: 
Scheduling attached as Exhibit B that states at subparagraph 10 that "[t]he Idaho Rules of Civil 
Proceduie'siiall go~em this. arbitration." 
16. On April 5, 2012 Cedillo and Farmers entered into the Stipulation attached as 
Exhibit C. This Stipulation includes the following: 
The parties further stipulate and agree that the following issues are not 
within the Arbitrator's jurisdiction: 
3. The enforceability of Farmers' setoff clause found in 
Endorsement El 179i. The parties hereby preserve and 
reserve the issue of enforceability of the setoff clause for 
determination by the District Court should Claimant wish 
to raise that issue, and failure to raise the issue before the 
Arbitrator will not be considered a waiver. The parties 
further agree that the Arbitrator has jurisdiction to apply 
Farmers' setoff clause found in Endorsement El 179i in 
arriving at his Final Award. The enforceability of Farmers' 
setoff clause found in Endorsement E 1179i, even though 
applied by the Arbitrator in arriving at the Final A ward, is -
preserved and reserved for determination by the District 
Court. The parties intend and agree that this issue is 
severable despite the presumption in favor of arbitration . 
The parties agree that this is an issue outside the scope of 
this arbitration and that the Arbitrator has no jurisdiction to 
determine the enforceability of Farmers' setoff clause; 
17. On January 16, 2013, the Arbitrator entered Arbitrator's Decision and Interim 
Award (Exhibit D, attached) totaling $406,700.12 calculated as follows: 
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1. Economic Damages: 
• Medical expenses: 
• Lost income: 
SUB TOT AL ECONOMIC DAMAGES: 
2. Noneconomic Damages: 
Pain and suffering, loss of. quality of life, physical limitations, 




Right hand: $150,000.00 
TOTALINTER™AWARD: $406,700.12 
18. On April 29, 2013, the Arbitrator entered Arbitrator's Final Award (Exhibit E 
attached) that awarded Cedillo $203,468.41, consisting of the Adjusted Interim Award of 
$100,332.95 plus accrued prejudgment interest of $103,135.46. 
19. Farmers has made the following payments. 
$25,000 on August 29, 2009 
$155,000 on October 16, 2012 
$100,332.95 on March 25, 2013 
-
20. On July 24, 2013, the Arbitrator entered his Amended Final Award (Exhibit F 
attached) that awarded Cedillo $101,947.96. 
21. There remains due and payable as of March 25, 2013 the amount of $101,947.96 
plus interest from March 25, 2013 on the amount of $100,332.95, plus costs and attorney fees 
incurred in arbitration. 
22. That interest at the rate of 12% per annum ($32.99 per day) is accruing. The 
interest due from March 25, 2013 to September 15, 2013 (174 days) is $5,740.26. 
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23. That as of September 15, 2013 the amount due and payable, principal and int~rest 
is $107,688.22 plus costs and attorney fees incurred in arbitration. 
COUNT I 
CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATOR'S AWARD 
24. Cedillo restates and realleges the preceding paragraphs and incorporates them 
herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
25. The Arbitrator's decision is binding on the reviewing court both as to questions of 
law and fact. Hughes v. Hughes, 123 Idaho 711, 851 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Ct. App. 1993). 
26. Cedillo, pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-911, seeks judicial confirmation of the 
Arbitrator's Final Award. 
27. Cedillo requests entry of judgment in the total amount of $269,266.81. As 
detailed in her Amended Verified Memorandum of Costs, Attorney Fees and Prejudgment Interest 
filed simultaneously with this Amended Petition. 
COUNT II 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE§ 49-1839(1) AND IRCP 
INCURRED IN THE ARBITRATION 
28. Cedillo restates and realleges the preceding paragraphs and incorporates them 
herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
29. The Arbitrator determined as a matter of law that Cedillo provided Farmers her 
proof of loss on July 28, 2009. 
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30. Farmers had thirty (30) days after proof of loss had been submitted to pay the 
amount justly due under the terms of the UIM Contract. 
31. If not paid within thirty days, Cedillo is entitled to an award of attorney fees and 
costs. 
32. Farmers did not pay the amount justly d~e under the UIM Contract within thirty 
(30) days of the proof of loss date, July 28, 2009. 
33. Cedillo is therefore entitled to a reasonable award of attorney fees and costs 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-1839 and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. See, Amended 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees and Prejudgment Interest filed herewith. 
COUNT III 
FARMERS SET-OFF OR OFFSET CLAUSE IS INAPPLICABLE/UNENFORCEABLE 
34. Cedillo restates and realleges the preceding paragraphs and incorporates them 
herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
35. The enforceability of Farmers' set-off or offset clause was preserved and reserved 
for determination by this Court 
36. Insurance policies are a matter of contract between the insurer and the insured. 
Brinkman v. Aid Insurance Co., 15 Idaho 346, 352, 766 P.2d 1227, 1233 (1988). In construing an 
insurance policy, the Court must look to the plain meaning of the words to determine if there are 
any ambiguities. Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 663, 
115 P.3d 751, 754 (2005) (citing Clark v. Prudential Prop. And Cas. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 538, 
. . 
540, 66 P.3d 242, 244 (2003)). In resolving this ·question of law, the Court must construe the 
policy "as a whole, not by an isolated phrase." Id. (citing Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins. Fund, l35 
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Idaho 434, 437, 18 P.3d 956, 959 (2000)). Where the policy language is clear and unambiguous, 
coverage must be determined according to the plain meaning of the words used. Cascade Auto 
Glass, Inc., 141 Idaho at 662-63, 115 P.3d at 753-54 (citing Clark, 138 Idaho at 541, 66 P.3d at 
245 (2003)). An insurance policy provision is ambiguous if "it is reasonably subject to 
conflicting interpretations." Cascade Auto Glass, Inc., 141 Idaho at 663, 115 P.3d at 754 (citing 
North Pac. Ins. Co. v. Mai, 130 Idaho 250, 253, 939 P.2d 570, 572 (1997); City of Boise v. Panet 
Ins. Co., 126 Idaho 51, 55, 878 P.2d 750, 754 (1994)). If the Court finds any ambiguities in the 
insurance policy, they must be construed against the insurer. Id. ( citing Farmers Insurance Co. of 
Idaho v. Talbot, 133 Idaho 428, 435, 987 P.2d 1043, 1050 (1999) ("The general rule is that, 
because insurance contracts are adhesion contracts, typically not subject to negotiation between 
the parties, any ambiguity that exists in the contract must be construed most strongly against the 
insurer." 
37. Farmers' insurance policy contains a "set-off' or "offset" clause that Farmers 
contends is enforceable under the facts of this case. 
38. Farmers' "set-off' or "offset" clause was specifically addressed by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in the case of Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho v. Talbot, 133 Idaho 428, 987 
P.2d 1043 (1999) attached as Exhibit G. 
39. The Talbot court unanimously ruled that Farmers' "set-off' or "offset" clause 
found in its El 179i endorsement did not apply to the facts of that case. 
40. A unanimous Idaho Supreme Court stated that Farmers' "set-off' or "offset" 
clause " ... refers only to situations where there is other UIM coverage." Id., 133 Idaho at 432. 
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Cedillo' s UIM contract contains the identical E 11 79i endorsement as addressed in 
As was the case in Talbot, Cedillo has no other UIM coverage. 
Farmers' "set-off'' or "offset" clause has no application to the facts of this case. 
Farmers' "set-off'' or "offset" clause is unenforceable under the facts of this case. 
45. Should Farmers' "set-off'' or "offset" be enforceable, it only reduces limits rather 
than Cedillo' s damages. 
46. Farmers has wrongfully applied its "set-off' or "offset" clause to Cedillo's 
damages rather than UIM limits. 
47. As a result of either the unenforceability of Farmers' offset clause or Farmers 
wrongful application of its offset clause, Cedillo is entitled to an additional award of $105,000 
plus prejudgment interest from August 25, 2009, plus attorney fees and costs. 
COUNT IV 
BAD FAITH 
48. Cedillo restates and realleges the preceding paragraphs and incorporates them 
herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
49. In adjusting and handling all aspects of the claims arising out of the occurrence of 
the crash of May 25, 2008, and arising out of the claims made under her UIM Contract, Farmers 
committed the tort of bad faith. 
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50. Farmers intentionally and unreasonably denied or withheld payment of the claims 
arising out of the occurrence of the crash and arising out of the handling and adjusting the claims 
relating thereto under the Farmers UIM Contract. 
51. Cedillo's claim was not fairly debatable. 
52. The denial or failure to pay Cedillo's claim was not the result of a good faith 
mistake. 
53. The resulting harm is not fully compensable by contract damages. 
54. Farmers, through its agents and/or employees, in evaluating and adjusting 
Cedillo's claims for the benefits under the UIM Contract, intentionally and unreasonably denied 
or delayed adjustment of the claim and payment of all benefits under the UIM Contract by 
engaging in unfair and unreasonable behavior. 
55. Farmers failed to acknowledge and to act reasonably promptly on communications 
with respect to Cedillo's claim. 
56. Farmers failed to adopt or implement reasonable standards for prompt 
investigation of Cedillo' s claim. 
57. Farmers refused, despite repeated requests, to pay Cedillo's claims, which any 
reasonable investigation would have demonstrated were payable. 
58. Farmer made no attempt to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of 
Cedillo's claim after having determined that liability was reasonably clear. 
59. Farmers delayed investigation and payment of Cedillo's claims pending obtaining 
information which had already been supplied, and by making no reasonable effort to pursue 
information made available to it, on more than one occasion. 
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60. Farmers failed and refused to make a timely, meaningful, and adequate 
investigation before withholding benefits due under Cedillo's UIM Contract. 
61. Farmers acted to protect its own financial interest at the expense of Cedillo' s 
rights. 
62. Farmers failed to provide Cedillo any reasonable or justifiable basis for denying 
her claim. 
63. Farmers, knowing that the benefits claimed were justly due, and that such benefits 
were necessary to pay Cedillo' s necessities of life, nevertheless deprived Cedillo of such benefits. 
64. Farmers has invoked a set-off or offset clause known to be unenforceable resulting 
in the withholding of an additional $105,000 due Cedillo. See, Count IV. 
65. Farmers has wrongfully applied its set-off or offset clause against Cedillo's 
damages rather than UIM limits. 
66. Farmers' refusal to pay benefits due compelled Cedillo to engage legal counsel and 
to initiate arbitration to recover such benefits. 
67. Farmers failed to handle Cedillo's claims for benefits in compliance with the 
minimum standards of conduct set by the state of Idaho in the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices 
Act. 
68. Farmers unreasonably failed to appropriately gather and evaluate information 
verifying Cedillo' s claim. 
69. Farmers' policies are designed to save Farmers money by routinely delaying and 
denying claims and by unreasonably "stonewalling" claims, including Cedillo's · claim, in the 
knowledge that most claimants will drop claims once they have been delayed or denied several 
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times, and with the intent that this policy cause the wrongful and unjustified denial of benefits to 
Cedillo and other claimants. 
70. Farmers failed to act in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable 
settlement of Cedillo's claim, after liability and damages had become reasonably clear. 
71. Farmers failed to provide Cedillo with a reasonable explanation of the basis in the 
UIM Contract in relation to the facts or applicable law for delaying or refusing payment of the 
known or reasonably ascertainable losses. 
72. In adjusting and handling all aspects of the claims arising out of the occurrence of 
the crash of May 25, 2008 Farmers committed the tort of bad faith. 
73. Farmers intentionally and unreasonably denied or withheld payment of the claims 
arising out of the occurrence of the crash described herein and arising out of the transaction of 
adjusting the claims relating thereto. 
74. The claims were not fairly debatable. 
75. The denial or failure to pay was not the result of a good faith mistake. 
76. The resulting harm is not fully compensable by contract damages. 
77. The facts stated in this Complaint are but a summary of the facts which arose out 
of the conduct, transactions, and occurrences described herein, and other facts in support of the 
causes of action pied in this co_mplaint will be proven at trial. 
78.. Cedillo has been compelled to retain counsel to assist her in recovering the benefits 
due under the Policy and has obligated herself to pay reasonably attorney fees which she is 
entitled to recover pursuant to the provisions ofldaho Code§ 12-121, 12-123 and 41-1839. 
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COUNTV 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO 
IDAHO CODE§§ 7-914, 12-121, 12-123, AND 41-1839. 
79. Cedillo restates and realleges the preceding paragraphs and incorporates them 
herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
80. Cedillo is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs incurred in bringing this 
action pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 7-914, 12-121, 12-123, and 41-1839. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
81. Farmers by its conduct, has engaged in an extreme deviation from reasonable 
standards of conduct, and has engaged in gross, willful, outrageous, malicious, wrongful and 
wanton conduct, and, therefore, Cedillo reserves the right to seek leave of the Court to amend her 
Complaint to plead for the recovery of punitive damages against Farmers in such amounts as will 
be proven at trial. 
WHEREFORE, Cedillo prays for judgment against Farmers as follows: 
1. As to Count I, that the Court confirm the Arbitration Award and enter 
judgment in favor of Cedillo for the total amount due. 
2. As to Count II, that Cedillo be awarded attorney fees and costs incurred in 
arbitration pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-1839 and the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure; 
3. As to Count III that the Court issue its ruling that Defendant's set-off clause is 
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unenforceable and that as a result Cedillo is entitled to an additional $105,000 
plus prejudgment interest plus attorney fees and costs. 
4. As to Count IV For all damages allowed by law, both special and general 
arising out of the breaches of contract committed by Farmers and all acts of 
bad faith constituting the tort of bad faith committed by Farmers, plus attorney 
fees and costs; 
5. As to Count V, that Cedillo be awarded attorney fees and costs incurred in 
bringing this action. 
6. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
7. For prejudgment interest. 
8. In summary, Cedillo requests that Judgment be entered in her favor for the 
amount of the unpaid arbitration award, attorney fees and costs incurred in the 
arbitration, the additional amount of $105,000 as a result of the 
inapplicable/unenforceable set-off or offset clause, and prejudgment interest, as 
well as damages for breach of contract and the tort of bad faith, plus attorney 
fees and costs incurred in bringing this action. 
DATED this lk~ay of August 2013. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Attorney for Peggy Cedillo 
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff hereby demands, pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
that the issues properly triable by a jury be tried before a jury. Plaintiff will not stipulate to a 
trial ofless than twelve (12) jurors. 
DATED this J{otlday of August 2013. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: JOd_~E~ 
Attorney for Peggy Cedillo 
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County of Ada ) 
VERIFICATION 
PEGGY CEDILLO after being first duly sworn, deposes and says as 
follows: 
That she is the Plaintiff in the foregoing FIRST AMENDED PETITION 
FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD, AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY FEES AND BAD FAITH, that she has read the foregoing and 
believes the facts stated therein are true based upon her own information and belief. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Plaintiff has set her hand and seal the day and year 
first above written 
01.-
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this j_;- day of July 2013. 
Notary Public for Idaho , 
Residing at: Nern~ . 
Commission expires -\.?I, - \°I. 
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Coverage C - 1 UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage 
E1179i 
1st Edition 
For an additional premium it is agreed that UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage C-1 is added to Part II of your 
policy. 
We will pay all sums which an insured person is legally entiUed to recover as damages from lhe owner or 
operator of an UNDERinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by the insured person. 
Limits of Liability 
a. Our liability under the UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage cannot exceed the limits of the UNDERinsured 
Motorist Coverage stated in this policy, and our maximum liability under the UNDERinsured Motorist 
Coverage is the lesser of: 
1. The difference between the amount paid in damages to the insured person by and for any person or 
organization who may be legally liable for the bodily injury, and the limit of UNDERinsured Motorist 
Coverage; or 
2. The amount of damages established but not recovered by any agreement, settlement, or judgment 
with or for the person or organization legally liable for the bodily injury. · 
b. We will pay up to the limits of liability shown in the schedule below as shown in the Declarations. (Note: 






















c. The limit for "each person'; is the maximum for bodily injury sustained by any person in any one 
occurrence. Any claim for loss of consortium or injury to the relationship arising from this injury shall be 
included in this limit. · 
If the financial responsibility law of the place of the accident treats the loss of consortium as a separate 
claim, financial responsibility limits will be furnished. 
d. Subject to the limit for "each person," the limit for "each occurrence" is the maximum combined amount 
for bodily injury sustained by two or more persons in any one occurrence. 
Additional Definitions Used In This Part Only 
a. Insured pe~son means: 
1. You or a family membor. 
2. Any other person while occupying your insured car or your insured motorcycle. 
3. Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of bodily injury to you, a family 
member, or other occupant of your insured car or your insured motorcycle. 
But, no person shall be considered an insured person if the person uses a vehicle without having sufficient 
reason to believe that the use is with permission of the owner. 
b. Motor vehicle m!,!ans a land motor vehicle or a trailer but does not mean a vehicle: 
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1. Operated on rails or crawler-treads. 
2, Which is a farm type tractor or any equipment designed or modified for use principally off public roads 
while not on public roads. 
3. Located for use as a residence or premises. 
c. Underinsured Motor Vehicle - means a land motor vehicle when: 
. . 
1. the ownership, maintenance or use is insured or bonded for bodily injury liability at the time of the 
accident; and 
2. its limit for bodily injury liability is less than the amount of the insured person's damages. 
An underinsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor vehicle: 
(a) insured under the liability coverage of this policy; 
(b) furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family member; 
(c) owned by any governmental unit or agency; 
(d) which are farm tractors and other off road designed vehicles and equipment; 
(e) defined as an "uninsured motor vehicle" in your policy; 
(f) which is self insured within the meaning of any financial responsibility law which applies. 
Other Insurance 
1. We wilr pay under this coverage only after the limits of liability under any applicable bodily injury liability 
bonds or policies have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements. 
2. The amount of UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage we will pay shall be reduced by the amount of any 
other bodily injury coverage available to any party held to be liable for the accident. 
3. If any other collectible insurance applies to a loss covered by this part, we will pay only our share. Our 
share is the proportion that our limits of liability bear to the total of all applicable limits. 
4. We will not provide insurance for a vehicle other than your insured car or your insured motorcycle, 
unless the owner of that vehicle has no other insurance applicable to this part. 
5. If any applicable insurance ot11er than this policy is issued to you by us or any other member company of 
the Farmers Insurance Group of Companies, the total amount payable among all such policies shall not 
exceed the limits provided for tile single vehicle with the highest limits of liability. 
Under Part II of the policy the. provisions that apply to Exclusions and Arbitration remain the same and apply 
to this endorsement. 
I 
/ 
This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise 
subject lo all other terms of lhe policy. 
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Case No. 81700-0040 
PRE-HEARING ORDER NO.1 RE: 
SCHEDULING 
A preliminary scheduling conference was held in this matter by telephone on 
February 8, 2012 with the arbitrator Merlyn W. Clark. JON STEELE, Runft & Steel Law 
Offices, PLLC, appeared. on behalf of the Claimant, PEGGY CEDILLO. JEFFREY A. 
THOMSON, Elam &Burke, P.A., appeared on behalfofRespondent, FARi\1ERS INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF IDAHO. During the scheduling conference, the parties agreed as follows: 
1. All parties who are necessary to complete the resolution of the dispute are 
participating in the arbitration. 
2. The arbitrator has concluded that he does not have a non-waivable conflict 
of interest with the parties in this matter. Farmers was an insurer of firm clients in the past and 
the Arbitrator has mediated two mediations in which Fanners was involved, both are closed and 
the Arbitrator has no immediate recollection of the matters. Farmers Insurance was involved in 
an Arbitration in 2009 that was arbitrated by the Arbitrator. Both parties have waived any 
potential conflict of interest. 
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Counsel for the parties shall notify the arbitrator within 10 days, the names of 
representatives of parties and potential witnesses who will be involved in the arbit_ration 
proceeding so the arbitrator can dete1mine whether any conflict of interest exists with said 
persons. 
3. The nature of the dispute to be arbitrated involves an underinsured 
motorist claim for personal injuries arising out of a motor vehicle accident in Ada County, Idaho 
in May of 2008. 
4. The dispute is being submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the 
Arbitration Clause in the Insurance Policy issued by Respondent and by agreement of the parties 
through their respective legal counsel. Counsel shall submit to the Arbitrator a formal Demand 
for Arbitration and Response to Demand within 10 days. 
5. Counsel have stipulated that whether or not there have been payments by 
./ 
Respondent to Claimant will not be disclosed nor taken into consideration by the Arbitrator and a 
written Stipulation so stating shall be provided to the Arbitrator by Counsel. 
6. Merlyn W. Clark shall serve as sole arb~trator. 
7. Sherry Montosa, legal assistant to Merlyn W. Clark, will serve as case 
administrator of the arbitration proceeding. Communications relating to the arbitration 
proceedings should be directed to Mrs. Montosa. Her direct dial number is 208-388-4881. Her 
fax number is 208-954-5243 and her e-mail address is smontosa@hawleytroxell.com. 
8. The scope of the arbitrator's jurisdiction to enter an award is governed by 




A stenographic record of the hearing will not be made. 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern this arbitration 
proceeding. The admissibility of evidence shall be controlled by the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
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11. Discovery will be conducted pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil 
.Procedure. All discovery shall be completed on or before April 30, 2012. 
The parties have agreed to exchange exhibit lists, exhibits and witness lists on or 
before l\'fay 16, 2012. A copy of the exhibit lists, witness lists and exhibits will be provided to 
the arbitrator. 
Claimant will disclose experts on or before April 30, 2012. Respondent will 
disclose experts on or before May 16, 2012. Claimant's Rebuttal expert witness disclosures are 
due on or before i\fay 23, 2010. The disclosure of experts shall include the name, qualifications 
of the expert and a brief summary of their expected testimony and the b'1sis for such testimony. 
12. The arbitrator does not require preheming briefs but they may be 
submitted if the parties desire. Prehearing briefs, if submitted, shall contain a statement of 
claims, damages and defenses, issues m1d the respective positions of the patiies on each issue, 
and any legal authority deemed applicable and shall be simultaneously submitted to the arbitrator 
by May 16, 2012. Response briefs, if submitted, shall be due on or before May 23, 2012. 
13. Any prehearing motions shall be filed and heard on or before l\'Iay 23, 
2012. 
14. The arbilrator is prepared to issue subpoenas for the appearm1ce of 
witnesses upon request by any party. 
15. The fact witnesses, except parties, will be excluded prior to giving 
testimony. 
16. The hearing is scheduled to commence at 9:00 a.m. on May 30 and May 
31, 2012 at the of.fices of HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, in Boise~ Idaho, and 
shall continue as necessary until completed. It is anticipated that the hearing will require 2 days. 
The Arbitrator is reserving June 1, 2012 if needed. 
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17. Claimant sha.11 pre-mark exhibits beginning with number 1. Respondent 
shall pre-mark exhibits beginning with number 1001. Prior to the hearing the parties shall 
attempt to agree on exhibits that may be admitted by stipulation. 
18. Subject to approval of the arbitrator, the parties will determine at the 
closing of the hearing whether written or oral closing arguments will be presented. If written 
closing arguments are required, a schedule for them will be discussed and decided at the heaiing. 
19. The compensation and expenses of the arbitrator wi11 be paid at the rate of 
$250 per hour. The compensation and expenses of the Arbitrator wil.l be d_ivided and paid one-
half_by Claimant and one-half by Respondent. 
20. The parties have agreed that service may be made by e-mail, as well as by 
mail, facsimi.le or in-person delivery. 
DATED this 10th day of February, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of February, 2012, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing PREHEARING ORDER NO. I RE: SCHEDULING by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Jon Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 1020 W. Main 
Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
j steele/@,nmftsteele.com 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
jat@eJamburke.com 
PRE-HEARING ORDER NO. 1 RE SCHEDULING - 5 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-rnail 
__ Telecopy 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Deli vcrcd 
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Jeffrey A. Thomson 
ELAM & BURKE, l'.A. 
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 33701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
jat@elamburke.com 
ISB #3380 
Attorneys for Farmers Insurance 
Company of Idaho 
r/\A IH, 
IN RE: MATTER OF ARBITRATION 
PEGGY CEDILLO 
and 
FAR!v.IERS INSURANCE COMP ANY OF 
IbAHO 
Arbitration Case No. 81700-0040 
STTPULA llON 
r, UUI 
Farmers Insurance Company ofrdaho (''Farmers"), by and through its attorney of record, 
Jeffrey A. Thomson, and Peggy Cedillo, by and through her attorney ofrecord, Jon M. Steele 
hereby stipulate and agree that any evidence of or information relating to the fo(lowing matters 
be deemed inadmissible and cannot be mentioned or commented upon either before or during the 
arbitratiou: 
I. Any and all evidence, testimony, comments or documents related to the amonnts 
paid (if any) to Peggy Cedillo or her healthcare providers by Jon Steele (the nnderinsured 
motorist) or his insurer (Progressive) pursuant to any insurance policy or other assets of Steele. 
2. Any and all evidence, testimony, comments or documents relating to amounts 
paid (if any) to Cedillo or her healthcare providers by Fanners under its UM coverage. 
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3. Any ll.lld all evidence, testimony, comments or documents relating to policy limit 
amounts of Steele's (the underinsured motorist) insurance policy or Fanners' UTI\11 limits. 
4. Any and all evidence, testimony, comments or documents relating to amotmts 
demanded by Cedillo in settlement of her claim against Steele (the underinsured motorist), his 
insurer (Progressive) or Farmers. 
5. Any and all evidence, testimony, comments or documents that Cedillo was or wns 
not insured under any health insurance policy. 
6. AJiy and nil evidence, testimony, comments or docnments that Cedillo has or has 
not made a prior claim against Fanners or any other insurance carrier. This does not preclude, 
however, any evidence, testimony, comments or documents relating to any prior injUl'ies or 
treatment. 
7. Any reference whatsoever to attorney fees which might be received by Cedillo's 
attorneys. 
The pnrties further stipulate and agree that the following issues nre not within the 
Arbitrator's jurisdiction: 
I. Farmers' liability under its lJIM coverage; ../ 
2. Farmers' deniaJ of medical expense coverage to Cedillo;./' 
3. The enforceability of Farmers' setoff clause found in Endorsement El 179i. The 
parties hereby preserve and reserve the issue of enforceability of the setoff clause for 
determination by the Oisn'ict Court should Claimant wish to raise that issue, and failure to raise 
the issue before the Arbitrator will not be consjdered a waiver. The parties fhrther agree that the 
Arbitrator.has jurisdiction to apply Fanners' setoff clause found i11 Endorsement Ell 79i in 
STIPULATION - 2 
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arriving at his Final Award. The enforceability of Farmers' setoff clause found in Endorsement 
Ell 79i, even though applied by the Arbitrator in arriving at the Final Award, is preserved and 
reserved for detennination by the District Court. The parties intend and agree that this issue is 
severable despite the presumption in favor of arbitration. The parties agree that this is an issue 
outside the scope of this arbitration and that the Arbitrator has uo jluisdictlon to determine the 
enforceability of'Farmers · setoff clause; 
4. Any contention of comparative negligence; 
5. Any award of attorney fees and costs; and 
6. Any claim of bad faith. 
Claimant further agrees and stipulates that she will not seek a determination by the 
Arbitrator of the amount of damages couched in terms of "amount justly due". 1l1e parties· 
acknowledge that this is a phrase with meaning and relevance only to the issue of attorney fees to 
be preserved for determination by the District Co1Jrt. 
Claimant further agrees and stipulates that she will not seek damages for any alleged 
injury to her credit as this issue is also preserved and relevant only in the event of a claim of bad 
faith. 
Claim.ant further agrce.s that any claim of privilege relating to Rule 503 is withdrawn and 
will not be asserted in arbitration. 
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Case No. 81700-0040 
ARBITRATOR'S DECISION AND 
INTERIM AW ARD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
, This arbitration involves claims for damages under the underinsured motorist provisions 
of a policy of insurance that was issued by Respondent, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho to 
Claimant, Peggy B. Cedillo. The claims are disputed by Respondent. The dispute has been 
submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the agreement to arbitrate, which is contained in the 
insurance policy. The agreement to arbitrate, the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act, Idaho Code§ 7-
901, et seq., the Pre-Hearing Orders that were entered by the arbitrator in this matter, and the 
Stipulations of the Parties dated February 22, 2012 and April 5, 2012 govern these proceedings. 
An e'videntiary hearing was commenced on November 20, 2012 in Boise, Idaho before 
the duly appointed arbitrator, Merlyn W. Clark. Claimant, Peggy B, Cedillo, appeared in person 
represented by her attomey, Jon M. Steele, Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC. Jeffrey A. 
Thomson, Elam & Burke, P.A., appeared with Ron Ramsey, a representative of Respondent, on 
behalf of Respondent. Oral and documentary evidence was presented by the parties. The 
evidentiru:y hearing was completed on November 21, 2012. At the close of the hearing the parties 
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stipulated to submit simultaneous written closing arguments on or before December 10, 2012 and 
simultaneous written responses on or before December 17, 2012. The written closing arguments 
have been submitted and the matter is· npw fully submitted for a decision and interim award. 
II. ISSUE FOR DECISION 
The issue to be decided by this arbitration is the amount of payment due under the 
underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage in the policy of insurance that was issued to Claimant 
by Respondent. The parties have agreed that an Interim Award will be issued reflecting a gross 
award of damages as would be recoverable for bodily injury caused by Jon Steele's negligence in 
operating his motorcycle. See Prehearing Order No. 2, p.2. After the issuance of an Interim 
Award, a Final Award.will be issued reflecting any setoffs, collateral source reductions, 
subrogations or prejudgment interest. Id. 
Because the insurance clause in the insurance policy that covers Claimant expressly 
provides that "[t]he expense of the arbitrator and all other expenses of arbitration will be shared 
equally" by the parties and "[a]ttomey's fees and fees paid for the witnesses are not expenses of 
arbitration and will be paid by the party incurring them," this Arbitrator has no authority to 
award expenses of arbitration or attorney fees and costs to either party in this proceeding. 
III. EVIDENCE, FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND DECISIONS 
A. The Insurance Coverage. 
1. Claimant is insured under a policy of insurance that was issued by Respondent. The 
policy provided underinsured motorist coverage to Claimant on May 25, 2008. 
2. Claimant was injured in a motorcycle accident on May 25, 2008 and has made a claim for 
damages under the underinsuted motori~t coverage of the policy. The claim is disputed by the 
insurer. 
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3. The policy of insurance contains an arbitration clause, which provides for binding 
arbitration if the insurer and insured disagree whether the insured is legally entitled to recover 
damages from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle or the amount thereof. 
The arbitration clause further provides: 
In that event, an arbitrator will be selected by the insured person and us. If 
agreement on an arbitrator cannot be reached within (30) days, the judge of a 
court having jurisdiction will appoint the arbitrator. The expense of the arbitrator 
and all other expenses of arbitration will be shared equally. Attorney's fees and 
fees paid for the witnesses are not expenses of arbitration and will be paid by the . 
party incuning them. 
The arbitration will take place in the county where the insured person lives. Local 
court rnles governing procedures and evidence will apply. The decision in writing 
of the arbitrator will be binding subject to the terms of this insurance. Formal 
demand for arbitration shall be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction. The 
court shall be located in the county and state of residence of the party making the 
demand. Demand may also be made by sending a certified letter to the party 
against whom arbitration is sought, with a return receipt as evidence. 
See the Insurance Policy. 
B. The Motorcycle Accident. 
4. On May 25, 2008, Claimant was injured while riding as a passenger on a motorcycle that 
was being operated by Jon Steele ("Steele"), who is now her husband. They were married on 
December 8, 2008. The accident happened on Warm Springs Ave., below the Mesa area, east of Boise 
in Ada County, Idaho. The cycle, which was being driven by Steele in an easterly direction at a speed of 
about 30 mph, drifted to the right side of the road and sideswiped a concrete barrier, known as a Jersey 
barrier, which was situated on the south side of the road. Steele's actions were the sole cause of the 
accident because he failed to control the cycle and allowed it to drift to the right and into the barrier. 
5. When the cycle accident occurred on May 25, 2008, Claimant was sitting in the passenger seat 
behind the driver. Her back was supported by a backrest. Claimant's right side, including her hand, arm 
and hip came in contact with the barrier. Claimant suffered abrasions and contusions on her right hand, 
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which remains scarred. There were no abrasions on Claimant's elbow or shoulder. The contact with the 
barrier rotated Claimant's upper torso in a clockwise direction during the collision. 
6. When the cycle accident occurred, Claimant was not wearing protective clothing such as leathers, 
gloves or a helmet, but there is no evidence that the injuries she suffered, except perhaps the injury to the 
back of her hand, would have been materially reduced by such protective wear. 
7. The collision with the baiTier damaged the gas tank, foot pegs and other areas on the right side of 
the cycle. The cycle remained operable after the collision. The driver brought the cycle to a controlled 
stop and then drove the cycle and Claimant to Steele's residence. Claimant then drove herself home. The 
accident was not reported to law enforcement authorities. 
C. Claimant's Medical History. 
8. The extent of injuries suffered by Claimant in the accident and the.cause of such injuries are 
disputed by the Respondent, which makes certain aspects of Claimant's prior physical condition and 
medical history relevant. 
1. Claimant's Pre-Accident Medical History. 
9. In 2000, Claimant was strnck in the right shoulder by the min-or on her motor vehicle 
when a passing motorist struck the minor and it broke off and flew through an open window into 
her right shoulder. 
10. On February 1, 2001, Claimant was in a motor vehicle acc::ident during which her vehicle, a 
Dodge Durango, was struck from the rear by a pickup truck going about 50 mph. Claimant was injured in 
that collision. 
11. Claimant was seen on February 1, 2001 by Dr. Ten-y Little, M.D., ("Dr. Terry Little") for the 
injuries Claimant suffered in the February l, 2001 accident. · 
12. On March 19, 2001, Dr. David Price, D.C., ("Dr. Price") saw Claimant on referral from Dr. 
Terry Little for injuries from the February 1, 2001 accident. She told Dr. Price she had a history of a prior 
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accident involving her right shoulder. She told him that in June of 2000, she was driving a motor vehicle 
with the window rolled down and was sideswiped by another vehicle, breaking the mirror off and 
throwing it against Claimant's right shoulder. She was being treated by Dr. Welker for the 2000 accident. 
Claimant told Dr. Price she was substantially better from a pain standpoint and was almost back to full 
function, estimating she was probably 90 - 95% recovered from the prior injury. 
13. On March 19, 2001, Dr. Price reported that Claimant "reports pain in h~r head that is 
predominantly in the temple, frontal and sinus areas and has a constant headache since the time of the 
accident. It is variable -- it is of variable intensity. Generally, she feels the headaches have probably 
worsened slightly." Dr. Price also reported in 2001 "patient [Claimant] has pain in the cervical spine that 
is presently bilaterally. This is a deep aching pain, stiffness, and soreness with sharpness on movements in 
extension or toward the right side." Dr. Price also reported in 2001, "The patient [Claimant] has been 
experiencing symptoms of pain, numbness and tingling down the right lateral upper arm, crossing into the 
medial forearm and into the #4 and 5 digits on the right hand." Claimant told Dr. Price that following the 
February 1, 2001 accident she had immediate onset of headache and neck pain. She reported she has new 
pains and an exacerbation of her old pains and feels like she is now worse than even right after the 
accident, as her condition has continued to deteriorate.· 
14. Dr. Price examined Claimant on March 19, 2001 and made the following diagnoses: 
• Cervical thoracic acceleration/deceleration sprain/strain injury with posttramatic 
biomechanical dysfunction, muscular spasming; 
• Lumbrosacral and sacroiliac sprain/strain injury with posttraumatic bio mechanical 
dysfunction, muscular spasming; and 
• Right shoulder sprain/strain injury that involved the rotator cuff muscle with possible 
impingement, and right upper extremity symptoms. 
Dr. Price treated Claimant for these injuries until December of 2002. 
15. On August 30, 2001, an MRI sea~ was performed on Claimant. The scan demonstrated intact 
rotator cuff; an extensive tear of the superior labium that is comparable to a slap tear; right 
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shoulder diffuse parascapular strain syndrome; and component of clinical rotator cuff tendinitis 
impingement type syndrome. 
16. . On September 25, 2001, on referral from Dr. Michael O'Brien, M.D., Claimant saw Dr. 
Thomas Goodwin, M.D., ("Dr. Goodwin"), an orthopedic surgeon at Boise Orthopedic Clinic for 
some complaints regarding her right shoulder; pain limitations in motion, and weakness in her 
right shoulder attributed to the accident ·on February 1, 2001. Upon examination, Dr. Goodwin 
diagnosed: 1) right shoulder diffuse parascapular strain syndrome 2) superior glenoid labral tear 
and 3) component of clinical rotator cuff tendinitis impingement type syndrome. He 
recommended nonsurgical management of her condition. 
17. On April 15, 2002, Claimant again saw Dr. Goodwin with complaints of pain in her right 
shoulder, she complained it was getting worse with light activities, such as riding a bicycle. He again 
recommended nonsurgical management of the condition. 
I 8. On July 25, 2002, Dr. Goodwin again saw Claimant. He examined her and made the following 
diagnoses: 1) right shoulder rotator cuff tendinits and impingement; 2) right shoulder labral tear; 3) 
posterior perilabral cyst extending into spinoglenoid notch of scapula with potential compression of 
suprascapular nerve. This time he recommended surgery. 
19. On July 26, 2002, Claimant had surgery on her right shoulder performed by Dr. Goodwin at 
Healthsouth Treasure Valley Hospital. The preoperative diagnoses were: 1) right shoulder Iabral tears; 2) 
rotator cuff impingement syndrome; and 3) Acromioclavicular joint osteoarthritis and chondromalacia. 
The postoperative diagnoses were the same. 
20. Dr. Price continued to treat Claimant. On November 18, 2002, Dr. Price gave a prognosis that he 
expected in her cervical spine she would have episodes of symptomatic and functional regression 
occurring most probably about once a quarter and that these would involve tightening through the 
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suboccipital region, which is at the base of the skull, leading to headaches and stiffness in the upper 
cervical spine and that it would probably take her anywhere from two to up to four treatments to get her 
· past that. Dr. Price also noted that she may have some residuals in the mid-back area between the 
shoulder blades and that she would be more susceptible to premature degenerative change in her cervical 
spine related to the altered mechanics because of the accident on February 1, 2001. 
21. On November 25, 2002, Claimant saw Dr. Price, claiming she had turned her head and had a 
sudden onset of sharp pain in the cervical area he had been treating. Dr. Price continued to treat her for 
this condition, which he relates to the February 1, 2001 accident, until December 11, 2002. At this time 
she had residual cervical thoracic pain that was spreading from her trapezius ridge area upward into the 
base of her occiput. Also, mid-back pain predominantly across the bra line area that affected some of her 
endurance when she would be exercising. Dr. Price did not see Claimant again until 2006. 
22. On February 15, 2006, Dr. Price saw Claimant. She indicated she was having some headaches 
and neck pain, and she thought it was from sleeping wrong. She reported she was not having upper 
extremity symptoms but was sore through her shoulders with dominance on the left and that previously it 
had been more dominant toward the right side. Dr. Price gave a diagnosis that she had a cervical facet and 
a costovertebral impingement with a cervical torticollis, muscular spasming, myofascitis, and 
compensatory thoracolumbar mechanical strain. He saw her and treated her on two occasions after that. 
23. On June 20, 2007, Dr. Price next saw Claimant. She presented for evaluation and treatment of 
primary left-sided hip pain and cervical thoracic pain. She reported she had been on a backpacking trip 
and had felt that probably her cervical thoracic pain was related to that. The pain was extending up into 
the suboccipital region, which Dr. Price in 2002 had anticipated would probably happen to her. She 
reported herself experiencing a generalized pain, numbness, and tingling in both upper extremities with 
dominance on the right side, but she did not have focal weakness. She did have some endurance weakness 
that Dr. Price thought was related to some rotator cuff muscle impingement point problems that she was 
having. She also tested positive for some thoracic outlet syndt'ome symptoms and she possibly had some 
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underlying disk etiology for radicular type symptoms. Dr. Price treated her for this condition on five 
occasions. 
24. On October 24, 2007, Claimant presented to Dr. Price because of tightness in her cervical 
thoracic region. He saw her and treated her on five occasions for that condition. The last treatment was 
/ 
on November 1, 2007. 
25. On January 14, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Price with right-sided dominant cervical thoracic 
pain and muscular tightness and spasm. She also complained of pain throughout the trapezius ridge and 
into the right levator scapula. She was treated on two occasions for this condition. She was scheduled for 
two more treatments on May 15 and 22, 2008 but did not appear for those. At this time Dr. Price 
suspected she could have a C6 disk that could be causing her some nerve root irritation, but she did not 
have hard or progressive neurologicals that would be supportive of nerve root compression. 
26. On February 27, 2008, Dr. Price tr~ated Claimant for paracervical thoracic muscular pain, 
tightness and spasm. She also had pain throughout the trapezius ridge and into the right levator scapula. 
He noted "C6 disk- weak right triceps" and C5-C6-C7 dysfunction resulting from the 2001 accident. Dr. 
Price treated Claimant for this condition on five occasions in March and four occasions in April of 2008. 
Dr. Price started Claimant on some home traction for self-maintenance because of the underlying 
degenerative changes that she had. He noted that she had improved to the point that by the end of April 
his plan was to work with her one time per week for about two weeks and then go to a two-week interval. 
The plan was for her to begin her regular wor~outs again at the gym on May 8, 2008. 
27. On May 15, 2008, Claimant saw Dr. Price who noted her right cervical thoracic region was 
continuing to improve and he expected her to be on her workout regimen and able to take care of herself. 
28. Prior to the cycle accident on May 25, 2008, Claimant was being treated by Dr. Price for 
muscular spasming and pain through the cervical thoracic region extending into the right shoulder. 
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2. Claimant's Post-Accident Medical History. 
29. When the cycle accident occurred on May 25, 2008, Claimant was sitting in the passenger seat 
behind the driver. Her back was suppo1ted by a backrest. Claimant's right side, including her hand, arm 
and hip came in contact with the batTier. Claimant suffered abrasions and contusions on her right hand, 
which remains scarred. There were no abrasions on Claimant's elbow or shoulder. The contact with the 
barrier rotated Claimant's upper torso in a clockwise direction during the collision. Following the 
accident, Claimant was not feeling well. She experienced problems, including spasms, pain in her neck 
and her right shoulder, and she suffered from headaches. 
30. On May 26, 2008, Claimant presented at McMillan Medical Clinic and was seen by Dr. Natalie 
A. Domangue-Shiflett, M.D., ("Dr. Shiflett") for an open wound on her right hand. The Clinic personnel 
scrubbed the debris from her hand, which was painful and treated it. Claimant returned to McMillan 
Medical Clinic on May 27, 2008 for follow-up treatment of her right hand injury. 
31. On May 29, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Price for injuries suffered during the cycle accident. 
Dr. Price noted that her hand and side had been impacted into the barrier and her body, head, and shoulder 
had been violently swung backwards. Dr. Price reported on May 29, 2008, "[t]he patient [Claimant] 
reports that she has headache pain in the occipital region traveling to the frontal area, but predominantly 
in the occipital portion of the head. It has been constantly present since a short time following the 
accident, but it is of variable intensity." Upon Examination of Claimant, Dr. Price reported he found: 
• She had posterior paracervical muscular spasming that was extending from the upper 
portion of the neck in the suboccipital region down through the cervical-thoracic 
junction, and outward into the shoulders, downward into the shoulder blades or scapulae. 
• When Dr. Price stimulated or tested the suboccipital trigger points they reproduced her 
headache pains that she was complaining of and when it was done to the musculature, it 
substantially intensified the pain into the neck, out to the shoulders. down into the 
shoulder blades. There was radiation into the right shoulder and into the right scapula or 
shoulder blade. 
• Claimant was decreased in her extension or bending backwards of the neck by about 
25%, and this produced a middle-to-low pinching pain in the cervical spine. She could 
force through that but it was with marked pain intensification. 
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• Claimant was decreased in her rotation to the right side by about one-third but it was 
full to the left side. · 
• Claimant's lateral flexion to the left was decreased about 50% and to the right about 
25%. The end points of those motions were·accompanied by substantial pain. 
• When Claimant had a cervical distraction test, pulling up on her neck, it was painful in 
the suboccipital region. 
• When Claimant had a shoulder depression test, it was painful on the opposite side with 
dominance on the right. 
• When Claimant had a foraminal compression test, which would be pressing down on 
the cervical spine vertically, it was painful, but if an extension or lateral flexion 
component was added, the pain intensified and was dominantly painful to the right side, 
causing radiation into the shoulder and shoulder blade itself. The function on her left 
shoulder in movement was normal and painless. 
• The function on her right shoulder in movement was restricted and painful in the upper 
portions of that movement. The right shoulder blade or scapula was hypomobile, showing 
significant decrease in mobility compared to normal. 
• The reduction of the circumduction or circular movement of the right shoulder was 
restricted about one-third in comparison to what was able to be accomplished on the left 
side; that abduction of the right shoulder was decreased about one-third on the right wide, 
or in other words lifting it up, in comparison to the left. 
• Internal rotation or bringing the shoulder -- the hand back behind the back was 
decreased about 25% on the right side in comparison to the left. 
• The insertion point of the common tendon of the rotator cuff muscle group was very 
painful to palpation. 
• The rhomboid muscles or the muscles between the shoulder blades were spasmed 
bilaterally, extending into the spinal muscles. 
• The part of the rotator cuff muscle group in the teres minor and the infraspinatus 
muscles, which are on the back of the shoulder blade, were spasmed and painful. If those 
trigger points were tested or pressed on or stimulated, they reproduced paraesthesia and 
pain down the right upper extremity. 
• Claimant also had indication of possible thoracic outlet syndrome with positive testing 
with scalenus muscle involvement through a part of the cervical spine that reproduced 
some pain and paresthesia in the right upper extremity. 
• Claimant had substantial abrasions on the hand/wrist area. 
• Claimant showed significant endurance weakness in the triceps muscle on the right side, 
and the top two segments in her neck. 
• The CS through 7 segments in her cervical spine showed significant restriction 
biomechanically. 
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• J;3etween her shoulder blades the spinal segments involved in that area showed 
significant abnormal movement. 
• The musculature in the front of the cervical spine was strained and painful and weak on 
strength testing, especially if it was tested from an angle--a 45 degree angle from the 
patient's right or left. 
• In testing of the low back the Claimant was very flexible in that she could reach her 
mid-shin area with some pulling pain across her low back but her extension was not so 
flexible as she was limited about 50% because of low back pain. 
• Lateral flexion on side bending to the side toward the right was decreased about one-
third but it was full to the left. 
• Rotation to the right was decreased about 20% but full to the left. These restricted 
motions produced pain across the lumbosacral region but did not cause lower extremity 
symptoms. 
• The buttocks musculature was spasmed, particularly on the right side. Stimulation of 
trigger points there reproduced some of her pains in the lower extremities, like a sciatic 
neuralgia type of pain and it radiated grade 2, which would mean down to the knee. 
• When laying in a prone or face-down position, Claimant was restricted in lifting the 
right lower extremity, indicating sacroiliac joint dysfunction and lumbosacral pain. 
• In a sitting position, when she straightened her legs bilaterally with both legs going up, 
the chin brought to her sternum, and a straining maneuver performed, it significantly 
i~creased the pain the neck/upper back area. 
• In the lower extremities the anterior tibiallis muscle, which is the muscle that lifts the 
foot up toward the knee, showed significant weakness with endurance. 
• When Claimant bent backwards and to the right and to the left, she had significant 
increase in her low back pain but it did not cause lower extremity radiations. Her 
parathoracolumbar musculature was spasmed and weak when tested in both a clockwise 
and counterclockwise rotational direction. 
32. Many of these findings that were reported by Dr. Price on May 29, 2008, had also been 
reported upon examination of Claimant by Dr. Price on March l 9, 2001 when he treated her for 
the injuries she suffered from the rear-end collision. Under conclusions in the 2008 report, it says, 
"A cervicotharacic sprain/strain injury with posttraumatic biomechanical dysfunction and 
muscular spasming." This is almost identical to the conclusions in the 2001 report. Under 
conclusion #3 in 2008 report, it refers to "the lumbosacral/sacroiliac sprain/strain injury with 
posttraumatic biomechanical dysfunction and muscular spasming" and it says word for word the 
same thing in the 2001 report. Under conclusion #4 in the 2008 report, it states: "indications of 
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present sclerogenic right upper extremity pain/paraesthesia related to a rotator cuff injury and 
sclerogenic referral points being active ... " In the 2001 report at conclusion No. 4, it states, 
"Right upper extremity symptoms that could have a radicular component, but most probably 
involved sclerogenic symptoms related to the right shoulder." 
33. On May 29, 2008, Dr. Price took x-rays of Claimant that showed she had discogenic spondylosis 
or, in other words some wear and tear type of arthritis at the C5-C6-C7 levels, which are the bottom three 
segments in the cervical spine.and there was clear mechanical dysfunction in her neck between a forward 
flexion and extension template view of her neck. In the 2001 x-ray report of Claimant, Dr. Price reported: 
"These x-rays show the patient to have mild discogenic spondylosis at the C6-7 level." 
34. On May 29, 2008, Dr. Price also x-rayed the low back area and it showed that she had a tilt of the 
lumbar spine toward the left side and some torqueing or what is called obliquity of the pelvis and some 
inferior tilting of the sacral base toward the left side. 
35. Dr. Price opined that the injuries he found and reported when he examined Claimant on May 29, 
2008, were related to the motorcycle accident. 
36. On May 29, 2008, Dr. Price referred Claimant to Dr. James Bates, a physical medicine 
rehabilitation physician, for assistance medically. In a letter to Dr. Bates, Dr. Price states: 
• Claimant had a prior history of cervical disk involvement in the C5-6-7 areas; 
moderate discogenic spondylosis at those levels; he had recently seen her because of her 
C5-C6 disk. 
• She was doing home traction and was essentially pain free in the cervicothoracic 
region, with some residual tightness in the trapezius ridge and levator scapula muscles, 
and some intermittent radiation in the superior and medial scapulae. 
•Dr.Price was concerned about the flare up in the right upper extremity. Dr. Price was 
referring to the fact that the shoulder was now very symptomatic. By "upper extremity" 
Dr. Price was talking about the shoulder and down the arm. 
37. On June 6, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Bates for consultation and treatment. Dr. Bates 
treated Claimant with injections of Cortisone, which provided only temporary relief and he prescribed 
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pain killers and pain patches for Claimant. She saw Dr. Bates in June, July, August, September and 
October of 2008. The last visit was October 9, 2008. 
38. On August 27, 2008, Dr. Price reevaluated Claimant. She presented complaining that she went 
out of town on vacation and that her shoulder pain had gradually intensified, spread into the right side; 
. . 
middle to low shoulder blade area and that she was having difficulty sleeping, and was frustrated. She 
requested that something be done to ease her pain. Dr. Price recommended an MRI to determine the 
extent of her cervical disk injuries and possible nerve root impingement. She also complained of having 
substantial pain through part qf the rotator cuff muscle group and Dr. Price suspected she might have a 
tear in the Iabrum of her shoulder. 
39. On September 8, 2008, an MRI was performed on Claimant which showed a "new disk extrusion 
arising from the dorsal right disk margin at C7-Tl measuring approximately 9x3x4 millimeters in 
transverse and anterior to posterior and cranial to caudal height." Dr. Price explained that an "extrusion" 
is a type of herniation that has progressed to the point that the disk material has escaped the outside 
circumference of the disk and has migrated somewhat in a lobular type of fashion in some direction away 
from the disk and it has extruded or extended past the disk margin and creates somewhat of a lobular type 
of appearance. It may compress a nerve or it may be painful for the disk itself but not compress the nerve. 
40. Dr. Price opined that in Claimant's case, the extrusion was large enough to be causing nerve root 
compression. 
41. Dr. Price explained that the MRI showed a disk extrusion from the C7-Tl space that was not 
present when the x-ray was taken of that area on May 29, 2008 and that the x-ray taken on May 29, 2008 
showed a comparatively normal disk space and did not show significant arthritic change or degenerative 
change at the C7-Tl level. 
42. Dr. Price explained that he suspected a tear in Claimant's labrum in the right shoulder because 
she was continuing to have substantial pain in a portion of her range of motion and on circumduction, 
abduction, internal and now external rotation. He noted the combining of the mechanism of injury where 
ARBITRATOR'S DECISION AND INTERIM AWARD - 13 
81700.0040.5517163.2 
000132
her shoulder was pulled back and in that way forced backwards and into the shoulder socket itself along 
with the continued symptomatology in spite of the injection into the shoulder to try to relieve some of the 
rotator cuff tendinitis and impingement pain led him to believe from this experience that there may be a 
tear of the labrum itself. 
43. On September 14, 2008, Claimant presented to Alderman Medical Acupuncture of Idaho for 
acupuncture treatments. She received JO acupuncture treatments between September 14, 2008 and 
October 27, 2008. They did not resolve her pain issues. 
44. On October 29, 2008, on referral from John Alderman, OMD, L.L.C., Claimant presented to Dr. 
Kenneth M. Little, M.D., ("Dr. Little") a Neurological surgeon with Neuroscience Associates, Boise, 
Idaho, for consultation regarding a chief complaint of neck pain, trapezius pain, and right shoulder pain. 
This was the initial visit with Dr. Little, who noted that Claimant repmted having neck pain, trapezius 
pain, right shoulder, and right mid scapular pain since the accident on May 25, 2008. She has not noticed 
any weakness in her arms. She initially had some right arm numbness and tingling involving her right 
radial forearm, index finger, and middle finger, which has subsided. She has been experiencing 
headaches. 
45. Dr. Little reported the MRI dated September 8, 2008 shows a new C7-T 1 soft disc extrusion 
extending into the right ventral epidural space abutting the ventral dural sac adjacent to the anterior root 
of the right C8 nerve root. He noted that at C5-6 there is a loss of disc space height with mild to moderate 
broad based spondylitic ridging abutting the ventral cord surface. There is minimal neural foraminal 
narrowing, left greater than right at C5-6. At C6-7 there is disc space narrowing with mild circumferential 
broad based osseus spondylotic ridging. There is a small perineural cyst in the left neural foramina." Dr. 
Little's impression was "likely has right C8 radiculitits secondary to a dramatic disc protmsion at C7-Tl." 
"Complicating her symptomatology is a history of shoulder problems. Though I suspect her symptoms are 
not coming from her shoulder, it does remain a possibility." Dr. Little recommended a C7-Tl 
transforaminal epidural steroid injection" at C6 and suggested a "decompression of the C8 nerve root by 
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way of anterior cervical approach." Because the injection at the C6 distribution eased Claimant's pain, Dr. 
Little opined the neck pain and radicular type arm pain was specifically in the C6 distribution. 
46. On November 24, 2008, Claimant had a C7-Tl anterior cervical decompression and fusion with 
iliac crest bone graft that was performed by Dr. Little. The preoperative diagnosis was right C8 
radiculopathy secondary to right C7-Tl traumatic herniated nucleus pulposus. The post-operative 
diagnosis was right C8 radiculopathy secondary to right C7-Tl traumatic herniated nucleus pulposus. 
47. Dr. Little opined that Claimant's injuries (the disk herniation) were caused by the cycle accident, 
based upon the MRI which showed mild degenerative changes at C7-Tl with a new disk extrusion plus 
the observation on the MRI that the disk extrusion was associated with quite a bit of edema or swelling, 
meaning it is more likely recent rather than old, and given that just prior to the accident she had not had 
neck pain and did not have radicular sympt?ms, nerve root impingement symptoms. 
48. On December 3, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Little post operation. She reported she was 
doing well and without arm pain. 
49. On December 31, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Little for followup. She reported she was 
doing very well, with no radicular arm pain, but she did complain of trapezius pain and posterior neck 
pain. 
50. On January 9, 2009, Claimant presented at Hands-On-Physical Therapy for therapy prescribed 
by Dr. Little. She continued to receive physical therapy on a regular basis from January 9, 2009 to March 
25, 2009 and from May I l, 20 IO to June 3, 20 I 0. 
51. On March 26, 2009, Claimant presented to Dr. Little for further followup. She reported 
improvement in much of her neck pain with resolution of the pain radiating into her face and well as the 
headaches. She complained of pain over her lateral right tr_apezius, under her right scapula and just below 
her right clavicle after rearranging clothes in her closet fo~ over an hour. 
52. On April 27, 2010, on referral from Dr. Little, Claimant presented at Idaho Sports Medicine 
Institute and was seen by, Dr. Scot Scheffel, M.D. ("Dr. Scheffel") with complaints of right shoulder 
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pain and intermittent right arm numbness. Dr. Scheffel noted Claimant had "long standing right trapezius 
pain, some of which preceded her surgery and has persisted since then. She was doing relatively well, but 
then started increasing a workout program and was doing a lot of overhead activity and noticed increasing 
pain in her trapezius and also beg~n having right arm numbness in the hand. The numbness is worse at 
night. Dr. Scheffel opined the trapezius and rhomboid pain was coming from some poor shoulder 
mechanics and recommended physical therapy. 
53. On August 18, 2011, Claimant presented to Dr. Scheffler for follow-up to recheck neck and 
shoulder pain. Her chart shows she had nol really gotten any improvement with her exercises through 
physical therapy and she continued to have significant right-sided neck pain into the right trapezius that is 
much worse with heavy shoulder activity. She had grinding and popping in both shoulders. Dr. 
Scheffler's impression was persistent right shoulder and neck pain, question secondary to 
acromioclavicluar joint etiology versus other shoulder pathology. He prescribed and administered 
injections in the right AC joint with 1 cc of lidocaine and l-l/2 cc of Kenalog. Claimant continued 
treating with Dr. Scheffler from September 20, 201 l until November 4, 2011. 
54. On October 3, 2011, Claimant had an MRI taken of her right shoulder. Dr. Price explained that 
the MRI of the shoulder that was taken on October 3, 2011 verified that Claimant had a tear in the labrum 
in the right shoulder. He explained that the MRI report showed a "non-displaced superior labral tear 
extending into the upper aspect of the anterior labrum" and also a "mild tendinosis involving the 
supraspinatus tendon without disruption." 
55. Dr. Price explained that the cartilage type of cushion inside the shoulder socket, that is called the 
labrum, was torn and there was a tendinitis, swelling, and inflammation of one of the rotator cuff muscle 
tendons called the supraspinatus muscle. 
56. On November 30, 2011, upon referral from Dr. Little, Claimant was seen by Dr. Thomas 
Goodwin fo_r complaints of right shoulder pain, weakness and loss of range of motion. Claimant reported 
to Dr. Goodwin that her shoulder had done well since the prior surgery until the cycle accident and that 
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she had developed increasing shoulder and scapular pain. Claimant reported that she had to back off on 
her weightlifting activity as a result. 
57. Dr. Goodwin opined that the delay between the accident in May of 2008 and seeking treatment 
from him on November 30, 2011 is not uncommon. Dr. Goodwin's diagnosis was probable recurrent 
superior labral tear of her right shoulder and partial thickness rotator cuff tear of her right shoulder. 
58. On February 15, 2012, Claimant had a C5-6 anterior cervical discectomy and fusion with left iliac 
crest bone graft performed by Dr. Little at St. Luke's Regional Medical Center. The preoperative 
diagnoses were: C5-6 spondylosis, degene~ative disk disease and foraminal stenosis. The postoperative 
diagnoses were the same. Dr. Little reported that the surgery went well and Claimant recovered better 
than the first surgery. She wore a hard collar, then a soft collar during the period of recovery. 
59. On March 27, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was 
satisfactory unchanged anterior C5-C6 and C7-Tl fusions; C6-7 degenerative disease. 
60. On March 28, 2012, Claimant presented to Dr. Little with complaints of severe neck spasms, 
throbbing and paresthesias in her left arm after a walk. Her arm symptoms involve her posterior shoulder, 
triceps, ulnar forearm and hand, consistent with the C7 distribution. Dr. Little charted that he would keep 
her off work an additional two weeks. Dr. Little issued a prescription that required Claimant to remain off 
work through April 13, 2012. 
61. On April 12, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was C5-6 
and C7-l. fusion with no change in alignment or evidence of hardware complication; persistent C6-7 
degenerative disk disease. 
62. Dr. Little prescribed return to work with restrictions on April 13, 2012, with limitation on 
reaching overhead or lifting with her right arm, no repetitive movement with her right hand; also to wear 
a hard collar as necessary and avoid repetitive motions of her head. 
63. On May 7, 2012, Claimant was seen again by Dr. Goodwin. He recommended that she have 
surgery to repair her right shoulder. 
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64. On May 22, 2012, Claimant had surgery on her right shoulder by Dr. Goodwin at Treasure Valley 
Hospital. The preoperative diagnoses were: 1) right shoulder partial thickness rotator cuff tear; 2) superior 
labral tear, right shoulder, extending most likely into biceps tendon. The postoperative diagnoses were: 1) 
right shoulder partial thickness rotator cuff tear; 2) superior labral tear, right shoulder, extending most 
likely into biceps tendon; 3) humeral head and glenoid chondromalacia; 4) subdeltoid subacromial bursa! 
adhesions. 
65. Dr. Goodwin reported that the labral tear that Dr. Goodwin saw in this surgery was in the same 
location but more macerated, more tom, and it extended into the biceps tendon where the biceps attaches 
in the shoulder at the upper part of the labrum; it was in the same location but more significant. 
66. Dr. Goodwin explained that in 2002, he just took a little shaver to smooth off the labrum and 
make it smooth again. In 201 2 he made an incision lower on the shoulder to reattach the biceps lower 
down with a polyethylene anchor screw. Comparing the 2002 and 2012 rotator cuff problem or 
impingement, the findings at the 2012 surgery were in the same location of the rotator cuff but more 
advanced. 
67. On July 19, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was 
satisfactory appearance anterior discectomy and fusion procedure C5-6 and C7-Tl; no abnormal 
movement or fusion levels; and mild movement at C3-4 and C4-5. 
68. On September 27, 2012, Dr. Little referred Claimant to a pain doctor. He reported her pain was 
improving but she needed further care by a pain specialist. Her pain has never com·pJetely resolved. 
D. Claimant's Claimed Injuries. 
1. Scrapes and Abrasions. 
69. Claimant was injured in the motorcycle accident and, as conceded by Respondent, she suffered 
scrapes and abrasions to her right hand and right hip, and is entitled to compensation for these injuries, 
without any deduction for contributory fault. 
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2. Right Shoulcler. 
70. There is disagreement in the testimony and medici}I records whether the motorcycle accident 
caused the labral and rotator cuff tears in her right shoulder. The evidence clearly establishes that 
Claimant had preexisting right shoulder pathology, particularly resulting from the motor vehicle accident 
in 2001 when she suffered right shoulder sprain/strain that involved the rotator cuff muscle with possible 
impingement, and right upper extremity symptoms. 
71. The MRI scan taken on August 30, 2001 demonstrated intact rotator cuff; an extensive tear of the 
superior labrum that is comparable to a slap tear; right shoulder diffuse parascapular strain syndrome; and 
component of clinical rotator cuff tendinitis impingement type syndrome. 
72. On July 25, 2002, Dr. Goodwin examined Claimant and made the following diagnoses: 1) right 
shoulder rotator cuff tendinits and impingement; 2) right shoulder labral tear; 3) posterior perilabral cyst 
extending into spinoglenoid notch of scapula with potential compression of suprascapular nerve. Dr. 
Goodwin prescribed surgery. 
73. On July 26, 2002, Claimant had surgery on her right shoulder performed by Dr. Goodwin at 
Healthsouth Treasure Valley Hospital. The ·postoperative diagnoses were: 1) right shoulder labral tears; 2) 
rotator cuff impingement syndrome; and 3) Acromioclavicular joint osteoarthritis and chondromalacia. 
74. Claimant testified that she recovered fully from the shoulder surgery and resumed her normal 
activities, which included mountain biking, golfing, weight lifting, hiking, snowshoeing, spin classes, 
Yoga and Pilates workouts. The relevant medical records support Claimant's testimony that she was 
asymptomatic with respect to her right shoulder prior to the cycle accident. 
75. Dr. Williams opined that the right shoulder conditions did not exist immediately following the 
cycle accident and therefore were not caused by it. The evidence does not support Dr. Williams' opinion. 
When Dr. Price examined Claimant on May 29, 2008, he reported, among other findings: 
• She had posterior paracervical muscular spasming that was extending from the upper 
portion of the neck in the suboccipital region down through the cervical-thoracic 
junction, and outward into the shoulders, downward into the shoulder blades or scapulae. 
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• When Dr. Price stimulated or tested the suboccipital trigger points they reproduced her 
headache pains that she was complaining of and when it was done to the musculature, it 
substantially intensified the pain into the neck, out to the shoulders, down into the 
shoulder blades. There was radiation into the right shoulder and into the right scapula or 
shoulder blade. 
• Claimant was decreased in her rotation to the right side by about one-third but it was 
full to the left side. 
• When Claimant had a shoulder depression test, it was painful on the opposite side with 
dominance on the right. 
• The function on her right shoulder in movement was restricted and painful in the upper 
portions of that movement. The right shoulder blade or scapula was hypomobile, showing 
significant decrease in mobility compared to normal. 
• The reduction of the circumduction or circular movement of the right shoulder was 
restricted about one-third in comparison to what was able to be accomplished on the left 
side; that abduction of the right shoulder was decreased about one-third on the right wide, 
or in other words lifting it up, in comparison to the left. 
• Internal rotation or bringing the shoulder -- the hand back behind the back was 
decreased about 25% on the right side in comparison to the left. 
• The insertion point of the common tendon of the rotator cuff muscle group ·was very 
painful to palpation. 
• The part of the rotator cuff muscle group in the teres minor and the infraspinatus 
muscles, which are on the back of the shoulder blade, were spasmed and painful. If those 
trigger points were tested or pressed on or stimulated, they reproduced paraesthesia and 
pain down the right upper extremity. 
76. On August 27, 2008, Dr. Price reevaluated Claimant. She presented complaining that her 
shoulder pain had gradually intensified, spread into the right side, middle to low shoulder blade area and 
that she was having difficulty sleeping and was frustrated. She also complained of having substantial pain 
through part of the rotator cuff muscle group and Dr. Price suspected she might have a tear in the labrum 
of her shoulder. 
77. Dr. Price explained that he suspected a tear in Claimant's labrum in the right shoulder because 
she was continuing to have substantial pain in a po1tion of her range of motion and on circumduction, 
abduction, internal and now external rotation. He noted the combining of the mechanism of injury where 
her shoulder was pulled back and in that way forced backwards and into the shoulder socket itself along 
with the continued symptomatology in spite of the injection into the shoulder to try to relieve some of the 
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rotator cuff tendinitis and impingement pain led him to believe from this experience that there may be a 
tear of the labrum itself. 
78. On September 14, 2008, Claimant presented to Alderman Medical Acupuncture ofldaho for 
acupuncture treatments. She received 10 acupuncture treatments between September 14, 2008 and 
October 27, 2008. They did not resolve her pain issues. 
79. On October 29, 2008, on referral from John Alderman, OMD, L.L.C., Claimant presented to Dr. 
Kenneth M. Little, M.D., neurological surgeon with Neuroscience Associates, Boise, Idaho, for 
consultation regarding a chief complaint of neck pain, trapezius pain, and right shoulder pain. Dr. Little 
noted that Claimant reported having neck pain, trapezius pain, right shoulder, and right mid scapular pain 
since the accident on May 25, 2008. She has not noticed any weakness in her arms. She initially had some 
right arm numbness and tingling involving her right radial forearm, index finger, and middle finger, 
which has subsided. 
80. On April 27, 2010, on referral from Dr. Little, Claimant presented at Idaho Sports Medicine 
Institute and was seen by, Dr. Scot Scheffel, M.D. ("Dr. Scheffel") with complaints of right shoulder 
pain and intermittent right arm numbness. Dr. Scheffel noted Claimant had "long standing right trapezius 
pain, some of which preceded her surgery and has persisted since then. She was doing relatively well, but 
then started increasing a workout program and was doing a lot of overhead activity and noticed increasing 
pain in her trapezius and also began having right arm numbness in the hand. The numbness is worse at 
night. Dr. Scheffel opined the trapezius and rhomboid pain was coming from some poor shoulder 
mechanics and recommended physical therapy. 
81. On August 18, 2011, Claimant presented to Dr. Scheffler for followup to recheck neck and 
shoulder pain. Her chart shows she had not really gotten any improvement with her exercises through 
physical therapy and she continued to have significant right-sided neck pain into the right trapezius that is 
much worse with heavy shoulder activity. She had grinding and popping in both shoulders. Dr. 
Scheffler's impression was persistent right shoulder and neck pain, question secondary to 
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acromioclavicluar joint etiology versus other shoulder pathology. He prescribed and administered 
injections in the right AC joint with l cc of lidocaine and 1-1/2 cc of Kenalog. She continued treating 
with Dr. Scheffler from September 20, 2011 until November 4, 2011. 
82. On October 3, 2011, Claimant had an MRI taken of her right shoulder. Dr. Price explained that 
the MRI of the shoulder that was taken on October 3, 2011 verified that Claimant had a tear in the labrum 
in the right shoulder. He explained that the MRI report showed a "nondisplaced superior labral tear 
extending into the upper aspect of the anterior labrum" and also a "mild tendinosis involving the 
supraspinatus tendon without disruption." 
83. Dr. Price explained that the caitilage type of cushion inside the shoulder socket; that is called the 
labrum, was torn and there was a tendinitis; swelling, and inflammation of one of the rotator cuff muscle 
tendons called the supraspinatus muscle. 
84. Dr. Price opined the tear in the labrum in the right shoulder and the trauma to the shoulder 
involving the rotator cuff muscles resulted from the motorcycle crash. Dr. Price explained that a labral 
tear is always undiagnosed until you see it on MRI or during a surgical procedure. 
85. Dr. Price deferred to Dr. Goodwin's opinion with respect to the prognosis on the shoulder. 
86. Upon referral from Dr. Little, on November 30, 2011, Claimant was seen by Dr. Thomas 
Goodwin for complaints of right shoulder pain, weakness and loss of range of motion. Claimant reported 
to Dr. Goodwin that her shoulder had done well since the prior surgery until the cycle accident and that 
she had developed increasing shoulder and scapular pain. Claimant reported that she had to back off on 
her weightlifting activity as a result. 
87. Dr. Goodwin opined that the delay between the accident in May of 2008 and seeking treatment 
from him on November 30, 2011 is not uncommon. 
88. Dr. Goodwin's diagnosis on November 30, 2011, was probable recurrent superior labral tear of 
her right shoulder and partial thickness rotator cuff tear of her right shoulder. He did not recommend 
surgery at that time. 
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89. Claimant was seen again by Dr. Goodwin on May 7, 2012. He recommended that she have 
surgery to repair her shoulder. 
90. On May 22, 2012, Claimant had surgery on her right shoulder by Dr. Goodwin at Treasure Valley 
Hospital. The preoperative diagnoses were: 1) right shoulder partial thickness rotator cuff tear; 2) su~rior 
labral tear, right shoulder, extending most likely into biceps tendon. The postoperative diagnoses were: 1) 
right shoulder partial thickness rotator cuff tear; 2) superior labral tear, right shoulder, extending most 
likely into biceps tendon; 3) humernl head and glenoid chondromalacia; 4) subdeltoid subacromial bursa) 
adhesions. 
91. Dr. Goodwin reported that the labral tear that Dr. Goodwin saw in this surgery was in the same 
location but more macerated, more torn, and it extended into the biceps tendon where the biceps attaches 
in the shoulder at the upper pait of the labrum; it was in the same location but more significant. 
92. In 2002, Dr. Goodwin just took a little shaver to smooth off the Iabrum and make it smooth again. 
In 2012 he made an incision lower on the shoulder to reattach the biceps lower down with a polyethylene 
anchor screw. Comparing the 2002 and 2012 rotator cuff problem or impingement, the findings at the 
2012 surgery were in the same location of the rotator cuff but a bit more advanced. 
93. Dr. Goodwin opined that what he saw in Claimant's shoulder in 2012 was more than just a 
degenerative wear and tear process; it was consistent with traumatic injury. 
94. Dr. Goodwin opined that Claimant's shoulder injuries were compatible with the type of injuries 
she would have sustained in the cycle accident in 2008. 
95. Dr. Goodwin opined that her shoulder injuries were caused by the cycle accident in 2008. 
96. Dr. Goodwin opined that based on his review of Dr. Price's records of treating Claimant, she was 
not asymptomatic regarding her upper back, the rhomboid, trapezius, and levator scapulai for which she 
was receiving treatment; but it could have been a stand-alone issue or it could have been related to 
shoulder or neck pathology, either one. It does not change his opinion relating to what he saw of her 
shoulder. 
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97. Dr. Goodwin opined that Claimant was symptomatic in the back of her shoulder on the date of the 
accident based on Dr. Price's records. Dr. Goodwin has doubts whether the cycle accident was the sole 
cause of her shoulder condition that he observed in 2012. He opined that the cycle accident could have 
aggravated a pre-existing condition. 
98. Dr. Goodwin opined that weight training by Claimant could possibly have played into some of 
this (complaints of pain in her right shoulder and neck, and parascapular pain) in 2012. He also opined 
that the weight training could possibly have caused the labrum tear. 
99. Dr. Goodwin opined that now knowing that she had the pretreatment or the history before the 
accident and now knowing that she had these difficulties with weight lifting several years after the 
accident before she had her surgery, he cannot say with a reasonable degree of medical ce1tainty that the 
cycle accident was the sole and oi1ly cause of the condition he repaired in 2012. He did not offer an 
opinion of apportionment. 
100. Dr. Goodwin opined the torn Iabrum was the primary reason for the surgery he performed. 
101. The Arbitrator will not make a finding of causation or apportionment based on possibilities that 
exercise weight training could have caused or contributed to Claimant's injuries in her right shoulder. 
102. It is the finding of the Arbitrator that the evidence establishes that the cycle accident was the 
cause of the Iabral tear and rotator cuff tear_ in the Claimant's right shoulder and the evidence does not 
support a finding that there should be an apportionmeilt of causation or damages resulting from these 
injuries. Claimant has met her burden of proof showing the cycle accident caused these injuries to her 
right shoulder and she is entitled to compensation for these injuries. 
3. C7-Tl Neck Surgery. 
1.03. On May 29, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Price for the injuries she suffered during the cycle 
accident. He performed a complete examination of Claimant as related above. 
I 04. Dr. Price explained that the only part of the injuries he observed when he examined Claimant 
following the motorcycle accident that predated the moto(cycle crash would have been the CS, 6 and 7 
discogenic spondylosis. 
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1.05. Dr. Price did not find any preexisting degenerative condition in the C7-Tl level of Claimant's 
spine. 
I 06. On September 8, 2008, an MRI was performed on Claimant, which showed a "new disk extrusion 
arising from the dorsal right disk margin aLC7-Tl measuring approximately 9x3x4 millimeters in 
transverse and anterior to posterior and cranial to caudal height." Dr. Price explained that an "extrusion" 
is a type of herniation that has progressed to the point that the disk material has escaped the outside 
circumference of the disk and has migrated somewhat in a lobular type of fashion in some direction away 
from the disk and it has extruded or extended past the disk margin and creates somewhat of a lobular type 
of appearance. It may compress a nerve or it may be painful for the disk itself but not compress the nerve. 
107. Dr. Price explained that in Claimant's case, the extrusion was large enough to be causing nerve 
root compression. 
I 08. Dr. Price explained that the IvlRI showed a disk extrusion from the C7-T l space that was not 
present when the x-ray was taken of that area on May 29, 2008 and that the x-ray taken on May 29, 2008 
showed a comparatively normal disk space ·and did not show significant arthritic change or degenerative 
change at the C7-Tl level. 
109. Dr. Price opined that the disk extrusion at the C7-TI level was the result of the May 25, 2008 
motorcycle crash. He also opined that the prognosis for that area is going to be one of continual problems 
because of the altered mechanics associated with the fusion. Dr. Price explained that Claimant will have 
an acceleration of the degenerative changes in the cervical spine as a result of the motorcycle accident and 
the multilevel surgery on her cervical spine above and below the surgical fusion. 
I 10. Dr. Price deferred to Dr. Little on the prognosis of the surgical fusion. 
111. On October 29, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Little for consultation regarding a chief 
complaint of neck pain, trapezius pain, and right shoulder pain on referral from John Alderman, OMD, 
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L.L.C. Dr. Little noted that Claimant reported having neck pain, trapezius pain, right shoulder, and right 
mid scapular pain since the accident on May 25, 2008. She has not noticed any weakness in her arms. She 
initially had some right arm numbness and tingling involving her right radial forearm, index finger, and 
111iddle finger, which has subsided. She has been experiencing headaches. 
112. Dr. Little reported the MRI dated September 8, 2008 shows a new C7-Tl soft disc extrusion 
extending into the right ventral epidural space abutting the ventral dural sac adjacent to the anterior root 
of the right CS nerve root. At CS-6 there is a loss of disc space height with mild to moderate broad based 
spondylitic ridging abutting the ventral cord surface. There is minimal neural foraminal narrowing, left 
greater than right at CS-6. At C6-7 there is disc space narrowing with mild circumferential broad based 
osseus spondylotic ridging. There is a small perineural cyst in the left neural foramina." Dr. Little's 
impression was "likely has right CS radiculitits secondary to a dramatic disc protrusion at C7-Tl." 
"Complicating her symptomatology is a history of shoulder problems. Though I suspect her symptoms are 
not coming from her shoulder, it does remain a possibility." Dr. Little recommended a C7-TJ 
transforaminal epidural steroid injection" at C6 and suggested a "decompression of the CS nerve root by 
way of anterior cervical approach." Because the injection at the C6 distribution eased Claimant's pain, Dr. 
Little opined the neck pain and radicular type arm pain was specifically in the C6 distribution. 
113. On November 24, 2008, Claimant had a C7-TI anterior cervical decompression and fusion with 
iliac crest bone graft that was performed by Dr. Little. The preoperative diagnosis was right C8 
radiculopathy secondary to right C7-Tl traumatic herniated nucleus pulposus. The post-operative 
diagnosis was right C8 radiculopathy secondary to right C7-T I traumatic herniated nucleus pulposus. 
114. Dr. Little opined that Claimant's injuries (the disk herniation) were caused by the cycle accident, 
based upon the MRI which showed mild degenerative changes at C7-Tl with a new disk extrusion plus 
the observation on the MRI that the disk extrusion was associated with quite a bit of edema or swelling, 
meaning it is more likely recent rather than old, and given that just prior to the accident she had not had 
neck pain and did not have radicular symptoms, nerve root impingement symptoms. 
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115. Dr. Little opined that Claimant's injuries were a combination of her condition prior to the 
accident and her symptoms afterwards. 
116. Dr. Little had no knowledge of the existence of symptoms at C7-T 1 prior to the cycle accident or 
the treatment she was getting from Dr. Price. He based his opinion that the accident led to the surgery on 
a lack of prior symptoms. 
117. Dr. Little opined that the existence of prior symptoms would indicate that the accident aggravated 
the prior condition, but was not the sole cause of the condition. Dr. Little opined that he does not have 
enough information to opine on the apportionment of the prior condition at C7-TI. 
118. Dr. Wilson opined that Claimant's treatment and surgery at C7-T 1 should be apportioned 50% to 
a preexisting condition and 50% to the cycle accident. The Arbitrator finds that Dr. Wilson's opinion is 
based on speculation. The medical evidence presented by the attending physicians, Dr. Price and Dr. 
Little, does not support this conclusion. Both opined and the medical evidence supports their opinions 
that the extrusion at C7-Tl was a new condition that was caused by the cycle accident and was the cause 
of the symptoms that required the surgery. 
119. The evidence as explained by Dr. price when he compared the results of the MRI with the prior x-
ray of Claimant, clearly establishes that the extrusion was not a preexisting condition. The x-ray taken on 
May 29, 2008 showed a comparatively normal disk space and did not show significant arthritic change or 
degenerative change at the C7-T 1 level. Thus, the Arbitrator finds that the evidence does not support a 
finding that the cycle accident aggravated any preexisting condition at C7-Tl, which required the surgery. 
No apportio~ment can reasonably be made by the Arbitrator and the Respondent is liable for the entire 
damage for this injury. 
4. CS-C6 Neck Surgery. 
l 20. The evidence establishes that Claimant suffered C5-C6-C7 dysfunction resulting from the 2001 
accident for which Claimant received treatment from Dr. Price up to and including in April of 2008. The 
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plan was for her to continue treatments from Dr. Price one or two times per week and return to her regular 
workouts at the gym on May 8, 2008. The last visit to Dr. Price prior to the cycle accident was on May 
15, 2008. He noted that her right cervical thoracic region was continuing to improve and he expected her 
to return to her workout regimen and be able to take care of herself. He opined that at that point she was 
probably 90% - 95% asymptomatic from the injuries she received in the 2001 accident. 
121. Dr. Price opined that some of the injuries suffered by Claimant in the cycle accident were 
probably similar to those she had in 2001 when she had sustained a sprain/strain injury to her cervical 
spine and this time sustained a sprain and a strain injury to her cervical spine. 
122. Dr. Price opined that the injuries he found when he examined Claimant on May 29, 2008, were 
related to the cycle accident. Dr. Price opined that the only part of the injuries he observed when he 
examined Claimant following the motorcycle accident that predated the motorcycle crash would have 
been the CS, 6 and 7 discogenic spondylosis. 
123. The x-rays taken by Dr. Price on May 29, 2008 showed that Claimant had discogenic spondylosis 
at the C5, 6 and 7 levels and there was clear mechanical dysfunction in her neck between a forward 
flexion and extension template view of her neck. Dr. Price opined that there was an aggravation of disk 
problems in her cervical spine in the C6 region that were causing some radicular patterns, and that is the 
part that he felt was related to the old sprain injury because she had some pre-existing discogenic 
spondylosis or arthritis in that region that probably caused her some nerve root irritation and some 
patterns of pain that were similar in pattern to what she had before. 
124. Dr. Price opined that the injuries themselves were new but the areas of involvement in the C6 
region were similar through C5, 6 and 7. 
125. Dr. Price opined that the trauma Claimant had in 2000 and in 2001 had an accelerating effect 
upon the degeneration in her C5, 6 and 7 regions. These were evident in the x-rays that Dr. Price took in 
2001 and repeated in 2008. They are the wear and tear type of thinning and spurring and arthritic changes 
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that one would expect to occur from trauma and age. Dr. Price used the two· x-rays to illustrate his 
testimony showing narrowing and spurring that occurred between 2001 and 2008 at CS, 6 and 7. He 
opined that they are not substantial increases but they are increased. He further opined that the 2008 x-
rays show the normally expected mild progression of the degenerative change that he thought would 
happen at the C5, 6 and 7 levels. 
126. Dr. Price opined that because of the prior history of trauma and their anatomical positioning in 
the cervical spine, the CS, 6 and 7 areas were very susceptible to injury in these type of snapping type 
injuries, and that the injuries would have been a major aggravation to those segments at CS, 6 and 7. Dr. 
Price explained that by "aggravation" he means that it is something that a new insult, injury or trauma has 
been superimposed upon an area that may previously have been symptomatic but that the trauma was 
sufficient to re-injure or create new trauma on that same tissue again. 
127. On May 29, 2008, Dr. Price referred Claimant to Dr. James Bates, a physical medicine 
rehabilitation physician, for assistance medically. In a letter to Dr. Bates, Dr. Price states, in relevant part 
• Claimant had a prior history of cervical disk involvement in the C5-6-7 areas; moderate 
discogenic spondylosis at those levels; he had recently seen her because of her C5-C6 
disk. 
128. _On June 6, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Bates for consultation and treatment. Dr. Bates 
treated Claimant with injections of Cortisq~e. which provided only temporary relief and he prescribed 
pain killers an~ pain patches for Claimant. She saw Dr. Bates in June, July, August, September and 
October of 2008. The last visit was October 9, 2008. 
129. On October 29, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Little for consultation regarding a chief 
complaint of neck pain, trapezius pain, and right shoulder pain. Dr. Little noted that Claimant reported 
having neck pain, trapezius pain, right shoulder, and right mid scapular pain since the accident on May 
25, 2008. She has not noticed any weakness in her arms. She initially had some right arm numbness and 
tingling involving her right radial forearm, index finger, and middle finger, which has subsided. She has 
been experiencing headaches. 
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130. Dr. Little was aware of the neural foraminal narrowing at CS-6-7. He reported: "the MRI dated 
September 8, 2008 shows a new C7-Tl soft disc extrusion extending into the right ventral epidural space 
abutting the Ventral dural sac adjacent to the anterior root of the tight CS nerve root. At CS-6 there is a 
loss of disc space height with mild to moderate broad based spondylitic ridging abutting the ventral cord 
surface. There is minimal neural foraminal narrowing, left greater than right at CS-6. At C6-7 there is disc 
space narrowing with mild circumferential broad based osseus spondylotic ridging. There is a small 
perineural cyst in the left neural foramina." Dr .. Little's impression was "likely has right CS radiculitits 
secondary to a dramatic disc protrusion at C7-T l." "Complicating her symptomatology is a history of 
shoulder problems. Though I suspect her symptoms are not coming from her shoulder, it does remain a 
possibility." Dr. Little recommended a C7-Tl transforaminal epidural steroid injection" at C6 and 
suggested a "decompression of the CS nerve root by way of anterior cervical approach." Because the 
injection at the C6 distribution eased Claimant's pain, Dr. Little opined the neck pain and radicular type 
arm pain was specifically in the C6 distribution. 
131. Dr. Little treated Claimant's CS-6 level and opined her condition was a combination of her 
condition prior to the accident and symptoms afterwards. 
132. Dr. Little opined the CS-6 disk problem was not a herniation; it was spondylosis impingement of 
the nerve that was creating pain. Dr. Little explained that the impingement of the nerve came from the 
process of spondylosis. Dr. Little opined that an MRI done in 2000 shows pre-existing spondylosis and 
bone spurring at the CS-6. He testified spondylosis is a progressive disease. Dr. Little opined that the 
spondylosis probably worsened between 2000 and the accident in 2008. 
133. On February I 5, 2012, Claimant had a CS-6 anterior cervical discectomy and fusion with left iliac 
crest bone graft performed by Dr. Little at St. Luke's Regional Medical Center. The preoperative 
diagnoses were: CS-6 spondylosis, degenerative disk disease and foraminal stenosis. The postoperative 
diagnoses were the same. Dr. Little reported that the surgery went well and Claimant recovered better 
than the first surgery. She wore a hard collar, then a soft collar during the period of recovery. 
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134. On March 27, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was 
satisfactory unchanged anterior C5-C6 and C7-Tl fusions. 
135. On March 28, 2012, Claimant presented to Dr. Little with complaints of severe neck spasms, 
throbbing and paresthesias in her left arm after a walk. Her arm symptoms involve her posterior shoulder, 
triceps, ulnar forearm and hand, consistenf with the C7 distribution. Dr. Little charted that he would keep 
her off work an additional two weeks. Dr. Little issued a prescription that required Claimant to remain off 
work through April 13, 2012. 
136. On April 12, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was CS-6 
and C7-1 fusion with no change in alignment or evidence of hardware complication; persistent C6-7 
degenerative disk disease. 
137. Dr. Little prescribed return to work with restrictions on April 13, 2012, with limitation on 
reaching overhead or lifting with her right arm, no repetitive movement with her right hand; also to wear 
a hard collar as necessary and avoid repetitive motions of her head. 
138. On July 19, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was 
satisfactory appearance anterior discectomy and fusion procedure CS-6 and C7-T1; no abnormal 
movement or fusion levels; and mild movement at C3-4 and C4-5. 
139. Dr. Little opined that the MRis of Claimant that were performed in September 2000, August 2008 
and October 3, 2011, all show C6-C7 to have problems, including disk space narrowing and bone 
spurring like the C5-C6. 
140. Dr. Little opined that after reviewing Dr. Price's report, Claimant's symptoms were almost 
resolved and essentially pain free with residual tightness in the trapezius of her scapula muscles and some 
intermittent radiation into the superior and medial scapula, but that she was not resolved prior to the cycle 
accident. 
141. Dr. Little opined that his operative findings at CS-6 were consistent with a long-standing 
preexisting CS-6 spondylosis. 
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142. Dr. Little opined that the injury and surgery at the C5-6 level was caused by the cycle accident. 
He treated Claimant for her C5-6 foraminal stenosis (bone spur was narrowing the nerve opening). Dr. 
opined there were degenerative changes as shown by the MRI that were not symptomatic, which was 
aggravated and became symptomatic following the cycle accident. 
143. Dr. Little could not say the cycle accident was the sole and only cause of Claimant's symptoms 
and need for surgery because of the underlying spondylosis that existed prior to the cycle accident. Dr. 
Little could not give an opinion of appmtionment between the condition or disability prior to the accident 
and the condition or disability caused by the accident. 
144. On September 27, 2012, Dr. Little referred Claimant to a pain doctor. He reported her pain was 
improving but she needed further care by a pain specialist. Her pain had never completely resolved. Dr. 
Little opined that Claimant's pain was the result of the cycle _accident. 
145. It is the finding of the Arbitrator that the evidence establishes that Claimant had a long standing 
preexisting C5-6 spondylosis that was not symptomatic prior to the cycle accident, but was aggravated 
and became symptomatic following the cycle accident. The evidence also establishes that Claimant was 
injured in the C5-6 area in the 2001 rear-end accident and as reported by Claimant and Dr. Price, was 
only 90-95% recovered from the 200 I rear-end accident when she was injured in the cycle accident. This 
condition was symptomatic and Claimant was still receiving treatment from Dr. Prior up to the time of the 
accident. 
146. Dr. Wilson opined that based on his review of the MRis, Claimant would have had surgery at C5-
6 even had there been no accident because the MRI findings were consistent with a natural progression of 
her preexisting spondylosis. It may be that someday the spondylosis would progress to the point where 
surgery would be advisable, but there is no evidence that establishes that it would have been required on 
February 15, 2012 or when that date would arrive. The evidence does establish that it had not arrived on 
the date of the accident because the condition was asymptomatic on the date of the accident. The 
Arbitrator does not accept the opinion of Dr. Wilson that the spondylosis alone caused the need for the 
surgery at C5-6. 
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147. The evidence establishes that the cycle accident aggravated the preexisting injury and spondylosis 
condition and was the major cause of the need for the surgery at the CS-6 level. 
148. The Arbitrator finds that the preexisting condition at C5-6 was aggravated by the cycle accident 
and that an apportionment can reasonably be made. The Arbitrator finds that 25% of the cost of surgery 
for the C5-6 area should be apportioned to the pre-existing condition and 75% should be apportioned to 
the injury at C5-6 that was caused by the accident. 
5. Lost Income. 
149. Claimant has asserted a claim for lost income from the date of the accident to the present in the 
amount of $135,000. Claimant has the burden of proving that she actually lost income as a result of the 
. . 
accident and the amount thereof. 
1.50. Claimant testified that following the accident in 2008, she did not feel well and was unable to 
work at the same level she had been working prior to the accident. She also missed work while attending 
medical appointments with Dr. Price, Dr. Bates, Dr. Alderman, Dr. Little, and during the neck surgery on 
November 24, 2008. Following the neck surgery in November of 2008, she was unable to work during the 
recovery period. She also missed substantial work hours for medical appointments with Dr. Price and Dr. 
Little in 2009, 2010 and 2011, therapy appointments with Hand-On Physical Therapy in 2009 and therapy 
appointments with Idaho Sports Medicine Institute in 20 lO. and 2011. Claimant also missed work for 
medical appointments with Dr. Goodman in 2011. Following the second surgery on February 15, 2012, 
Claimant was unable to work during the recovery period and she missed additional substantial work hours 
for medical and therapy appointments following the surgery. Claimant also missed work during and 
following the shoulder surgery on May 22, 2012. Following the shoulder surgery she was unable to work 
during the period of recovery. She continued to lose work during medical visits with Dr. Little in 201.2. 
The evidence establishes that Claimant made a reasonable effort to wo_rk when she was able to do so, 
including working a second job at BCBG doing part-time retail sales beginning in 2009. The Arbitrator 
finds no evidence to support any claim that Claimant failed to mitigate her loss of income following the 
cycle accident. 
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15 l. Dr. Nancy J. Collins, PhD CRC, ("Dr. Collins"), a vocational rehabilitation specialist in Boise, 
Idaho, opined that Claimant lost income of $135,000 during the 4.5 years following the cycle accident to 
the present. Dr. Collins also opined that Claimant may have some reduced income in the future but she 
did not project or opine on the amount. Thus, the Arbitrator will not award future lost income. 
152. Shannon Purvis, a vocational rehabilitation specialist in Boise, Idaho, opined that Claimant 
possessed the capacity to work following the cycle accident and that no objective evidence proved any 
loss of income by Claimant from the date of the accident to the date of the hearing. She criticized Dr. 
Collins opinion of lost income as being based only of production factors and not other factors, such as the 
recession. Ms. Purvis testified she would limit the loss income to the periods of recovery from surgery 
that Claimant experience, but she did not quantify the amounts lost. The opinions of Ms. Purvis are not 
based on or supported by the relevant evidence. 
153. The Arbitrator finds that Claimant lost income as a result of the cycle accident in the amount of 
$135,000. Dr. Collins explained that she based her opinion on the actual lost earnings that Claimant 
suffered and had taken into account other factors such as the loss of earnings opportunities relating to the 
recession and the reduction in real estate sales in Ada County during the relevant period of time. 
6. Medical Expenses. 
154. Claimant has asserted a claim for medical expenses that can be summarized as follows: 
• Alderman Medical Acupuncture of Idaho 
• Boise Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Clinic (Carpal Tunnel) 
• David N. Price, D.C. 
• Hands-On-Physical Therapy 
• Kenneth M. Little, M.D., Idaho Neurological 
• Idaho Neurological, Charisse H. Mack, P.A. 
• Idaho Sports Medicine 
• Primary Health 
• Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
• Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
• The Shoulder Clinic, Dr. Goodwin 
• Boise Anesthesia, P.A. 
• James H. Bates, M.D. 
• Gem State Radiology 
• Intermountain Medical Imaging 
• Anesthesia Associates of Boise 
• Walgreens 




















• McMillan Medical Center 
•St.Luke's RMC 
• Biomet 
• A Caring Hand 
• Treasure Valley Hospital 
• Physical Therapy of Idaho 








155. Dr. Price reviewed a summary of his billings for treating Claimant following the 2008 motorcycle 
crash in the amount of $6,108.58 and opined that the treatments were all necessary and the amount 
charged for the treatments was reasonable .. 
156. Dr. Little opined that his treatment of Claimant was necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
157. Dr. Little opined that the treatments by Hands-On Physical Therapy, which he prescribed, were 
necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
158. Dr. Little opined that the services ofldaho Sports Medicine physician, Dr. Sheffield, were 
necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
159. Dr. Little opined that the services of Boise Anesthesia, P.A. were necessary and the charges are 
reasonable. 
160. Dr. Little opined that the services of St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center were necessary and 
the charges are reasonable. 
161. Dr. Little opined that the services of Intermountain Medical Imaging were necessary and the 
charges are reasonable. 
162. Dr. Little opined that the services of St. Luke's Regional Medical Center for the second fusion 
were necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
163. Dr. Little opined that the services of St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center for lab work were 
necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
164. Dr. Little opined that the services of Anesthesia Associates for the second surgery were necessary 
and the charges are reasonable. 
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1.65. Dr. Little opined that the prescriptions listed in the summaries of prescriptions from Walgreens 
were necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
166. Dr. Goodwin opined that Claimant's treatment by Dr. Goodwin was necessary and the costs that 
are associated with that treatment are reasonable. 
167. Dr. Goodwin opined that the physical therapy Claimant received was necessary and the costs are 
reasonable. 
l 68. Dr. Goodwin opined that the MRI scan of Claimant's shoulder in 2011 and the dye injected to 
better delineate shoulder pathology was necessary and the costs are reasonable. 
169. Dr. Goodwin opined that the services of Treasure Valley Hospital were necessary and the costs 
are reasonable. 
170. Dr. Goodwin opined the Biomet shoulder pack that was obtained from Biomet for Claimant was 
necessary and the cost is reasonable. 
171. Dr. Goodwin opined that the services of Physical Therapy of Idaho were necessary and the costs 
are reasonable. 
172. The Arbitrator finds that the medical services and costs summarized above in the amount of 
$134,223.63 are reasonable and necessary and were caused by the cycle accident, except as follows: 
• Boise Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Clinic for carpal tunnel treatment 
• Idaho Neurological, K. Little (25% of the 2012 costs of $13,321.19) 
• Idaho Neurological, C. Mack (25% of 2/15/ I 2 cost of $2,812.57) 
• Anesthesia Associates of Boise (25% of2/15/12 cost of $1,969.00) 
• Walgreens (25% of 20 I 2 costs of $412.59) 
•St.Luke's RMC (25% of 2/15/12 cost of $26,526.65) 
• A Caring Hand (25% of 2012 costs of $668.00) 









173. The Arbitrator finds that Claimant is entitled to an interim award of medical costs in the amount 
of $121,700.12. 
174. Claimant made a claim for future medical expenses of $5,000.00. Dr. Collins opined that 
Claimant may have future medical expenses in the amount of $5,000.00 but did not provide any basis for 
such opinion. Thus, the Arbitrator will not award future medical expenses. 
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175. The evidence does not support a claim for household cleaning services and none will be awarded. 
7. General Damages. 
176. Claimant is entitled to an interim award of general damages for pain and suffering, loss of quality 
of life, physical limitations, aggravation to any preexisting condition and scaring on her Right hand, after 
disallowing general damages relating to the 25% apportionment for the C5-6 preexisting condition, in the 
amount of$ 150,000.00. 
IV. INTERIM AW ARD 
As its Interim Award, the Arbitrator assesses the amount of damages for bodily injury suffered 
by Claimant in the motorcycle accident on May 25, 2008 as follows: 
I. Economic Damages: 
• Medical expenses: 
• Lost income: 
SUBTOTAL ECONOMIC DAMAGES: 
2. Noneconomic Damages: 
Pain and suffering, loss of. quality of life, physical limitations, 




Right hand: $150,000.00 
TOT AL INTERIM AW ARD: $406,700.12 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 16th day of January, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of January, 2013, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing ARBITRATOR'S DECISION AND INTERIM AWARD by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Jon Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
jsteele@runftsteele.com 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
jat@elamburke.com 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
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Case No. 81700-0040 
ARBITRATOR'S FINAL A WARD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This arbitration involves claims for damages under the underinsured motorist provisions 
of a policy of insurance that was issued by Respondent, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho 
("Farmers") to Claimant, Peggy B. Cedillo. The claims are disputed by Respondent. The dispute 
has been submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the agreement to arbitrate, which is 
contained in the insurance policy. The agreement to arbitrate, the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act, 
Idaho Code§ 7-901, et seq., the Pre-Hearing Orders that were entered by the arbitrator in this 
matter, and the Stipulations of the Parties dated Febmary 22, 2012 and April 5, 2012 govern 
these proceedings. 
An evidentiary hearing was commenced on November 20, 2012 in Boise, Idaho before 
the duly appointed arbitrator, Merlyn W. Clark. Claimant, Peggy B. Cedillo, appeared in person 
represented by her attorney, Jon M. Steele, Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC. Jeffrey A. 




behalf of Respondent. Oral and documentary evidence was presented by the parties and the 
matter was submitted for a decision and interim award. 
The Arbitrator's Decision and Interim Award was issued January 16, 2013. The Interim 
Award assessed lhe amount of damages for bodily injury suffered by Claimant in the motorcycle 
accident on May 25, 2008 as follows: 
I. Economic Damages: 
• Medical expenses: 
• Losl income: 
SUBTOTAL ECONOMIC DAMAGES: 
2. Noneconomic Damages: 
Pain and suffering, loss of quality of life, physical limitations, 




Right hand: $150,000.00 
TOTAL INTERIM AWARD: $406,700.12 
II. ISSUE FOR DECISION 
The parties have agreed "that following issuance of the Interim Award, the arbitrator will 
conduct post Interim Award proceedings to determine what, if any, adjustments would be made 
in the amount of the Interim Award for prejudgment interest, setoffs or collateral sources and 
subrogation issues prior to issuance of the final award by the arbitrator." (Prehearing Order No. 
2.) This is the Final Award that assesses the amounts for adjustments in the amount of the 
Interim A ward. 
The parties, through their respective counsel, submitted memoranda and exhibits stating 
the positions of the parties with respect to adjustments to be made in the Interim Award. A 
hearing was held on February 26, 2013, during which counsel for the parties presented oral 
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arguments in support of their respective positions. The matter is now fully submitted for entry of 
the Final Award. 
Because the insurance clause in the insurance policy that covers Claimant expressly 
provides that "[t]he expense of the arbitrator and all other expenses of arbitration will be shared 
equally" by the parties and "[a]ttorney' s fees and fees paid for the witnesses are not expenses of 
arbitration and will be paid by the party incurring them," this Arbitrator has no authority to 
award expenses of arbitration or attorney fees and costs to either party in this proceeding. 
III. FACTS, ANALYSIS AND DECISIONS 
A. Adjustments for Payments Made on Behalf of the Tortfeasor, Mr. Steele. 
1. Payments by Progressive Insurance. Progressive paid Claimant $100,000 plus 
medical payment coverage benefits of $5,000 on behalf of its insured, Mr. Steele. Farmers is 
entitled to credit for the amounts paid by Progressive. The Interim Award does not factor in these 
payments and it must be adjusted to do so. 
2. UIM Payments by Farmers. Farmers paid Claimant UIM benefits of $25,000 on 
August 25, 2009 and an additional $155,000 in UIM benefits on October 18, 2012, for which 
Farmers is entitled to credit. The Interim Award does not factor in this payments and it must be 
adjusted to do so. 
3. Adjustment for Contra~tual Reductions. The medical "cost" summary 
submitted by Claimant was for the amount billed by the caregivers. The evidence establishes that 
the amount billed for some of the medical expenses was reduced prior to payment. To avoid a 
"windfall" Claimant is entitled to recover only the amount of medical expenses actually paid. 
The Interim Award disallowed the charges incurred at Boise Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation Clinic and reduced the charges of (l) Idaho Neurological for K. Little, (2) Idaho 
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Neurological for C. Mack, (3) Anesthesia Associates and (4) St. Luke's for charges related to the 
February 15, 2012 surgery by 25%. Contractual adjustments for the services provided by these 
entities were reduced proportionately. Respondent has submitted evidence that supports a 
finding that the amount of contractual adjustments made to lhe amount billed, minus the 25% 
reduction for those charges having contractual adjustments, totals $19,234.81. (See Kathryn 
Brandt Affidavit,~[ 7 and Ex. A attached thereto.) The Arbitrator finds and concludes that the 
Interim Award should be reduced by this amount. 
4. Adjustment for Further Reductions to Medical Expenses Awarded Due to 
25 % Apportionment for CS-C6 Preexisting Condition. 
In calculating the Interim Award, the Arbitrator apportioned 25% of the cost of the C5-
C6 treatment to Claimant's preexisting condition. (Arbitration Decision and Interim Award, p. 
33.) Based on that finding the Arbitrator reduced by 25% the medical expenses associated with 
treatment of the C5-C6 medical issue. The following medical expenses were not reduced but the 
evidence indicates that they are also related to treatment of Claimant's C5-C6 disk and should be 
reduced by 25%. 
a. February 8, 2012, St. Al's bill in the amount of $1,036.00, portions of Exs. 17 and 
40 show lhat this bill is related to the pre-exiting preparation for C5-C6 surgery. 
25% of lhe $1,036.00 in medical expenses results in a reduction of $259.00. 
b. Physical Therapy of Idaho. Exhibit 50 shows that the physical therapy was for 
both the C5-C6 and the C7-Tl issue. Attributing 50% of this $2,893.00 bill 
(Exhibit 24)) to C5-C6 and reducing that amount by 25% results in a further 
reduction of $361.63. 
c. Idaho Sports Medicine treatment from April 27, 2010 to November 18, 2011. 
Exhibit 32 shows that parl of the treatment given relates to C5-C6, including a 
right C6 nerve block. Apportioning the $3,003.00 bill (Ex. 11) one-half to C5-C6 
and one-half to the shoulder and making a futther reduction of 25% equals a 
reduction of $375.38. 
d. Primary Health visit on September 9, 2011. Exhibit 39 shows that this visit was 
for the C5-C6 problem. A reduction of 25% to the $113.00 biJl equals $28.25. 
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e. Intermountain Medical Imaging. Exhibit 12 shows that on October 3, 2011 the 
imaging was related to C5-C6. A 25% reduction of the $1,206.80 bill equals 
$301.70. 
f. St. Luke's visit dated January 11, 2012. Portions of Exhibits 20 and 45 show that 
this visit was for the C6 nerve root block. The $1,221.58 bill should be reduced by 
25% leading to a further reduction of $305.40. 
The total reductions due to the application of the 25% apportionment calculated above is 
$1,631.36. The Arbitrator finds and concludes that this correction should be made to the Interim 
Award. It reduces the Interim Award $1,631.36. 
5. Payments Purportedly Made by Mr. Steele. 
Some argument has been presented that the Arbitrator should also credit Farmers with 
any payments that were made by Mr. Steele directly to Claimant's caregivers. There is no 
evidence that allows the Arbitrator to make this calculation. Moreover, some of the purported 
payments were allegedly made while Mr. Steele and Claimant were married, and thus were likely 
made from community funds, which would entitle her to recover such payments or include them 
in her claim against Farmers. 
6. Adjustment for A ward of" A Caring Hand" Bill. 
The Arbitrator awarded medical expenses in the amount of $668.00 for a bill from "A 
Caring Hand." (See Ex. 21.) The Arbitrator finds that the award of this amount is not supported 
by the evidence and the amount 9f $668.00 minus the 25% reduction already applied by the 
Arbitrator of $167.00 should be reduced from the Interim Award in the amount of $501.00. 
7. The Regence Blue Shield Subrogation Interest. 
The subrogation claim of Regence Blue Shield is a matter between Regence Blue Shield 
and Claimant. It is not within the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to make any adjustment for this 
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subrogation claim. Moreover, the Arbitrator has no jurisdiction or authority to direct how 
payment of the Regence claim should be made and will not attempt to do so. 
8. Collateral Source Rule. 
Respondent, through its counsel, has informed the Arbitrator that Respondent is not 
seeking an offset under the collateral source rule in this proceeding and it will not be considered 
by the Arbitrator in this Final Award. 
9. The Adjusted Interim Award. 
The Interim Award must be reduced by the amount of payments made by Progressive on 
behalf of Mr. Steele ($105,000.00); the amount of the prior UIM payments made by Farmers 
($180,000.00); the amount of the contractual adjustments made to the medical expenses 
($19,234.81); the amount represented by a uniform application of the 25% apportionment to all 
C5-C6 related medical expenses ($1,631.36); and the amount of the adjustment for the "A Caring 
Hand" bill ($501.00). The Arbitrator finds that after making the adjustments, the adjusted Interim 
Award is $100,332.95 plus the award of prejudgment interest. 
B. Prejudgment Interest. 
1. Commencement of Prejudgment Interest. An award of prejudgment interest. 
upon a claim for underinsured motorist ("UIM") benefits is governed by Idaho Code§ 28-22-104 
and Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 
1127 (2006). Section 28-22-104 provides, in relevant part, that when there is no express contract 
in writing fixing a different rate of interest, interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents (12¢) on 
the hundred by the year on money after the same becomes due. 
ln Greenough, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that under Idaho Code§ 28-22-104, 




cases where the amount claimed, even though not liquidated, is capable of mathematical 
computation. The Court furU1er stated that in insurance cases money becomes due as provided 
under the express terms of the insurance contract; therefore, the insured is not entitled to 
prejudgment interest until he or she complies with U1e applicable contract provisions. 
Greenough, 142 Idaho at 592, 130 P.3d at .L 130. 
The Greenough Court held that prejudgment interest began to accrue sixty days after 
submission of sufficient proof of loss, not on the date of the accident, because the applicable 
insmance policy required payment within 60 days after receipt of a signed, sworn proof of loss. 
The Greenough Court also held that a submitted proof of loss is sufficient when the insured 
provides the insurer with enough information to allow the insurer a reasonable opportunity to 
investigate and determine its liability and that the amount of information that should be provided 
in a proof of loss is proportional to the amount reasonably available to the insured. When 
enough information is provided in a proof of loss, the insurer is obligated to investigate and/or 
determine its rights and liabilities in a fair and accurate manner. Greenough, 142 Idaho at 593, 
130 P.3d at 113.L. 
The policy of insurance that was issued to Claimant contains no provision requiring a 
proof of loss to initiate a claim under the policy. Thus, adopting the rationale of the Greenough 
decision, it is the finding and conclusion of this Arbitrator that prejudgment interest began to 
accrue in this case when Claimant provided the insurer with enough information to allow the 
insurer a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability. 
Claimant notified Farmers of her unclerinsurance claim on June 5, 2009. On that date, 
she advised Farmers that she had made a demand for Mr. Steele's policy limits of $100,000 and 
that she would be making a claim under her policy of underinsurance. On June 17, 2009, 
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Farmers acknowledged the receipt of Claimant's demand letter to Mr. Steele's insurer and notice 
that she sought Mr, Steele's policy limits. 
On July 9, 2009, Claimant advised Farmers that she had settled her claim against Mr. 
Steele for his policy limits of $100,000. Claimant, by Farmers' letter dated July 27, 2009, was 
then directed to correspond with Mr. Ron W. Ramsey, Senior General Adjuster for Farmers. On 
July 28, 2009, Claimant by letter addressed to Mr. Ramsey, again advised Farmers that she had 
settled her claim against Mr. Steele for his policy limits of $100,000 and an additional $5,000 in 
medical coverage. She informed Farmers that her medical records and reports which documented 
her injuries had previously been submitted to her local agent, Mr. Jay Reinke. She also enclosed 
a copy of her demand letter to Progressive Northwest Insurance, Mr. Steele's insurer, the Full 
Release of All Claims with Indemnity against Mr. Steele, and her previous letters addressed to 
Farmers Insurance. She also informed Farmers that her medical expenses at that time totaled 
$53,048.62. She stated "[i]n light of my continuing pain, discomfort, ongoing medical treatment, 
the effects upon my daily life, and my future life expectancy, I hereby demand that you pay me 
policy limits [$500,000] and medical coverage." She stated that the enclosed documents had all 
been previously delivered to Fam1ers Insurance, contained a detailed account of her injury, 
medical care, medical expenses, her painful recovery and her damages. She also informed 
Farmers that she and Mr. Steele were then mmTied and that she understood Farmers would 
conduct an investigation of Mr. Steele's financial condition before resolving her claim. She 
asked that the claim be resolved within the next thirty days. (See letter to Mr. Ron Ramsey, 
Farmers Insurance, elated July 28, 2009.) By letter dated July 29, 2009, from Farmers to 
Claimant, Farmers acknowledged receipt of her claim for injuries arising from the accident on 
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May 25, 2008, while riding as a passenger on a motorcycle driven by Mr. Steele. Her claim for 
medical expenses was denied. 
Subsequently, following further investigation, Farmers sent Claimant a check for $25,000 
with a letter dated August 25, 2009. In the letter, Farmers explained that the check represented 
Farmers' valuation of the amount due Claimant under the Underinsured Motorist coverage of her 
policy based upon her letter dated July 28, 2009 and the information provided. Farmers informed 
Claimant that she had provided no information about a wage loss claim, so none was included in 
the valuation. Farmers informed Claimant that she could submit additional information for its 
consideration. Farmers also claimed an offset for the settlement funds paid by Progressive 
Insurance Company, Mr. Steele's insurer for Bodily Injury coverage and medical payments of 
$5,000. (See Letter dated August 25, 2009.) 
Claimant asserts that the date for commencement of prejudgment interest on her claim is 
August 25, 2009. Based on the foregoing facL<;, this Arbitrator finds that Claimant provided 
enough information to obligate Farmers to investigate and determine its rights and liabilities in a 
fair and accurate manner prior to and with her letter dated July 28, 2009, and concludes as a 
matter of law that prejudgment interest began to accrue in this case on August 25, 2009, which is 
the date that Farmers provided Claimant with its valuation of the amount due under the 
Underinsured Motorist coverage of her policy. 
Respondent's contention that Claimant should be required Lo file a new proof of loss for 
each surgery she received is rejected. No such requirement is imposed by law or the insurance 
contract that was issued to Claimant and there is no public policy reason why a new proof of loss 




2. Methodology for Calculation of Prejudgment Interest. 
This Arbitrator cannot accept Claimant's contention that the award of prejudgment 
interest applies to the damage award of $406,700.12 commencing on the proof of loss date, 
August 25, 2009, because it would not account for payments that were made by Progressive or 
by Farmers. Claimant cites American Fo,:eign Insurance Company v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 
400, 94 P.3d 699, 705 (2204) as authority for her contention. This Arbitrator was the arbitrator in 
the Reichert case. In Richert the arbitrator was restricted under the terms of an agreement 
between the parties that prevented the arbitrator in Reichert from considering the worker's 
compensation offset and subrogation issues in the _calculation of prejudgment interest. In 
Reichert the arbitrator erroneously included the issues in the calculation of the final award. The 
Supreme Court held that the Reichert arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to do so because of the 
restrictive agreement. No such agreement or restriction applies in this case that is now before the 
Arbitrator. In this matter, the parties have agreed to allow the Arbitrator to consider these issues 
in determining the Final Award. 
As noted by Respondent in its Response to Claimant's Brief in Support of Final Award, 
Reichert supports Fmmers' position that prejudgment interest is calculated on the Final Award 
and from a date that avoids a windfall to the Claimant. In Reichert, because the Arbitrator did not 
have jurisdiction over the issues, the district court was tasked with handling the issues of the 
worker's compensation offset and subrogation. 1.40 Idaho at 404, 94 P.3d at 709. The Supreme 
Court upheld the district court's p~·ejudgment interest calculation, ruling that offsets for money 
already received shall be deducted from the arbitration award and the prejudgment interest shall 
be recalculated based on a reduction to the gross award of the amounts paid by the worker's 
compensation insurer. 140 Idaho at 402, 94 P.3d at 707. The Supreme Court noted that the 
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purpose of the offset provisions is consistent with the public policy against double recovery and 
these provisions are valid. 140 Idaho at 400, 94 P.3d at 705. The Court concluded that recovery 
of prejudgment interest on amounts paid would result in a windfall to the insured. Id. 
Section 28-22-104 provides that interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents on the 
hundred by the year on "money after the same becomes due." (LC. § 28-22-104(1)2.). Thus, it is 
incumbent on this Arbitrator to determine when payments were due from Farmers to Claimant 
and the amounts thereof as interest accrued on said amounts. In other words, Claimant was 
entitled to interest on the money that was owed to her by Farmers and unpaid from the dates it 
was due and owing, but unpaid, to the extent that said amounts are capable of mathematical 
computation. (See Dillon v. Montgomery, 138 Idaho 614,617, 67 P.3d 93, 96 (2003).) 
The policy of insurance at issue in the setoff clause provides that the amount owed to 
Claimant under the UIM coverage is the amount of damages established but not otherwise 
recovered from the person legally liable for the bodily injury. (See Insurance policy, p. 8, 
Endorsement El 179i.) Thus, logic dictates that the determination of the amounts due and owing 
to Cl~imant under the UIM coverage for the purpose of computing prejudgment interest, are any 
amounts that accrue over and above the payments of $105,000 that were made by the insurer for 
Mr. Steele. In other words, the payments made by Mr. Steele's insurer must be taken off the 
front end of the F~rmer's obligation rather than the back end, i.e., the Final Award, as proposed 
by Claimant. Thus, the obligation of Farmers to pay the medical expenses of Claimant did not 
begin to accrue until the unpaid medical expenses exceeded $105,000. Also, Farmers is entitled 
to credit for payments made by Farmers as of the elate the two payments were actually made. 
Claimant has asserted that this setoff clause is not enforceable and should not be applied 
by the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator is not persuaded that the rationale of the Court in Talbot v. 
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Fanners, 133 Idaho 428, 987 P.2d 1043 (1999) is applicable in this case because the facts of this 
case are distinguishable from those in Talbot. Moreover, the parties have agreed by stipulation 
that the Arbitrator does not have jurisdiction to determine the validity/enforceability of the setoff 
provision found in Endorsement El 179i of the policy at issue. The parties stipulated to "reserve 
the issue of enforceability of the setoff clause for determination by the District Court should 
Claimant wish to raise that issue .... " The parties further agreed that "the Arbitrator has 
jurisdiction to apply Farmer's setoff clause found in Endorsement El 179i in arriving at his Final 
Award. (See Stipulation dated April 5, 2012, pp.2-3.) Thus, the Arbitrator will apply the set off 
provision in determining the Final Award. 
Because it is not feasible to calculate the accrued amounts due for each and every invoice 
Claimant received as of the date of receipt thereof, the Arbitrator will not attempt to do so. 
Rather, the Arbitrator will calculate the prejudgment interest based on an adjusted amount of the 
final award from the date of the proof of loss less the payments that were received by Claimant 
as of the dates such payments were received by Claimant. 
3. Calculation of Prejudgment Interest. 
The Interim Award after the adjustments are made to reduce the Interim Award for the 
contractual adjustments made to the medical expenses ($19,234.81); the amount represented by a 
uniform application of the 25% apportionment to all C5-C6 related medical expenses 
($1,631.36); and the amount of the adjustment for the "A Caring Hand" bill ($501.00) is 
$385,784.01, the "Initial Amount" for calculating prejudgment interest. 
Payments were received from Progress Insurance Company by Claimant in the amount of 
$105,000.00 prior to the date of proof of loss, reducing the Initial Amount to $280,784.01. A 
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payment of $25,000.00 was received by Claimant from Farmers on August 25, 2009, the date of 
proof of loss, which further reduces the Initial Amount to $255,784.01. 
The Arbitrator finds and concludes that prejudgment interest at the rate of 12% per 
annum commenced on the Initial Amount of $255,784.01 and accrued at the rate of 12% per 
annum from August 25, 2009 to October 18, 2012 (1,150 days), when Claimant received a UIM 
payment from Farmers of $155,000, which reduced the Initial Amount to $100,784.01. 
Prejudgment interest at the rate of 12% per annum accrued on the reduced Initial Amount of 
$100,784.01 from October 18, 2012 to the date of the Final Award, April 30, 2013 (194 days). 
The amount of prejudgment interest from August 25, 2009 to October 18, 2012 is 
$96,707.38. The amount of prejudgment interest from October 18, 2012 to April 30, 2013 is 
$6,428.08. The total amount of prejudgment interest is $103,135.46. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND FINAL A WARD 
The Final Award to Claimant against Farmers is TWO HUNDRED THREE 
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT DOLLARS AND FORTY-ONE CENTS 
($203,468.41). 
Prejudgment interest at the rate of twelve percent per annum (12%) shall continue to 
accrue on the adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 until the Final Award is affirmed by a 
Judgment or paid, whichever sooner occurs. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 29th day of April, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of April, 2013, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing ARBITRATOR'S FINAL AWARD by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
Jon Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
jsteele@runftsteele.com 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
jat@elamburke.com 
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__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-mail 
__ Telecopy 





















) ________________ .) 
Case No. 81700-0040 
AMENDED FINAL A WARD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This arbitration involves claims for damages under the underinsured motorist provisions 
of a policy of insurance that was issued by Respondent, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho 
("Fanners" or "Respondent") to Claimant, Peggy B. Cedillo ("Claimant"). The claims are 
disputed by Respondent. The dispute has been submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the 
agreement to arbitrate, which is contained in the insurance policy. The agreement to arbitrate, the 
Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act, Idaho Code§ 7-901, et seq., the Pre-Hearing Orders that were 
entered by the arbitrator in this matter, and the Stipulations of the Parties dated Febrnary 22, 
2012 and April 5, 2012 govern these proceedings. 
The Final Award was issued on April 29, 2013. In the Final Award, Claimant was 
awarded the sum of $203,468.41, consisting of the Adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 plus 
accrned prejudgment interest of $103,135.46. It was further ordered that prejudgment interest at 
the rate of twelve percent per annum (12%) shall continue to accrue on the Adjusted Interim 





Award of $100,332.95 from the date of the Final Award until the Final Award ~s confirmed by a 
final judgment of a court or paid, whichever sooner occurs. 
On May 20, 2013, Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Prejudgment 
Interest Award, in which Respondent seeks adjustment of the amount of prejudgment interest 
that was included in the Final Award to account for a payment by Respondent to Claimant that 
was made after the Interim Award was issued but before the Final A ward was issued. The 
Affidavit of Counsel that is submitted in support of Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration 
establishes that Respondent paid to Claimant the sum of $100,332.95 on March 25, 2013, which 
was the amount.of the Adjusted Interim Award. The fact that this payment was made by 
Respondent and received by Claimant is not dfaputed by Claimant. This payment was made 
thirty-six (36) days before the Final Award was issued. The Arbitrator was not informed of this 
payment and did not consider it in the calculation of prejudgment interest that was made by the 
Arbitrator and awarded in the Final Award. The Motion for Reconsideration also seeks a 
recalculation and adjustment of prejudgment interest on medical expenses, lost income and 
general damages based on information submitted with the Motion. The parties, through their 
respective counsel, submitted memoranda in support of and in opposition to the Motion. 
The Arbitrator has duly considered the authorities and arguments that were submitted by 
the patties and has issued simultaneously with this Amended Final Award, the Arbitrator's Final 
Order No. 12 Re: Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of Prejudgment Interest Award and 
Claimant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Counsel for Respondent. The Final Order No. 12 grants 
in part and denies in part the Motion for Reconsideration. 
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II. AMENDED FINAL AW ARD 
The Final Award that was issued on April 29, 2013 is incorporated herein, except as it is 
revised and amended by this Amended Final Award. 
In the Final Award, Claimant was awarded the sum of $203,468.41 consisting of the 
Adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 plus accrued prejudgment interest of $103,135.46, a 
total of $203,468.41. It was further ordered that prejudgment interest at the rate of twelve 
percent per annum (12%) shall continue to accrue on the Adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 
from the date of the Final Award until the Final Award is confirmed by a judgment of a court or 
paid, whichever sooner occurs. 
Respondent is entitled to a credit on the Final Award of $100,332.96 for the payment on 
March 25, 2013. On March 25, 2013, Respondent's obligation under the Final Award was 
$100,332.95 (the Adjusted Interim Award) plus outstanding accrued prejudgment interest of 
$103,135.46, a total of $203,468.41. The payment was applied to the accrued prejudgment 
interest of $103,135.46, leaving unpaid the award of $100,332.95 plus accrued interest of 
$2,802.51. 
Respondent is also entitled to a credit of $1,187.50 for 36 days of interest at 12% per 
annum on the Adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95. This credit further reduces the amount of 
the accrued unpaid interest to $1,615.01 as of March 25, 2013. Thus, on March 25, 2013, the 
corrected and Amended Final Award is $101,947.96. 
Prejudgment interest at the rate of 12% per annum continues to accrne on the unpaid 
Adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 from March 25, 2013 until the Amended Final Award is 
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confirmed in a final judgment or paid, whichever sooner occurs. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 24th day of July, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of July, 2013, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing AMENDED FINAL A WARD by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
Jon Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
jsteele@mnftsteele.com 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
jat@elamburke.com 
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__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
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Sept. 14, 1999. 
Automobile insurer sought a declaration that it was 
entitled to set off the amount that an injured insured had 
received from the tortfeasor's liability insurer in deter-
mining the limit of the insured's underinsured motorist 
(UIM) coverage. The District Court, Ada County, N. 
Randy Smith, J., granted summary judgment to the in-
sured, and the insurer appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Schroeder, J., held that: (I) a setoff provision appearing in 
the policy's "Other Insurance" section did not apply; (2) as 
a matter of first impression, a "Dear Policyholder" notice 
sent by the insurer to the insured concerning the amount of 
UIM coverage was part of the parties' contract; and (3) the 
notice created an ambiguity which had to be construed 
against the insurer. 
· Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
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eral 
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30k863 k. In general. Most Cited Cases . 
When the Supreme Court reviews the district court's 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it employs the 
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when originally ruling on the motion. Rules Civ.Proc .. 
Rule 56(c). 
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summary judgment, the Supreme Court exercises free 
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but is free to draw its own conclusions from the evidence 
presented. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(c). 
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As a general rule, any ambiguity that exists in an in-
surance contract must be construed most strongly against 
the insurer. 
ill Appeal and Error 30 €=;,842(8) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30:XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in Gen-
eral 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(8) k. Review where evidence 
consists of documents. Most Cited Cases 
Whether an insurance policy is ambiguous is a ques-
tion of law over which the Supreme Court exercises free 
review. 
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flicting interpretation. 
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ance. Most Cited Cases 
Setoff provision which appeared in the "Other Insur-
ance" section of an automobile policy and provided that 
the amount of underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage 
would be "reduced by the amount of any other bodily 
injury coverage available to any party held to be liable for 
the accident" applied only to situations where there was 
other UIM coverage. 
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insurer to its insured indicating that the amount of under-
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damages, up to the limits of the coverage, had to be con-
sidered part of the parties' contract, where it varied the 
policy's limit of liability clause, which measured the 
amount of UIM coverage by the difference between the 
amount paid in damages to the insured and the limit of 
UIM coverage, and where it nowhere stated that it was a 
cover letter provided for informational purposes only. 
121 Insurance 217 €=;,1839 
217 Insurance 
217XIII Contracts and Policies 
217XIU(G) Rules of Construction 
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2 I 7XXII(D) Uninsured or Underinsured Motorist 
Coverage 
217k2794 Amount of Coverage 
217k2795 k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
Court wa·s free to consider the insured's reasonable 
understandings in determining whether a "Dear Policy-
holder'' notice sent by an automobile insurer to its insured 
concerning the amount of underinsured motorist (UIM) 
coverage should be treated as part of the insurance con-
tract. 
l!!l insurance 217 ~796 
2 I 7 Insurance 
2 I 7XXII Coverage--Automobile Insurance 
217XXII(D) Uninsured or Underinsured Motorist 
Coverage 
2 l 7k2794 Amount of Coverage 
2171<27?6 k. Policy limits. Most Cited Cases 
Where a "Dear Policyholder" notice sent by an au-
tomobile insurer to its insured attempted to limit underin-
sured motorist (UIM) coverage in one manner and the 
policy's limit of liability clause attempted to limit UIM 
coverage in a different manner, an ambiguity existed which 
had to be construed against the insurer. 
**1044 *429 Elam & Burke, P.A., Boise, for appellant. 
Bobbi K. Dominick argued. 
Comstock & B~sh, Boise, for respondent. John A. Bush. 
argued. 
SCHROEDER, Justice. 
This automobile insurance case concerns underin-
sured motorist (UIM) coverage. Farmers Insurance Com-
pany of Idaho (Farmers) brought a declaratory judgment 
seeking a determination that it is entitled to set off the 
amount that the insured, Adelyn Talbot (Talbot), received 
from the tort-feasor's insurance company from Talbot's 
maximum UIM liability limit. The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Talbot, ruling that language 
in the "Dear Policyholder" notice which accompanied the 
endorsement for UIM coverage conflicted with the limita-
tion of liability and setoff provisions in the endorsement, 
and, therefore, the endorsement was ambiguous. Because 
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the endorsement was ambiguous, the district court held 
that Farmers was prohibited from enforcing the limitation 
of Iiabijity and setoff provisions contained in the en-
dorsement. This Court affirms the district court's decision. 
I. 
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
Talbot was involved in an automobile accident with a 
vehicle driven by Dave L. Shield (Shield). Talbot was 
injured in the accident. At the time of the accident, Talbot 
had an automobile insurance policy with Farmers which 
included UIM coverage provided through an endorsement 
to the policy. The endorsement for UIM coverage reads in 
relevant part as follows: 
PLEASE KEEP THIS 
ENDORSEMENT 
WITH YOUR POLICY 
Dear Policyholder: 
This endorsement adds UNPERinsured Motorist 
Coverage to your policy, [t applies when the driver of 
another vehicle not owned by you, who is liable to you for 
damages **1045 *430 because of an automobile accident, 
is insured for liability coverage in amounts less than your 
actual damages. UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage will 
pay the difference of the total amount paid by that driver's 
liability insurance and the amount of your damages, up to 
the limits of the coverage [This underlined portion is 
hereinafter referred to in this opinion as the " 'Dear Poli-
cyholder' language"]. The limits of your UNDERinsured 
Motoris.t Coverage are the same as shown in the Declara-
tions for Uninsured Motorist Coverage. 
UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage should not be 
confused with Uninsured Motorist Coverage, which only 
applies when the owner or operator of the other car has no 
liability insurance coverage. Your policy has both UN-
DERinsured and Uninsured Motorist Coverage. However, 
like Uninsured Motorist Coverage, UNDERinsured Mo-
torist insurance applies only to bodily injury. It does not 
cover damage to your car, or any other damages not part of 
the bodily injury. 
ff you have any questions, please contact your Farm-
ers Agent. 
FAJRMERS INSURANCE GROUP OF COMPANIES 
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Coverage C-1 UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage 
For an additional premium it is agreed that UNDER-
insured Motorist Coverage C-1 is added to Part II of your 
policy. 
We will pay all sums which an insured person is le-
gally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or 
operator of an UNDERinsured motor vehicle because of 
bodily injury sustained by the insured person. 
Limits of Liability · 
a. Our liability under the UNDERinsured Motorist 
Coverage cannot exceed the limits of the UNDERinsured 
Motorist Coverage stated in this policy, and our maximum 
liability under the UNDER.insured Motorist Coverage is 
the lesser of: 
I. The difference between the amount paid in damages 
to the insured person by and for any person or organi-
zation who may be legally liable for the bodily injury, 
and the limit of UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage; 
[This underlined portion is hereinafter referred to in this 
opinion as the "limitation of liability clause"]; or 
2. The amount of damages established but not recovered 
by any agreement, settlement, or judgment with or for 
the person or organization legally liable for the bodily 
injury. · 
b. We will pay up to the limits ofliability shown in the 
schedule below as shown in the Declarations .... 
Additional Definitions Used In This Part Only 
c. Underinsured Motor Vehicle-means a land motor 
vehicle when: 
l. the ownership, maintenance or use is insured or 





2. its limit for bodily injury liability is less than the 
amount of the insured persons damages. 
Other Insurance 
2. The amount of UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage we 
will pay shall be reduced by the amount of any other bod-
ily injury coverage available to any party held to be liable 
for the accident [This underlined portion is hereinafter 
referred to in th~s opinion as the "setoff provision"]. 
This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes 
and controls anything to the contrary. ft is otherwise sub-
ject to all other terms of the policy. 
(Emphasis added). Under Talbot's policy, the maxi-
mum limits of her UIM coverage were $25,000 per per-
son/$50,000 per occurrence. 
Talbot entered into a settlement agreement with Shield 
and his insurer, Allstate, **1046 *431 for the amount of 
$50,000, which was Shield's limit of liability under All-
state's policy. Because Talbot's damages exceeded 
$50,000, Talbot made a claim for $25,000 ofUIM benefits 
under her policy with Farmers. Farmers denied the claim 
based on its belief that the policy required a setoff of the 
amount paid by Shield against Talbot's maximum UIM 
limit of$25,000, resulting in no money owed to Talbot. 
Farmers filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief 
seeking a determination that the policy issued to Talbot did 
not obligate Farmers to pay Talbot UIM benefits. Talbot 
filed an Answer and Counterclaim in which she alleged a 
breach of contract and bad faith. She also sought class 
certification, claiming that the UIM coverage was illusory. 
Farmers moved for summary judgment on its claim for 
declaratory judgment, and Talbot filed a cross motion for 
partial summary judgment on the issue of her entitlement 
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to payment ofUIM benefits. 
The district court granted Talbot's cross motion for 
partial summary judgment and denied Farmers' motion for 
summary judgment. The district court held that Talbot's 
policy was ambiguous because of the conflicting inter-
pretation between the "Dear Policyholder" language and 
the limitation of liability and setoff provisions. Construing 
the ambiguity strongly against Farmers, the district court 
held that Farmers could not offset the amount Talbot re-
ceived from Shield and that Talbot was entitled to UIM 
coverage for damages she incurred that are in excess of 
Shield's liability policy limits ($50,000), up to her UIM 
coverage limit of $2~,000. 
Following the district court's decision, the parties 
stipulated to a dismissal with prejudice of Talbot's re-
maining counterclaims, and the district court certified its 
Memorandum Decision and Order as final under I.R.C.P. 
54(b). Farmers filed a timely appeal, challenging the dis-
trict court's determination that the policy for UIM coverage 
is am_biguous; 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1)[2][3] When this Court reviews the district court's 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it employs the 
same standard properly employed by the district court 
when originally ruling on the motion. Smith v. Meridian 
Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2. 128 Idaho 71.4, 718, 9 I 8 P.2d 583, 
587 (1996); City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 
Idaho 198, 200, 899 P.2d 41 I, 413 (1995). Summary 
judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of ma-
terial fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Mutual o(Enwnclaw v. Box. 
127 Idaho 851,852,908 P.2d 153, 154 (1995). Normally, 
both this Comt and the district court will liberally construe 
the record in favor of the party opposing the motion for 
summary judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences and 
conclusions supported by the record in favor of that party. 
City of Chubbuck. 127 ldaho at 200, 899 P.2d at 413. 
However, 
[ w ]here, as in this case, both parties file motions for 
. summary judgment relying on the same facts, issues and 
theories, the parties essentially stipulate that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact which would preclude the 
district court from entering summary judgment. As the 
trier of fact, the district court is free to arrive at the most 
probable inferences based upon the evidence before it 
and grant summary judgment, despite the possibility of 
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conflicting inferences. As the trier of fact, the district 
court is responsible for resolving the possible conflict 
between inferences. 
Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189, 191-92, 923 P.2d 
434, 436-37 (l 996) ( citations omitted). "When questions 
of law are presented, this Court exercises free review and is 
not bound by findings of the district court, but is free to 
draw its own conclusions from the evidence presented." 
Box. 127 Idaho at 852, 908 P.2d at 154. 
III. 
THE ENDORSEMENT CONTAINING UIM COV-
ERAGE IS AMBIGUOUS AND IS STRONGLY 
CONSTRUED AGAINST THE INSURER 
[41[51[6]The sole issue before this Court is whether 
the district court erred by determining**l047 *432 that 
Talbot's policy concerning UIM coverage is ambiguous. 
The general rule is that, because insurance contracts are 
adhesion contracts, typically not subject _to negotiation· 
between the parties, any ambiguity that exists in the .con-
. tract "must be construed most strongly against the insurer." 
Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Roberts. 128 Idaho 232, 
235, 912 P.2d 119, 122 (1996). The question of whether a 
policy is ambiguous is a question of law over which this 
Court exercises free review. Baker v. Farm Bureau Mut. 
Ins. Co. ofldaho. Inc .• 130 Idaho 415, 416-17, 941 P.2d 
1316, 1317-18 (Ct. Aoo.1997). "To determine whether a 
policy is ambiguous, the Court must ask whether the policy 
'is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation.' "Box. 
127 Idaho at 853,908 P.2d at 155. (quoting Citv o(Boise v. 
Planet Ins. Co.. 126 Idaho 51, 55, 878 P.2d 750, 754 
(1_994)). 
The district court concluded that the "Dear Policy-
holder" language was part of the UIM endorsement. It then 
concluded that there was a conflicting interpretation be-
tween the "Dear Policyholder" language and the limitation 
of liability and setoff provisions, thus, making the en-
dorsement ambiguous. This Court agrees that the "Dear 
Policyholder" language is part of the endorsement for UIM 
coverage and that there is a conflicting interpretation be-
tween the "Dear Policyholder" language and the limitation 
of liability clause which makes the endorsement ambigu-
ous. However, the setoff provision, which is located under 
the section entitled, "Other Insurance," does not apply to 
the facts of this case, and, therefore, has no bearing on the 
Court's ambiguity analysis. Cf Sublimity Insurance Co. v. 
Shaw. 127 Idaho 707,905 P.2d 640 (1995) (utilizing ap-
plicable rationale). 
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A. The setoff provision does not apply to this case. 
I1l In Shaw, the insured argued that a clause found 
under a section entitled "OTHER INSURANCE" con-
flicted with the limitation of liability clause found in the· 
portion of his policy concerning UIM coverage. 127 Idaho 
at 708, 905 P .2d at 641. The Court in Shaw determined that 
the OTHER INSURANCE clause did not apply in that 
particular circumstance because the OTHER INSUR-
ANCE clause referred only to situations where there is 
other UIM coverage. Because there was no other UIM 
coverage in that case, the Court held that the OTHER 
INSURANCE clause was inapplicable and, therefore, 
there was no resulting ambiguity. Id. 
In the present action, the setoff provision in Talbot's 
policy is found in the "Other Insurance" section which 
reads: "The amount ofUNDERinsured Motorist Coverage 
we will pay shall be reduced by the amount of any other 
bodily injury coverage available to any party held to be 
liable for the accident." (Italicized emphasis added). The 
other provisions found under the "Other Insurance" section 
in Talbot's policy are similar to the provisions found in the 
OTHER INSURANCE section of the policy in Shaw. The 
setoff provision in Talbot's policy refers only to situations 
where there is other UIM coverage. Because there is no 
other UIM coverage at issue in the present case, the setoff 
provision is inapplicable and will not be considered by this 
Court in its analysis. 
n. The "Dear Policyholder" language is a part of the 
contract for UIM coverage . 
.(fil Whether language in a "Dear Policyholder'' notice 
may be considered part of the contract for insurance is a 
question of first impression in Idaho. Several other states· 
have either addressed this specific issue or a related issue. 
Those jurisdictions which have addressed whether separate 
documents are a part of a contract for insurance focus 
upon: (I) whether the document is physically attached to 
the policy, (2) whether the policy specifically refers to the 
document, (3) whether the document amends, alters or 
changes any of the terms and conditions in the policy. See 
Shunga Plaza, Inc. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 206 
Kan. 16,476 P.2d 642, 644-45 0970) (cover letter which 
accompanies an endorsement which is to be attached to 
insurance policy and which deletes one item of property 
will control as to the time and conditions of payment of the 
return premium and the necessity for confirmation**1048 
*433 of cancellation by insurer where the endorsement is 
silent on such matters); Thompson v. Harold Thompson 
Trucking. 12 Kan.App.2d 449, 748 P.2d 430. 433 (1987) 
("Unless specifically included by reference, the declara-
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tions page to an insurance contract is not an actual part of 
the contract."); 2 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. 
SEGALLA, COUCH ON JNSURANCE 3D 18:23 0995) 
("Separate documents may become a part of a contract of 
insurance by law, by being annexed or attached to the . 
policy, or by a clear reference in the policy that they are 
intended to be a part thereof."). See also Brown v. Finan-
cial Serv. Corp .• Int'!. 489 F.2d 144, 149-50 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(cover letter should have been considered as part of the 
parties' stock purchase agreement where the cover letter: 
(1) summarized in writing the content of a telephone 
conversation concerning the purchase agreement, (2) spe-
cifically discussed and modified certain terms of the pur-
chase agreement, and (3) accompanied and served as a 
cover to the signed purchase agreement); Richardson 
Eng'g Co. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp .• 554 F.Supp. 
467, 470 (D. Vt.1981) (where cover letter sent by subcon-
tractor to general contractor along with executed subcon-
tract in some respects attempted to modify subcontract that 
it accompanied, subcontract was not complete integration 
of parties' understanding and consideration of cover letter 
did not, therefore, violate parol evidence rule). · 
Colorado has addressed the specific question of 
whether language in a "Dear Policyholder" notice consti-
tutes part of the insurance contract. Brennan v. Farmers 
Alliance Mut. Ins. Co .• 961 P.2d 550 (Colo. Ct. App.1998). 
In that case, the Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that 
the following "policyholder notice" did not constitu_te part 
of the insurance contract: 
POLICYHOLDER NOTICE 
ADDED PERSONAL INJURY 
PROTECTION 
Your automobile policy has been renewed with the same 
Personal Injury Protection (PIP) work loss benefit 
amounts as last year. However, a recent language inter-
pretation of the Colorado Revised Statute Section 
10-4-710(2)(a) provides that Added Personal Injury 
Protection (PIP) benefits shall be offered "at the option · 
of the insured." You therefore have the option to choose 
any or all of the three Added Personal Injury Protection 
benefits as desired: 
If you desire to change your Personal Injury Protection 
benefit coverage or you need more information, please 
contact your agent. 
Id. at 554-55. The Colorado Court of Appeals recog-
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nized that 
this document ... [was] not an endorsement. Unlike the 
other attachments to the policy which [were] referred to 
as "endorsements," it plainly is entitled "policyholder 
notice." Furthermore, its specific language does not alter 
the policy. To the contrary, it requires the insured to 
contact a Farmers agent in order to change coverage. 
Id at 555 (emphasis added). 
Unlike the policyholder notice in Brennan, the lan-
guage in the policyholder notice in the instant matter ap-
pears to alter or modify the endorsement with respect to 
how UIM benefits are measured. The limitation of liability 
clause in the endorsement provides ffiat UIM benefits are 
measure . erms of"[t]he difference between the t 
paid in damages to the insure person by ... any persQJ1 ... 
legally liable for the bodily in,iury, and the limit of UN-
DERinsured Mcit-erist 6e-verage." Under this clause, the 
calculation is $25,000 (Talbot's UIM limit) minus $50,000 
(amount received from Shields), which leaves negative 
$25,000. The "Dear Policyholder'' language, on the other 
hand, measures UIM benefits in terms of"the difference of 
the total amount paid by (the other] driver's liability in-
surance and the amount of [the insured's] damages, up to 
the limits of the coverage." Under this clause, the calcula-
tion is at least $75,000 (the total amount of Talbot's dam-
ages) FNJ minus $50,000 *434 **1049 (amount received 
from Shields), which leaves $25,000 (Talbot's maximum 
U[M limit) du·e and owing. 
FNl. Although it is unclear from the record the 
exact extent of Talbot's total damages, it is un-
disputed that her damages were at least $75,000. 
[2} The policyholder notice in the present case does 
not contain a designation that it is simply a notice, instead 
"it explains what UIM coverage the insured has, as well as 
the uninsured motorist [UM] coverage, and states that the 
limits of the UIM and UM coverage are the same." Gen-
erally, if an insurer does not wish for a particular document 
to become part of the insurance contract, "the insurer 
should make it clear that it is provided for informational 
purposes only and that its contents are not intended to 
amend, alter or change any of the terms and conditions of 
the policy." 2 LEE R. RUSS 8? THOMAS F. SEGALLA, 
COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 18:23, cmt. (1995). No 
such language is found in this policyholder notice. As the 
district court noted, a reasonable person would deem the 
policyholder notice as part of the contract for UIM cov-
erage and not just a mere cover letter. 
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liQ.1 Farmers interprets Talbot's legal argument as one 
based upon the "doctrine of reasonable expectations." 
Because Idaho does not recognii;e the doctrine of reason-
able expectations, Farmers argues that Talbot's argument 
must fail. Farmers' argument is misplaced. 
The doctrine of reasonable expectations (also known 
as the doctrine of adhesion contracts) is based on the un-
derstanding that insurance contracts are adhesion con-
tracts, and because they are adhesion contracts, the comt 
will coµstrue the contract as providing the type of coverage 
the insured reasonably expected the contract to provide, 
regardless of whether the contract in fact provides such 
coverage. See Corgatelli v. Globe life & Accident Ins. Co., 
96 Idaho 616. 619,533 P.2d 737, 740 {1975). overruled by 
Casey v. Highland,; Ins. Co .. I 00 Idaho 505, 600 P.2d 1387 
(1979). According to the Court in Corgatelli, the doctrine 
ofreasonable expectations applied regardless of whether or 
not ambiguity was present in the insurance contract. 96 
Idaho at 620, 533 P.2d at 741. In Casev v. Highlands In-
surance Co .• JOO Idaho 505, 509, 600 P.2d 1387, 1391 
{1979), this Court expressly rejected the doctrine of rea-
sonable expectations in favor of traditional rules of con-
tract construction. See Foremost Ins. Co. V. Putzier, I 00 
Idaho 883, 888. 606 P.2d 987, 992 (1980). Following 
Casey, Idaho courts may only consider an insured's rea-
sonable understandings after it has been detennined that 
the insurance contract is ambiguous. See Foremost Ins. Co. · 
v. Putzier, 102 Idaho 138, 142,627 P.2d 317,321 (1981) 
("[I]n the case of ambiguously written insurance policies, 
to effectuate the intent of the parties, the test is what a 
reasonable person in the position of the insured Would have 
·understood the language of the contract to mean."). The 
question in this case is, what documents constitute the 
insurance contract? This Court is free to consider Talbot's 
reasonable understandings in determining whether the 
policyholder notice should be treated as part of the insur-
ance contract. 
The Court concludes that the "Dear Policyholder" 
language is a part of the contract for UIM coverage on the 
bases that: (I) the "Dear Policyholder" language alters or 
modifies the limiting language in the UIM endorsement, 
and (2) the "Dear Policyholder" language contains no 
designation that the document is a cove.r letter provided for I 
informational purposes only and is not intended to alter or 
amend the terms of the policy. Based on these factors, it 
was reasonable for Talbot to assume that the "Dear Poli-
cyholder" language was a part of the contract for UIM 
coverage. 
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The next question the Court must resolve is whether 
the conflict between the "Dear Policyholder'' language and 
the limitation of liability clause creates an ambiguity 
within the policy such that the policy should be strongly 
construed against Farmers. 
C. The conflicting interpretation between the "Dear 
Policyholder" language and the limitation of liability 
clause malk.es the policy ambiguous. 
Lill Farmers argues that even if the "Dear Policy-
holder" language is considered a part of the contract, the 
fact that that 1anguage**1050 *435 conflicts with the lim-
itation of liability clause does not make the policy am-
biguous. Relying on Meeker/ v. Transamerica Insurance 
Co., I 08 fdaho 597, 70 I P.2d 217 (I 985). Farmers con-
tends that as long as a clause which limits the insurer's 
liability contains clear and unambiguous language, the 
limitations clause is enforceable, irrespective of whether 
the limitations clause conflicts with other language in the 
polfcy. Farmers reads Meeker/ to mean that a court can 
only refuse to enforce a limitations clause if either: (I) the 
clause violates public policy, or (2) the language in the 
clause itself is not clear. Since there are no public policy 
considerations associated with UIM coverage, see Farmers 
Insurance Co. of!daho v. Buffa. 119 fdaho 345. 347, 806 
P.2d 438, 440 (1991), and the language of the limitation of 
liability clause in Talbot's policy is clear and unambiguous, 
Farmers claims that this Court is compelled to enforce the 
limitation of liability clause as written. 
Farmers' argument applying the Meeker! rule to the 
facts of this case is misplaced. Meeker! stands for the 
proposition that a limitations clause in an insurance con: 
tract is valid and enforceable even if it conflicts with other 
provisions in the contract which grant coverage. The pol-
icy in Meeker/ provided that the insurer would "pay 
damaoes which a covered person is legally entitled to 
recov:r from the owner ... of an underinsured motor vehi-
cle because of bodily injury sustained by a covered person 
and caused by an accident" (coverage-granting clause), but 
then excluded UIM coverage if the insured was injured 
while driving a motor vehicle not covered under the policy 
(limitations clause). 108 Idaho at 599, 701 P.2d at 219 
(emphasis deleted). The Meeker! court found no ambiguity 
between the granting clause and the limitations clause. It 
held: · · 
An insurance carrier has the right to limit its coverage of 
risk and its liability, and in so doing may impose condi-
tions and restrictions upon its contractual obligations 
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which are not inconsistent with public policy. 
[A]n insurer must use clear and precise language if it 
wishes to restrict the scope of its coverage. We hold that 
[the insurer] has met its burden of clarity and precision. 
In the absence of ambiguity, the words used in an in-
surance policy are to be given their plain, ordinary and 
popular meaning. 
Id. at 600-0 I, 70 I P .2d at 220-2 l ( citations omitted). 
In the present case, th.£_ prQvisions at issue are no! a 
granting clause and a limitations clau~e. Unlike /vlec~ert, 
the i:>rovisions at issue in this case (i.e., the "Dear Policy-
holder" language and the ljmjtatjon of liabilit)! clause) <Jre 
each limitations clauses. The "Dear Policyholder" lan-
guage attempts to limit Talbot'sUIM covera e in one 
manner, while t e 1m1tat10n O . 1ability clause atteme~to 
liinit Talbot's UIM coverage iri a different manne_r. !!e-
tause the provisions attempt to limit Talbot's 011vt cov~r-
~ in two different ways, ambiguity exists. Because aw-
e . . 
6ioui exists the trad"t" a rule of constructwn -b 
p ies-i.e., the insurance contract must be coostrued_ 
strongly against the insu~r. Roberts. 128 Idaho at 235. 912 
P.2d at 122. Contrary to Farmers' argument, Meeker! does 
not chanoe the traditional rule of construction that where 
b •• 
ambiguity exists in an insurance contract, the amb1gmty 
should be construed strongly against the insurer. 
Farmers' reliance on other Idaho cases wherein this 
Court upheld an insurer's right to set off the amount re-
ceived from a tort-feasor's insurance col11jjan'yagainst the 
insured's UIM limits is also misplaced. The insurance 
policies at issue in those particular cases did uo.Lco.JJ.ta.i.o.the 
"Dear"'"policyholder" language which is present in the in-
stant case. 'I'he presence of the "Dear Pa!ic;yho!der" lan-
gi:iage is what makes the policy in this case ambiguol_!s; 
th'i:is, this case 1s distinguishable from the other Idaho cases_ 
~
relied upon by Farmers. 
This Court affirms the district court's determination 
that the policy is ambiguous and that, as a matter of law, 
Talbot is entitled to summary judgment. 
**1051 *436 HV. 
CONCLUSfON . 
The district court's decision to grant summary judg-
ment in favor of Talbot and against Farmers is affirmed. 
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Neither party is entitled to an award of attorney fees on 
appeal. Costs are awarded to Talbot. 
Chief Justice TROUT and Justices SILAK, WALTERS 
and KIDWELL concur. 
Idaho, 1999. 
Farmers Ins. Co. of [daho v. Talbot 
133 Idaho 428,987 P.2d 1043 
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CASE NO. CV OC 1308697 
AMENDED VERIFIED 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS, 
ATTORNEY FEES AND 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
COMES NOW Peggy Cedillo, by and through her counsel of record, and hereby submits 
this Amended Verified Memorandum of Costs, Attorney Fees, and Prejudgment Interest 
pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, following the entry of the 
Amended Final Award in this matter on July 24, 2013. 
Cedillo requests the Court to enter judgment against Defendant in the total amount of 
$269,266.81 as detailed below. 
I. STATEMENT OF ENTITLEMENT TO AW ARD OF COSTS 
Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is entitled to recover costs if they are 
the "prevailing party." See, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(A). In this case, there is no question that Plaintiff 
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was the prevailing party at arbitration in this matter. At arbitration, the Arbitrator entered his 
Interim Award of $406,700.12. See, Exhibit D to First Amended Petition for Confirmation of 
Arbitration Award, Award of Attorney Fees, Unenforceability of Set-Off Clause, and Bad Faith 
(hereafter "Amended Petition"). 
The Arbitrator's Final Award, entered after adjustments, which included previous 
payments of $25,000 and $155,000, concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to $203,468.41, which 
includes prejudgment interest of $103,135.46. See, Exhibit E to Amended Petition. 
The Arbitrator's Amended Final Award, which credits Farmers for their March 25, 2013 
payment of $100,332.95 (applied to outstanding prejudgment interest) and prejudgment interest 
of $1,187.50, concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to $101,947.96. Prejudgment interest at the rate 
of 12% per annum continues to accrue on the unpaid Adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 
from March 25, 2013 (per diem of $32.99 following March 25, 2013) until the Amended Final 
Award is confirmed in a final judgment or paid, whichever sooner occurs. See, Exhibit F, 
Amended Final Award, pp. 3-4. 
There is no reasonable basis for any dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party. 
A. Costs as a Matter of Right. 
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l )(C), Plaintiff submits the following as 
costs incurred, actually paid in arbitration, that should be awarded as a matter of right: 
1. Medical Records-54(d)(l)(C)(5) & (6) 
Hands On Physical Therapy 




Boise Physical Medicine and Rehab 
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St. Luke's Film Library 
Idaho Sport Medicine 
St. Luke's 
Healthport- St. Al's 
Walgreen's 
St. Luke's Financial 
The Shoulder Clinic 
Neuroscience Associates 
Idaho Sports Medicine 
Treasure Valley Hospital 
Walgreens 
Dr. Weyrich 




2. Expert Witness Fees -54(d)(l)(C)(8) 
David Price, DC 
Dr. Thomas Goodwin 
Dr. Kenneth Little 
Nancy Collins, Ph.D. 
Sergeant Fred Rice 




























3. Charges for Depositions Reporting/Transcribing- 54(d)(l)(C)(9) 
David Price, DC 
Dr. Kenneth Little 
Dr. Thomas Goodwin 
TOTAL 
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Dennis Reinstein, CPA 
Nancy Collins, Ph.D. 
David Price, DC 
Dr. Thomas Goodwin 
Dr. Kenneth Little 
TOTAL 







1. Medical Records $1,251.29 
2. Expert Witness Fees $10,143.75 
3. Charges for Depositions Reporting/Transcribing $1,718.80 
4. Charges for Depositions (one copy) $1,148.84 
TOTAL COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT $14,262.68 
B. Discretionary Costs 
Pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l)(D) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff also 
requests an award of discretionary costs on the grounds that the following listed costs were 
necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred in this case, and should in the interest of 
justice be assessed against the Defendant. The assessment of these discretionary costs serve the 
interest of justice and the purpose of Idaho Code § 41-1839 by reimbursing Plaintiff for her out-
of-pocket costs incurred in bringing this matter to arbitration. All arbitration costs have been 
paid by Plaintiff. It is unlikely that Plaintiff would have prevailed without incurring these 
additional costs. 
Specifically, the deposition testimony of Plaintiffs treating doctors was critical. The 
Defendant contested the treatment provided by each of Plaintiff's treating doctors. Dr. Price, 
Plaintiffs long-time treating chiropractor, provided essential video deposition testimony 
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concerning the treatment and the absence of any pre-existing medical conditions. Dr. Price's 
video deposition was 3½ hours in length. 
Dr. Little, Plaintiff's neck surgeon, provided crucial video deposition testimony 
concerning Plaintiff's two neck fusions, her overall treatment, recovery, rehabilitation and 
medical expenses incurred. Dr. Little's video deposition was 4 hours in length. Dr. Little is a 
skilled orthopedic surgeon. His testimony was extensively relied upon by the Arbitrator. 
Dr. Goodwin, Plaintiff's shoulder surgeon, also provided crucial video deposition 
testimony concerning Plaintiff's shoulder surgeries and the absence of a pre-existing condition. 
Each of these treating physicians testified via video deposition. The expenses incurred in 
taking these video depositions were absolutely necessary and exceptional in the arbitration of 
this matter. These video depositions were essential in obtaining the testimony of Plaintiff's 
treating physicians. The video depositions allowed flexibility in scheduling and hence did not 
require the in-person appearance of the treating physicians at arbitration, which would have been 
even more inconvenient, expensive, and lengthy. As a result of these video depositions, the 
actual time in the arbitration hearing was shortened by two days, benefitting both parties. 
The testimony of Plaintiff's rehabilitation expert, Dr. Collins, was also necessary and 
exceptional. Dr. Nancy Collins testified concerning Plaintiff's physical limitations and her 
income loss. Her report and testimony was hotly contested by Defendant and contested by 
Defendant's rehabilitation expert. 
Mr. Dennis Reinstein, CPA, was deposed by Defendant. However, he did not testify at 
the arbitration hearing. Defendant did attempt to use Reinstein's deposition in post arbitration 
matters. Reinstein's report and testimony was necessary and exceptional in developing and 
pursuing Plaintiff's claims. 
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Mr. James Lynch, an attorney with over 45 years of experience, served as a non-
testifying expert. His analysis and research concerning the "amount justly due" was essential to 
presenting Plaintiffs case. 
Each of these experts provided necessary and exceptional services to Plaintiff and their 
costs should in the interest of justice be assessed against Defendant. 
The discretionary costs claimed in this matter are as follows: 
1. Expert Witness Costs Above $2,000 or Non-Testifying Witnesses. 
David Price, DC 
Dr. Kenneth Little 
Nancy Collins, Ph.D. 









2. Video Depositions, Video Transfers and CD of Surgery 
Video deposition expense, video transfer expense and the expense of CD copies of a 
previous shoulder surgery were absolutely necessary and exceptional in the arbitration of this 
matter. The Idaho Camera expenses were incurred in the transfer of video of Plaintiffs shoulder 
surgery to a CD. The John Glenn Hall expenses were incurred in videotaping the depositions of 
Dr. Price, Dr. Little and Dr. Goodwin, all of which were submitted to the arbitrator in lieu of 
their live testimony. 
Idaho Camera 
Idaho Camera 
John Glenn Hall - video depo Dr. 
Price 
John Glenn Hall - video depo Dr. 
Little 
John Glenn Hall - copy 2 disks 
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Photocopy expenses were absolutely necessary and exceptional in the arbitration of this 
matter. Medical records were extensive and multiple copies were required in discovery, 
depositions, and at arbitration. These charges were incurred in the office of Plaintiff's attorney's 
firm at the rate of .10¢ per page for black and white copies and .25¢ per page for color. 
Plaintiff's medical records and the exhibits admitted at the arbitration hearing consisted of 
thousands of pages. 
Photocopies - b/w 
Photocopies - color 
Photocopies - b/w 
Photocopies - b/w 
Photocopies - b/w 
Photocopies - b/w 
Photocopies - b/w 
Photocopies - b/w 
Photocopies - color 
Photocopies - b/w 
Photocopies - b/w 
Photocopies - b/w 
Photocopies - b/w 
Photocopies - b/w 



















Research expenses were absolutely necessary and exceptional in the arbitration of this 
matter. Plaintiff's attorney's firm incurred these charges while researching several critical issues 
during the arbitration of this matter all concerning underinsurance. 
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Westlaw research re: underinsurance 
Westlaw research re: underinsurance 
W estlaw research re: underinsurance 
Idaho Legal Research re: 
underinsurance 
Westlaw research re: underinsurance 
TOTAL 





Expert Witness Costs Above $2,000 or 
Non-testifying experts 
















In conclusion, only by the award of these discretionary costs will Plaintiff be made 
whole. It is the intent of Idaho Code §41-1839 that insureds be swiftly, justly and fully 
compensated. These expenses were all the result of Defendant's refusal to acknowledge its 
responsibility to pay Plaintiff the amount justly due. 
II. VERIFICATION OF COSTS 
The undersigned, Jon M. Steele, hereby verifies and confirms, to the best of my personal 
knowledge and belief, that each of the above listed and described costs are correct, were actually 
incurred on behalf of Plaintiff in this litigation have been paid, and that all of said costs are in 
compliance with Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and its various sub-parts. 
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III. ATTORNEY FEES- IDAHO CODE§ 41-1839 
Plaintiff is clearly entitled to an award of attorney fees against Defendant pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 41-1839. 
Allowance of attorney fees in suits against insurers 
(1) Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance, 
surety, guaranty or indemnity of any kind or nature whatsoever, which 
shall fail for a period of thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been 
furnished as provided in such policy, certificate or contract, to pay to the 
person entitled thereto the amount justly due under such policy, certificate 
or contract, shall in any action thereafter brought against the insurer in any 
court in this state or in any arbitration for recovery under the terms of the 
policy, certificate or contract, pay such further amount as the court shall 
adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in such action or arbitration. 
(Emphasis added) 
On July 28, 2009 Plaintiff submitted to Defendant a proof of loss for underinsured 
motorist benefits. Defendant did not pay the amount justly due to Plaintiff within thirty (30) 
days of the proof ofloss as required by Idaho Code§ 41-1839. 
The Arbitrator's Interim, Final, and Amended Final Awards detail the calculation of the 
amount justly due and the Defendant's failure to pay that amount within 30 days. See, Exhibit 
D, E, and F to Amended Petition. The Arbitrator's Final Award states the following: 
The ..... Arbitrator finds that Claimant provided enough information to 
obligate Farmers to investigate and determine its rights and liabilities in a 
fair and accurate manner prior to and with her letter date July 28, 2009, 
and concludes as a matter oflaw that prejudgment interest began to accrue 
in this case on August 25, 2009, which is the date that Farmers provided 
Claimant with its valuation of the amount due under the Underinsure 
Motorist coverage in her policy. 
See, Exhibit E, Arbitrator's Final Award, p. 9, to Amended Petition 
AMENDED VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS, ATTORNEY FEES AND PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST - Page 9 
000196
A. Legal Argument 
Idaho Code § 41-1839 has been discussed by the Idaho Supreme Court on numerous 
occasions. See, Brinkman v. Aid, 115 Idaho 346 (1988); Walton v. Hartford Ins. Col, 120 Idaho 
616 (1991), Afartin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244 (2002). In 
summary, those cases conclude that a plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 41-1839 when: (1) the insured has provided proof of loss as required by the 
insurance policy; and (2) the insurance company fails to pay an amount justly due under the 
policy within thirty (30) days of such proof of loss. Id. 
Here, Plaintiff submitted a fully documented proof of loss to Defendant on July 28, 2009 
(see Arbitrator's Final Award, p. 9, attached as Exhibit E to the Amended Petition filed 
herewith). Defendant responded by sending Plaintiff a $25,000 check. Years later and months 
after this arbitration was commenced, Defendant made a payment to Plaintiff in the amount of 
$155,000 in October of 2012. Thereafter, Defendant did not make any additional payments or 
offers of any kind until after the arbitration hearing had been concluded. The arbitration of 
Plaintiffs case against Defendant took place on November 20 and 21, 2012. The arbitrator 
issued his Interim Award in favor of Plaintiff and awarded damages which totaled $406,700.12. 
On March 25, 2013 Defendant made an additional payment of$100,332.95. 
Plaintiffs entitlement to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1839 is 
indisputable. Defendant failed to pay within 30 days of her proof of loss the amount justly due. 
Plaintiffs damages totaled $406,700.12, as found by the Arbitrator. Since its $25,000 payment 
in August of 2009, Defendant has made several payments and has received credit for those 
payments. But even those payments were not paid when they were supposed to be paid (i.e. 
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thirty days after the "proof of loss" was submitted under I. C. § 41-1839). Defendant forced its 
insured to wait literally years and to go through an arbitration to obtain an award of the amount 
justly due on her claim. 
The amount justly due can be determined by trial, (Boe/ v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 
137 Idaho 9, 16, 43 P.3d 768, 775 (2002)); by arbitration (Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 138 Idaho 244, 248, 61 P.3d 601, 605 (2002)); or by settlement (Parsons v. Mutual of 
Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 745, 152 P.3d 614, 616 (2007). See, Estate of Holland v. 
Metropolitan Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 94,279 P.3d 80 (2012). 
Simply put, Defendant cannot reasonably dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to recover 
attorney fees on her first party insurance claim under Idaho law. 
B. Amount of Attorney Fees to Be Awarded. 
At the outset, it is important to recognize that the attorney fees authorized by Idaho Code 
§ 41-1839 for the failure by Defendant to pay underinsured motorist benefits to Plaintiff after 
submission of a proof of loss is an additional sum rendered as compensation to Plaintiff, not a 
penalty. The purpose of Idaho Code § 41-1839 is to make the insured whole and prevent the 
amount owed under the insurance policy from being diminished by attorneys' fees. Halliday v. 
Famers Ins. Exch., 89 Idaho 283 (1965), Bergund v. Potlatch Corp., 129 Idaho 752 (1980); 
Walton v. Hartford Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 616 (1991). 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54( e )(3) provides a list of 12 factors which the trial court 
should consider in determining the amount of attorney fees to award. Each of the factors 
outlined in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3) will be discussed, briefly, for the Court's 
benefit. 
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Initially as disclosed to the Defendant and to the Arbitrator, the Court should be informed 
that attorney Steele was the underinsured motorist and that attorney Steele and Cedillo were 
married in December of 2008. 
1. The Time and Labor Required. 
A detailed accounting of the time and labor required to handle the personal injury claim 
of Plaintiff from beginning to end is attached as Exhibit 1. The time and labor is based upon 
time sheets prepared by the attorneys working on the case. Mr. Steele was the primary attorney 
who performed work on the case. Mr. Steele spent a total of 399.6 hours working on the case. 
Paralegal Karissa Armbrust devoted 48.3 hours working on this case. Paralegal Armbrust 
is an experienced and certified paralegal with 12 years of litigation experience 
2. The Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions. 
This lawsuit involved relatively straight forward liability facts, but a more challenging 
damages claim. Plaintiff was injured as a result of a motorcycle crash. The medical issues in the 
case were complicated by the fact that Plaintiff's injuries required two neck fusions and a 
shoulder surgery. During the course of arbitration, Plaintiff provided proof that both neck 
fusions and her shoulder surgery were medically necessary due to the crash and that she suffered 
substantial earning losses as a result of her injuries in spite of her efforts to mitigate losses by 
working in retail sales of women's fashions. 
Defendant challenged Plaintiff's claim by questioning her need for medical care. 
Defendant also challenged the amount that Plaintiff would recover for her general damages and 
special damages. 
Defendant consistently took the position that Plaintiff's claim was not worth more than 
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$25,000, the amount Defendant had previously paid. As a result, it became necessary to initiate 
arbitration and to present the case to the arbitrator, Mr. Merlyn Clark. 
3. The Quality of the Legal Services. 
The claim in this case resulted in a two day arbitration. The arbitration involved the 
presentation of expert witnesses by both sides. Both sides were represented by experienced and 
capable lawyers. In preparation for arbitration, extensive discovery and a number of depositions 
were taken by both Plaintiff and Defendant. 
4. The Prevailing Charges for Like Work. 
In this case, Plaintiff employed Runft & Steele Law Offices on a contingent fee of 33 
1/3% of all amounts recovered on behalf of Plaintiff. Plaintiff's fee agreement is attached to this 
Amended Verified Memorandum of Costs, Attorney Fees and Prejudgment Interest as Exhibit 2. 
This fee agreement is consistent with similar agreements commonly used by Plaintiff's attorneys 
in personal injury litigation. 
If the legal work that was necessary had been paid for pursuant to an hourly fee 
assessment, the hours worked would have resulted in payment of fees in excess of $120,000. 
The lawyers for the Plaintiff in this case typically charge hourly rates that reflect the market for 
those services and the experience of the lawyers who do the work. Jon Steele accounted for over 
399.6 hours of work on this case. Mr. Steele's time would have been charged at $300 per hour. 
The charges for the work performed by Mr. Steele were well within the hourly rates charged by 
plaintiff's lawyers who do personal injury litigation who have experience and expertise similar to 
Mr. Steele, a lawyer with 37 years of experience. Mr. Steele's services would have been valued 
at approximately $119,880 if Plaintiff had been paying the prevailing hourly rates for Mr. 
Steele's work. Paralegal Armbrust devoted 48.3 hours on her time on this case. Her hourly rate 
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is $75.00 per hour. If Plaintiff had been paying her hourly rate her services would have been 
valued at $3,622.50. Total billing to Plaintiff had Plaintiff been paying the prevailing hourly 
rates would total $123,502.50 
5. Whether the Fee is Fixed Or Contingent. 
The lawyers for Plaintiff were employed on a contingent fee basis. The fee agreement 
provided that her lawyers would be paid one-third of the "any recovery" as their fee. See, 
Exhibit 2 attached. 
6. Time Limitations Imposed by the Client. 
The case did not involve the imposition of any time limitation imposed by the client or by 
the circumstances of the case. However, the five years since the crash to the present have 
resulted in extreme financial burdens and anxiety for Plaintiff. 
7. Amount Involved and the Results Obtained. 
The Arbitrator rendered an Interim Award of $406,700.12 and a Final Award of 
$203,468.41, including prejudgment interest of $103,135.46. Defendant did not make any offers 
of settlement at any time during the arbitration in an effort to settle the case. It is clear that the 
result obtained by the Plaintiff far exceeded the evaluation of the case by Defendant. 
8. Undesirability of the Case. 
The case was clearly a desirable personal injury case. Liability was clear. Plaintiff's 
injury required a neck fusion. As time passed it became apparent that Plaintiff would require 
additional neck fusion surgery and shoulder surgery that would prevent her from returning to her 
work as a real estate agent. It soon became clear that Plaintiff had a substantial claim and that 
her case was strong and compelling. Plaintiff always believed that she had a strong and 
meritorious underinsured motorist claim. Apparently, Defendant believed otherwise because it 
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made no offer of settlement to Plaintiff after paying her $25,000 on August 25, 2009. 
9. Nature and Length of the Professional Relationship with the Client. 
The lawyers for Plaintiff have had a long and enjoyable professional relationship with 
her. 
10. Awards in Similar Cases. 
It is somewhat difficult to compare one personal injury case with another. In this case, 
there was never any reasonable dispute over the liability facts. This case was primarily focused 
on the damage claim. Over time, the damage issues in dispute became focused on Plaintiff's two 
neck fusions and a shoulder surgery. Plaintiff's injuries prevented her from returning to work as 
a real estate agent and prevented her from enjoying the lifestyle that she enjoyed prior to her 
accident. Plaintiff's attorneys have obtained similar results in similar cases. 
C. Calculation of Attorney Fees. 
In this case, Plaintiff will recover damages totaling $382,280.91 from Defendant pursuant 
to her underinsured motorist claims. Of that total, a portion has been paid and the remaining 
balance is expected to be paid pursuant to the judgment to be entered by this Court. Of that total, 
$100,332.95 is the unpaid Adjusted Interim Award, $1,615.01 is unpaid prejudgment interest 
through March 25, 2013. The Adjusted Interim Award of$100,332.95 is still accruing interest at 
the rate of 12% per annum ($32.99 per diem following March 25, 2013). See, Exhibit F, 
Amended Final Award, pp. 3-4, to Amended Petition. 
Plaintiff is obligated to pay attorney fees on all amounts recovered for her benefit under 
her contingency fee agreement with her attorneys. She is therefore obligated to pay one-third 
attorney fees on the prejudgment interest portion of the recovery, as well as other amounts paid 
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by Defendant. Since the purpose of awarding attorney fees to a first party insured under Idaho 
Code § 41-1839 is to make the insured whole, the attorney fees awarded here should also include 
the fees Plaintiff will be obligated to pay her attorneys for the prejudgment interest award as 
well. As addressed above, the Arbitrator awarded prejudgment interest in the amount of 
$101,947.96 through March 25, 2013. Interest continues to accrue on the principal amount of 
100,332.95. As such, the Plaintiff should recover as additional attorney fees the amount of 
$33,982.65 (one-third of $101,947.96). 
Plaintiff will pay her attorneys one-third of the amount recovered from Defendant. This 
amount is one-third of $382,280.91. Plaintiff will pay attorney fees of $127,426.97 and should 
recover this amount from Defendant pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1839. 
The amount of attorney fees ($127,426.97) is calculated as follows: 
1. $25,000 paid by Defendant on August 29, 2009 
2. $155,000 paid by Defendant on October 16, 2012 
3. $100,332.95 paid by Defendant on March 25, 2013 
4. $101,947.96 to be paid by Defendant 
$382,280.91 Total+ 1/3 = $127,426.971 
V. VERIFICATION OF ATTORNEY FEES 
The undersigned Jon M. Steele hereby verifies and confirms, to the best of my personal 
knowledge and belief, that the above calculated attorney fees are correct, and accurately reflect 
time spent by attorneys on behalf of Plaintiff in this litigation. 
1 Plus 1/3 of accruing interest at the rate of$32.99 per diem following March 25, 2013. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court enter 
Judgment and award Plaintiff her costs as a matter of right, discretionary costs, attorney fees, and 
prejudgment interest. These amounts do not include or address the issue of the enforceability or 
application of Defendant's offset clause. Plaintiff requests the Court to address the offset issue 
separately. 
Plaintiff requests judgment be entered in the total amount of $262,307.37 calculated as 
follows: 
Total Costs as a Matter of Right 
Total Discretionary Costs 
Unpaid Principal Amount from interim award 
Unpaid Prejudgment interest due to 3/25/13 
Prejudgment Interest from 03/25/13-09/15/13 
(174 days at Per diem of$32.99) 
Attorney Fees 
Total Judgment Amount 








RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By:_..,..____, \,_-+-~----4--1--,'4-,,...lllJ_.;,__ ___ _ 
1futi M. &\TEW 
Attorney for Peggy Cedillo 
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Attorney Time for Jon M. Steele 
12/30/2010 Jon Steele open file; receipt and review from client 0.8 $300.00 $240.00 
letter from Jeff Thomson of Elam & 
Burke requesting IME dates; telephone 
call to Jeff Thomson notifying him of 
representation 
1/3/2011 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from Jeff 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
Thomson re: phone call of 12/30/10 and 
need for letter of representation. 
1/23/2011 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from paralegal 0.8 $300.00 $240.00 
Kathryn Brandt at Elam & Burke with CD 
containing medical records. 
1/26/2011 Jon Steele E-mail to atty Thomson re: files on CD 0.4 $300.00 $120.00 
that we received and requesting all 
medical records 
2/9/2011 Jon Steele Draft Stipulation re: Defense Medical 0.6 $300.00 $180.00 
Examination; letter to Jeff Thomson 
enclosing Stipulation. 
2/18/2011 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from Thomson 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
and Stipulation. 
3/8/2011 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from Jeff 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
Thomson 
3/28/2011 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from Jeff 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
Thomson re: date for IME. 
3/30/2011 Jon Steele Draft and send letter to Jeff Thomson 0.6 $300.00 $180.00 
confirming that client will be at IME 
4/11/2011 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from atty 0.7 $300.00 $210.00 
Thomson with forms for client to fill out 
before IME; 
4/13/2011 Jon Steele Review Litigating Tort Cases, Conlin, 2 2.4 $300.00 $720.00 
litigating tort cases section 24 Pain and 
suffering and non-economic damages. 
5/2/2011 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from Jeff 1.2 $300.00 $360.00 
Thomson with Dr. Wilson's IME attached. 
5/5/2011 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from Ron 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
Ramsey at Farmers 
5/18/2011 Jon Steele Draft and send demand letter to Jeff 0.9 $300.00 $270.00 
Thomson re: demand for amount justly 
due 
5/19/2011 Jon Steele Review validity and construction of 6.5 $300.00 $1,950.00 
provision of Uninsured or Underinsured 
motorist coverage that damages under the 
coverage will be reduced by amount of 





5/20/2011 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from Jeff 0.8 $300.00 $240.00 
Thomson re: arbitration clause and 
possible arbitrators 
6/13/2011 Jon Steele Review Litigating the Uninsured and 4 $300.00 $1,200.00 
Underinsured Motorist Claim, NBI 
(2011). 
6/14/2011 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from atty 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
Thomson 
6/18/2011 Jon Steele Draft and send letter to atty Thomson 0.8 $300.00 $240.00 
7/20/2011 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from atty 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
Thomson. 
8/22/2011 Jon Steele Research Am Jur Trials - Uninsured and 4.5 $300.00 $1,350.00 
Underinsured Motorist Claims, Am Jur 
Proof of Facts and Am Jur Proof of Facts -
Insurer's Failure to Investigate Claim in 
Good Faith; e-mail articles to paralegal 
for filing. 
8/25/2011 Jon Steele Review The Claims Environment, 7 $300.00 $2,100.00 
Insurance Institute of America (1993). 
8/29/2011 Jon Steele Receipt and review Farmer's First Set of 1 $300.00 $300.00 
Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents 
9/18/2011 Jon Steele Research re: Weinstein v. Prudential 3 $300.00 $900.00 
Properties case; e-mails to paralegal with 
research attached. 
9/19/2011 Jon Steele Receipt and review documents received 1.2 $300.00 $360.00 
from Progressive Insurance 
10/15/2011 Jon Steele Review The Claims Environment, 2d. 8 $300.00 $2,400.00 
Edition, American Institute for Chartered 
Property Casualty Underwriters and the 
Insurance Institute of America (2000). 
10/19/2011 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from Thomson. 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
10/27/2011 Jon Steele Draft and send letter to atty Thomson 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
10/28/2011 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from atty 0.6 $300.00 $180.00 
Thomson 
11/1/2011 Jon Steele Draft letter to atty Thomson 0.8 $300.00 $240.00 
11/2/2011 Jon Steele Draft and send letter to atty Thomson 0.7 $300.00 $210.00 
11/8/2011 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from atty 1.5 $300.00 $450.00 
Thomson with copy of insurance policy 
and endorsements. 
11/14/2011 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from Jeff 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
Thomson 
11/22/2011 Jon Steele Draft engagement letter; meeting with 2.5 $300.00 $750.00 
client 
000206
- • 11/23/2011 Jon Steele Review Damages, Degree of Certainty 0.8 $300.00 $240.00 
Required, 22 Am Jur. 2d Damages Section 
186. 
1/15/2012 Jon Steele review Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 1.1 $300.00 $330.00 
455,210 P.3d 563 (2009) (recovering for 
emotional distress; review Tucker v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 351 Mont. 
448, 215 P.3d 1 (2009) (recovery for 
emotional distress). 
1/16/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from Jeff 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
Thomson 
1/20/2012 Jon Steele Draft and send letter to Jeff Thomson; 1.2 $300.00 $360.00 
Receipt and review letter from Jeff 
Thomson with Department of Insurance 
Bulletin and Disclosure Statement 
enclosed. 
1/23/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from Jeff 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
Thomson 
1/25/2012 Jon Steele Review Empey v. Farmers Insurance 4.5 $300.00 $1,350.00 
Company originally filed in Ada County; 
Idaho Repository - Ada County 
transferred to Bannock County (2001-
2005); Empey v. Farmers Insurance 
Compnay U.S. District Court for the 
District of Idaho, review pleadings on 
PACER. 
1/26/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review e-mail from Sherry 0.8 $300.00 $240.00 
Montosa at Hawley Troxell re: conflict 
check for Merlyn Clark; receipt and 
review e-mail from atty Thomson to 
Sherry Montosa 
1/27/2012 Jon Steele receipt e-mail from Sherry Montosa 0.3 $300.00 $90.00 
1/29/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review Scheduling Order #10 0.4 $300.00 $120.00 
1/31/2012 Jon Steele E-mail to Sherry Montosa. 0.3 $300.00 $90.00 
2/1/2012 Jon Steele E-mail from Sherry Montosa with draft 0.6 $300.00 $180.00 
documents attached. 
2/4/2012 Jon Steele review Alan I. Widiss and Jeffrey E. 9 $300.00 $2,700.00 
Thomas, Uninsured and Underinsured 
Motorist Coverage (3d ed. 2005) 
2/6/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter and documents 1 $300.00 $300.00 
from Merlyn Clark; e-mail from Sherry 
Montosa with conference call info for 
February 8 hearing 
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2/8/2012 Jon Steele Telephone conference with Arbitrator and 2.3 $300.00 $690.00 
atty Thomson to set arbitration hearing 
and deadlines; receipt and review fax 
letters from atty Thomson re: deposition 
of Cedillo and the other enclosing 
Stipulation 
2/9/2012 Jon Steele review Cole v. Esquibel, 145 Idaho 652, 0.7 $300.00 $210.00 
182 P .3d 709 (2008) ( calculation of 
damages). 
2/10/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review Pre-Hearing Order 3.2 $300.00 $960.00 
No. 1 re: Scheduling; receipt and review 
Farmers' Disclosure of Potential 
Witnesses; Draft and send letter to 
Regence Blue Shield re: subrogation; 
Draft and send letter to Jeff Thomson re: 
demand for binding arbitration and 
enclosed copy of signed Appointment of 
Arbitrator. 
2/11/2012 Jon Steele review Purdy v. Farmers Insurance 0.8 $300.00 $240.00 
Company of Idaho (interpretation of 
insurance contract). 
2/13/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from Jeff 1 $300.00 $300.00 
Thomson; revise Appointment of 
Arbitrator. 
2/14/2012 Jon Steele E-mail to Judge McKee re: Proof of Fact 0.4 $300.00 $120.00 
articles. 
2/21/2012 Jon Steele Draft demand for Arbitration and 4.9 $300.00 $1,470.00 
Disclosure of Potential Witnesses and fax 
to Merlyn Clark; letter to atty Thomson 
with several Stipulations and Cedillo's 
first set of discovery to Farmers attached; 
fax to atty Thomson with Disclosure of 
witnesses, Demand for Arbitration and 
Revised Appointment of Arbitrator 
attached. 
2/21/2012 Jon Steele Finalize and serve Cedilla's 1st set of 5.3 $300.00 $1,590.00 
Interrogatories, Requests for Production 
and Requests for Admission to Farmers 
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Thomson and Motion in Limine 
Stipulation, red-lined Stipulation to 
Submit Dispute to Binding Arbitration 
and re-served Farmers' first set of 
discovery; receipt copy of letter to Merlyn 
Clark from Nichole Pappas of Elam & 
Burke with Stipulation and appointment 
of Arbitrator enclosed; e-mail from 
Dennis Reinstein re: okay to serve as 
expert witness; e-mail to Dennis Reinstein 
2/24/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review e-mail from Dennis 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
Reinstein with Karen Ginnett's CV 
attached 
2/25/2012 Jon Steele Review 24 ALR 4th 13 Uninsured and 4.3 $300.00 $1,290.00 
Underinsured Motorist Coverage; 
recoverability, under insured motorist 
coverage of deficiencies in compensation 
afforded injury party by tortfeasor's 
liability coverage (2011); review 
Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist 
Update, Heyl, Royster, Voelken and Allen 
(2012). 
2/27/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review Appointment of 0.4 $300.00 $120.00 
Arbitrator signed by Merlyn Clark 
3/1/2012 Jon Steele Draft and send to Clark and Thomson 1.1 $300.00 $330.00 
Notice of Conflict Disclosure; draft and 
send letter to Jeff Thomson 
3/3/2012 Jon Steele Finalize and serve Cedillo's 2nd set of 3.5 $300.00 $1,050.00 
Requests for Production and Requests for 
Admission to Farmers. 
3/5/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from atty 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
Thomson 
3/6/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review e-mail from Teressa 2.3 $300.00 $690.00 
Zywicki with research summary attached 
and cases; e-mail to Teressa. 
3/8/2012 Jon Steele draft and send letters to Dr. Little and Dr. 2.1 $300.00 $630.00 
Price 
3/16/2012 Jon Steele Finalize and send to Merlyn Clark and 3.2 $300.00 $960.00 
atty Thomson Cedillo's Statement of 
Claims. 
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Cedillo's 1st Request for Production, 
Farmers' Responses to Cedillo's 2nd 
Requests for Production, Farmers 
Response to Cedillo's 1st Requests for 
Admission, and Farmers' Responses to 
Cedillo's 2nd Requests for Admission; 
review and sign Notice of Taking Video 
Deposition of Dr. Little 
3/20/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review Farmers' Objections 1.5 $300.00 $450.00 
and Responses to Cedillo's 1st set of 
Interrogatories. 
3/22/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from Dr. Price's 0.7 $300.00 $210.00 
office 
3/26/2012 Jon Steele Finalize and serve Cedillo's Responses to 4.8 $300.00 $1,440.00 
Farmer's 1st set oflnterrogatories and 
Requests for Production; e-mail to client 
re: meeting with Nancy Collins 
3/27/2012 Jon Steele Initial meeting with Nancy Collins 1 $300.00 $300.00 
3/29/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review Farmer's Response to 1.2 $300.00 $360.00 
Claimant's Statement of Claims. 
3/30/2012 Jon Steele Review Sublimits Insurance Company v. 8 $300.00 $2,400.00 
Shaw, 127 Idaho 707,905 P.2d 640 
(1995) (UIM coverage not ambiguous; 
other insurance clause does not apply); 
review Farmers Insurance Company of 
Idaho v. Talbot, 133 Idaho 428, 987 P.2d 
1043 (1999) (Judge SchroederUIM -
other insurance clause inapplicable); 
review district court Judge Randy Smith 
Memorandum Decision; review Farmers 
Insurance contract and Endorsement 
El 179i; review entire District Court file at 
Ada County Courthouse. 
4/2/2012 Jon Steele E-mails to and from parties to set up 0.6 $300.00 $180.00 
hearing date; e-mail from Merlyn Clark 
re: issues for hearing. 
4/3/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review Notices of 0.8 $300.00 $240.00 
Depositions for Jon Steele, Dennis 
Reinstein, and Nancy Collins 
4/4/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from Jeff 0.7 $300.00 $210.00 
Thomson with enclosed Stipulation; sign 
stipulation and return to atty Thomson 
4/5/2012 Jon Steele Pre-Arbitration hearing 0.7 $300.00 $210.00 
4/10/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review Pre-Hearing Order 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
No. 2 from Merlyn Clark's office. 
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Claims with Merlyn Clark, copy to atty 
Thomson removing the insurance policy 
as Exhibit. 
4/14/2012 Jon Steele Review Hill v. American Family Mutual 14.5 $300.00 $4,350.00 
Insurance Company ( exhaustion void by 
reason of public policy; review Mason v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company (issues to be arbitrated); review 
Idaho Code Section45-701-704B 
Medical Liens; review White v. St. 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
(medical lien and attorney fees); review 
Wensman v. Farmers insurance Company 
ofldaho, 134 Idaho 148, 997 P.2d 609 
(2000) (attorney fees and common fund 
doctrine. 
4/16/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review Fanner's Response to 2.9 $300.00 $870.00 
Statement of Claims; receipt and review 
letter from atty Thomson re: no objection 
to vacating arbitration. 
4/17/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review Notices vacating 0.7 $300.00 $210.00 
depos of Peggy Steele, Jon Steele, Dennis 
Reinstein and Nancy Collins 
4/18/2012 Jon Steele Draft and send Notices Vacating Video 0.6 $300.00 $180.00 
depositions of Dr. Little, Dr. Price, and 
Dr. Goodwin 
4/20/2012 Jon Steele Fax letter and Joint Motion to Vacate 1 $300.00 $300.00 
Arbitration and Affidavit to atty 
Thomson; receipt fax letter from atty 
Thomson along with signed Joint Motion. 
4/21/2012 Jon Steele Boll v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 2.5 $300.00 $750.00 
Insurance Company, 140 Idaho 334, 92 
P.3d 1081 (2004) (insurer's obligation to 
pay share of attorney fees and costs); 
review White v. Unigard Mutual 
Insurance Co., 122 Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 
1014 (1986). 
4/24/2012 Jon Steele Sign Joint Motion to Vacate Arbitration 1 $300.00 $300.00 
and Affidavit of Steele and serve on 
Merlyn Clark and atty Thomson. 
5/2/2012 Jon Steele E-mail from Sherry Montosa with Pre- 0.9 $300.00 $270.00 
Hearing Order No. 3 attached; review Pre-
Hearing Order No. 3; e-mail to Dennis 
Reinstein; e-mail to Nancy Collins 
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Insurance Company v. Weinstein; review 
entire Idaho Supreme Court and Ada 
County District Court filings (pleadings, 
affidavits, motions, discovery, and 
rulings. 
5/21/2012 Jon Steele E-mail to Fred Rice re: report 0.6 $300.00 $180.00 
5/22/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review report from David 1.9 $300.00 $570.00 
Price, D.C. 
5/28/2012 Jon Steele E-mail from Dennis Reinstein re: status 0.4 $300.00 $120.00 
5/29/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review final report from Fred 2.1 $300.00 $630.00 
Rice 
5/30/2012 Jon Steele E-mail to Dennis Reinstein re: status 0.4 $300.00 $120.00 
update 
6/15/2012 Jon Steele Letter to Dr. Price 1.2 $300.00 $360.00 
7/2/2012 Jon Steele Draft and send letters to Dr. Little and Dr. 1.4 $300.00 $420.00 
Goodwin. 
7/6/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review opinion letter from Dr. 0.9 $300.00 $270.00 
Goodwin. 
7/25/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from Jeff 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
Thomson 
8/13/2012 Jon Steele Draft and send letter to Kevin Saul at 1.3 $300.00 $390.00 
Physical Therapy of Idaho; draft and send 
letters to Kenneth Little, MD and Charisse 
Mack 
8/13/2012 Jon Steele E-mails to and from Dennis Reinstein re: 0.8 $300.00 $240.00 
status and update 
8/21/2012 Jon Steele E-mail from Sherry Montosa with Pre- 0.4 $300.00 $120.00 
Hearing Order No. 4 attached moving up 
arbitration 
9/11/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from atty 0.8 $300.00 $240.00 
Thomson re: IME and depo dates. 
9/12/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from atty 1.2 $300.00 $360.00 
Thomson re: discovery; receipt and 
review Notice of Deposition Duces 
Tecum of Dr. Goodwin 
9/13/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review Notice of Deposition 0.3 $300.00 $90.00 
Duces Tecum of Dr. Little. 
9/17/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review Amended Notice of 0.9 $300.00 $270.00 
Deposition Duces Tecum of Dr. Collins, 
Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of 
David Price, D.C., Amended Notice of 
Deposition of Jon Steele, and Amended 
Notice of Deposition of Peggy Cedillo; 
receipt and review amended Notice of 
Deposition of Dr. Goodwin 
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enclose First Supplemental Responses to 
discovery; receipt and review Second 
Amended Notice of Deposition for Peggy 
Steele. 
9/19/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from atty 1.2 $300.00 $360.00 
Thomson with Stipulation to take Dennis 
Reinstein's depo after discovery deadline; 
letter to Rick Mellon at Brassey, 
Crawford & Howell. 
9/20/2012 Jon Steele Draft and send letter to atty Thomson with 0.8 $300.00 $240.00 
signed Stipulation re: deposition of 
Dennis Reinstein. 
9/21/2012 Jon Steele Draft and send letter to atty Thomson and 0.7 $300.00 $210.00 
enclose prescription record from 
Walgreens; receipt of fully executed 
Stipulation regarindg deposition of 
Reinstein. 
9/24/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from atty 0.4 $300.00 $120.00 
Thomson; receipt and review Order 
regarding Deposition of Dennis Reinstein 
from Merlyn Clark 
9/24/2012 Jon Steele E-mail from Dennis Reinstein requesting 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
documents; e-mail to Reinstein re: Nancy 
Collins' report 
9/26/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review Amended Notice of 2.8 $300.00 $840.00 
Deposition of Dennis Reinstein; Draft and 
serve Notice of Taking Video Deposition 
of Dr. Wilson; receipt and review 
Amended Notice of Deposition Duces 
Tecum of Dr. Little 
10/1/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from atty 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
Thomson 
10/2/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from atty 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
Thomson 
10/3/2012 Jon Steele Letter to atty Thomson 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
10/4/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from atty 1.2 $300.00 $360.00 
Thomson; receipt and review 
Respondent's Objection to Notice of 
Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Dr. 
Wilson; receipt and review e-mail from 
Sherry Montosa re: conference at 2:00 
pm; telephone conference with Merlyn 
Clark and atty Thomson 
10/5/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review Pr-Hearing Order No. 0.6 $300.00 $180.00 
5 
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Thomson re: Idaho PT records; receipt 
and review letter from atty Thomson re: 
fee agreement with Cedillo; draft and send 
letter to atty Thomson with copy of fee 
agreement enclosed and notice vacating 
Dr. Wilson's depo enclosed; receipt and 
review letter from atty Thomson 
10/9/2012 Jon Steele Draft subpoenas for Dr. Collins, Fred Rice 2.4 $300.00 $720.00 
and Dennis Reinstein, CPA for arbitration 
hearing; fax to Merlyn Clark for issuance, 
cc to atty Thomson; receipt and review 
letter from atty Thomson; receipt of 
signed supboenas, forward to Karissa 
Armbrust 
10/11/2012 Jon Steele E-mail to Jeff Thomson re: settlement 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
10/12/2012 Jon Steele Draft and send letter to atty Thomson 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
10/15/2012 Jon Steele Draft letters to Collins, Rice, and 1.2 $300.00 $360.00 
Reinstein and send with enclosed 
subpoenas for the arbitration hearing; e-
mail from atty Thomson re: settlement; e-
mail to atty Thomson 
10/16/2012 Jon Steele Finalize and serve Notices of Taking 5.5 $300.00 $1,650.00 
Video Deposition of Dr. Price and Dr. 
Goodwin in lieu of live testimony; review 
and revise Cedilla's 4th Supplemental 
responses to Farmers discovery; finalize 
subpoena duces tecum of Dr. Wilson and 
have paralegal e-mail to Merlyn Clark and 
atty Thomson; e-mail from Sherry 
Montosa with issued subpoena; e-mail 
from atty Thomson objecting to subpoena. 
10/17/2012 Jon Steele Serve Notice of Taking Video Deposition 1.2 $300.00 $360.00 
of Kenneth Little in lieu of live testimony 
at arbitration; e-mail from Sherry Montosa 
re: destroy subpoena issued yesterday; 
telphone call from Nancy Collins re: depo 
tomorrow; e-mail to atty Thomson re: 
Collin's deposition at her office 
10/18/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from atty 1 $300.00 $300.00 
Thomson with $155,000 check enclosed. 
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10/22/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review Farmer's Objection to 1.6 $300.00 $480.00 
Claimant's Subpoena Duces Tecum of 
Richard Wilson; e-mail from Sherry 
Montosa re: date for telephone conference 
on Motion to Quash 
10/23/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review report from Karen 1.2 $300.00 $360.00 
Ginnett and Dennis Reinstein; e-mail to 
atty Thomson re: remainder of Motion to 
Quash - did not all come through 
10/25/2012 Jon Steele E-mails from Sherry Montosa re: hearing 0.4 $300.00 $120.00 
date set for 11 /2 
10/26/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review Memorandum and 0.9 $300.00 $270.00 
Affidavit in support of Respondent's 
Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum 
10/29/2012 Jon Steele E-mail from atty Thomson re: Reinstein 2.3 $300.00 $690.00 
report; review expert report of Dennis 
Reinstein; revise 5th supplemental 
responses to Farmer's discovery 
11/1/2012 Jon Steele Finalize and send Affidavit of Steele in 2 $300.00 $600.00 
Opposition to Respondent's Motion to 
Quash Subpoena; Draft and finalize 
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of 
Thomas Goodwin 
11/5/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review Pre-Hearing Order 2.5 $300.00 $750.00 
No. 6 re: Motion to Quash Subpoena 
Duces Tecum; e-mail from Sherry 
Montosa with signed Amended Subpoena 
Duces T ecum of Wilson; e-mail to Sherry 
Montosa 
11/6/2012 Jon Steele Finalize and serve Claimant's Pre-Hearing 6 $300.00 $1,800.00 
Brief, Witness List, and Exhibit List; 
receipt and review of Farmer's Pre-
Hearing Brief, Witness list and List of 
Exhibits 
11/7/2012 Jon Steele Revise and serve Claimant's Amended 2.5 $300.00 $750.00 
Exhibit list. 
11/9/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from atty 1.8 $300.00 $540.00 
Thomson and 2nd IME report from Dr. 
Wilson 
11/12/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review Pre-Hearing Order no. 0.6 $300.00 $180.00 
7 re: Stipulation to Evidence Issues; e-
mail from Sherry Montosa setting up 
hearing November 16. 
11/12/2012 Jon Steele E-mails to and from Sherry Montosa re: 0.7 $300.00 $210.00 
telephone conference; telephone 




11/13/2012 Jon Steele Finalize and send Claimant's Response to 4.5 $300.00 $1,350.00 
Farmers Pre-Hearing Brief 
11/14/2012 Jon Steele Draft and send letter to atty Thomson re: 4.9 $300.00 $1,470.00 
expert reports; receipt and review letter 
from Kathryn Brandt, paralegal at Elam & 
Burke with enclosed expert reports of Dr. 
Williams and Shannon Purvis; receipt and 
review letter from Katrhyn Brandt to 
paralegal Karissa Armbrust at our office; 
receipt and review signed subpoena duces 
tecum for Shannon Purvis and Dr. 
Williams from Merlyn Clark's office .. 
11/15/2012 Jon Steele E-mails to and from Dennis Reinstein re: 1.2 $300.00 $360.00 
arbitration; e-mail to Nancy Collins; e-
mail to Fred Rice; e-mail to atty Thomson 
re: meeting re: exhibits; e-mail from atty 
Thomson 
11/16/2012 Jon Steele E-mails to and from Dennis Reinstein; 2.9 $300.00 $870.00 
finalize and serve Claimant's Response to 
Respondent's Objections by Letter dated 
November 14, 2012; telephone hearing 
with Merlyn Clark and atty Thomson; 
receipt and review Pre-Hearing Order No. 
8 
11/19/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review letter from Kathryn 4.9 $300.00 $1,470.00 
Brandt to Karissa Armbrust; receipt and 
review letter from atty Thomson to 
Merlyn Clark re: objections to depositions 
of Dr. Price and Dr. Little and enclosing 
proposed Interim Award; prepare for 
arbitration hearing. 
11/20/2012 Jon Steele Prepare for and attend arbitration before 16 $300.00 $4,800.00 
Arbitrator Clark, preparation for 
following day. 
11/21/2012 Jon Steele Prepare for and attend arbitration before 8 $300.00 $2,400.00 
Arbitrator Clark. 
12/4/2012 Jon Steele Receipt and review Pre-Hearing Order 0.5 $300.00 $150.00 
No.9. 
12/10/2012 Jon Steele Finalize and serve Claimant's Post 6.5 $300.00 $1,950.00 
Arbitration Brief; receipt and review 
Farmer's written closing argument. 
12/17/2012 Jon Steele Finalize and serve Claimant's Response to 5.9 $300.00 $1,770.00 
Farmer's Written Closing Argument; 
Farmer's Rebuttal Closing Argument 
1/16/2013 Jon Steele Receipt and review Arbitrator's Decision 2.5 $300.00 $750.00 
and Interim Award. 
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1/18/2013 Jon Steele Draft and send letter to atty Thomson 2.3 $300.00 $690.00 
demanding payment; receipt and review 
letter from atty Thomson 
1/29/2013 Jon Steele Draft and send letter to atty Thomson 2.1 $300.00 $630.00 
demanding payment; receipt and review 
letter from atty Thomson. 
2/5/2013 Jon Steele Review American Foreign Insurance 6 $300.00 $1,800.00 
Company v. Reichert; draft initial Brief in 
Support of Final Award. 
2/8/2013 Jon Steele Finalize Briefin Support of Final Award; 8 $300.00 $2,400.00 
draft Affidavits of Steele in Support of 
Claimant's Final Award. 
2/9/2013 Jon Steele Review Farmers Memorandum in Support 3.8 $300.00 $1,140.00 
of Adjustments; review Affidavit of 
Kathryn Brandt; review Affidavit of Ron 
Ramsey. 
2/12/2013 Jon Steele Prepare and file errata to Brief. 1 $300.00 $300.00 
2/15/2013 Jon Steele Draft additional Affidavit of Steele in 7 $300.00 $2,100.00 
Support of Award; draft Response to 
Farmer's Adjustments; receipt and review 
Farmer Response to Claimants' Brief. 
4/1/2013 Jon Steele Draft Memorandum of Attorney fees and 8 $300.00 $2,400.00 
costs; review Parsons v. Mutual of 
Enumclaw Insurance Company ( court 
awards atty fees on both underlying claim 
and UIM claim); review Idaho Code 
Section 41-1839 and cases cited in Notes 
of Decisions. 
4/2/2013 Jon Steele Review 3 AmJur Pleadings and Forms 1.5 $300.00 $450.00 
Petition Application for Order Compelling 
Arbitration and Appointing Neutral 
Arbitrator 
4/3/2013 Jon Steele Review Vol. 49 November 2006 Advocate 3.5 $300.00 $1,050.00 
Attorneys Fees In Arbitration; A Primer 
for Awarding Attorney Fees in Idaho Law 
Review; Wattenburger v. A.G. Edwards 
(arbitration and attorney fees). 
4/7/2013 Jon Steele Review Harrison v. Certain Underwriters 0.7 $300.00 $210.00 
at Lloyd's London (2010) (confirmation of 
arbitrator's award); review In re: Jones v. 
State Farm Mutual (Auto Insurance 
Company). 
4/8/2013 Jon Steele Review Estate of Holland v. Metropolitan 3.5 $300.00 $1,050.00 
Property; Dillon v. Montgomery; Cranney 
v. Mutual of Enumclaw. 
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4/9/2013 Jon Steele Review Idaho Code Section 12-120, 12- 1.5 $300.00 $450.00 
123, and 41-1839; review Idaho Uniform 
Arbitration Act, Idaho Code Section 7-
901, 7-919 and case cited under notes of 
decisions. 
4/10/2013 Jon Steele Draft Petition for Confirmation of 5.5 $300.00 $1,650.00 
Attorney fees; revise Memorandum of 
Attorney Fees and costs. 
4/29/2013 Jon Steele Receipt and review Arbitrator Clark's 2.2 $300.00 $660.00 
Final Award. 
5/21/2013 Jon Steele Receipt and review Farmesr Motion fo 6 $300.00 $1,800.00 
Reconsideration and Attonrey Thomson's 
Affidavit in Support of Motion; research 
re: use of opponent's expert witness; 
receipt and review Scheduling Order No. 
11. 
5/30/2013 Jon Steele Draft and serve response to Farmers 10 $300.00 $3,000.00 
Motion for Reconsideration; draft and 
serve Motion to Strike; research re: 
Greenough case, review Uninsured and 
Underinsured, Witless, Vol 3, Chapter 39, 
Damages. 
6/6/2013 Jon Steele Receipt and review Respondent's Reply to 0.6 $300.00 $180.00 
Claimant's Opposition to Motion for 
Reconsideration and Respondent's 
Opposition to Claimant's Motion to Strike 
7/10/2013 Jon Steele Receipt and review Draft Order No. 12; 2.5 $300.00 $750.00 
conference with client. 
7/18/2013 Jon Steele Draft and serve Respon to Arbitrator's 8 $300.00 $2,400.00 
Draft Order No. 12; receipt and review 
Farmers' Response to Draft Order No. 12. 
7/24/2013 Jon Steele Receipt and review Arbitrator's Final 3.5 $300.00 $1,050.00 
Order No. 12 re:Respondent's Mot for 
Reconsideration of Prejudgment Interest 
Award and Claimant's Mot to Strike Aff 
of Counsel for Respondent; conference 
with client. 
7/29/2013 Jon Steele Revise Petition for Confirmation of 5 $300.00 $1,500.00 
Arbitrator's Award and Amended 
Memorandum of Attorney Fees 
7/25/2013 Jon Steele Revise Petition for Confirmation of 2.5 $300.00 $750.00 
Arbitrator's Award 
7/30/2013 Jon Steele Receipt and review Farmers' Application 2 $300.00 $600.00 
for Modification of Arbitrator's Final 
Award 





Jon Steele Review file; draft respon to Farmers' 
Application for Modification of 








Paralegal Time for Karissa Armbrust 
11/29/2011 Karissa Send new medical release to client for 0.2 $75.00 $15.00 
Armbrust signature. 
11/30/2011 Karissa Receipt of signed medical release from 0.1 $75.00 $7.50 
Armbrust client 
12/22/2011 Karissa Draft 18 letters and send with medical 0.6 $75.00 $45.00 
Armbrust releases to client's medical providers 
2/6/2012 Karissa E-mail from Sherry Montosa re: 0.4 $75.00 $30.00 
Armbrust available dates for Jon; conference 
with atty Steele; telephone call and 
leave message to Sherry Montosa; e-
mails to and from Sherry Montosa 
2/24/2012 Karissa Receipt and review e-mail from 0.2 $75.00 $15.00 
Armbrust Nichole Pappas requesting Word 
version of discovery; e-mail to Nichole 
with discovery attached. 
2/27/2012 Karissa Send out several requests for updated 0.3 $75.00 $22.50 
Armbrust medical records 
3/19/2012 Karissa Telephone calls to and from Dr. 1.7 $75.00 $127.50 
Armbrust Price's, Dr. Goodwin's and Dr. Little's 
office re: dates and times for 
depositions; draft Notice of Taking 
Video Deposition of Dr. Little and 
serve; e-mail to court reporter and 
John Glenn Hall; e-mail from 
Burnham Habel confirming; e-mail 
from John Glenn Hall confirming 
3/22/2012 Karissa Send additional medical requests out. 0.3 $75.00 $22.50 
Armbrust 
3/26/2012 Karissa Finalize Bate Number index and 1.5 $75.00 $112.50 
Armbrust finalize documents to be produced 
with responses to discovery and create 
CD; prepare binders of documents for 
Nancy Collins 
3/27/2012 Karissa E-mails to and from Nichole Pappas 0.3 $75.00 $22.50 
Armbrust regarding deposition dates 
3/28/2012 Karissa Draft Notice of Taking Video 0.4 $75.00 $30.00 
Armbrust Deposition of Dr. Price; e-mail to 
court reporter; e-mail from Burnham 
Habel confirming depo 
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4/2/2012 Karissa Draft and send medical request to 0.5 $75.00 $37.50 
Armbrust Wal greens; e-mails to and from 
Nichole Pappas re: deposition dates; e-
mails to and from Sherry Montosa to 
set up a telephone hearing conference 
regarding Statement of claims. 
4/3/2012 Karissa E-mail to Nancy Collins with notice of 0.4 $75.00 $30.00 
Armbrust deposition; e-mail to Nancy Collins 
with documents attached 
4/16/2012 Karissa Send medical request to Walgreens 0.2 $75.00 $15.00 
Armbrust 
4/18/2012 Karissa Receipt of notices vacating depositions 0.2 $75.00 $15.00 
Armbrust and forward via e-mail to Reinstein 
and Collins 
4/24/2012 Karissa E-mails to and from Merlyn Clark's 0.2 $75.00 $15.00 
Armbrust office and to Jeff Thomson re: 
conference call to set up new 
arbitration date 
4/25/2012 Karissa E-mails from Jeff Thomson's office re: 0.1 $75.00 $7.50 
Armbrust conference time 
4/26/2012 Karissa E-mails from Sherry Montosa re: 0.1 $75.00 $7.50 
Armbrust conference call on May 1 
5/4/2012 Karissa Send medical request to Walgreens 0.1 $75.00 $7.50 
Armbrust 
8/8/2012 Karissa Send multiple requests for updated 0.6 $75.00 $45.00 
Armbrust medical records and billings 
8/29/2012 Karissa E-mails and phone calls to and from 0.6 $75.00 $45.00 
Armbrust experts and doctors gathering CV s, 
etc.; phone call to Dr. Little's office re: 
report; e-mail to atty Steele re: Dr. 
Little's report 
9/4/2012 Karissa E-mail from Fred Rice with CV, fees, 0.2 $75.00 $15.00 




9/12/2012 Karissa E-mails to and from John Glenn Hall 0.8 $75.00 $60.00 
Armbrust re: copying of CD; telephone call to 
Dr. Goodwin's office re: depositions 
date and fees; telephone call with atty 
Steele re: times for depos for him; 
telephone call with client re: 
deposition dates and date for IME; 
several e-mails to and from Nichole 
Pappas re: deposition dates and IME 
date and confirm 9/20 for Kathryn 
Brandt to come to office to review 
files. 
9/13/2012 Karissa Send further medical requests out 1.2 $75.00 $90.00 
Armbrust pursuant to atty Thomson letters; 
gather wage loss documents and bum 
onto CDs and send with letters to 
Dennis Reinstein and Nancy Collins; 
phone calls with Dr. Little's office; e-
mail to Dennis Reinstein; e-mail to 
Regence. 
9/14/2012 Karissa E-mail to and from Nichole Pappas re: 0.4 $75.00 $30.00 
Armbrust Dr. Price depo; e-mail from Dennis 
Reinstein re: depo date and report; e-
mail to Nancy Collins re: deposition 
date 
9/16/2012 Karissa E-mail from Dennis Reinstein re: 0.2 $75.00 $15.00 
Armbrust unavailable dates 
9/18/2012 Karissa Organize, bates number and index 4.5 $75.00 $337.50 
Armbrust documents for production; draft 
Cedillo's First Supplemental responses 
to Farmers' Insurance and give to atty 
Steele for review; finalize and serve 
discovery. 
9/24/2012 Karissa E-mail from Dennis Reinstein 0.5 $75.00 $37.50 
Armbrust requesting information; e-mail to 
Dennis Reinstein with information 
requested; e-mails to and from Nichole 
Pappas re: Reinstein depo; e-mail from 
Reinstein confirming date of depo 
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9/25/2012 Karissa Organize, bates number, and index 2.4 $75.00 $180.00 
Armbrust documents to be produced; draft 
responses to Cedillo's 2nd 
Supplemental to Farmer's discovery 
and give to atty Steele for review; 
finalize and serve discovery 
9/25/2012 Karissa E-mail from Nichole Pappas re: 0.2 $75.00 $15.00 
Armbrust require only 1 hour for Dr. Little's 
deposition; call Dr. Little's office and 
notify of change in duration of 
deposition. 
9/26/2012 Karissa E-mails to and from Nichole Pappas 0.2 $75.00 $15.00 
Armbrust re: change in start time for Dr. Little 
deposition; e-mail to atty Steele re: W-
2s to Collins; e-mail to Fred Rice re: 
drawings and photos. 
9/27/2012 Karissa Receipt and review maps, etc. from 0.2 $75.00 $15.00 
Armbrust Fred Rice 
10/1/2012 Karissa E-mail from Fred Rice with remainder 0.2 $75.00 $15.00 
Armbrust of maps and notes. 
10/10/2012 Karissa E-mails to and from Nichole Pappas 0.6 $75.00 $45.00 
Armbrust re: length of deposition for doctors: e-
mail to atty Steele re: supplement of 
discovery 
10/11/2012 Karissa Phone call to Boise Orthopedic re: 1 $75.00 $75.00 
Armbrust previous shoulder surgery records for 
Dr. Goodwin; draft letter and sent with 
release to Boise Orthopedic; receipt of 
updated records from Idaho Physical 
therapy and prepare for production; 
call for updated chart notes for 
Goodwin; call Dr. Little's office and 
inquire about possible missing notes -
verify that there are none missing. 
10/12/2012 Karissa Organize, bates number, and index 5.3 $75.00 $397.50 
Armbrust documents; draft responses to Cedillo's 
3rd Supplemental response and give to 
Steele for review; revise responses per 
atty Steele's comments; finalize and 




10/15/2012 Karissa draft letter to atty Thomson with 0.3 $75.00 $22.50 
Armbrust enclosed verification page to Third 
Supplement and Subpoenas to 
Collilns, Rice, and Reinstein. 
10/16/2012 Karissa Organize, bates number, and index 3.2 $75.00 $240.00 
Armbrust documents; draft 4th supplemental 
responses to discovery and give to atty 
Steele for review; revise 4th 
supplemental responses and serve. 
10/22/2012 Karissa E-mail from John Glenn Hall 0.3 $75.00 $22.50 
Armbrust confirming deposition; e-mail from 
Karen Ginnett re: report and final 
review 
10/26/2012 Karissa Letter to atty Thomson with signed 0.6 $75.00 $45.00 
Annbrust verification for Fourth Supplement to 
Discovery; draft and send letter to Dr. 
Friedman with medical release; e-
mails to and from Karen Ginnett; e-
mail from Nichole Pappas. 
10/29/2012 Karissa Organize, bates number, and index 1 $75.00 $75.00 
Armbrust documents; draft 5th supplemental 
response to Farmer's discovery and 
give to atty Steele for review; make 
revisions and serve; e-mail to Karen 
Ginnett with Walgreen's information 
11/5/2012 Karissa Prepare Exhibits and Exhibit List for 5 $75.00 $375.00 
Armbrust Arbitration Hearing 
11/6/2012 Karissa Prepare Exhibits for arbitration 7.5 $75.00 $562.50 
Armbrust hearing; e-mails to and from Nichole 
Pappas re: exchange of exhibits and 
briefs 
11/7/2012 Karissa E-mails to Nichole Pappas and Sherry 0.3 $75.00 $22.50 
Armbrust Montosa re: Amended Exhibit List and 
missing exhibit 
11/9/2012 Karissa Letter to atty Thomson with signed 0.6 $75.00 $45.00 
Armbrust verification to 5th supplement, medical 
records and Regence subrogation; e-
mail from Nichole Pappas with Wilson 
IME information, forward to atty 
Steele. 
11/12/2012 Karissa Revise Exhibits requested by atty 2.4 $75.00 $180.00 
Armbrust Thomson; e-mail to atty Thomson with 
revised exhibits 
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- • 11/14/2012 Karissa Receipt and review letter from Kathryn 0.1 $75.00 $7.50 
Armbrust Brandt re: records. 
11/19/2012 Karissa Receipt and review letter from Kathryn 0.1 $75.00 $7.50 
Armbrust Brandt. 
TOTAL 48.3 $3,622.50 
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RUNFT & S~~tlELE 
LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
John L. Runft I Jon M. Steele 
Peggy Cedillo Steele 
4707 W. Clearview Dr. 
Boise, ID 83703 
November 22, 2011 
Re: Engagement Letter for Legal Services 
Dear Ms. Cedillo Steele: 
The purpose of this letter is to set forth the terms and conditions of the engagement of 
this law firm ("Law Firm") as lawyers for you in your underinsurance claim with Farmers 
Insurance Co. Mr. John L. Run.ft will be the responsible attorney. 
This confirms that you and the Law Firm have agreed that the Law Firm will take this 
matter and represent you as your lawyer in pursuing your above referenced claim on a 
contingency basis, whereby legal fees will be paid only when, and if, you recover monetary 
damages on your claim in this matter, whether by settlement, or by decision of the district 
court. The Law Firm's portion of the recovery for payment oflegal fees will be as follows: 
33 1/3% of any recovery obtained. Subrogation payments, if any, made from proceeds of 
recovery on your above claim will be made after the fees and costs owed to this Law Firm 
are calculated and paid. We will confer with you and obtain your consent before filing any 
litigation in this matter. Any appeal will be filed only with your consent and approval. 
However, in the event of an appeal, by any party, the Law Firm's portion of the recovery for 
payment of legal fees will increase to 40% of any recovery. 
You will be responsible for reimbursing the Law Firm for its costs and disbursements 
in the event of a recovery. In the event ofrecovery, the Law Firm's costs and disbursements 
will be first paid from any proceeds of recovery. The amount of attorney's fees will be 
calculated, however, as a percentage ( see above) of the total recovery before the payment of 
said costs and disbursements. The balance remaining after payment of said costs, 
disbursements, attorney's fees, and subrogated interests will be paid to you with a full 
accounting of same. 
runftsteele.com 
Phone: (208) 333-8506 Fa:c: l208) 343-3246 I Boise. Idaho 83702 
[n che Absb Center j 1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 I Fourth Floor Exhibit _g_ 
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Further terms of our representation are set forth in the Appendix to this letter. 
We look forward to working with you and appreciate your confidence in entrusting 
your representation to us. 
Please sign and date the enclosed copy of this letter and return it to me to 
acknowledge your acceptance of the foregoing terms. 
Please call if you have any questions. 
Sincerel ~ 
#.t/f)v 
ohn L. Runft 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
JLR:kra 
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Appendix to Engagement Letter 
Dated November 22, 2011 
Between Run.ft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
and 
Peggy Cedillo Steele 
Disbursements. You will be responsible for reimbursing the Law Finn for its out-of -
pocket expenses incurred on your behalf ("disbursements") from any recovery in this matter. 
Such disbursements may include, without limitation, long distance phone calls, travel, 
telefax, photocopying, computerized legal research, delivery services, filing fees, deposition 
costs, expert witness fees and charges, document preparation and document storage, court 
costs and transcripts and other incidental expenses, such as overtime, secretarial or word 
processing assistance incurred due to your specific time constraints. 
Payment and Distribution of Recovery Proceeds: Payment of any and all recovery 
proceeds shall be paid to you and this Law Finn jointly and delivered or sent to this Law 
Finn for distribution in accordance with the terms of this engagement letter. Any check 
received by the Law Firm as and for recovery proceeds shall be endorsed by both you and the 
law firm and promptly negotiated and the proceeds deposited in the Law Finn's attorney trust 
account for distribution in accordance with the terms of this engagement letter. 
Termination of Representation; Retention and Disposition of Documents. Unless 
previously terminated, or otherwise agreed in writing, our representation of you in this matter 
will terminate upon the resolution of this matter and The Law Finn's sending to you a letter 
notifying you of the final resolution of this matter and, in the event of a recovery, a final 
statement and accounting for services rendered and disbursements made. At your request, 
your papers and property will be returned to you promptly upon such final resolution. 
You may terminate this Law Finn's representation of you at any time. We may 
terminate our representation of you for any reason consistent with the applicable rules of 
professional conduct, including breach of the terms of this engagement letter. Following such 
termination, any otherwise non-public information you have supplied to us which is retained 
by us will be kept confidential in accordance with applicable rules of professional conduct. 
In the event you or the Law Finn terminate this Law Finn's representation of you in 
this matter prior to final resolution of this matter, the Law Firm may file an attorney's lien for 
its legal services to date, or reach an acceptable agreement with your new lawyers regarding 
this Law Firm's attorney fees, disbursements and regarding your papers and property. In the 
event of a recovery in this matter after termination of this Law Finn's representation of you, 
you will be responsible for This Law Finn's fees for services and expenses incurred prior to 
termination, including those incurred in transferring any matters to your new counsel. In the 
event of any termination of our representation, you acknowledge our right to retain all files 
and other documents relating to matters as to which we are then or have previously 
represented you as a lien pending against any recovery in this matter for our receipt of 
payment in full for our legal services and disbursements. Subject to the foregoing, for 
various reasons, including the minimization of unnecessary storage expenses, we reserve the 
right to destroy or otherwise dispose of any documents or other materials retained by us 
within a reasonable time, whether during or after the termination of the engagement. 
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• - • This Law Firm's own files pertaining to the matter will be retained by the Law Firm. 
These files include, for example, Law Firm administrative records, time and expense reports, 
personnel and staffing materials, and credit and accounting records; and internal lawyers; 
work product such as drafts, notes, internal memoranda, and legal and factual research, 
including investigative reports, prepared by or for the internal use of lawyers. 
finis 
000229
JOHN L. RUNFf (ISB # 1059) 
JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
RUNFf & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone:(208)333-9495 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: JSteele@runftsteele.com 
Attorneys for Peggy Cedillo 
l'/L!g -
....P.M---~---
ALJG 1 B 2013 
CHRISTOPHER o 
By CHRISTINE: ·sWf ,t:.• Clark 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA . " " 
PEGGY CEDILLO, an individual, ) 
) 









· CASE NO~ CV OC 1308697 .,, ., .'" 
MOTION TO CONFIRM ... 
ARBITRATION AWARD AND.FOR 
AW ARD OF COSTS, ATTORNEY 
FEES, AND PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST 
COMES NOW, Peggy Cedillo, by and through her counsel of record, Jon M. Steele, and 
moves this Court, pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-911, for an Order confirming the arbitration award 
entered by the parties' chosen arbitrator, Mr. Merlyn Clark, on July 24, 2013. Plaintiff also 
moves this Court to award costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest. This Motion is 
supported by the First Amended Petition for Confirmation and the Amended Verified 
Memorandum of Costs, Attorney Fees and Prejudgment Interest. 
( 41-DATED this J!.._ day of August 2013. 
/ 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: rod/Jrnlit 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MOTION TO CONFIRM ARBITRATION AW ARD AND FOR AW ARD OF COSTS, 





Jeffrey A. Thomson 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
jat@elamburke.com 
ISB #3380 
Attorneys for Defendant 
NO. FILED LL ~ , = 
A.M.----·M ~ ~-
SEP O 9 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DAYSHA OSBORN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PEGGY CEDILLO, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 1308697 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED 
PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION 
OF ARBITRATION A WARD, 
A WARD OF ATTORNEY FEES, 
UNENFORCEABILITY OF OFFSET 
CLAUSE AND BAD FAITH AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho ("Farmers"), by and through its attorneys of 
record, Elam & Burke, P.A., and in answer to Plaintiffs First Amended Petition for 
Confirmation of Arbitration Award, Award of Attorney Fees, Unenforceability of Offset Clause 
and Bad faith ("Plaintiffs Petition") admits, denies and alleges as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
The following defenses are not stated separately as to each claim for relief or allegation 
of Plaintiff, nevertheless, the following defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any and all 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR 
CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION A WARD, A WARD OF ATTORNEY FEES, 
UNENFORCEABILITY OF OFFSET CLAUSE AND BAD FAITH AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL - 1 
000231
of Plaintiffs claims for relief. Farmers, in asserting the following defenses, does not admit that 
the burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses is upon Farmers, but, to 
the contrary, asserts that by reason of said denials, and by reason of relevant statutory and 
judicial authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses and 
affirmative defenses and the burden of proving the inverse of the allegations contained in many 
of the defenses and affirmative defenses is upon Plaintiff. Moreover, Farmers does not admit, in 
asserting any defense, any responsibility or liability but, to the contrary, specifically denies any 
and all allegations of responsibility and liability contained in Plaintiffs Petition. 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs Petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Farmers 
and should therefore be dismissed pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Farmers denies each and every allegation in Plaintiffs Petition not specifically admitted 
herein. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
PARTIES & JURISDICTION 
1. In response to Paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers admits the allegations 
contained therein. 
2. In response to Paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers admits the allegations 
contained therein. 
3. In response to Paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs Petition, Plaintiff attempts to set forth 
legal conclusions which do not require an answer. 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR 
CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD, AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES, 
UNENFORCEABILITY OF OFFSET CLAUSE AND BAD FAITH AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL - 2 
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4. In response to Paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs Petition, Plaintiff attempts to set forth 
legal conclusions which do not require an answer. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
5. In response to Paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers admits that Plaintiff 
seeks confirmation of the Arbitrator's Amended Final Award. 
6. In response to Paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers admits Plaintiff seeks 
this relief but denies entitlement thereto. 
7. In response to Paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers admits Plaintiff seeks 
this ruling but denies entitlement that Farmers' offset clause is inapplicable. 
8. In response to Paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers admits Plaintiff seeks 
this relief but denies entitlement thereto. 
9. In response to Paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers admits Plaintiff seeks 
· this relief but denies entitlement thereto. 
FACTS 
10. In response to Paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers admits that a contract 
of insurance exists and that the document speaks for itself. 
11. In response to Paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers admits the contract of 
insurance has endorsement E 1179i, and that the document speaks for itself. 
12. In response to Paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers admits Plaintiff 
suffered bodily injury. Farmers denies the remaining allegation contained in Paragraph 12. 
13. In response to Paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmer admits Cedillo made an 
underinsured motor vehicle claim ("UIM"). 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR 
CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION A WARD, A WARD OF ATTORNEY FEES, 
UNENFORCEABILITY OF OFFSET CLAUSE AND BAD FAITH AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL - 3 
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14. In response to Paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers admits the parties 
agreed to arbitrate the UIM claim. 
15. In response to Paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers admits the allegations 
contained therein. 
16. In response to Paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers admits the allegations 
contained therein, but affirmatively alleges Plaintiff has waived all rights thereunder. 
17. In response to Paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers admits only that the 
Arbitrator's Decision and Interim A ward was entered on January 16, 2013, and the document 
speaks for itself. 
18. In response to Paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers admits that the 
Arbitrator's Final Award was entered on April 29, 2013, and the document speaks for itself. 
19. In response to Paragraph 19 of Plaintiff's Petition, Farmers admits it made 
payments but denies $25,000.00 was made on August 29, 2009, which payment was made on 
August 25, 2009, and denies $155,000.00 was made on October 16, 2012, which payment was 
made on October 18, 2012. 
20. In response to Paragraph 20 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers admits that the 
Arbitrator's Amended Final Award was entered on July 24, 2013, and the document speaks for 
itself. 
21. In response to Paragraph 21 of Plaintiff's Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
22. In response to Paragraph 22 of Plaintiff's Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
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23. In response to Paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
COUNTl 
CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATOR'S AWARD 
24. In response to Paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers realleges its responses 
to paragraphs 1 through 23, as if fully set forth herein. 
25. In response to Paragraph 25 of Plaintiffs Petition, Plaintiff attempts to set forth 
legal conclusions which do not require an answer. 
26. In response to Paragraph 26 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers admits Plaintiff seeks 
judicial confirmation. 
27. In response to Paragraph 27 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers admits Plaintiff seeks 
entry of judgment but denies Plaintiffs entitled thereto in the amount requested. 
COUNT II 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE§ 49-1839(1) AND IRCP 
INCURRED IN THE ARBITRATION 
28. In response to Paragraph 28 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers realleges its responses 
to paragraphs 1 through 27, as if fully set forth herein. 
29. In response to Paragraph 29 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
30. In response to Paragraph 30 of Plaintiffs Petition, Plaintiff attempts to set forth 
legal conclusions which do not require an answer. 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR 
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31. In response to Paragraph 31 of Plaintiffs Petition, Plaintiff attempts to set forth 
legal conclusions which do not require an answer. 
32. In response to Paragraph 32 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
33. In response to Paragraph 33 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
COUNT Ill 
FARMERS SET-OFF OR OFFSET CLAUSE IS INAPPLICABLE/UNENFORCEABLE 
34. In response to Paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers realleges its responses 
to paragraphs 1 through 33, as if fully set forth herein. 
35. In response to Paragraph 35 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein and affirmatively alleges that Plaintiff has waived the preservation and 
reservation of this issue. 
36. In response to Paragraph 36 of Plaintiffs Petition, Plaintiff attempts to set forth 
legal conclusions which do not require an answer. 
37. In response to Paragraph 37 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers admits the allegations 
contained therein. 
3 8. In response to Paragraph 3 8 of Plaintiffs Petition, Plaintiff attempts to set forth 
legal conclusions which do not require an answer, but to the extent an answer is required, 
Farmers denies the allegations contained therein. 
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39. In response to Paragraph 39 of Plaintiffs Petition, Plaintiff attempts to set forth 
legal conclusions which do not require an answer, but to the extent an answer is required, 
Farmers denies the allegations contained therein. 
40. In response to Paragraph 40 of Plaintiff's Petition, Plaintiff attempts to set forth 
legal conclusions which do not require an answer, but to the extent an answer is required, 
Farmers denies the allegations contained therein. 
41. In response to Paragraph 41 of Plaintiff's Petition, Farmers admits only that the 
endorsement is the same, but denies the issue of enforceability was addressed by Talbot. 
42. In response to Paragraph 42 of Plaintiff's Petition, Farmers admits Cedillo had no 
other UIM coverage but denies the remaining allegations contained therein. 
43. In response to Paragraph 43 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
44. In response to Paragraph 44 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
45. In response to Paragraph 45 of Plaintiff's Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
46. In response to Paragraph 46 of Plaintiff's Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
47. In response to Paragraph 47 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR 
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48. In response to Paragraph 48 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers realleges its responses 
to paragraphs 1 through 4 7, as if fully set forth herein. 
49. In response to Paragraph 49 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
50. In response to Paragraph 50 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
51. In response to Paragraph 51 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
52. In response to Paragraph 52 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
53. In response to Paragraph 53 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
54. In response to Paragraph 54 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
55. In response to Paragraph 55 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
56. In response to Paragraph 56 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
57. In response to Paragraph 57 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
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58. In response to Paragraph 58 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
59. In response to Paragraph 59 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
60. In response to Paragraph 60 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
61. In response to Paragraph 61 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
62. In response to Paragraph 62 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
63. In response to Paragraph 63 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
64. In response to Paragraph 64 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
65. In response to Paragraph 65 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
66. In response to Paragraph 66 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
67. In response to Paragraph 67 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
68. In response to Paragraph 68 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
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69. In response to Paragraph 69 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
70. In response to Paragraph 70 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
71. In response to Paragraph 71 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
72. In response to Paragraph 72 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
73. In response to Paragraph 73 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
74. In response to Paragraph 74 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
75. In response to Paragraph 75 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
76. In response to Paragraph 76 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
77. In response to Paragraph 77 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
78. In response to Paragraph 78 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
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COUNTV 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO 
IDAHO CODE§§ 7-914, 12-121, 12-123, AND 41-1839. 
79. In response to Paragraph 79 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers realleges its responses 
to paragraphs 1 through 78, as if fully set forth herein. 
80. In response to Paragraph 80 of Plaintiffs Petition, Plaintiff attempts to set forth 
legal conclusions which do not require an answer, but to the extent an answer is required, 
Farmers denies the allegations contained therein. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
81. In response to Paragraph 81 of Plaintiffs Petition, Farmers denies the allegations 
contained therein and moves to strike as this paragraph is in violation ofldaho Code§ 6-1604. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That Plaintiff breached the contract which forms the basis of her cause of action. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That Plaintiff is estopped from claiming certain relief. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That a sufficient Proof of Loss, a condition precedent of Defendant's obligations, did not 
timely occur. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That Plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate the claimed or alleged damage. 
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FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That Defendant was unable to perform the contract which forms the basis of Plaintiffs 
Petition because of Plaintiffs failure to cooperate which frustrated the purpose and performance 
of the contract. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That the Plaintiffs request for attorney fees cannot be maintained because the attorney 
fee contract was for an illegal purpose. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That Plaintiff has, by failing to timely provide information and documents, failed to 
cooperate in the investigation; that such cooperation is required under the policy in question; and 
that insurer was substantially prejudiced by insured's breach of her duty to cooperate with the 
msurer. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That Plaintiff has violated or failed to comply with certain conditions of the insuring 
agreement thereby prejudicing Defendant and discharging it from obligation under the insuring 
agreement with respect to the claims set forth in Plaintiffs Petition. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents the Plaintiff from challenging the 
enforceability of the offset provision in this action, because she did so in the arbitration despite 
stipulating that the issue was outside the scope of the arbitration, thus Plaintiff is barred from , 
presenting the issue in this action. 
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TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That Plaintiffs request for attorney fees should be barred as a matter of public policy 
because the attorney fee contract is collusive and a tortfeasor should not benefit from his actions. 
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That Plaintiffs request for attorney fees is such that it would be unconscionable to now 
maintain that the tortfeasor benefit from his actions in causing the accident and alleged injuries. 
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That Plaintiff did release Jon M. Steele from all liability in connection with the facts and 
circumstances of this case and that Jon M. Steele is the person primarily responsible for the 
Plaintiffs injuries alleged in her Petition. 
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That Plaintiff has unclean hands by her actions through her agent and attorney. 
FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That the alleged contract upon which Plaintiff based her request for attorney fees is 
unconscionable for the reason that a tortfeasor should not benefit from his actions. 
FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That some or all of the claims registered in Plaintiffs Petition with regard to items of 
damages have been the subject of payment by other persons or entities not parties to this lawsuit 
and to the extent payment has been received and accepted by Plaintiff, those items of damages 
have been paid and recovery in the present lawsuit would result in unjust enrichment to Plaintiff. 
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SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That Plaintiff has voluntarily waived any right to challenge the offset provision of 
her actions in arbitration. 
RESERVATION 
Farmers reserves the right, after discovery, to amend this Answer to add additional 
affirmative defenses supported by the facts, and a failure to include all such defenses in this 
Answer shall not be deemed a waiver of any right to further amend this Answer. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Farmers hereby requests that it be awarded its attorney fees and costs incurred herein. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Farmers hereby demands a trial by jury. 
WHEREFORE, Farmers prays for judgment as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Petition be dismissed with prejudice, and that judgment be entered for 
Farmers and against Plaintiff and that she take nothing thereby. 
2. For costs, including reasonable attorney fees to be set by the Court. 
3. For such other and further relief as to the Court may deem proper. 
DATED this _J__ day of September, 2013. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
eY, . Thomson, Of the firm 
orneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 9 day of September, 2013, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows: 
John L. Runft /u.s. Mail 
Jon M. Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
Peter J. Johnson 
Johnson Law Group 
103 E. Indiana Ave., Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
Via Facsimile - 343-3246 
/u.s.Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
__ Via Facsimile - (509) 326-7503 
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.. 
JOHN L. RUNFT (ISB # 1059) 
JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-9495 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: jmsteele(a),runftlaw .com 
Attorneys for Peggy Cedillo 
NO._. 
AAt _____ .:..IIL~~-5£>2: 
SEP 11 2013 
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By STEPHANIE VIDAK 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PEGGY CEDILLO, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMP ANY OF 
IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
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CASE NO. CV OC 1308697 
AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO CONFIRM ARBITRATION 
AW ARD, COSTS, ATTORNEY FEES, 
AND PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
COMES NOW, Jon M. Steele, being over the age of eighteen years and competent to 
make this Affidavit, after first being duly sworn, and upon his own personal knowledge, states as 
follows: 
1. That I am an attorney in good standing with the Idaho State Bar and counsel for 
Plaintiff in the above arbitration and confirmation. 
2. · That I make this Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Confirm Arbitration 
Award, Costs, Attorney Fees, and Prejudgment Interest. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JON STEELE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONFIRM 




3. That this matter is scheduled to come before the Court on Wednesday, October 2, 
2013 at 2:45 p.m. 
4. That Cedillo has requested confirmation of the Arbitrator's Award entered on July 
24, 2013. 
5. On July 24, 2013 the Arbitrator entered his Amended Final Award which awarded 
Cedillo $101,947.96 plus interest. See, Exhibit F to First Amended Petition for Confirmation of 
Arbitration Award, Award of Attorney Fees, Unenforceability of Offset Clause, and Bad Faith; 
also attached hereto as Exhibit F. 
6. The Amended Final Award (Exhibit F) denied Farmers' Motion for 
Reconsideration of Prejudgment Interest Award. 
7. Following entry of the Arbitrator's Amended Final Award on July 24, 2013, 
Farmers filed another Application to Modify or Correct Amended Final Award and/or Motion 
for Reconsideration seeking modification of the Amended Final Award in this matter. 
8. That Farmers' Application/Motion was denied by the Arbitrator on August 21, 
2013 in his Final Order No. 13 Re: Respondent's Application to Modify or Correct Amended 
Final Award and/or Motion for Reconsideration attached hereto as Exhibit G. 
9. That in his Final Order No. 13 Re: Respondent's Application to Modify or 
Correct Amended Final Award and/or Motion for Reconsideration, the Arbitrator states the 
following: 
It is also the finding and conclusion of the Arbitrator that the application 
for modification or correction of the Amended Final Award to have the 
payment applied to the principle balance rather than the accrued interest 
does not constitute a request to correct an evident miscalculation of figures 
or an evident mistake in the description of any person, thing or property 
AFFIDAVIT OF JON STEELE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONFIRM 
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referred to in the award, nor a request to correct an award that is imperfect 
in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the controversy as required 
under Sections 7-909 and 7-913(1) and(3). 
10. That there remains due and payable the adjusted award of $100,332.95, unpaid 
prejudgment interest to March 25, 2013 of $1,615.01, and interest from March 25, 2013 of 
$32.99 per diem. 
11. That demand for this amount has been made yet remains unpaid. See, Exhibit H 
attached. 
Further, your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this \ l~ day of September 2013. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: < )~~II 
--JO"'-<N='"-M-. -+-§i:'_E_E_L_E---v-u ~---
Attorney for Plaintiff 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
' t 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _it day of September 2013. 
Notary Public for the State ofldaho 
Residing at: NCN\ ~ 
My Commission Expires: ~-\ q-~ \ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this I (ib day of September 2013, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JON STEELE IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONFIRM ARBITRATION AW ARD, COSTS, ATTORNEY 
FEES AND PREJUDGMENT INTEREST was served upon opposing counsel as follows: 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam Burke 
251 E. Front St., Ste 300 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance Company 
Of Idaho 
Peter J. Johnson 
Johnson Law Group 
103 E. Indiana Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance Company 
Of Idaho 
Via Facsimile 
__ Via Personal Delivery 
_x_ Via U.S. Mail 
_x__ ViaE-mail 
Via Facsimile 
__ Via Personal Delivery 
~ Via U.S. Mail 
__)( Via E-mail 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: < JJ1 ~l 
JONM. ST¥._L 
Attorney for Peggy Cedillo 
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Case No. 81700-0040 
AMENDED FINAL AWARD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This arbitration involves claims for damages under the underinsured motorist provisions 
of a policy of insurance that was issued by Respondent, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho 
("Farmers" or "Respondent") to Claimant, Peggy B. Cedillo ("Claimant"). The claims are 
disputed by Respondent. The dispute has been submitted to binding arbitration- pursuant to the 
agreement to arbitrate, which is contained in the insurance policy. The agreement to arbitrate, the 
Idaho Uriiform Arbitration Act, Idaho Code§ 7-901, et seq., the Pre-Hearing Orders that were 
entered by the arbitrator in this matter, and the Stipulations of the Parties dated Febrnary 22, 
2012 and April 5, 2012 govern these proceedings. 
The Final Award was issued on April 29, 2013. In the Final Award, Claimant was 
awarded the sum of $203,468.41, consisting of the Adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 plus 
accmed prejudgment interest of $103,135.46. It was further ordered that prejudgment interest at 
the rate of twelve percent per annum (12%) shall .continue to accrne on the Adjusted Interim 
AIYIENDED FINAL AW ARD - 1 Exhibit F 
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Award of $100,332.95 from the date of the Final Awm·d until the Final Award is confirmed by a 
final judgment of a court or paid, whichever sooner occurs. 
On May 20, 2013, Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Prejudgment 
Interest Award, in which Respondent seeks adjustment of the amount of prejudgment interest 
that was included in the Final Award to account for a payment by Respondent to Claimant that 
was made after the Interim Award was issued but before the Final Award was issued. The 
Affidavit o~ Counsel that is submitted in support of Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration 
establishes that Respondent paid to Claimant the sum of $100,332.95 on March_25,_ 2013, which 
was the amount of the Adjusted Interim Award. The fact that this payment was made by 
Respondent and· received by Claimant is not disputed by Claimant. This payment was made 
thirty-six (36) days before the Final Award was issued. The Arbitrator was not informed of this 
payment and did not consider it in the calculation of prejudgment interest that was made by the 
Arbitrator al)d awarded in the Final Award. The Motion for Reconsideration also seeks a 
recalculation and adjustment of prejudgment interest on medical expenses, lost income and 
general damages based on information submitted with the Motion. The parties, through their 
respective counsel, submitted memoranda in support of and in opposition to the Motion. 
The Arbitrator has duly considered the authorities and arguments that were submitted by 
the parties and has issued simultaneously with this Amended Final Award, the Arbitrator's Final 
Order No. 12 Re: Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of Prejudgment Interest Award and 
Claimant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Counsel for Respondent. The Final Order No. 12 grants 
in part and denies in part the Motion for Reconsiderntion. 
AMENDED FINAL A WARD - 2 
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II. AMENDED FINAL AW ARD 
The Final Award that was issued on April 29, 2013 is incorporated herein, except as it is 
revised and amended by this Amended Final Award. 
In the Final Award_, Claimant was awarded the sum of $203,468.41 consisting of the 
Adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 plus accrued prejudgment interest of $103,135.46, a 
total of $203,468.41. It was further ordered that prejudgment interest at the rate of twelve 
percent per annum (12%) shall continue to accrue on the Adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 
from the date of the Firial A ward until the Final A ward is c~nfirmed by a judgment of a court or 
paid, whichever sooner occurs. 
~espondent is entitled-to a credit on the Final Award of $100,332.96 for the payment on 
March 25, 2013. On March 25, 2013, Respondent's obligation under the Final Award was 
$100,332.95 (the Adjusted Interim Award) plus outstanding accrned prejudgment interest of 
$103,135.46, a total of $203,468.41. The payment was applied to the accrued prejudgment 
interest of $103,135.46, leaving unpaid the award of $100,332.95 plus accrned interest of 
$2,802.51. 
Respondent is also entitled to a credit of $1,187.50 for 36 days of interest at 12% per" 
annum on the Adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95. This credit further reduces the amount of 
the accrued unpaid interest to $1,615.01 as of March 25, 2013. Thus, on March 25, 2013, the 
corrected and Amended Final Award is $101,947.96. 
Prejudgment interest at the rate of 12% p_er annum continues to accrue on the unpaid 
Adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 from March 25, 2013 until the Amended Final Award is 
AMENDED FINAL A WARD - 3 
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confirmed in a_finaljudgment or paid, whichever sooner occurs. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 24th day of July, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of July, 2013, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing AMENDED FINAL A WARD by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
Jon Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
js teele@mnftsteele.com 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
jat@elamburke.com 
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Case No. 81700-0040 
FINAL ORDER NO. 13 RE: 
RESPONDENT'S APPLICATION TO 
MODIFY OR CORRECT AlYIENDED 
FINAL AW ARD AND/OR MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Introduction 
Pending b~fore 'the Arbitrator is Respondent's Application to Modify or Correct 
Amended Final Award and/or Motiorn for Reconsideration seeking modification of the Amen~ed . 
Final Award in this matter. 
Pursuant to Ordyr No. 12 'and the Amended Final Award that was issued by the Arbitrator 
on Ju,ly 24, 2013, the Arbitrator determined that the payment by Farmers on March 25, 2013 in 
the amount of $100,332.95 should be applied first to accrued prejudgment interest rather than the 
principle amount of the adjusted Interim Award. Respondent contends that this will result in an 
erroneous calculation of interest. 
The Application to Modify was received by the Arbitrator on July 30, 2013. A response 
from the Claimant, objecting to the Application, was received by the Arbitrator on August 2, 
2013. No reply memorandum from Respondent has been received by the Arbitrator and the 
matter is deemed ripe for decision. 
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II. 
POWER TO CORRECT AND MODIFY THE Alv.lENDED FINAL AW ARD 
Resp9ndent contends that the Arbitrator has the power to modify or correct the Amended 
Final Award pursuant to Idaho Code§ 7-909 and§§ 7-913(a)(l) and (3) and Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 11. Respondent asserts th~t the application herein has been made ~ithin 14 
and/or 70 days of the Amended Final Award and is thereby timely. 
Section 7-909 aµthorizes an arbitrator to modify or correct a final award upon the 
grounds stated in I.C. § 7-913(a), paragraphs (1) [eyident miscalculation of figures or an evident 
mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referre_d to in the award] or (3) [award 
is imperfect in a matter of form, not affectm.g the merits of the controversy], upon application of 
a party, provided the application is made within twenty (20) days after delivery of the award to 
the applicant. In this case, the Amended Final Award was served on the Parties via email, as 
stipulated by the parties (see Pre-Hearing Order No. 1 Re Scheduling at '1I 20) on July 24, 2013. 
This Application was received by the Arbitrator on July 30, 2013. 
Section 7-909 does not address,·whether an application to modify or correct an award may 
be made to modify or correct an award that has been once amended to modify or correct the 
initial final award and the Arbitrator has found no case law on the issue. Because the statute 
makes no distinction between a final award and an amended final award, it is the finding and 
conclusion of the Arbitrator that the Arbitrator has the power to modify or correct the Amended 
Final A ward, if statutory grounds as provided in Section 7-909, exist to do so. 
Having decided that the Arbitrator has the power to modify or correct the Amended Final 
Award, if statutory grounds exist to do so, the Arbitrator will not consider whether to modify or 
correct the Amended Final Award under Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for the 
same reasons that this application of Rule 11 was rejected in Final Order No. 12. 
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III. 
ARBITRATOR'S ALLEGED E;RRONEOUS CALCULATIONS 
On January 16, 2013, the Arbitrator's Interim Award was issued in this matter. The 
Interim Award of $40q,700.:12 for economic and ·noneconomic damages was subject to 
•• # ' 
adjustment for payments that had Qeen made to Claimant and for prejudgment interest. On April 
29, 2013, the Arbitrator's Final Award was issued, which adjusted the Interim Award for 
payments that had been received, oy Claimant arid awarded Claimant damages in the principle 
. ' 
amount of $100,332.95, plus prej~dgment interest in the apiount of $103,135.46. 
Respondent theri submitted a Motion, for Reconsiderati9n of Prejudgment Interest 
Award in whic;:h Respondent '.sought adjustment of the amount of prejudgment interest that was 
incJuded in the Final Award to account for a payment by Respondent to Claimant that was made 
after the Interim Award was issued but before the Final Award was issued. The Affidavit of 
Counsel that was submitted in support of Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration and the 
Affidavit of Jeffrey A. Thomson Iii Support of Application to Modify or Correct Award and/or 
Motion for Reconsideration establish that Respondent paid to Claimant the sum of $100,332.95 
on March 25, 2013, which is the_principle amount of the adjusted Interim Award for damages. 
This payment was made thirty-"six (36) days before the Final Award was issued. The Arbitrator 
was not informed of this payment and did not consider it in the calculation of prejudgment 
interest that was made by the Arbitrator and awarded in the Final Award. 
In· Final Order No. 12 Re: Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of Prejudgment 
Interest Award and the Amended Final Award, which were issued on July 24, 2013, the 
Arbitrator corrected and amended the calculation of prejudgment interest in two ways. First the 
. 
arbitrator recalculated prejudgment interest to account for the payment of $100,332.95 on March 
-25, 2013, which stopped the runnjng of statutory interest on the amount paid and reduced the 
Final Award of prejudgment interest by $1,187.50. Second, the Arbitrator applied the payment 
of $100,332.95 on March 25, 2013 to. reduce the amount that was owed to Claimant on that date 
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damages of $100,332.95 and interest ef $101,947.96. The Arbitrator applied the payment first to 
accrued interest, which left a balance of interest in the amount of $1,615.01 as of March 25, 2013 
and a balance of damages in the amount of $100,332.95, or a total obligation of $101,947.96 as 
of March 25, 2013. The Arbitrator further ordered that prejudgmept _interest at the rate of 12% 
per -~um would continue to accrue on the unpaid Adjusted ~terim Award of $100,332.95 from 
March 25, 2013 until confinned in a final judgment or paid, whichever sooner occurs. An 
Amended.Final Award was issued to conform to Final Order No. 12. 
The Arbitrator is now ask~d to; correct or amend the Amended Final A ward to change the 
methodology that was appljed by the Arbitrator in reaching the determination to apply the March 
25, 2013,payrnent first to ac~rued interest rather ~an the unpaid adjusted Interim Award of 
d~ages of$100,332.95. Respondent argues that the March ~5. 2013 payment was made before 
the Arbitrator made its prejudgment interest award of $103,135.46 and there was no prejudgment 
interest award to which the payment could be applied. Respondent contends that it paid off the 
award of damages, not prejudgment interest. 
The Arbitrator rejects the Respondent's argument that it did not owe prejudgment interest 
to the Clamant simply b~cause the amount of interest has not been calculated and awarded as of 
the date of Respondent's payment to Claimant. The law of Idaho clearly provides that the 
Claimant is entitled to prejudgment interest on unpaid claims. The fact that the actual amount of 
prejudgment interest that was owed by Respondent to Claimant had not been calculated as of the 
date of Respondent's payment is immaterial. When calculated by the Arbitrator, it was 
accurately determined that the amount of accrued prejudgment interest exceeded the amount of 
the payment by $1,615.01. To follow Respondent's logic and apply the payment to the principle 
balance, rather than the accrued interest, would leave the Claimant with a balance of accrued 
interest owed and no right to collect interests on the money owed. This application of the 
payment would deny Claimant of the right under section 28-22-104 to collect interest at the rate 
of 12% per annum "on n,.oney after the same becomes due." The right to prejudgment interest is 
"money after the same becomes due." Thus, regardless of whether the p~yment was applied to 
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principle or accrued interest, the Claimant is entitled to collect interest at the rate of 12% per 
annum on the amount that was due lJ:er on the date of the payment and thereafter until it is fully 
paid. 
It is a~so the finding and conclusion of the Arbitrator that the application for modification 
or correction of the Amended Final Award to have the payment applied to the principle balance 
rather than the accrued i:nterest does not constitute. a request to correct an evident miscalculation 
of figures- or an eviden~ mistake in the d,escription of any person, thing or property referred to in 
the award, nor a request to correct l\ll award that is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting 
the merits of the controyersy as required :under Sections 7-909 and 7-913(1) and(3). 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons,; Respondent's Application to Modify or Correct Amended 
· Final Award and/or Motion for Reconsideration is denied. 
DATED this-21st day of August, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I lIBREBY C~TIFY that on this 21st day of August, 2013, I caused to be ~erved a true 
copy of the foregoing ORDER Nb:·13 RE: RESPONDENT'S APPLICATION TO MODIFY 
OR CORRECT,AMENDED FINAL A WARD AND/OR MOTIONN FOR 
RECONSIDERA TINO by the metll9d indicated below, and addressed to each of tile following: 
Jon Steele . 
Runft .& Steele Law Offices, PLLC 1020 W. Main 
Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
jsteele@runftsteele.com 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam ~ Burke, P.A. 
P.O. Box 153Q. 
Boise, ID 83701 
. jat@elamburke.com 
_._ U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
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RUNFT & STEELE 
LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
John L. Runfr l Jon M. Srccle 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, PA 
Address: PO Box 1539 . ~-
Boise, ID 83701 
August 27, 2013 
Re: Cedillo v. Farmers .lnsurc~nc~. Co. -Arbitration· 
Dear Jeff: 
Via FacsimHe 
The Arbitrator's Final Order No. 13 re: Respondent's Application to Modify or Correct 
Amended Final Award and/or Motion for Reconsideration has been issued. On behalf of my 
client, Peggy Cedillo, I demand and expect to receive payment of (1) the adjusted award of 
$100,332.95 plus interest from March 25, 2013 of $32.99 per diem and (2) $1,615.01 interest to 
March 25, 2013. · · 
Failure to pay this undisputed amount in a pr:ompt nianner constitutes. additional evidence · 
of bad faith on behalf of your client, Farmers Insurance Company ofldaho. 
JAJJJ 
Jon M. Steele 
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Jeffrey A. Thomson 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
jat@elamburke.com 
ISB #3380 
Attorneys for Defendant 
No. ___ :::::~:eo-tltf~uk;/:::__ A.M,- F/lED. \:~-P.M._,,,_ __ 
SEP 1 8 2013 
CHRISTOPHER o 
By ANNAMARIE:~~ Clerk 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PEGGY CEDILLO, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 1308697 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
MODIFICATION AND/OR 
CORRECTION OF ARBITRATION 
AWARD 
Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho ("Farmers"), the Defendant in the above-entitled 
action, by and through its attorneys of record, Elam & Burke, PA., moves this court, pursuant to 
Idaho Code§§ 7-913(a)(l), (3) and 7-916, for an order modifying and/or correcting the 
Amended Final Award dated July 24, 2013, on the grounds and for the reasons that: 
1. The Arbitrator miscalculated prejudgment interest by calculating it on amounts 
previously paid and amounts that were never owed rather than to the Final Adjusted Award of 
damages; 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION AND/OR CORRECTION OF 
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2. The Arbitrator miscalculated prejudgment interest by calculating it beginning 
August 25, 2009; 
3. The Arbitrator miscalculated prejudgment interest by calculating it on medical 
expenses not yet incurred, income not yet lost and on unliquidated general damages; and 
4. The Arbitrator miscalculated prejudgment interest by calculating it on the 
previously paid award of damages. 
This Motion is made and based upon the files and records in the above-entitled action, 
together with the supporting memorandum and affidavit filed herewith. 
DATED this / ff day of September, 2013. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION AND/OR CORRECTION OF 
ARBITRATION AWARD- 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /ff day of --1' r , 2013, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as fo ows: 
John L. Runft 
Jon M. Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
Peter J. Johnson 
Johnson Law Group 
103 E. Indiana Ave., Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207 
_JJ-.S. Mail 
_--------;;7 __ H :and Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
Via Facsimile - 343-3246 
~S.Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
__ Via Facsimile- (509) 326-7503 




Jeffrey A. Thomson 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
jat@elamburke.com 
ISB #3380 
Attorneys for Defendant 
No. ___ ~-fdtj~~~:_ 
A.M. ____ FIL~~.9':, -
SEP J 8 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D FllC~ 
Ely ANNAMARIE MEYE~ Clerk 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PEGGY CEDILLO, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 





County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 1308697 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY A. 
THOMSON IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
MODIFICATION AND/OR 
CORRECTION OF ARBITRATION 
AWARD 
Jeffrey A. Thomson, having first been duly sworn, upon his oath deposes and says as 
follows: 
1. I am a shareholder in the law firm of Elam & Burke, P.A., and at all relevant 
times counsel of record for Defendant. I have reviewed the contents of the file in this matter and 
miµce this affidavit based on personal knowledge. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY A. THOMSON IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 




2. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of the Amended Final 
Award dated July 24, 2013. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of the Arbitrator's Final 
Award dated April 29, 2013. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of correspondence from me 
to Jon Steele dated March 25, 2013. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of a check in the amount of 
$44,638.01 made payable to Peggy Cedillo and Regence Blue Shield, and proof that said check 
was cashed on April 19, 2013. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of a check in the amount of 
$55,695.94 made payable to Peggy Cedillo and Runft & Steele Law Office, and proof that said 
check was cashed on March 28, 2013. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of correspondence dated 
September 11, 2013 from me to Jon Steele. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit 7 is a true and correct copy of Dennis Reinstein's 
Expert Witness Report dated October 28, 2012. 
9. Attached hereto as Exhibit 8 is a true and correct copy of a Medical Expense 
Summary admitted in the Arbitration Hearing. 
10. Attached hereto as Exhibit 9 is a true and correct copy of correspondence dated 
July 28, 2009 from Peggy Cedillo to Farmers Insurance. 
11. Attached hereto as Exhibit 10 is a true and correct copy of the Arbitrator's 
Decision and Interim Award dated January 16, 2013. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY A. THOMSON IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 




DATED this __ /_(}_ day of September, 2013. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to befor /Q day of September, 2013. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: Meridian 
My Commission Expires: _0=1~/-"-10=/-=2=0=18"------
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / 6 day of September, 2013, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows: 
JohnL. Runft 
Jon M. Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Peter J. Johnson 
Johnson Law Group 
103 E. Indiana Ave., Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207 
__JJ.S. Mail 
i/ Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 




__ Federal Express 
__ Via Facsimile - (509) 326-7503 
z_ 
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Case No. 81700-0040 
AMENDED FINAL AW ARD 
r 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This arbitration involves claims for damages under the underinsured motorist provisions 
of a policy of insurance that was issued by Respondent, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho 
("Farmers" or "Respondent") to Claimant, Peggy B. Cedillo ("Claimant"). The claims are 
disputed by Respondent. The dispute has been submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the 
agreement to arbitrate, which is contained in the insurance policy. The agreement to arbitrate, the 
Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act, Idaho Code§ 7-901, et seq., the Pre-~earing Orders that were 
entered by the arbitrator in this matter, and the Stipulations of the Parties dated February 22, 
2012 and April 5, 2012 govern these proceedings. 
The Final Award was issued on April 29, 2013. In the Final Award, Claimant was 
awarded the sum of $203,468.41, consisting of the Adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 plus 
accrued prejudgment interest of $103,135.46. It was further ordered that prejudgment interest at 
the rate of twelve percent per annum (12%) shall continue to accrue on the Adjusted Interim 
- --- --- - -- ---, 
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Award of $100,332.95 from the date of the Final Award until the Final Award is confirmed by a 
final judgment of a court or paid, whichever sooner occurs. 
On May 20, 2013, Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Prejudgment 
Interest Award, in which Respondent seeks adjustment of the amount of prejudgment interest 
that was included in the Final Award to account for a payment by Respondent to Claimant that 
was made after the Interim Award was issued but before the Final Award was issued. The 
Affidavit of Counsel that is submitted in support of Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration 
establishes that Respondent paid to Claimant the sum of $100,332.95 on March 25, 2013, which 
was the amount of the Adjusted Interim Award. The fact that this payment was made by 
Respondent and received by Claimant is not disputed by Claimant. This payment was made 
thirty-six (36) days before the Final Award was issued. The Arbitrator was not informed of this 
payment and did not consider it in the calculation of prejudgment interest that was made by the 
Arbitrator and awarded in the Final Award. The Motion for Reconsideration also seeks a 
recalculation and adjustment of prejudgment interest on medical expenses, lost income and 
general damages based on information submitted with the Motion. The parties, through their 
respective counsel, submitted memoranda in support of and in opposition to the Motion. 
The Arbitrator has duly considered the authorities and arguments that were submitted by 
the parties and has issued simultaneously with this Amended Final Award, the Arbitrator's Final 
Order No. 12 Re: Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of Prejudgment Interest Award and 
Claimant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Counsel for Respondent. The Final Order No. 12 grants 






II. AMENDED FINAL AW ARD 
The Final Award that was issued on April 29, 2013 is incorporated herein, except as it is 
revised and amended by this Amended Final Award. 
In the Final A ward, Claimant was awarded the sum of $203,468.41 consisting of the 
Adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 plus accrued prejudgment interest of $103,135.46, a 
total of $203,468.41. It was further ordered that prejudgment interest at the rate of twelve 
percent per annum (12%) shall continue to accrue on the Adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 
from the date of the Final A ward until the Final A ward is confirmed by a judgment of a court or 
paid, whichever sooner occurs. 
Respondent is entitled to a credit on the Final Award of $100,332.96 for the payment on 
March 25, 2013. On March 25, 2013, Respondent's obligation under the Final Award was 
$100,332.95 (the Adjusted Interim Award) plus outstanding accrued prejudgment interest of 
$103,135.46, a total of $203,468.41. The payment was applied to the accrued prejudgment 
interest of $103,135.46, leaving unpaid the award of $100,332.95 plus accrued interest of 
$2,802.51. 
Respondent is also entitled to a credit of $1,187.50 for 36 days of interest at 12% per 
annum on the Adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95. This credit further reduces the amount of 
the accrued unpaid interest to $1,615.01 as of March 25, 2013. Thus, on March 25, 2013, the 
corrected and Amended Final Award is $101,947.96. 
Prejudgment interest at the rate of 12% per annum continues to accrue on the unpaid 
Adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 from March 25, 2013 until the Amended Final Award is 
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confinned in a final judgment or paid, whichever sooner occurs. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 24th day of July, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of July, 2013, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing AMENDED FINAL AW ARD by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
Jon Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
jsteele@runftsteele.com 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
jat@elamburke.com 
AMENDED FINAL AWARD - 4 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ . Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-mail 
__ Telecopy 




( APR 2 9 2013 
















) ________________ .) 
Case No. 81700-0040 
ARBITRATOR'S FINAL AWARD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This arbitration involves claims for damages under the underinsured motorist provisions 
of a policy of insurance that was issued by Respondent, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho 
("Farmers") to Claimant, Peggy B. Cedillo. The claims are disputed by Respondent. The dispute 
has been submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the agreement to arbitrate, which is 
contained in the insurance policy. The agreement to arbitrate, the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act, 
Idaho Code§ 7-901, et seq., the Pre-Hearing Orders that were entered by the arbitrator in this 
matter, and the Stipulations of the Parties dated February 22, 2012 and April 5, 2012 govern 
these proceedings. 
An evidentiary hearing was commenced on November 20, 2012 in Boise, Idaho before 
the duly appointed arbitrator, Merlyn W. Clark. Claimant, Peggy B. Cedillo, appeared in person 
represented by her attorney, Jon M. Steele, Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC. Jeffrey A. 
Thomson, Elam & Burke, P.A., appeared with Ron Ramsey, a representative of Respondent, on 
,,...---- --- --- -- - ~-, 
ARBITRATOR'S FINAL AW ARD - 1 EXHIBIT2 




behalf of Respondent. Oral and documentary evidence was presented by the parties and the 
matter was submitted for a decision and interim award. 
The Arbitrator's Decision and Interim Award was issued January 16, 2013. The Interim 
Award assessed the amount of damages for bodily injury suffered by Claimant in the motorcycle 
accident on May 25, 2008 as follows: 
I. Economic Damages: 
• Medical expenses: 
• Lost income: 
SUBTOTAL ECONOMIC DAMAGES: 
2. Noneconomic Damages: 
Pain and suffering, loss of quality of life, physical limitations, 




Right hand: $150,000.00 
TOT AL INTERTh1 AW ARD: $406,700.12 
II. ISSUE FOR DECISION 
The parties have agreed "that following issuance of the Interim Award, the arbitrator will 
conduct post Interim Award proceedings to dete1mine what, if any, adjustments would be made 
in the amount of the Interim Award for prejudgment interest, setoffs or collateral sources and 
subrogation issues prior to issuance of the final award by the arbitrator." (Prehearing Order No. 
2.) This is the Final Award that assesses the amounts for adjustments in the amount of the 
Interim Award. 
The parties, through their respective counsel, submitted memoranda and exhibits stating 
the positions of the parties with respect to adjustments to be made in the Interim Award. A 
hearing was held on February 26, 2013, during which counsel for the pmties presented oral 
ARBITRATOR'S FINAL AWARD - 2 
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arguments in support of their respective positions. The matter is now fully submitted for entry of 
the Final Award. 
Because the insurance clause in the insurance policy that covers Claimant expressly 
provides that "[t]he expense of the arbitrator and all other expenses of arbitration will be shared 
equally" by the parties and "[a]ttomey's fees and fees paid for the witnesses are not expenses of 
arbitration and will be paid by the paity incmTing them," this Arbitrator has no authority to 
award expenses of arbitration or attorney fees and costs to either party in this proceeding. 
III. FACTS, ANALYSIS AND DECISIONS 
A. Adjustments for Payments Made on Behalf of the Tortfeasor, Mr. Steele. 
1. Payments by Progressive Insurance. Progressive paid Claimant $100,000 plus 
medical payment coverage benefits of $5,000 on behalf of its insured, Mr. Steele. Farmers is 
entitled to credit for the amounts paid by Progressive. The Interim Award does not factor in these 
payments and it must be adjusted to do so. 
2. UIM Payments by Farmers. Farmers paid Claimant UIM benefits of $25,000 on 
August 25, 2009 and an additional $155,000 in UIM benefits on October 18, 2012, for which 
Farmers is entitled to credit. The Interim Award does not factor in this payments and it must be 
adjusted to do so. 
3. Adjustment for Contractual Reductions. The medical "cost" summary 
submitted by Claimant was for the amount billed by the caregivers. The evidence establishes that 
the amount billed for some of the medical expenses was reduced prior to payment. To avoid a 
"windfall" Claimant is entitled to recover only the amount of medical expenses actually paid. 
The Interim Award disallowed the charges incurred at Boise Physical Medicine and 
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Neurological for C. Mack, (3) Anesthesia Associates and (4) St. Luke's for charges related to the 
February 15, 2012 surgery by 25%. Contractual adjustments for the services provided by these 
entities were reduced proportionately. Respondent has submitted evidence that supports a 
finding that the amount of contractual adjustments made to the amount billed, minus the 25% 
reduction for those charges having ~ontractual adjustments, totals $19,234.81. (See Kathryn 
Brandt Affidavit, <JI 7 and Ex. A attached thereto.) The Arbitrator finds and concludes that the 
Interim Award should be reduced by this amount. 
4. Adjustment for Further Reductions to Medical Expenses Awarded Due to 
25 % Apportionment for C5-C6 Preexisting Condition. 
In calculating the Interim Award, the Arbitrator apportioned 25% of the cost of the C5-
C6 treatment to Claimant's preexisting condition. (Arbitration Decision and Interim Award, p. 
33.) Based on that finding the Arbitrator reduced by 25% the medical expenses associated with 
treatment of the C5-C6 medical issue. The following medical expenses were not reduced but the 
evidence indicates that they are also related to treatment of Claimant's C5-C6 disk and should be 
reduced by 25%. 
a. February 8, 2012, St. Al's bill in the amount of $1,036.00, portions ofExs. 17 and 
40 show that this bill is related to the pre-exiting preparation for C5-C6 surgery. 
25% of the $1,036.00 in medical expenses results in a reduction of $259.00. 
b. Physical Therapy of Idaho. Exhibit 50-shows that the physical therapy was for 
both the C5-C6 and the C7-T 1 issue. Attributing 50% of this $2,893.00 bill 
(Exhibit 24)) to C5-C6 and reducing that amount by 25% results in a further 
reduction of $361.63. 
c. Idaho Sports Medicine treatment from April 27, 2010 to November 18, 2011. 
Exhibit 32 shows that pait of the treatment given relates to C5-C6, including a 
right C6 nerve block. Appo1tioning the $3,003.00 bill (Ex. 11) one-half to C5-C6 
and one-half to the shoulder and making a fu1ther reduction of 25% equals a 
reduction of $375.38. 
d. Primary Health visit on September 9, 2011. Exhibit 39 shows that this visit was 
for the C5-C6 problem. A reduction of 25% to the $113.00 bill equals $28.25. 
ARBITRATOR'S FINAL AWARD - 4 
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e. Intermountain Medical Imaging. Exhibit 12 shows that on October 3, 2011 the 
imaging was related to C5-C6. A 25% reduction of the $1,206.80 bill equals 
$301.70. 
f. St. Luke's visit dated January 11, 2012. Portions of Exhibits 20 and 45 show that 
this visit was for the C6 nerve root block. The $1,221.58 bill should be reduced by 
25% leading to a further reduction of $305.40. 
The total reductions due to the application of the 25% apportionment calculated above is 
$1,631.36. The Arbitrator finds and concludes that this c01Tection should be made to the Interim 
Award. It reduces the Interim Award $1,631.36. 
S. Payments Purportedly Made by Mr. Steele. 
Some argument has been presented that the Arbitrator should also credit Farmers with 
any payments that were made by Mr. Steele directly to Claimant's caregivers. There is no 
evidence that allows the Arbitrator to make this calculation. Moreover, some of the purported 
payments were allegedly made while Mr. Steele and Claimant were married, and tlms were likely 
made from community funds, which would entitle her to recover such payments or include them 
in her claim against Faimers. 
6. Adjustment for Award of "A Caring Hand" Bill. 
The Arbitrator awarded medical expenses in the amount of $668.00 for a bill from "A 
Caring Hand." (See Ex. 21.) The Arbitrator finds that the award of this amount is not supported 
by the evidence and the amount of $668.00 minus the 25% reduction already applied by the 
Arbitrator of $167 .00 should be reduced from the Interim A ward in the amount of $501.00. 
7. The Regence Blue Shield Subrogation Interest. 
The subrogation claim of Regence Blue Shield is a matter between Regence Blue Shield 
and Claimant. It is not within the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to make any adjustment for this 
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subrogation claim. Moreover, the Arbitrator has no jurisdiction or authority to direct how 
payment of the Regence claim should be made and will not attempt to do so. 
8. Collateral Source Rule. 
Respondent, through its counsel, has infmmed the Arbitrator that Respondent is not 
seeking an offset under the collateral source rule in this proceeding and it will not be considered 
by the Arbitrator in this Final Award. 
9. The Adjusted Interim Award. 
The Interim Award must be reduced by the amount of payments made by Progressive on . 
behalf of Mr. Steele ($105,000.00); the amount of the prior UIM payments made by Farmers 
($180,000.00); the amount of the contractual adjustments made to the medical expenses 
($19,234.81); the amount represented by a uniform application of the 25% apportionment to all 
C5-C6 related medical expenses ($1,631.36); and the amount of the adjustment for the "A Caring 
Hand" bill ($501.00). The Arbitrator finds that after making the adjustments, the adjusted Interim 
Award is $100,332.95 plus the award of prejudgment interest. 
B. Prejudgment Interest. 
1. Commencement of Prejudgment Interest. An award of prejudgment interest 
upon a claim for underinsured motorist ("UIM") benefits is governed by Idaho Code§ 28-22-104 
and Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 
1127 (2006). Section 28-22-104 provides, in relevant pait, that when there is no express contract 
in writing fixing a different rate of interest, interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents (12¢) on 
the hundred by the year on money after the same becomes due. 
In Greenough, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that under Idaho Code§ 28-22-104, 





cases where the amount claimed, even though not liquidated, is capable of mathematical 
computation. The Court further stated that in insurance cases money becomes due as provided 
under the express terms of the insurance contract; therefore, the insured is not entitled to 
prejudgment interest until he or she complies with the applicable contract provisions. 
Greenough, 142 Idaho at 592, 130 P.3d at 1130. 
The Greenough Court held that prejudgment interest began to accrue sixty days after 
submission of sufficient proof of loss, not on the date of the accident, because the applicable 
insurance policy required payment within 60 days after receipt of a signed, sworn proof of loss. 
The Greenough Court also held that a submitted proof of loss is sufficient when the insured 
provides the insurer with enough information to allow the insurer a reasonable opportunity to 
investigate and determine its liability and that the amount of information that should be provided 
in a proof of loss is proportional to the amount reasonably available to the insured. When 
enough information is provided in a proof of loss, the insurer is obligated to investigate and/or 
determine its rights and liabilities in a fair and accurate manner. Greenough, 142 Idaho at 593, 
130 P.3d at 1131. 
The policy of insurance that was issued to Claimant contains no provision requiring a 
proof of loss to initiate a claim under the policy. Thus, adopting the rationale of the Greenough 
decision, it is the finding and conclusion of this Arbitrator that prejudgment interest began to 
accme in this case when Claimant provided the insurer with enough info1111ation to allow the 
insurer a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability. 
Claimant notified Farmers of her underinsurance claim on June 5, 2009. On that date, 
she advised Farmers that she had made a demand for Mr. Steele's policy limits of $100,000 and 
that she would be making a claim under her policy of underinsurance. On June 17, 2009, 
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Farmers acknowledged the receipt of Claimant's demand letter to Mr. Steele's insurer and notice 
that she sought Mr. Steele's policy limits. 
On July 9, 2009, Claimant advised Farmers that she had settled her claim against Mr. 
Steele for his policy limits of $100,000. Claimant, by Farmers' letter dated July 27, 2009, was 
then directed to co1Tespond with Mr. Ron W. Ramsey, Senior General Adjuster for Farmers. On 
July 28, 2009, Claimant by letter addressed to Mr. Ramsey, again advised Farmers that she had 
settled her claim against Mr. Steele for his policy limits of $100,000 and an additional $5,000 in 
medical coverage. She informed Farmers that her medical records and reports which documented 
her injuries had previously been submitted to her local agent, Mr. Jay Reinke. She also enclosed 
a copy of her demand letter to Progressive N01thwest Insurance, Mr. Steele's insurer, the Full 
Release of All Claims with Indemnity against Mr. Steele, and her previous letters addressed to 
Farmers Insurance. She also informed Farmers that her medical expenses at that time totaled 
$53,048.62. She stated "[i]n light of my continuing pain, discomfort, ongoing medical treatment, 
the effects upon my daily life, and my future life expectancy, I hereby demand that you pay me 
policy limits [$500,000] and medical coverage." She stated that the enclosed documents had all 
been previously delivered to Fanners Insurance, contained a detailed account of her injury, 
medical care, medical expenses, her painful recovery and her damages. She also informed 
Farmers that she and Mr. Steele were then married and that she understood Farmers would 
conduct an investigation of Mr. Steele's financial condition before resolving her claim. She 
asked that the claim be resolved within the next thirty days. (See letter to Mr. Ron Ramsey, 
Farmers Insurance, dated July 28, 2009.) By letter dated July 29, 2009, from Farmers to 
Claimant, Farmers acknowledged receipt of her claim for injuries arising from the accident on 
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May 25, 2008, while riding as a passenger on a motorcycle driven by Mr. Steele. Her claim for 
medical expenses was denied. 
Subsequently, following further investigation, Farmers sent Claimant a check for $25,000 
with a letter dated August 25, 2009. In the letter, Farmers explained that the check represented 
Farmers' valuation of the amount due Claimant under the Underinsured Motorist coverage of her 
policy based upon her letter ·dated July 28, 2009 and the info1mation provided. Farmers informed 
Claimant that she had provided no information about a wage loss claim, so none was included in 
the valuation. Farmers informed Claimant that she could submit additional information for its 
consideration. Farmers also claimed an offset for the settlement funds paid by Progressive 
Insurance Company, Mr. Steele's insurer for Bodily Injury coverage and medical payments of 
$5,000. (See Letter dated August 25, 2009.) 
Claimant asserts that the date for commencement of prejudgment interest on her claim is 
August 25, 2009. Based on the foregoing facts, this Arbitrator finds that Claimant provided 
enough information to obligate Farmers to investigate and determine its rights and liabilities in a 
fair and accurate manner prior to and with her letter dated July 28, 2009, and concludes as a 
matter of law that prejudgment interest began to accme in this case on August 25, 2009, which is 
the date that Farmers provided Claimant with its valuation of the amount due under the 
, Underinsured Motorist coverage of her policy. 
Respondent's contention that Claimant should be required to file a new proof of loss for 
each surgery she received is rejected. No such requirement is imposed by law or the insurance 
contract that was issued to Claimant and there is no public policy reason why a new proof of loss 
should be required for each new medical procedure received by Claimant. 
ARBITRATOR'S FINAL AWARD - 9 
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2. Methodology for Calculation of Prejudgment Interest. 
This Arbitrator cannot accept Claimant's contention that the award of prejudgment 
interest applies to the damage award of $406,700.12 commencing on the proof of loss date, 
August 25, 2009, because it would not account for payments that were made by Progressive or 
by Farmers. Claimant cites American Foreign Insurance Company v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 
400, 94 P.3d 699, 705 (2204) as authority for her contention. This Arbitrator was the arbitrator in 
the Reichert case. In Richert the arbitrator was restricted under the terms of an agreement 
between the pmties that prevented the arbitrator in Reichert from considering the worker's 
compensation offset and subrogation issues in the calculation of prejudgment interest. In 
Reichert the m·bitrator eIToneously included the issues in the calculation of the final award. The 
Supreme Court held that the Reichert arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to do so because of the 
restrictive agreement. No such agreement or restriction applies in this case that is now before the 
Arbitrator. In this matter, the pmties have agreed to allow the Arbitrator to consider these issues 
in determining the Final A ward. 
As noted by Respondent in its Response to Claimant's Brief in Suppmt of Final Award, 
Reichert supports Fmmers' position that prejudgment interest is calculated on the Final Award 
and from a date that avoids a windfall to the Claimant. In Reichert, because the Arbitrator did not 
have jurisdiction over the issues, the district court was tasked with handling the issues of the 
worker's compensation offset and subrogation. 140 Idaho at 404, 94 P.3d at 709. The Supreme 
Court upheld the district court's prejudgment interest calculation, ruling that offsets for money 
already received shall be deducted from the arbitration award and the prejudgment interest shall 
be recalculated based on a reduction to the gross award of the amounts paid by the worker's 





purpose of the offset provisions is consistent with the public policy against double recovery and 
these provisions are valid. 140 Idaho at 400, 94 P.3d at 705. The Court concluded that recovery 
of prejudgment interest on amounts paid would result in a windfall to the insured. Id. 
Section 28-22-104 provides that interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents on the 
hundred by the year on "money after the same becomes due." (I.C. § 28-22-104(1)2.). Thus, it is 
•· . 
incumbent on this Arbitrator to determine when payments were due from Farmers to Claimant 
and the amounts thereof as interest accmed on said amounts. In other words, Claimant was 
entitled to interest on the money that was owed to her by Farmers and unpaid from the dates it 
was due and owing, but unpaid, to the extent that said amounts are capable of mathematical 
computation. (See Dillon v. Montgomery, 138 Idaho 614,617, 67 P.3d 93, 96 (2003).) 
The policy of insurance at issue in the setoff clause provides that the amount owed to 
Claimant under the UIM coverage is the amount of damages established but not otherwise 
recovered frmh the person legally liable for the bodily injury. (See Insurance policy, p. 8, 
Endorsement Ell 79i.) Thus, logic dictates that the determination of the amounts due and owing 
to Claimant under the UIM coverage for the purpose of computing prejudgment interest, are any 
amounts that accrue over and above the payments of $105,000 that were made by the insurer for 
Mr. Steele. In other words, the payments made by Mr. Steele's insurer must be taken off the 
front end of the Fanner' s obligation rather than the back end, i.e., the Final Award, as proposed 
by Claimant. Thus, the obligation of Farmers to pay the medical expenses of Claimant did not 
begin to accrue until the unpaid medical expenses exceeded $105,000. Also, Farmers is entitled 
to credit for payments made by Farmers as of the date the two payments were actually made. 
Claimant has asserted that this setoff clause is not enforceable and should not be applied 
by the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator is not persuaded that the rationale of the Court in Talbot v. 






Fanners, 133 Idaho 428, 987 P.2d 1043 (1999) is applicable in this case because the facts of this 
case are distinguishable from those in Talbot. Moreover, the parties have agreed by stipulation 
that the Arbitrator does not have jurisdiction to determine the validity/enforceability of the setoff 
provision found in Endorsement Ell 79i of the policy at issue. The parties stipulated to "reserve 
the issue of enforceability of the setoff clause for determination by the District Comt should 
Claimant wish to raise that issue .... " The parties further agreed that "the Arbitrator has 
jurisdiction to apply Farmer's setoff clause found in Endorsement El 179i in aniving at his Final 
Award. (See Stipulation dated April 5, 2012, pp.2-3.) Thus, the Arbitrator will apply the set off 
provision in determining the Final Award. 
Because it is not feasible to calculate the accrued amounts due for each and every invoice 
Claimant received as of the date of receipt thereof, the Arbitrator will not attempt to do so. 
Rather, the Arbitrator will calculate the prejudgment interest based on an adjusted amount of the 
final award from the date of the proof of loss less the payments that were received by Claimant 
as of the dates such payments were received by Claimant. 
3. Calculation of Prejudgment Interest. 
The Interim Award after the adjustments are made to reduce the Interim Award for the 
contractual adjustments made to the medical expenses ($19,234.81); the amount represented by a 
uniform application of the 25% app01tionment to all C5-C6 related medical expenses 
($1,631.36); and the amount of the adjustment for the "A Caring Hand" bill ($501.00) is 
$385,784.01, the "Initial Amount" for calculating prejudgment interest. 
Payments were received from Progress Insurance Company by Claimant in the amount of 
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payment of $25,000.00 was received by Claimant from Farmers on August 25, 2009, the date of 
proof of loss, which further reduces the Initial Amount to $255,784.01. 
The Arbitrator finds and concludes that prejudgment interest at the rate of 12% per 
annum commenced on the Initial Amount of $255,784.01 and accrued at the rate of 12% per 
annum from August 25, 2009 to October 18, 2012 (1,150 days), when Claimant received a UIM 
payment from Farmers of $155,000, which reduced the hlitial Amount to $100,784.01. 
Prejudgment interest at the rate of 12% per annum accrued on the reduced Initial Amount of 
$100,784.01 from October 18, 2012 to the date of the Final Award, April 30, 2013 (194 days). 
The amount of prejudgment interest from August 25, 2009 to October 18, 2012 is 
$96,707.38. The amount of prejudgment interest from October 18, 2012 to April 30, 2013 is 
$6,428.08. The total amount of prejudgment interest is $103,135.46. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND FINAL AWARD 
The Final Award to Claimant against Farmers is TWO HUNDRED THREE 
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT DOLLARS AND FORTY-ONE CENTS 
($203,468.41). 
Prejudgment interest at the rate of twelve percent per annum (12%) shall cqntinue to 
accrue on the adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 until the Final Award is affirmed by a 
Judgment or paid, whichever sooner occurs. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of April, 2013, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing ARBITRATOR'S FINAL AWARD by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: · 
Jon Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
jsteele@runftsteele.com 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
jat@elamburke.com 
ARBITRATOR'S FINALAWARD-14 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-mail 
__ Telecopy 







JEFFREY A. THOMSON 
251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone 208 343-5454 
Fax 208 384-5844 
E-mail jat@elamburke.com 
Via Hand Delivery 
Jon M. Steele 
Runft &. Steele Law Offices, "PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
March 25, 2013 
RE: Insured: Peggy Cedillo 
Claim#: 1014413194-1-2-1 
Policy#: 75-0163542585 
Date of Loss: 05/25/2008 
E&B File No.: 2-1347 
Dear Mr. Steele: 
( 
ELAM&BURKE 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
I am in receipt of your March 13, 2013 Rule 408 Settlement Offer. As you know, it has 
been Farmers' position that any of Ms. Cedillo's medical bills paid by you are a setoff against the 
Final Award. Until your "testimony" at the hearing befo_re the Arbitrator on the Final Award, 
that amount was unknown. During the time that amount was unknown it was not possible fo 
determine a minimum amount that might be owed to Ms. Cedillo. Your "testimony" that you did 
not pay any of Ms. Cedillo' s medical expenses prior to manying her, coupled with the 
Arbitrator's oral ruling that he would consider medical expenses paid after man-iage to be 
community debt and therefore not an offset, has enabled Farmers to calculate a minimum amount 
owed as a Final Award. 
Fa1mers hereby tenders the amount of $100,332.95 with the two enclosed checks: one in 
the amount of $55,694.94 made out to Peggy Cedillo and your law firm· and the other in the 
amount of $44,638.01 made out to Peggy Cedillo, Regence BlueShield and your law firm. 
Please note that this amount has been tendered within thirty (30) days of your "testimony" and 
the Arbitrator's ruling which allowed Farmers to determine the amount hereby tendered. 
i 
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Jon M., Steele 
March 25, 2013 
Page2 
( ( 
Your client's offer to settle all claims upon payment of $1,250,000.00 is respectfully 
rejected. I would note that the only award made to date is an Interim Award and we are still 
awaiting the Final Award. Farmers requests that your client allow the arbitration process to be 
completed so that both sides can properly assess what fu~re actions may need to be taken. With 
that in mind, it is believed that any lawsuit filed before the Arbitrator's Final Award would be 
premature and without a reasonable basis. 
Please feel :free to contact me if you have any questions. 
JAT/nlp 
Enclosures 
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Peggy Cedillo Aka Peggy Steele 
And Regence Blue shield 
AND RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
BOISE, ID, 83702 
Claimant/Patient: 
Insured: 
Date of Loss: 
Claim Unit Number: 
Check Number: 
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Peggy Cedillo Aka Peggy Steele And 
Runft & Steele Law offices, Pllc 
1020 W. MAIN ST., SUITE 400 
BOISE, ID, 83702 
Claimant/Patient: 
Insured: 
Date of Loss: 
Claim Unit Number: 
Check Number: 
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JEFFREY A. TI-IOMSON 
251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone 208 343-5454 
Fax 208 384-5844 
E-mail jat@elamburke.com 
September 11, 2013 
Via Hand Delivery 
Jon M. Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
RE: Insured: Peggy Cedillo 
Claim#: 1014413194-1-2 
Policy#: 75-0163542585 
Date of Loss: 05/25/2008 
E&B File No.: 2-1347 
Dear Mr. Steele: 
ELAM&BURKE 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
As you know, Farmers previously paid the Interim Award of $100,332.95 and challenged 
the Arbitrator's award of prejudgment interest of $101,947.96. Despite the clear payment of the 
Interim Award and despite your knowledge of that payment, you urged the Arbitrator to apply the 
payment not to the Interim Award but rather to the prejudgment interest award. The Arbitrator 
accepted this factually and legally incorrect position and applied payment not to the Interim 
Award but to the prejudgment interest award. 
Without waiving its right to challenge the Arbitrator's erroneous calculation of 
prejudgment interest, Farmers hereby tenders the amount of the prejudgment interest award of 
$101,947.96. Farmers hereby reserves, preserves and does not waive, by making this payment, 
its right to challenge to the district court the Arbitrator's award of prejudgment interest. Farmers 
further preserves, reserves and does not waive its right to seek reimbursement for any 
overpayment of prejudgment interest should the district court rule in Farmers' favor. 
Should you have any questions, please feel free to give me a call. 
EXHIBIT6 
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Jon M. Steele 




cc: Peter Johnson (via email) (w/encl.) 
Very truly yours, 
ELAM&BURKE 
AE I.lion 
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Peggy Cedillo Aka Peggy Steele And 
Runft Law offices, Pllc 
1020 W. MAIN ST., SUITE 400 
BOISE, ID, 83702 
Claimant/Patient: 
Insured: 
Date of Loss: 
Claim Unit Number: 
Check Number: 
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EXPERT WITNESS REPORT 
Peggy Cedillo vs. Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho 
In Re: Matter of Arbitration 
Arbitration Case No. 81700-0040 
Prepared for: 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
Prepared by: 
Dennis R. Reinstein, CPNABV, ASA, CVA 
Hooper Cornell, PLLC 
250 Bobwhite Court, Suite 300 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
October 28, 2012 
,, 
'---· 




I was engaged by Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC to evaluate the economic loss associated 
with Peggy Cedillo's motorcycle accident injuries. I quantified losses related to earnings and 
also added past and future medical expenses. 
Data relied upon in support of my opinions contained herein is as noted in my opinions and/or 
as listed in Table 1, which fo((ows my opinions. 
In addition to documents referenced in my report, I may summarize information contained in 
such documents in exhibit form to assist the explan~tion of my opinions. 
This report reflects my opinions to date in this matter. As additional information or testimony 
becomes available, I may find it appropriate to revise or supplement my opinions, analyses and 
conclusions stated herein. I may also be called upon to provide testimony with regard to 
additional data or records and/or data received from or testified to by other parties and/or their 
witnesses. 





The economic losses of Peggy Cedillo as detailed in Opinions 1 and 2 are summarized below. 
Schedule# Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
OPINION 1: 
Past Lost Earnings 1, 2 $ 34,927 $ 34,927 
Future Lost Earnings 1, 2 16,881 37,687 
Total Lost Earnings 51,808 72,614 
Interest on Past Lost Earnings 6 5,479 5,479 
Total Lost Earnings Including Interest 57,287 78,093 
OPINION 2: 
Past Medical Expenses 7 134,647 134,647 
Future Medical Expenses 5,000 5,000 
139,647 139,647 
Interest on Past Medical Expenses 7 30,081 30,081 
Total Medical Including Interest 169,728 169,728 






I calculated the economic losses related to earnings of Peggy Cedillo as shown on the 
accompanying schedules. 
This opinion is based upon: 
Background 
1} Ms. Cedillo was born on  At the time of the accident, Ms. Cedillo 
was 47.8 years old. 
2} At the time of the accident on May 25, 2008, Ms. Cedillo was a real estate agent 
working as independent contractor through Sel-Equity Real Estate. 
3} The economic loss is calculated as of October 31, 2012. 
4} To estimate the present value of the economic losses it is necessary to discount 
the future projected amounts by an appropriate discount rate. To quantify this 
rate, I examined the historical relationship and expected future differentials 
between growth rates and interest rates to reduce amounts to present values, as 
noted in each of the accompanying schedules. 
Lost Earnings 
1} At the time of the accident, Ms. Cedillo was a real estate agent in Ada County, 
Idaho. Dr. Nancy Collins' report states that: 
"Ms. Cedilla's most transferable work will be in real estate sales. This 
option utilizes her highest level skill set and will provide her with the 
flexibility and earning capacity few other sales jobs will offer her." 
2} Ms. Cedilla's actual production for the years 2004 through 2011 is shown on 
Schedule 3. Ada County market production for the years 2004 through 2011 is 
also shown on this schedule. I have compared Ms. Cedilla's production for 2004 
through 2007 to the Ada County market production for 2004 through 2007 to 
determine Ms. Cedilla's average production percentage of .1910%. 
3} Ms. Cedilla's actual production and actual commissions earned for the years 
2004 through 2007 are shown in Schedule 4. Ms. Cedillo earned an average 
commission of 2.04% on her real estate sales for 2004 through 2007. 
4} Ms. Cedilla's net profit from her real estate sales as reported on Form Schedule 
C for the years 2004 through 2011 are summarized on Schedule 5. Ms. 
Cedilla's average net profit percentage from her real estate sales in 2004 through 




5) Based on the above analysis, I calculated Ms. Cedillo's ex?ected production and 
commissions for the years 2009 through 2011 as shown on Schedule 3 in order 
to determine Ms. Cedilla's annual expected profit had she not been injured in the 
motorcycle accident. 
The results of the calculation for 2009 through 2011 produce an average annual 
expected profit in the amount of $27,398. This has been used to compute Ms. 
Cedilla's lost earnings beginning in 2012. 
6) All workers can expect periods of separation from the work force because of 
voluntary or involuntary events. These periods of separation can be measured 
by a person's statistical work life expectancy. Gary R. Skoog and James E. 
Ciecka report the statistical work life expectancies for workers by gender and 
educational attainment in "A Markov {Increment-Decrement) Model of Labor 
Force Activity: Extended Tables of Central Tendency, Variation, and Probability 
Intervals." 
The Skoog and Ciecka Years to Final Separation tables calculate the total 
number of full years that a person will work between their age at separation from 
employment and the time they would permanently leave the work force had the 
separation not occurred. Built into these tables are periods of time a person may 
be temporarily out of the work force. For example, one may leave the work force 
due to illness, injury or job loss unrelated to this case. The years to final 
separation for an average female worker in the workplace at 47.8, with a high 
school diploma is approximately 14.5 years. 
In order to estimate the time working, the statistical work life expectancy is 
compared to the years to final separation to calculate the expected percentage of 
the year an individual will work. 
An average female worker in the workforce at age 47.8, with a high school 
diploma has a statistical work life expectancy of approximately 10.5 years. The 
ratio of this work life expectancy to the ye_ars to final separation is equal to 
approximately 72.47% (10.52 years/14.52 years). 
7) Since the time of the accident, Ms. Cedillo has tried to continue her work in real 
estate sales and has worked part time at a retail store. Ms. Cedilla's post-injury 
profit and wages for 2009 through 2011 are based upon tax returns and Forms 
W-2 · she received. Ms. Cedilla's 2012 past post-injury wages are based on her 
2012 paystubs from BCBG. Ms. Cedillo has been unable to work in real estate 
sales during 2012 due to her surgeries and recovery times. 
8) I computed Ms. Cedillo economic loss under two scenarios. Scenario 1 is based 
on Ms. Cedilla's future plans to return to real estate sales full time beginning 
January 1, 2013. Scenario 2 is based on Dr. Collins' report that states that Ms. 
Cedillo "typically works four hours a day, two days a week at the retail store" and 
"hopes to return to her pre-injury earnings in real estate with the next few years." 
9) Scenario 1 is based on Ms. Cedilla's plans to return to real estate sales on a full 




her health continues to improve and that she does not have any setbacks in her 
recovery. She hopes to begin realizing commission income in July 2013 and to 
have fully mitigated her future lost earnings by December 2013. 
10) Under Scenario 2, Dr. Collins' states that Ms. Cedillo "will not be medically 
stable for another five to 17 months" and that "it will now take her some time to 
get back in the business." Ms. Cedilla's post-injury wages are based on her 
continuing to work at BCBG for 4 hours per day, twice a week at $9.00 per hour. 
Based on a telephone conversation with Dr. Collins, after her 17 month recovery 
period, Ms. Cedillo will be able to fully mitigate her loss within another two years 
of her returning to full time real estate sales. 
11) Based on the above analysis, Ms. Cedilla's past lost earnings equal $34,927 
under both scenarios. Ms. Cedilla's future lost earnings under Scenario 1 equal 
$16,881 resulting in total lost earnings of $51,808. See Schedule 1. Under 
Scenario 2, Ms. Cedilla's future lost earnings equal $37,687 resulting in total lost 
earnings of $72,614. See Schedule 2. 
12) As reques~ed by counsel, interest has been calculated on past lost earnings at 
the rate of 12% simple interest for amounts exceeding 90 days from the last day 
of the month the lost earnings would have been earned through October 31, 
2012. Interest on past lost earnings equals $5,479. See Schedule 6. 
SUPPORTING DATA 
This opinion is based upon the above noted sources and information and/or documents 





Peggy Cedilla's past medical expenses and future medical expenses are added to her 
economic loss. 
This opinion is based upon: 
1) Counsel provided a listing of past medical expenses totaling $134,647. These 
expenses are shown in Schedule 6. 
2) Dr. Collins' report states that: 
"Dr. Little does anticipate additional therapy and medication needs that 
will total $5,000." 
3) As requested by counsel, interest has been calculated on past medical expenses at 
the rate of 12% simple interest for amounts exceeding 90 days from the date of 
service through October 31, 2012. Interest on past medical expenses equals 




TABLE 1 SUPPORTING DATA 
1) Stipulation to Submit Dispute to Binding Arbitration. 
2) Report of Nancy J. Collins, Ph.D. dated September 20, 2012. 
3) Bates numbered documents Cedillo 03648 and Cedillo 03649, Cedillo 03690 and Cedillo 
03691, Cedillo 03512, Cedillo 03650 through Cedillo 03670. 
4) Ada County Sold Market Analysis - All Homes for 2003, 2004 and 2005 per the 
lntermountain Multiple Listing Service, Inc. 
5) Ada County Single Family Home Sales for 2006 through Quarter 2 of 2011 from the 
lntermountain Multiple Listing Service, Inc. 
6) Group One, Inc Real Estate Salesperson Independent Contractor Agreement. Bates 
numbered document Cedillo 03500 through Cedillo 03509. 
7) Group One Agent Income Ledger and Items Sold to Customers. Bates numbered 
document Cedillo 03510 and Cedillo 03511. 
8) U.S. Individual Income Tax Returns and Forms 1099 for Peggy B. Cedillo for the years 
2003 through 2007. Bates numbered documents Cedillo 03792 through Cedillo 03809; 
Cedillo 03812 through Cedillo 03814; Cedillo 03513 through Cedillo 03538. 
9) U.S. Individual Income Tax Returns for Jon Steele and Peggy Cedillo for the years 2008 
through 2011. Bates numbered documents Cedillo 03539 through 03645, Cedillo 03692 
through Cedillo 3757. 
10) Forms W-2 from BCBG MAX AZRIA GROUP INC. for 2009 through 2011. 
11) Earnings statement from BCBG MAX AZRIA GROUP, INC. Bates numbered documents 
Cedillo 03675, Cedillo 03759 and Cedillo 0360. 
12) Form 1099, Miscellaneous Income for 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2010. 
13) Form 1099, Miscellaneou.s Income for 2011. Bates numbered documents Cedillo 03642 
and 03643. 
14) Bates numbered documents Cedillo 03671 through Cedillo 03686; Cedillo 03758, 
Cedillo 0646 and Cedillo 03647; Cedillo 03687 through Cedillo 03689; Cedillo 03761 
through Cedillo 03761 through Cedillo 03764. 
15) Various telephone conversations with Peggy _Cedillo and Dr. Nancy Collins. 
16) Medical Cost Summary - Peggy Cedillo. 




TABLE 1 SUPPORTING DATA- continued 
18) United States Life Tables, 2007, National Vital Statistics Report, Volume 59, Number 9, 
September 28, 2011. 
19) The Markov (Increment-Decrement) Model of Labor Force Activity: Extended Tables of 
Central Tendency, Variation, and Probability lnteNals, Skoog, Gary and Ciecka, James. 
20) Daily Treasury Yield CuNe Rates, U.S. Treasury website: www.ustreas.gov. 
21) The 2010 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal O!d-Age and Survivors 















PEGGY CEDILLO vs. FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO 
ECONOMIC LOSS CALCULATION - SCENARIO 1 
Date of Birth 
Date of Injury 
Present Value Date 10/31/12 
Age at Date of Injury 47.84 
Years to Final Separation 14.52 
Arithimetic Worklife 12/2/2022 
Statistical Worklife Expectancy 10.52 
Statistical Worklife Adjustment 72.47% 
Net Discount Rate 0.00%. 
Percent Pre-injury Post-injury Post-injury 
From To of Year Profit Profit Wages 
Past lost earnings 
01/01/09 12/31/09 100.00% 26,324 12,677 3,226 
01/01/10 12/31/10 100.00% 27,873 14,102 4,405 
01/01/11 12/31/11 100.00% 27,999 14,842 5,144 
01/01/12 10/31/12 83.33% 22,832 2,434 
Total past lost earnings 
Future lost earnings 
11/01/12 11/30/12 8.20% 2,246 312 
12/01/12 12/31/12 8.47% 2,321 312 
01/01/13 01/31/13 8.49% 2,327 
02/01/13 02/28/13 7.67% 2,102 
03/01/13 03/31/13 8.49% 2,327 
04/01/13 04/30/13 8.22% 2,252 
05/01/13 05/31/13 8.49% 2,327 
06/01/13 06/30/13 8.22% 2,252 
07/01/13 07/31/13 8.49% 2,327 388 
08/01/13 08/31/13 8.49% 2,327 776 
09/01/13 09/30/13 8.22% 2,252 1,126 
10/01/13 10/31/13 8.49% 2,327 1,551 
11/01/13 11/30/13 8.22% 2,252 1,877 
12/01/13 12/31/13 8.49% 2,327 2,327 
Total future lost earnings 
Total Lost Earnings 
Schedule 1 
Statistical Adjusted Present Cumulative 
Net Worklife Net Value at Present 
Loss Adjustment Loss 0.00% Value 
10,421 72.47% 7,552 7,552 7,552 
9,366 72.47% 6,787 6,787 14,339 
8,013 72.47% 5,806 5,806 20,145 
20,398 72.47% 14,781 14,781 34,927 
34,927 
1,934 72.47% 1,401 1,401 36,328 
2,009 72.47% 1,456 1,456 37,784 
2,327 72.47% 1,686 1,686 39,470 
2,102 72.47% 1,523 1,523 40,993 
2,327 72.47% 1,686 1,686 42,679 
2,252 72.47% 1,632 1,632 44,311 
2,327 72.47% 1,686 1,686 45,997 
2,252 72.47% 1,632 1,632 47,629 
1,939 72.47% 1,405 1,405 49,034 
1,551 72.47% 1,124 1,124 50,158 
1,126' 72.47% 816 816 50,974 
776 72.47% 562 562 51,536 
375 72.47% 272 272 51,808 
0 72.47% 0 0. 51,808 
16,881 
51,808 
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Schedule 2 
PEGGY CEDILLO vs. FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO 
ECONOMIC LOSS CALCULATION - SCENARIO 2 
Date of Birth 
Date of Injury 05/25/08 
Present Value Date 10/31/12 
Age at Date of Injury 47.84 
Years to Final Separation 14.52 
Arithimetlc Worklife 12/2/2022 
Statistical Workiife Expectancy 10.52 
Statistical Worklife Adjustment 72.47% 
Net Discount Rate 0.00% 
Statistical Adjusted Present Cumulative 
Percent Pre-injury Post-injury Post-injury Net Worklife Net Value at Present 
From To of Year Profit Profit Wages Loss Adjustment Loss 0.00% Value 
Past lost earnings 
01/01/09 12/31/09 100.00% 26,324 12,677 3,226 10,421 72.47% 7,552 7,552 7,552 
01/01/10 12/31/10 100.00% 27,873 14,102 4,405 9,366 72.47% 6,787 6,787 14,339 
01/01/11 12/31/11 100.00% 27,999 14,842 5,144 8,013 72.47% 5,806 5,806 20,145 
01/01/12 10/31/12 83.33% 22,832 2,434 20,398 72.47% 14,781 14,781 34,927 
Total past lost earnings 34,927 
Future lost earnings 
11/01/12 11/30/12 8.20% 2,246 312 1,934 72.47% 1,401 1,401 36,328 
12/01/12 12/31/12 8.47% 2,321 312 2,009 72.47% 1,456 1,456 37,783 
01/01/13 01/31/13 8.49% 2,327 312 2,015 72.47% 1,460 1,460 39,243 
02/01/13 02/28/13 7.67% 2,102 312 1,790 72.47% 1,297 1,297 40,540 
03/01/13 03/31/13 8.49% 2,327 312 2,015 72.47% 1,460 1,460 42,001 
04/01/13 04/30/13 8.22% 2,252 312 1,940 72.47% 1,406 1,406 43,406 
05/01/13 05/31/13 8.49% 2,327 312 2,015 72.47% 1,460 1,460 44,867 
06/01/13 06/30/13 8.22% 2,252 312 1,940 72.47% 1,406 1,406 46,272 
07/01/13 07/31/13 8.49% 2,327 312 2,015 72.47% 1,460 1,460 47,733 
08/01/13 08/31/13 8.49% 2,327 312 2,015 72.47% 1,460 1,460 49,193 
09/01/13 09/30/13 8.22% 2,252 312 1,940 72.47% 1,406 1,406 50,599 
10/01/13 10/31/13 8.49% 2,327 312 2,015 72.47% 1,460 1,460 52,059 
11/01/13 11/30/13 8.22% 2,252 312 1,940 72.47% 1,406 1,406 53,465 
12/01/13 12/31/13 8.49% 2,327 312 2,015 72.47% 1,460 1,460 54,925 
01/01/14 01/31/14 8.49% 2,327 312 2,015 72.47% 1,460 1,460 56,385 
02/01/14 02/28/14 7.67% 2,102 312 1,790 72.47% 1,297 1,297 57,682 
03/01/14 08/31/14 50.41% 13,812 3,453 10,359 72.47% 7,507 7,507 65,189 
09/01/14 02/28/15 49.59% 13,587 6,793 6,793 72.47% 4,923 4,923 70,112 
03/01/15 08/31/15 50.41% 13,812 10,359 3,453 72.47% 2,502 2,502 72,614 
09/01/15 02/28/16 49.59% 13,587 13,587 0 72.47% 0 0 72,614 
Future lost earnings 37,687 
0 Total Lost Earnings 72,614 








PEGGY CEDILLO vs. FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO 
CEDILLO PRODUCTION VS. MARKET PRODUCTION 
PRE-INJURY EARNINGS BASE 
Cedillo Production - Actual 
Ada County Production 
Cedillo vs Ada County 
2004- 2007 Average 
Ada County Production 
Cedillo 2004 - 2007 Average 
Cedillo Expected Production 
Commission Percentage -
Average 2004 - 2007 - See 
Schedule4 
Cedillo Expected Commissions 
Profit Percentage - See Schedule 5 
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PEGGY CEDILLO vs. FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF JDAHO 
SUMMARY OF PRODUCTION INFORMA TJON 
List Sold Gross 
Price Price Income 
2004: 
Listed - Sellers 2,944,900 2,793,400 
Buyers-Sold 1,289,800 1,274,850 
Less: Dual Agency (394,800) (285,500) 
Add: error in price 119,700 
Land 445,000 445,000 
Total 4,284,900 4,347,450 $ 76,295 
2005: 
Listed - Sellers 1,954,700 1,922,400 
Buyers-Sold 892,700 897,800 
Less: Dual Agency (163,900) (164,000) 
Land 1,170,850 1,105,191 
Total 3,854,350 3,761,391 $ 95,070 
2006: 
Listed ·_ Sellers 2,689,800 2,641,900 
Buyers-Sold 2,592;170 2,567,500 
Less: Dual Agency (324,900) -(324,900) 
Land 
Total 4,957,070 4,884,500 $128,926 
2007: 
Listed - Sellers 1,418,900 1,158,200 
Buyers-Sold 1,029,800 984,900 
Less: Dual Agency (239,900) (234,900) 
Land 
Partners - Sellers 1,298,900 1,205,000 
Partners - Buyers 1,318,900 1,194,900 
Less: Dual Agency (1,019,000) {925,000) 
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PEGGY CEDILLO vs. FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO 




Compensation of officers 
Advertising 




Legal & professional fees 
Office expense 
Repairs & maintenance 
Supplies 
Taxes & licenses 
Telephone/Utilities 
Dues and Subscriptions 





Ordinary Income per Schedule C 
Addback: Depreciation 












Amount ~ Amount ~ 
$76,295 100.0% $95,070 100.0% 
5,344 7.0% 5,489 5.8% 
16,066 21.1% 15,235 16.0% 
524 0.6% 
2,175 2.9% 2,238 2.4% 
972 1.3% 1,964 2.1% 
625 0.8% 675 0.7% 
880 1.2% 410 0.4% 
626 0.8% 715 0.8% 
26,688 35.0% 27,250 28.7% 
$49,607 $67,820 
__ o_ ___ o_ 
~ $67,820 
~ ~ 
Date of Injury: 
12131/2006 12/31/2007 
Amount % Amount __ .,,. __ 
$128,926 100.0% $41,230 100.0% 
5,700 4.4% 3,383 8.2% 
19,658 15.2% 14,315 34.7% 
325 0.3% 610 1.5% 
200 0.2% 125 0.3% 
1,973 1.5% 2,036 4.9% 
885 0.7% 781 1.9% 
425 0.3% 400 1.0% 
825 0.6% 695 1.7% 








12/31/2008 12/31/2009 12/31/2010 12131/2011 
Amount __ % __ Amount ¾ Amount ~ Amount % 
$39,992 100.0% $23,807 100.0% $25,330 100.0% $17,370 100.0% 
900 2.3% 100 0.4% 
5,870 14.7% 8,178 34.4% 5,729 22.6% 372 2.1% 
325 0.8% 
3,400 1,100 . 14,097 5,603 
150 0.4% 268 1.1% 268 1.5% 
325 1.3% 
350 0.9% 250 1.1% 324 1.3% 124 0.7% 
2,638 10.4% 
130 0.3% 1,600 6.7% 1,944 7.7% 1,764 '10.2% 
187 0.5% 687 2.9% 
430 1.1% 315 1.3% 
11,742 29.4% 12,230 51.4% 25,325 100.0% 8,131 -- 46.8% 
$28,250 $11,577 $5 $9,239 
__MQQ_ __LlQQ_ -11,QQL ~ 
~ ~ $14,102 $14,842 
~ ~ ~ ~ 




PEGGY CEDILLO vs. FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO 
INTEREST ON PAST LOST EARNINGS 
Present 
Value of # Days 
Net Lost to 12.0% 
Date Earnin£!S 90 Da~s 10/31/12 Interest 
01/31/09 629 05/01/09 1,279 264 
02/28/09 629 05/29/09 1,251 259 
03/31/09 629 06/29/09 1,220 252 
04/30/09 629 07/29/09 1,190 246 
05/31/09 629 08/29/09 1,159 240 
06/30/09 629 09/28/09 1,129 233 
07/31/09 629 10/29/09 1,098 227 
08/31/09 629 11/29/09 1,067 221 
09/30/09 629 12/29/09 1,037 214 
10/31/09 629 01/29/10 1,006 208 
11/30/09 629 02/28/10 976 202 
12/31/09 629 03/31/10 945 195 
7,552 2,762 
01/31/10 566 05/01/10 914 170 
02/28/10 566 05/29/10 886 165 
03/31/10 566 06/29/10 855 159 
04/30/10 566 07/29/10 825 153 
05/31/10 -566 08/29/10 794 148 
06/30/10 566 09/28/10 764 142 
07/31/10 566 10/29/10 733 136 
08/31/10 566 11/29/10 702 130 
09/30/10 566 12/29/10 672 125 
10/31/10 566 01/29/11 641 119 
11/30/10 566 02/28/11 611 114 
12/31/10 566 03/31/11 580 108 
6,787 1,668 
01/31/11 484 05/01/11 549 87 
02/28/11 · 484 05/29/11 521 . 83 
03/31/11 484 06/29/11 490 78 
04/30/11 484 07/29/11 460 73 
05/31/11 . 484 08/29/11 429 68 
06/30/11 484 09/28/11 399 63 
07/31/11 484 10/29/11 368 59 
08/31/11 484 11/29/11 337 54 
09/30/11 484 12/29/11 307 49 
10/31/11 484 01/29/12 276 44 
11/30/11 484 02/28/12 246 39 
12/31/11 484 03/30/12 215 34 
5,806 731 
01/31/12 1,478 04/30/12 184 89 
02/29/12 1,478 05/29/12 155 75 
03/31/12 1,478 06/29/12 124 60 
04/30/12 1,478 07/29/12 94 46 
05/31/12 1,478 08/29/12 63 31 
06/30/12 1,478 09/28/12 33 16 
07/31/12 1,478 10/29/12 2 1 
08/31/12 1,478 11/29/12 
09/30/12 1,478 12/29/12 
10/31/12 1,478 01/29/13 
14,781 318 
Total 34,927 5,479 




PEGGY CEDILLO vs. FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO 
MEDICAL COST SUMMARY 
# Days 
Amount to 12.0% 
Date Provider Charged 90 Days 10/31/12 Interest 
09/14/08 Alderman Medical Acupuncture of Idaho 464.00 12/13/08 1,418 216.16 
09/17/08 Alderman Medical Acupuncture of Idaho 85.00 12/16/08 1,415 39.52 
09/23/08 Alderman Medical Acupuncture of Idaho 85.00 12/22/08 1,409 39.35 
09/24/08 Alderman Medical Acupuncture of Idaho 85.00 12/23/08 1,408 39.32 
09/26/08 Alderman Medical Acupuncture of Idaho 85.00 12/25/08 1,406 39.26 
09/29/08 Alderman Medical Acupuncture of Idaho 85.00 12/28/08 1,403 39.18 
10/01/08 Alderman Medical Acupuncture of Idaho 85.00 12/30/08 1,401 39.12 
10/13/08 Alderman Medical Acupuncture of Idaho 85.00 01/11/09 1,389 38.79 
10/24/08 Alderman Medical Acupuncture of Idaho 85.00 01/22/09 1,378 38.48 
10/27/08 Alderman Medical Acupuncture of Idaho 85.00 01/25/09 1,375 38.40 
1,229.00 567.59 
04/26/10 Boise Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Clinic 1,096.00 07/25/10 829 298.51 
05/29/08 David N. Price, D.C. 401.50 08/27/08 1,526 201.29 
05/30/08 David N. Price, D.C. 72.00 08/28/08 1,525 36.07 
05/31/08 David N. Price, D.C. 97.00 08/29/08 1,524 48.57 
06/02/08 David N. Price, D.C. 93.00 08/31/08 1,522 46.50 
06/03/08 David N. Price, D.C. 106.00 09/01/08 1,521 52.97 
06/05/08 David N. Price, D.C. 61.00 09/03/08 1,519 30.44 
06/06/08 David N. Price, D.C. 26.00 09/04/08 1,518 12.97 
06/09/08 David N. Price, D.C. 97.00 09/07/08 1,515 48.28 
06/10/08 David N. Price, D.C. 114.00 09/08/08 1,514 56.71 
06/25/08 David N. Price, D.C. 97.00 09/23/08 1,499 47.77 
06/27/08 David N. Price, D.C. 106.00 09/25/08 1,497 52.13 
06/28/08 David N. Price, D.C. 158.00 09/26/08 1,496 77.66 
07/01/08 David N. Price, D.C. 97.00 09/29/08 1,493 47.58 
07/02/08 David N. Price, D.C. 106.00 09/30/08 1,492 51.96 
07/07/08 David N. Price, D.C. 138.00 10/05/08 1,487 67.42 
07/09/08 David N. Price, D.C. 106.00 10/07/08 1,485 51.72 
07/14/08 David N. Price, D.C. 101.00 10/12/08 1,480 49.11 
07/24/08 David N. Price, D.C. 97.00 10/22/08 1,470 46.85 
07/25/08 David N. Price, D.C. 106.00 10/23/08 1,469 51.16 
07/28/08 David N. Price, D.C. 97.00 10/26/08 1,466 46.72 
08/02/08 David N. Price, D.C. 107.00 10/31/08 1,461 51.36 
08/05/08 David N. Price, D.C. 106.00 11/03/08 1,458 50.78 
08/06/08 David N. Price, D.C. 97.00 11/04/08 1,457 46.43 
08/11/08 David N. Price, D.C. 101.00 11/09/08 1,452 48.18 
08/26/08 David N. Price, D.C. 97.00 11/24/08 1,437 45.80 
08/27/08 David N. Price, D.C. 177.00 11/25/08 1,436 83.51 
08/28/08 David N. Price, D.C. 97.00 11/26/08 1,435 45.73 
08/29/08 David N. Price, D.C. 106.00 11/27/08 1,434 49.94 
09/02/08 David N. Price, D.C. 114.00 12/01/08 1,430 53.56 
09/03/08 David N. Price, D.C. 89.00 12/02/08 1,429 41.78 
09/06/08 David N. Price, D.C. 97.00 12/05/08 1,426 45.44 
09/10/08 David N. Price, D.C. 101.00 12/09/08 1,422 47.19 
09/13/08 David N. Price, D.C. 144.00 12/12/08 1,419 67.13 
09/16/08 David N. Price, D.C. 9.11 12/15/08 1,416 4.24 
09/20/08 David N. Price, D.C. 146.00 12/19/08 1,412 67.73 
09/22/08 David N. Price, D.C. 89.00 12/21/08 1,410 41.23 
09/23/08 David N. Price, D.C. 112.00 12/22/08 1,409 51.85 




PEGGY CEDILLO vs. FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF JDAHO 
. MEDICAL COST SUMMARY 
# Days 
Amount to 12.0% 
Date Provider Char~ed 90 Da~s 10/31/12 Interest 
09/29/08 David N. Price, D.C. 97.00 12/28/08 1,403 44.71 
09/30/08 David N. Price, D.C. 116.00 12/29/08 1,402 53.43 
10/13/08 David N. Price, D.C. 89.00 01/11/09 1,389 40.61 
10/14/08 David N. Price, D.C. 108.00 01/12/09 1,388 49.25 
10/16/08 David N. Price, D.C. 89.00 01/14/09 1,386 40.53 
10/17/08 David N. Price, D.C. 19.77 01/15/09 1,385 9.00 
10/22/08 Davi.d N. Price, D.C. 97.00 01/20/09 1,380 43.98 
10/26/08 David N. Price, D.C. 108.00 01/24/09 1,376 48.82 
10/27/08 David N. Price, D.C. 82.00 01/25/09 1,375 37.04 
11/03/08 David N. Price, D.C. 97.00 02/01/09 1,368 43.60 
11/05/08 David N. Price, D.C. 97.00 02/03/09 1,366 43.53 
11/06/08 David N. Price, D.C. 108.00 02/04/09 1,365 48.43 
11/10/08 David N. Price, D.C. 89.00 02/08/09 1,361 39.80 
11/13/08 David N. Price, D.C. 108.00 02/11/09 1,358 48.19 
11/18/08 David N. Price, D.C. 32.37 02/16/09 1,353 14.39 
11/20/08 David N. Price, D.C. 100.00 02/18/09 · 1,351 44.39 
12/10/08 David N. Price, D.C. 74.00 03/10/09 1,331 32.36 
12/11/08 David N. Price, D.C. 108.00 03/11/09 1,330 47.19 
12/19/08 David N. Price, D.C. 45.36 03/19/09 1,322 19.70 
01/20/09 David N. Price, D.C. 59.13 04/20/09 1,290 25.06 
02/17/09 David N. Price, D.C. 61.86 05/18/09 1,262 25.65 
03/17/09 David N. Price, D.C. 62.54 06/15/09 1,234 25.36 
04/17/09 David N. Price, D.C. 64.36 07/16/09 1,203 25.44 
05/19/09 David N. Price, D.C. 65.29 08/17/09 1,171 25.12 
06/16/09 David N. Price, D.C. 65.29 09/14/09 1,143 24.52 
6,108.58 2,865.83 
01/09/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 110.00 04/09/09 1,301 47.02 
01/09/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 04/09/09 . 1,301 6.84 
01/09/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 04/09/09 1,301 34.19 
01/12/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 04/12/09 1,298 6.82 
01/12/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 04/12/09 1,298 34.12 
01/14/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 40.00 04/14/09 1,296 17.03 
01/14/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 04/14/09 1,296 6.81 
01/14/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 04/14/09 1,296 34.06 
01/16/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 40.00 04/16/09 1,294 17.01 
01/16/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 04/16/09 1,294 6.80 
01/16/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 04/16/09 1,294 34.01 
01/20/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 04/20/09 1,290 6.78 
01/20/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 04/20/09 1,290 33.91 
01/22/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 40.00 04/22/09 1,288 16.93 
01/22/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 04/22/09 1,288 6.77 
01/22/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 04/22/09 1,288 33.85 
01/26/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 40.00 04/26/09 1,284 16.87 
01/26/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 04/26/09 1,284 6.75 
01/26/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 04/26/09 1,284 33.75 
01/28/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 40.00 04/28/09 1,282 16.85 
01/28/09 . Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 04/28/09 1,282 6.74 
01/28/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 04/28/09 1,282 33.70 
01/30/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 04/30/09 1,280 6.73 




PEGGY CEDILLO vs. FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO 
MEDICAL COST SUMMARY 
#Days 
Amount to 12.0% 
Date Provider Charged 90 Da}'.'.S 10/31/12 Interest 
01/30/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 04/30/09 1,280 33.64 
02/03/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 05/04/09 1,276 6.71 
02/03/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 05/04/09 1,276 33.54 
02/10/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 40.00 05/11/09 1,269 16.68 
02/10/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 05/11/09 1,269 6.67 
02/10/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 05/11/09 1,269 33.35 
02/13/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 05/14/09 1,266 6.65 
02/13/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 05/14/09 1,266 33.27 
02/17/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 05/18/09 1,262 6.63 
02/17/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 05/18/09 1,262 33.17 
02/20/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 05/21/09 1,259 6.62 
02/20/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 05/21/09 1,259 33.09 
02/20/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 05/21/09 1,259 6.62 
02/23/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 05/24/09 1,256 33.01 
02/23/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 05/24/09 1,256 6.60 
02/27/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 05/28/09 1,252 32.91 
02/27/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 05/28/09 1,252 6.58 
03/03/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 06/01/09 1,248 32.80 
03/03/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 06/01/09 1,248 6.56 
03/05/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 06/03/09 1,246 32.75 
03/05/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 06/03/09 1,246 6.55 
03/09/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 06/07/09 1,242 32.64 
03/09/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 40.00 06/07/09 1,242 16.32 
03/11/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 06/09/09 1,240 6.52 
03/11/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 06/09/09 1,240 32.59 
03/11/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 40.00 06/09/09 1,240 16.30. 
03/13/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 06/11/09 1,238 6.51 
03/13/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 06/11/09 1,238 32.54 
03/13/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 7.50 06/11/09 1,238 3.05 
03/16/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 06/14/09 1,235 6.49 
03/16/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 06/14/09 1,235 32.46 
03/18/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 06/16/09 1,233 6.48 
03/18/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 06/16/09 1,233 32.41 
03/20/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 06/18/09 1,231 6.47 
03/20/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 06/18/09 1,231 32.35 
03/23/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 16.00 06/21/09 1,228 6.46 
03/23/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 06/21/09 1,228 32.28 
03/25/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 60.00 06/23/09 1,226 24.17 
03/25/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 40.00 06/23/09 1,226 16.11 
03/25/09 Hands on Physical Therapy 80.00 06/23/09 1,226 32.22 
05/11/10 Hands on Physical Therapy 115.00 08/09/10 814 30.75 
05/11/10 Hands on Physical Therapy 90.00 08/09/10 814 24.07 
05/13/10 Hands on Physical Therapy 45.00 08/11/10 812 12.00· 
05/13/10 Hands on Physical Therapy 90.00 08/11/10 812 24.01 
05/19/10 Hands on Physical Therapy 37.00 08/17/10 806 9.80 
05/19/10 Hands on Physical Therapy 90.00 08/17/10 806 23.83 
05/26/10 Hands on Physical Therapy 45.00 08/24/10 799 11.81 
05/26/10 Hands on Physical Therapy 90.00 08/24/10 799 23.63 
01/10/12 Hands on Physical Therapy 45.00 04/09/12 205 3.03 
06/01/10 Hands on Physical Therapy 90.00 08/30/10 793 23.45 
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MEDICAL COST SUMMARY 
# Days 
Amount to 12.0% 
Date Provider Char9ed 90 Da;ts 10/31/12 Interest 
06/03/10 Hands on Physical Therapy 45.00 09/01/10 791 11.69 
06/03/10 Hands on Physical T~erapy 90.00 09/01/10 791 23.39 
3,889.50 1,474.58 
10/29i08 Idaho Neurological - Kenneth M. Little, M.D. 314.00 01/27/09 1,373 141.64 
11/12/08 Idaho Neurological - Kenneth M. Little, M.D. 42.00 02/10/09 1,359 18.75 
11/24/08 Idaho Neurological - Kenneth M. Little, M.D. 14,243.41 02/22/09 1,347 6,303.37 
03/26/09 Idaho Neurological - Kenneth M. Little, M.D. 42.00 06/24/09 1,225 16.90 
01/23/12 Idaho Neurological - Kenneth M. Little, M.D. 42.00 04/22/12 192 2.65 
02/15/12 Idaho Neurological - Kenneth M. Little, M.D. 13,240.19 05/15/12 169 735.14 
07/19/12 Idaho Neurological - Kenneth M. Little, M.D. 39.00 10/17/12 14 0.18 
27,962.60 7,218.64 
11/24/08 Idaho Neurological - Charisse H. Mack, P.A. 2,136.52 02/22/09 1,347 945.51 
02/15/12 Idaho Neurological - Charisse H. Mack, P.A. 2,812.57 05/15/12 169 156.16 
4,949.09 1,101.67 
04/27/10 Idaho Sports Medicine 255.00 07/26/10 828 69.37 
08/18/10 Idaho Sports Medicine 418.00 11/16/10 715 98.19 
09/20/11 Idaho Sports Medicine 185.00 12/19/11 317 19.27 
10/11/11 Idaho Sports Medicine 700.00 01/09/12 296 68.07 
10/12/11 Idaho Sports Medicine 212.00 01/10/12 295 20.55 
10/18/11 Idaho Sports Medicine 91.00 01/16/12 289 8.64 
10/21/11 Idaho Sports Medicine 150.00. 01/19/12 286 14.09 
10/25/11 Idaho Sports Medicine 100.00 01/23/12 282 9.26 
10/28/11 Idaho Sports Medicine 100.00 01/26/12 279 9.17 
11/01/11 Idaho Sports Medicine 100.00 01/30/12 275 9.03 
11/04/11 Idaho Sports Medicine 150.00 02/02/12 272 13.40 
11/04/11 Idaho Sports Medicine 185.00 02/02/12 272 16.53 
11/08/11 Idaho Sports Medicine 100.00 02/06/12 268 8.80 
11/15/11 Idaho Sports Medicine 141.00 02/13/12 261 12.09 
11/18/11 Idaho Sports Medicine 116.00 02/16/12 258 9.83 
3,003.00 386.31 
09/09/11 Primay Health 113.00 12/08/11 328 12.18 
03/26/09 Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 189.00 06/24/09 1,225 76.07 
04/19/10 Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 200.00 07/18/10 836 54.93 
11/19/08 -
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 23,064.33 02/22/09 1,347 10,207.03 
11/24/08 
12/29/08 Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 189.00 03/29/09 1,312 81.47 
09/15/09 Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 200.00 12/14/09 1,052 69.1.3 
02/08/12 Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 1,036.00 05/08/12 176 59.91 
24,878.33 10,548.53 
11/30/11 The Shoulder Clinic - Dr. Goodwin 234.00 02/28/12 246 18.91 
05/07/12 The Shoulder Clinic - Dr. Goodwin 152.00 08/05/12 87 4.34 
05/22/12 The Shoulder Clinic - Dr. Goodwin 6,473.00 08/20/12 72 153.12 
6,859.00 176.38 
11/24/08 Boise Anesthesia, P.A. 2,070.00 02/22/09 1,347 916.07 




PEGGY CEDILLO vs. FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO 
MEDICAL COST SUMMARY 
# Days 
Amount to 12.0% 
Date Provider Charged 90 Da~s 10/31/12 Interest 
06/06/08 James H. Bates, M.D. 161.00 09/04/08 1,518 80.30 
06/12/08 James H. Bates, M.D. 94.00 09/10/08 1,512 46.70 
06/30/08 James H. Bates, M.D .. 335.00 09/28/08 1,494 164.43 
07/09/08 James H. Bates, M.D. 94.00 10/07/08 1,485 45.86 
07/14/08 James H. Bates, M.D. 335.00 10/12/08 1,480 162.89 
07/21/08 James H. Bates, M.D. 94.00 10/19/08 1,473 45.49 
08/01/08 James H. Bates, M.D. 101.00 10/30/08 1,462 48.51 
08/15/08 James H. Bates, M.D. 101.00 11/13/08 1,448 48.05 
08/28/08 James H. Bates, M.D. 318.00 11/26/08 1,435 149.92 
09/04/08 James H. Bates, M.D. 101.00 12/03/08 1,428 47.38 
09/09/08 James H. Bates, M.D. 101.00 12/08/08 1,423 47.22 
10/09/08 James H. Bates, M.D. 101.00 01/07/09 1,393 46.22 
12/30/08 James H. Bates, M.D. 1.52 03/30/09 1,311 0.65 
1,937.52 933.63 
11/19/08 Gem State Radiology 30.80 02/17/09 1,352 13.68 
12/29/08 Gem State Radiology 30.80 03/29/09 1,312 13.28 
03/26/09 Gem State Radiology 30.80 06/24/09 1,225 12.40 
09/15/09 Gem State Radiology 30.80 12/14/09 1,052 10.65 
04/19/10 Gem State Radiology 30.80 07/18/10 836 8.46 
154.00 58.46 
09/08/08 lntermountain Medical Imaging 980.20 12/07/08 1,424 458.58 
10/03/11 lntermountain Medical Imaging 1,206.80 01/01/12 304 120.53 
10/03/11 lntermountain Medical Imaging 1,476.60 01/01/12 304 147.48 
10/03/11 lntermountain Medical Imaging 400.00 01/01/12 304 39.95 
10/03/11 lntermountain Medical Imaging 205.10 01/01/12 304 20.48 
10/03/11 lntermountain Medical Imaging 33.00 01/01/12 304 3.30 
10/03/11 lntermountain Medical Imaging 39.00 01/01/12 304 3.90 
4,340.70 794.22 
02/15/12 Anesthesia Associates of Boise 1,969.00 05/15/12 169 109.33 
05/26/08 Walgreens 57.98 08/24/08 1,529 29.13 
05/30/08 Walgreens 12.76 08/28/08 1,525 6.39 
06/06/08 Walgreens 12.64 09/04/08 1,518 6.30 
06/12/08 Wafgreens 264.90 09/10/08 1,512 131.59 
07/09/08 Walgreens 52.94 10/07/08 1,485 25.83 
07/09/08 Walgreens 10.93 10/07/08 1,485 5.33 
08/08/08 Walgreens 10.93 11/06/08 1,455 5.22 
08/15/08 Walgreens 13.08 11/13/08 1,448 6.22 
08/26/08 Walgreens 16.01 11/24/08 1,437 7.56 
09/04/08 Walgreens 9.39 12/03/08 1,428 4.41 
09/09/08 Walgreens 16.01 12/08/08 1,423 7.48 
09/23/08 Walgreens 16.01 12/22/08 1,409 7.41 
09/29/08 Walgreens 0.00 12/28/08 1,403 
10/02/08 Walgreens 7.30 12/31/08 1,400 3.36 
10/09/08 Walgreens 19.26 01/07/09 1,393 8.81 
10/09/08 Walgreens 9.39 01/07/09 1,393 4.30 
11/04/08 Walgreens 22.36 02/02/09 1,367 10.04 
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# Days 
Amount to 12.0% 
Date Provider Charged 90 Dal'.'.S 10/31/12 Interest 
11/12/08 Walgreens 11.53 02/10/09 1,359 5.15 
11/19/08 Walgreens 33.89 02/17/09 1,352 15.05 
11/25/08 Walgreens 80.11 02/23/09 1,346 35.43 
12/03/08 Walgreens 26.78 03/03/09 1,338 11.77 
12/12/08 Walgreen~ 68.00 03/12/09 1,329 29.69 
01/05/09 Walgreens 14.67 04/05/09 1,305 6.29 
02/03/09 Walgreens 14.67 05/04/09 1,276 6.15 
03/03/09 Walgreens 14.67 06/01/09 1,248 6.02 
03/26/09 Walgreens 14.67 06/24/09 1,225 5.90 
03/30/09 Walgreens 14.67 06/28/09 1,221 5.88 
05/13/09 Walgreens 14.67 08/11/09 1,177 5.67 
08/14/09 Walgreens 11.86 11/12/09 1,084 4.22 
04/19/10 Walgreens 4.50 07/18/10 836 1.24 
04/30/10 Walgreens 5.00 07/29/10 825 1.36 
06/01/10 Walgreens 5.00 08/30/10 793 1.30 
08/18/10 Walgreens 3.75 11/16/10 715 0.88 
09/09/11 Walgreens 3.40 12/08/11 328 0.37 
09/09/11 Walgreens 7.50 12/08/11 328 0.81 
09/21/11 Walgreens 4.30 12/20/11 316 0.45 
09/21/11 Walgreens 10.00 12/20/11 316 1.04 
10/28/11 Walgreens 4.30 01/26/12 279 0.39 
10/31/11 Walgreens 18.99 01/29/12 276 1.72 
01/05/12 Walgreens 14:99 04/04/12 210 1.03 
01/06/12 Wal greens 18.99 04/05/12 209 1.30 
01/14/12. Walgreens 33.99 04/13/12 201 2.24 
01/20/12 Walgreens 14.99 04/19/12 195 0.96 
01/27/12 Walgreens 41.98 04/26/12 188 2.59 
02/09/12 Walgreens 44.99 05/09/12 175 2.59 
03/09/12 Walgreens 10.00 06/07/12 146 0.48 
03/15/12 Wal greens 24.22 06/13/12 140 1.11 
03/16/12 Walgreens 6.59 06/14/12 139 0.30 
04/02/12 Walgreens 10.00 07/01/12 122 0.40 
04/05/12 Walgreens 6.59 07/04/12 119 0.26 
04/12/12 Walgreens 85.00 07/11/12 112 3.13 
05/04/12 Walgreens 3.36 08/02/12 90 0.10 
05/08/12 Walgreens 2.92 08/06/12 86 0.08 
05/18/12 Walgreens 7.51 08/16/12 76 0.19 
05/22/12 Walgreens 28.33 08/20/12 72 0.67 
05/25/12 Walgreens 4.07 08/23/12 69 0.09 
05/26/12 Walgreens 10.00 08/24/12 68 0.22 
06/06/12 Walgreens 10.00 09/04/12 57 0.19 
06/14/12 Walgreens 10.00 09/12/12 49 0.16 
06/27/12 Walgreens 10.00 09/25/12 36 0.12 
06/30/12 Walgreens 4.07 09/28/12 33 0.04 
07/24/12 Wal greens 10.00 10/22/12 9 0.03 
1,351.41 434.47 
05/26/08 McMillan Medical Center 212.50 08/24/08 1,529 106.75 
05/27/08 McMillan Medical Center 95.00 08/25/08 1,528 47.69 
05/30/08 McMillan Medical Center 90.00 08/28/08 1,525 45.09 
Page 6 of 7 
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MEDICAL COST SUMMARY 
Amount 
Date Provider Char~ed 
397.50 
01/11/11 St. Luke's RMC 1,221.58 
02/15/12 St. Luke's RMC 26,526.65 
27,748.23 
05/22/12 Biomet 125.00 
04/02/12 A Caring Hand 148.00 
05/04/12 A Caring Hand 144.00 
05/01/12 A Caring Hand 64.00 
05/02/12 A Caring Hand 64.00 
05/03/12 A Caring Hand 64.00 
05/25/12 A Caring Hand 40.00 
05/30/12 A Caring Hand 80.00 
06/04/12 A Caring Hand 64.00 
668.00 
05/07/12 Treasure Valley Hospital 91.00 
05/22/12 Treasure Valley Hospital 10,813.99 
10,904.99 
07/13/12 Physical Therapy. of Idaho 202.00 
07/16/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 112.00 
07/19/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 112.00 
07/30/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 152.00 
08/01/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 112.00 
08/03/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 112.00 
08/08/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 112.00 
08/10/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 112.00 
08/13/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 80.00 
08/15/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 112.00 
08/17/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 112.00 
08/20/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 120.00 
08/22/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 155.00 
08/24/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 120.00 
08/27/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 120.00 
08/31/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 120.00 
09/04/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 112.00 
09/05/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 112.00 
09/17/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 112.00 
09/19/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 112.00 
09/24/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 120.00 
10/01/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 120.00 
10/03/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 120.00 
10/10/12 Physical Therapy of Idaho 120.00 
2,893.00 
TOTAL MEDICAL BILLS 134,647 
#Days 
to 












































































DENNIS R. REINSTEIN, CPAIABV, ASA, CVA 
University of Idaho 
BS Agri-business, 197 4 
BS Business (Accounting), 1975 
Licensed in Idaho as CPA, 1976 
CVA designation, 1995 
ABV designation, 2001 
ASA designation, 2003 
Coles Reinstein, PLLC 
Partner 
Hooper Cornell, PLLC 
Partner 
October, 2012 - Present 
January, 2002 - October, 2012 
Presnell-Gage Accounting & Consulting 
Firm-wide supervisory responsibilities for business consulting services and 











Professional experience includes: 
January, 1996 - December 31, 2001 
October, 1991 -January, 1996 
July, 1989- September, 1991 
October, 1983 - June, 1989 
May, 1980 - September, 1983 
1979-1980 
1975-1978 
(1) Valuation of small businesses and professional practices. 
(2) Assistance to clients with the analysis of business operations and 
significant business transactions. These include negotiations on purchase 
and sale of a business or business segments, including assistance with 
valuation of business entities. 
(3) Design and assist with implementation of financial accounting and control 
systems for various clients served by the firm. 
(4) Supervision of accounting and auditing services provided by the firm's 
professional staff and consultation on procedures and methods of providing 
client services. 
(5) Member of team conducting review of complex mainfra_me and 
microcomputer accounting systems. 
(6) Co-authored and presented eight-hour course on cash management. 
Presented other client educational seminars and seminars to other service 
professionals such as bankers and attorneys. 
(7) Duties as a partner-in-charge included the responsibility for managing an 









DENNIS R. REINSTEIN, CPAIABV, ASA, CVA (Continued) 
Farmer's Home Administration -Assistant County Supervisor, 1974. 
Duties included: 
(1) Evaluation of credit applications and preparation of application 
packages for review and approval. 
(2) Residential real estate and farm appraisals. 
Idaho Society of CPAs, member 
Past Chairman of Management of an Accounting Practice Committee 
Prior Member of Committees on 
Public Relations 
Continuing Professional Education 
Relations with Bankers 
Northern Chapter of Idaho Society of CPAs, past president 
American Institute of CPAs, member 
American Society of Appraisers, member - Business Valuation 
National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts, member 
The Institute of Business Appraisers, member 
Continental Association of CPAs, Past Chair of Litigation Services Committee 
arid Information Technology Committee 
Boise Estate Planning Council, member, President and Treasurer, 
Past Vice President and Program Chairman 
Prior Public Service 
and Community 
Activities: 
Boise Chamber of Commerce 
Member of Small Business Recognition Sub-committee 
Member of Small Business Education and Advisory Sub-committee 
Chair of Small Business Committee 
Member of Garden City Chamber Council 
Discovery Center of Idaho, Vice President of Board 
Kiwanis 
Moscow Chamber of Commerce 
President, Vice. President, Treasurer & Board member 
Moscow Executive Association 
Moscow Rotary 
Lewiston Chamber of Commerce 
Lewiston Jaycees 
Held various offices & a member of Board of Directors 
Prepared and presented accounting seminars for Human Advancement's 
Inc., Minority Contractors Awareness Seminars and the Lewis-Clark 
Homebuilders Association. 




PRIOR TESTIMONY - DENNIS R. REINSTEIN. CPAIABV, ASA. CVA 
The following is a list of cases in which I have given recorded testimony in the last four years .. 
1) Idaho State Department of Agriculture v. Wheatland Agribusiness, Inc., et al. 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - April 2008 
2) J.R. Simplot Company v. Nestle USA, Inc. 
Deposition- Boise, Idaho - May 2008 
3) · United States of America ex rel. Cherri Suter and Melinda Harmer v. National Rehab 
Partners, Inc. and Magic Valley Regional Medical Center 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - August 2008 
4) Hobson Fabricating Corp. v. SEIZ Construction, LLC, et al. 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - September 2008 
5) George C. Turner. v. Russell E. and Victoria F. Turner 
Trial - Murphy, Idaho - July 2009 
6) Ronald R. McCann. v. William V. Mccann, Jr., et al. 
Hearing on Motion to Compel - Boise, Idaho - August 2009 
7) Dare( Hardenbrook, et al. v. United Parcel Service, Co. 
Trial - Boise, Idaho - January 2010 . 
8) Jean-Michel Thirion, et al. v. Brenda E. Sangster. 
Hearing on Fees - Boise, Idaho - December 2010 
9) The City of Meridian v. Petra Incorporated 
Trial - Boise, Idaho - March 2011 
10) Tim Hopkins v. Advantage Sales and Marketing Holdings, LLC 
Trial - Boise, Idaho - December 2011 
11) Rodney Shaddox, et al. v. Daryl Kent Maccarter, M.D. 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - January 2012 
12) Profits Plus Capital Management, LLC, et al. v. Jeffrey Podesta, et al.. 
Trial - Boise, Idaho - February 2012 
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PUBLICATIONS/PRESENTATIONS-DENNIS R. REINSTEIN, CPAIABV, ASA. CVA 
The following is a list of publications I have authored or co-authored over the last 10 years. · 
1) Litigation Questions, Problems & Solutions: The Bench, Bar and Clients Speak Out. 
Participant on the client panel - presented to the Idaho State Bar Litigation Section on 
January 10, 2003. 
2) Using Business Valuations To Build An Estate - presented to the Boise Estate Planning 
Council on November 3, 2003. 
3) Business Valuation Basics - presented to the Boise Wells Fargo Business Bankers 
meeting on December 5, 2003. 
4) Business Valuation Basics: How to Use Valuation/Financial Theory to Increase the 
Value of Your Business - presented to TechHelp, Manufacturers Luncheon on January 
28, 2005. 
5) Tax Planning for Sales of Real Estate - sponsored by Premier Alliance on March 16, 
2005. 
6) Valuation and Credit Analysis: Similarities and Differences - presented to Boise area 
U.S. Bank business bankers on May 11, 2005. 
7) The Guideline Publicly Traded Company Method and The Market Value of "invested" 
Capital: Should Market Value of "Stakeholder'' Capital be the Appropriate Reference -
Business Valuation Review; Summer, 2006. 
8) A Hybrid Restricted Stock/Pre-lPO Data Point: Lack of Marketability Discount for 
ESOP's. -Business Valuation Review; Summer, 2007. 
9) Pension Plans and Closely-Held Companies: Valuing Tricky Assets in Divorce -
presented to the Idaho State Bar Association on May 9, 2008. 
10) Considerations in Star;ting a Dental Practice -
a) Presented to Idaho State University Dental School, November 11, 2008 
b) Presented to Idaho State University Dental School, January 12, 2010 
c) Presented to Idaho State University Dental School, June 20, 2011 
11) Co-presenter on damages in Personal Injury litigation to various Treasure Valley area 
law firms - 2009. 
12) An Update on Proposed IRS' Appraiser Penalty Procedures - published in ISCPA 
Adjusting Entry, April 2010. 
13) Co-presenter in "Accounting 101 Seminar for Attorneys" - sponsored by the National 
Business Institute, Boise, Idaho August 12, 2010. 
Cedillo 05199 
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PUBLICATIONS/PRESENTATIONS - DENNIS R. REINSTEIN- continued 
14) Co-presenter in "Buy-Sell Agreements: Recipe for Success or Roadmap to Ruin?"-:-
a) Presented to the Idaho State Bar - 2010 Advanced Estate Planning Seminar, 
September 11, 2010. 
b) Presented to the Business and Corporate Law Section of .the Idaho State Bar, 
September 14, 2011. . 
c) Presented to the Business Group of Holland & Hart, LLP, September 28, 2011. 
15) Co-presenter in "So You Think You Want To Be An Expert Witness?" - sponsored by 
the Idaho Society of CPA's, Boise, Idaho November 4, 2011. 
QUALIFICATIONS - DENNIS R. REINSTEIN. CPAIABV, ASA, CVA 
See curriculum vitae attached. 
COMPENSATION- DENNIS R. REINSTEIN, CPAIABV. ASA. CVA 




9/14/08 - 10/27/08 
4/2610 
5/29/08 - 12/11/08 
12/19/08 - 6/16/09 
1/9/09 - 3/25/09 
5/11/10- 6/3/10 
10/29/08 - 3/29/09 















5/7/12 & 5/22/12 
11/24/08 
6/6/08 - 10/9/08 
Cedillo-Steele 
Medical Expense Summary 
PROVIDER AMOUNT 
Alderman Medical Acupuncture of Idaho 1229.00 
Vivek Kadyan, M.D./Boise PM&R 1096.00 
David Price, D.C. 5803.11 
David Price, D.C. (accrued interest) 305.47 
Hands On Physical Therapy 3017.50 
Hands On Physical Therapy 872.00 
Kenneth Little, M.D. 14641.41 
Kenneth Little, M.D. 13282.19 
Kenneth Little, M.D. 39.00 
Charisse Mack, PA 2136.52 
Charisse Mack PAC 2812.57 
Idaho Sports Medicine 255.00 
Idaho Sports Medicine 418.00 
Idaho Sports Medicine 2330.00 







Thomas Goodwin, M.D. 234.00 
Thomas Goodwin, M.D. 6625.00 
Boise Anesthesia 2070.00 
James Bates, M.D. (+$1.52 interest) 1937.52 


























5/26/08 - 7/24/12 
5/26/08 - 5/30/08 
1/11/12 
2/15/12 - 2/17/12 
5/22/12 





Medical Expense Summary 
PROVIDER AMOUNT 
Gem State Radiology 92.40 
Gem State Radiology 30.80 
Gem State Radiology 30.80 
IMI 980.20 
IMI 3360.50 
Anesthesia Associates 1969.00 
Walgreen's 1351.41 
McMillan Medical Center 397.50 
St. Luke's 1221.58 
St. Luke's 26526.65 
Biomet 125.00 
A Caring Hand Home Health Care 668.00 
Treasure Valley Hospital 91.00 
Treasure Valley Hospital 10813.99 
Physical Therapy of Idaho 2893.00 
TOTALS: 134647.45 












Peggy, B. Cedillo 
4707 W. Clearview Drive 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
Mr. Ron Ramsey 
Farmers Insurance 
PO Box 268994 
Oklahoma City, OK 73126 
Re: Insured: 
DOB: 
Date of Injury: 
Claim.No.: 
Dear Mr. Ramsey, 
July 28, 2009 
Via: US Mail & Certified Mail 
Peggy B. Cedillo 
May25,2008 
1014413194 
As per my telephone conversation with you yesterday, I have settled my claim 
against Mr. Steele for his policy limits of $100,000.00 and $5,000.00 in medical 
coverage. I request that Farmers Insurance pay me policy limits of $500,000.00 under 
my underinsurance policy. 
There is no issue of liability. I was a passenger on Mr. Steele's motorcycle. The 
crash was severe. Mr. Steele hit a concrete retaining wall at approximately 30 MPH. 
Medical records and reports which thoroughly document my injuries have 
previously been submitted to my local agent, Mr. Jay Reinke. I am enclosing a copy of 
my demand letter to Progressive Northwest Insurance (Mr. Steele's insurer), the Full 
Release of All Claims with Indemnity against Mr. Steele, and my previous letters 
addressed to Farmers Insurance. My medical expenses now total $53,048.62. 
In light of my continuing pain, discomfort, ongoing medical treatment, the effects 
upon my daily life, and my future life expectancy, I hereby demand that you pay me 
policy limits and medical coverage. 
~_(§CO~~ __ ., 
l 
....... ------ ____ ., _____ ··-···------ EXHIBIT 9 
000327
The enclosed documents, all delivered to Fanners Insurance previously, are a 
detailed account of my injury, my medical care, my medical expenses, my painful 
recovery, and my damages. 
As I told you Mr. Steele and I were married in December despite this crash. I 
understand that you will have to conduct an investigation of Mr. Steele's financial 
condition before resolving my claim. 
I look forward to getting this resolved within the next thirty (30) days. 
Sincerely, 
Enclosures 
1. Full Release of All Claims with Indemnity 
2. Previous letters to Mr. Reinke 
3. Letter of June 12, 2009, to Progressive Northwest Insurance w/attachments 
a. Medical Costs Summary 
b. Medical Bills 
c. Dr. Little's files 
d. Dr. Price's files 





FULL RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS 
WITH INDEMNITY 
KNOW ALL BY THESE PRESENTS, I (we), _P...,eg...,g""'"y_B. __ C...,;e .... d· __ ,110 .... *_•• __________ _ 
•••••••••**•*•**• a single individ!,lal 
(individually and as husband and wife), for and in consideration of the sum of ............... .. 
One Hundred Thousand*** (S 100,000••• ). 
the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do hereby for myself (ourselves), my (our) heirs, executors, 
administrators, successors and assigns and any and all other persons, firms, employers, corporations, 
associations, or partnerships release, acquit and forever discharge .... J_on ___ S_te"'"e_le ___________ _ 
.................. (his/her/their) agents, employees, 
principals, employers, insurers, heirs, executors, administrators, insurers, successors and assigns from any 
and all claims, actions, causes of actions, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of wages, expenses, 
hospital and medical expenses, accrued or unaccrued claims for loss of consortium, loss of support or 
atTection. loss of society and companionship, attorneys fees, and punitive damages on account of or in 
any way growing out of any and all known and unknown personal injuries, property damages and other 
damages resu~ting from an automobile accident which occurred on or about .:.:M.::::a:.c.Y.::2:=5,i..:2::.:0;,;a0=-8-----
at or near Warm Springs Road, Boise 
It is understood and agreed that this settlement is in full compromise ofa doubtful and disputed claim as 
to both questions of liability and as to the nature and extent of the injuries and damages, and that neither 
this release, nor the payment pursuant thereto shall be construed as an admission ofliability, such being 
denied. 
It is further understood and agreed that the undersigned rely (relies) wholly upon the undersigned's 
judgment, belief, and knowledge of the nature, extent, effect, and duration of said injuries and liability 
therefore and is made without reliance upon any statement or representation of the party or parties hereby 
released or their representatives. 
The undersigned expressly warrant{s) that no other person or entity has asserted or is able to assert any 
lien, claim or entitlement to any portion of the consideration recited above which has not been satisfied, 
or will not be satisfied immediately out of the above recited consideration being paid for this Release. 
In consideration of the payment of the sum, I (we) hereby agree to defend, indemnify and hold harmless 
all parties released hereunder and Progressive Northwestern Insurance Company 
.................. of and from all loss, damage,judgment, claim 
payment and expense, including all costs of defense and attorneys fees, as a result ofany claim based 
upon account of any liens, subrogation interests, derivation, assignment, government benefits, worker's 
compensation benefits, or claims for contribution or indemnity brought by or on behalf of any person, 
finn or corporation whatsoever originating from the claims of the undersigned arising out of the loss 
described above. including any attorneys fees and costs incurred in the defense of any such claims or in 
seeking the enforcement ofthe within Release and Indemnity Agreement. 
This Release contains the entire agreement between the parties hereto and the tenns of the same are 
contractual and not a mere recital. · 
~M NT AND RELEASE AND UNDERSTAND IT. 
~~~~~{J; ·ZfiQ_CJ ---~ 
Signed Date 
Witness Date Witness Date 
000329
June 5, 2009 
Mr. Jay Reinke 
Farmers Insurance Group 
3737 N. Locust Groove Rd, Suite 100 
Meridian, Idaho 83646 
Re: Patient: 
DOB: 
Date of Injury: 
Dear Mr. Reinke: 
Peggy Cedillo 
May25,2008 
Enclosed is my Demand Letter to Progressive Insurance concerning my iajury of 
May 25, 2008. I wish to advise you that I have made a demand for policy limits of 
$100,000.00. 
When this case is resolved, I will be making a claim under my policy of 
underinsurance. 
Very Truly Yours, 





500 East Shore Drive 
Eagle, Idaho 83666 
Mr. Jay Reinke 
Fanners Insurance Group 
July 9, 2009 
3737 N. Locust Groove Rd, Suite 100 
Meridian, Idaho 83646 
Re: Insured: 
DOB: 
Date of Injury: 
Dear Mr. Reinke: 
Peggy Cedillo 
May 25, 2008 
As per my previous letter to you, I have settled my claim against Mr. Steele for 
the policy limits of $100,000 paid by Progressive Northwest Insurance. 




500 East Shore Drive 
Eagle, Idaho 83666 
June 12, 2009 
Mr. Curtis Neill, Claims Department 
Progressive Northwest Insurance 
2264 South Bonito Way, Suite 100 
Meridian, Idaho 83642~9327 
V-uz: Certified iJ,fail Return 
Receipt & US Mail 
Re: Patient: 
DOB: 
Date of Injury: 
Dear Mr. Neill: 
Peggy Cedillo 
May25,2008 
I am writing you concerning my claim against your insured, Jon M. Steele. As 
you lmow, I was a passenger on Mr. Steele's motorcycle on May 25, 2008, when Mr. 
Steele, unfortunately, hit a concrete retaining wall. 
Last November my neck was fused at the C7 -Tl level. I have incurred more 
than $50,000.00 in medical costs and loss of income. I have gone through a very painful 
and lengthy recovery. 
Enclosed you will find the following: 
1. Medical summary of costs incuned totally $49,712.22. 
2. Copy of medical bills. 
3. Copy of Dr. Little's (neurologic surgeon) files; 
4. Copy of Dr. David Price's (chiropractor) files; 
I believe most, if not all, of those bills have been previously copied to you by the 
medical providers. In addition to the enclosed medical bills, I incurred several thousand 





As you know, liability is not an issue in this case. I understand that Mr. Steele has 
insurance coverage of $100,000.00 with your company. 
Demand is hereby made for payment of policy limits, the sum of $100,000.00 
within 10 days from the date of this letter. If you have any questions please do not 
hesitate to contact me. Thank you. 




PEGGY CEDILLO MEDICAL COSTS SUMMARY 7/27/09 
DATE PROVIDER AMOUNT CHARGED 
11/19/08 Gem State Radiology $30.80 
12/29/08 Gem State Radiolo2v $30.80 
03/26/09 Gem State Radiology $30.80 
$92.40 
04/14/09 Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center $189.00 
05/26/09 Saint Alphonsus Re.ltional Medical Center $23,064.33 
$23.253.33 
01/08/09 Alderman Medical Acupuncture of Idaho $1.329.00 
02/17/09 David N. Price, D.C. $4.352.94 
01/09/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $110.00 
01/09/09 Hands on Phvsical Theraov $16.00 
01/09/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $80.00 
01/12/09 Hands on Phvsical Theraov $16.00 
01/12/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $80.00 
01/14/09 Hands on Physical Theranv $40.00 
01/14/09 Hands on Phvsical Theraov $16.00 
01/14/09 Hands on Physical Therapy $80.00 
01/16/09 Hands on Physical Therapy $40.00 
01/16/09 Hands on Physical Theranv $16.00 
01/16/09 Hands on Phvsical Theraov $80.00' 
01/20/09 Hands on Physical Theranv $16.00 
01/20/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $80.00 
01/22/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $40.00 
01/22/09 Hands on Ph-ysical Theraov $16.00 
01/22/09 Hands on Ph-ysical Theranv $80.00 
01/26/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $40.00 
01/26/09 Hands on Ph-ysical Theraov $16.00 
01/26/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $80.00 
01/28/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $40.00 
01/28/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $16.00 
01/28/09 Hands on Physical Theranv $80.00 
01/30/09 Hands on Phvsical Theranv $16.00 
01/30/09 Hands on PhJSical Theraov $80.00 
02/03/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $16.00 
02/03/09 Hands on Phvsical Theraov $80.00 
02/10/09 Hands on Physical Theranv $40.00 
02/10/09 Hands on Phvsical Theranv $16.00 
02/10/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $80.00 
02/13/09 Hands on Physical Theranv $16.00 




PEGGY CEDILLO MEDICAL COSTS SUMMARY 7/27/09 
02/17/09 Hands on Physical Therapy $16.00 
02/17/09 Hands on Phvsical Theraov $80.00 
02/20/09 Hands on Physical Therapy $16.00 
02/20/09 Hands on Physical Therapy $80.00 
02/23/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $16.00 
02/23/09 Hands on Physical Therapy $80.00 
02/27/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $16.00 
02/27/09 Hands on Physical Therapy $80.00 
03/03/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $16.00 
03/03/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $80.00 
03/05/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $16.00 
03/05/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $80.00 
03/09/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $16.00 
03/09/09 Hands on Physical Therapy $80.00 
03/11/09 Hands on Physical Therapy $40.00 
03/11/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $16.00 
03/11/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $80.00 
03/13/09 Hands on Physical Therapy $40.00 
03/13/09 Hands on Physical Therapy $16.00 
03/13/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $80.00 
03/13/09 Hands on Physical Therapy $7.50 
03/16/09 Hands on Physical Therapy $16.00 
03/16/09 Hands on Physical Therapy $80.00 
03/18/09 Hands on Physical Theranv $16.00 
03/18/09 Hands on Physical Therapy $80.00 
03/20/09 Hands on Phvsical Theraov $16.00 
03/20/09 Hands on Physical Therapy $80.00 
03/23/09 Hands on Physical Therapy $16.00 
03/23/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $80.00 
03/25/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $60.00 
03/25/09 Hands on Physical Theraov $40.00 
03/25/09 Hands on Physical Therapy $80.00 
$2,957.50 
10/30/08 Boise RadioloI!V Group, PLLC $631.00 
11/24/08 Boise Anesthesia, P.A. $2.070.00 
10/28/08 Kenneth M. Little. M.D. $314.00 
11/12/08 Kenneth M. Little, M.D. $42.00 
11/24/08 Kenneth M. Little, M.D. $14.243.41 
$14.243.41 
11/24/08 Charisse H. Mack, P.A. $2,136.52 
l l/25/08 James H. Bates, M.D. $1.982.52 
000335
PEGGY CEDILLO MEDICAL COSTS SUI\1MARY 7/27/09 






April 3, 2009 
Pagg-.1 a Ced~llo 
4707 Clearview or 
Boise ID 83703-3523 
Dear Pegg-y B Cedillo, 
Gem State Radiology 
PO Box 9549 







PEGGY B CEDILLO 
92.40 
We have been informed by your insurance carrier that your claim 
for the following dates of service has been processed. Be sure to 
read carefully the reason listed below. 
~his patient has reached maximum allowable benefits . 
i• 
D11.TE REFEP..BNCE PATIENT CH.!\.RGE PAYMNT/ADJ BAI.J\~lCE DUE 
-------- ---------- ------------ ----------~ -----·---- -----------
11/19/08 1101426.l PEGGY B 30.80 0.00 30.80 
12/29/oa 1119633.l l?EGGY B 30.80 0.00 30.80 
03/26/09 1163968.1 PEGGY B 30.80 o.oo 30.80 
-----------Total Jl..mount Now Due -------->>> 
Therefore, the balari.ce due is your responsibility. Please remit 
within ten (10) working days or contact our billing office at 

























Case No. 81700-0040 
ARBITRATOR'S DECISION AND 
INTERIM AW ARD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This arbitration involves claims for damages under the underinsured motorist provisions 
of a policy of insurance that was issued by Respondent, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho to 
Claimant, Peggy B. Cedillo. The claims are disputed by Respondent. The dispute has been 
submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the agreement to arbitrate, which is contained in the 
insurance policy. The agreement to arbitrate, the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act, Idaho Code§ 7-
901, et seq., the Pre-Hearing Orders that were entered by the arbitrator in this matter, and the 
Stipulations of the Parties dated February 22, 2012 and April 5, 2012 govern these proceedings. 
An evidentiary hearing was commenced on November 20, 2012 in Boise, Idaho before 
the duly appointed arbitrator, Merlyn W. Clark. Claimant, Peggy B. Cedillo, appeared in person 
represented by her attorney, Jon M. Steele, Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC. Jeffrey A. 
Thomson, Elam & Burke, P.A., appeared with Ron Ramsey, a representative of Respondent, on 
behalf of Respondent. Oral and documentary evidence was presented by the parties. The 
evidentiary hearing was completed on November 21, 2012. At the close of the hearing the parties 
r----






stipulated to submit simultaneous written closing arguments on or before December 10, 2012 and 
simultaneous written responses on or before December 17, 2012. The written closing arguments 
have been submitted and the matter is IJ.PW fully submitted for a decision and interim award. 
II. ISSUE FOR DECISION 
The issue to be decided by this arbitration is the amount of payment due under the 
underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage in the policy of insurance that was issued to Claimant 
by Respondent. The parties have agreed that an Interim Award will be issued reflecting a gross 
award of damages as would be recoverable for bodily injury caused by Jon Steele's negligence in 
operating his motorcycle. See Prehearing Order No. 2, p.2. After the issuance of an Interim 
Award, a Final Award will be issued reflecting any setoffs, collateral source reductions, 
subrogations or prejudgment interest. Id. 
Because the insurance clause in the insurance policy that covers Claimant expressly 
provides that "[t]he expense of the arbitrator and all other expenses of arbitration will be shared 
equally" by the pa1ties and "[a]ttomey's fees and fees paid for the witnesses are not expenses of 
arbitration and will be paid by the party incurring them," this Arbitrator has no authority to 
award expenses of arbitration or attorney fees and costs to either party in this proceeding. 
III. EVIDENCE, FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND DECISIONS 
A. The Insurance Coverage. 
1. Claimant is insured under a policy of insurance that was issued by Respondent. The 
policy provided underinsured motorist coverage to Claimant on May 25, 2008. 
2. Claimant was injured in a motorcycle accident on May 25, 2008 and has made a claim for 
damages under the underinsured motori~t coverage of the policy. The claim is disputed by the 
insurer. 





3. The policy of insurance contains an arbitration clause, which provides for binding 
arbitration if the insurer and insured disagree whether the insured is legally entitled to recover 
damages from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle or the amount thereof. 
The arbitration clause further provides: 
In that event, an arbitrator will be selected by the insured person and us. If 
agreement on an arbitrator cannot be reached within (30) days, the judge of a 
comt having jurisdiction will appoint the arbitrator. The expense of the arbitrator 
and all other expenses of arbitration will be shared equally. Attorney's fees and 
fees paid for the witnesses are not expenses of arbitration and will be paid by the 
party incurring them. 
The arbitration will take place in the county where the insured person lives. Local 
court rules governing procedures and evidence will apply. The decision in writing 
of the arbitrator will be binding subject to the terms of this insurance. Formal 
demand for arbitration shall be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction. The 
court shall be located in the county and state of residence of the party making the 
demand. Demand may also be made by sending a certified letter to the party 
against whom arbitration is sought, with a return receipt as evidence. 
See the Insurance Policy. 
B. The Motorcycle Accident. 
4. On May 25, 2008, Claimant was injured while riding as a passenger on a motorcycle that 
was being operated by Jon Steele ("Steele"), who is now her husband. They were married on 
December 8, 2008. The accident happened on Warm Springs Ave., below the Mesa area, east of Boise 
in Ada County, Idaho. The cycle, which was being driven by Steele in an easterly direction at a speed of 
about 30 mph, drifted to the right side of the road and sideswiped a concrete barrier, known as a Jersey 
barrier, which was situated on the south side of the road. Steele's actions were the sole cause of the 
accident because he failed to control the cycle and allowed it to drift to the right and into the barrier. 
5. When the cycle accident occurred on May 25, 2008, Claimant was sitting in the passenger seat 
behind the driver. Her back was supported by a backrest. Claimant's right side, including her hand, arm 
and hip came in contact with the barrier. Claimant suffered abrasions and contusions on her right hand, 





which remains scarred. There were no abrasions on Claimant's elbow or shoulder. The contact with the 
barrier rotated Claimant's upper torso in a clockwise direction during the collision. 
6. When the cycle accident occurred, Claimant was not wearing protective clothing such as leathers, 
gloves or a helmet, but there is no evidence that the injuries she suffered, except perhaps the injury to the 
back of her hand, would have been materially reduced by such protective wear. 
7. The collision with the ~arrier damaged the gas tank, foot pegs and other areas on the right side of 
the cycle. The cycle remained operable after the collision. The driver brought the cycle to a controlled 
stop and then drove the cycle and Claimant to Steele's residence. Claimant then drove herself home. The 
accident was not reported to law enforcement authorities. 
C. Claimant's Medical History. 
8. The extent of injuries suffered by Claimant in the accident and the cause of such injuries are 
disputed by the Respondent, which makes certain aspects of Claimant's prior physical condition and 
medical history relevant. 
1. Claimant's Pre-Accident Medical History. 
9. In 2000, Claimant was struck in the right shoulder by the mirror on her motor vehicle . 
when a passing motorist struck the mirror and it broke off and flew through an open window into 
her right shoulder. 
10. On February 1, 2001, Claimant was in a motor vehicle accident during which her vehicle, a 
Dodge Durango, was struck from the rear by a pickup truck going about 50 mph. Claimant was injured in 
that collision. 
11. Claimant was seen on February 1, 2001 by Dr. Terry Little, M.D., ("Dr. Terry Little") for the 
injuries Claimant suffered in the February I, 2001 accident. 
12. On March 19, 2001, Dr. David Price, D.C., ("Dr. Price") saw Claimant on referral from Dr. 
Terry Little for injuries from the February 1, 2001 accident. She told Dr. Price she had a history of a prior 





accident involving her right shoulder. She told him that in June of 2000, she was driving a motor vehicle 
with the window rolled down and was sideswiped by another vehicle, breaking the mirror off and 
throwing it against Claimant's right shoulder. She was being treated by Dr. Welker for the 2000 accident. 
Claimant told Dr. Price she was substantially better from a pain standpoint and was almost back to full 
function, estimating she was probably 90 - 95% recovered from the prior injury. 
13. On March 19, 2001, Dr. Price reported that Claimant "reports pain in her head that is 
predominantly in the temple, frontal and sinus areas and has a constant headache since the time of the 
accident. It is variable -- it is of variable intensity. Generally, she feels the headaches have probably 
worsened slightly." Dr. Price also reported in 2001 "patient [Claimant] has pain in the cervical spine that 
is presently bilaterally. This is a deep aching pain, stiffness, and soreness with sharpness on movements in 
extension or toward the right side." Dr. Price also reported in 2001, "The patient [Claimant] has been 
experiencing symptoms of pain, numbness and tingling down the right lateral upper arm, crossing into the 
medial forearm and into the #4 and 5 digits on the right hand." Claimant told Dr. Price that following the 
February 1, 2001 accident she had immediate onset of headache and neck pain. She reported she has new 
pains and an exacerbation of her old pains and feels like she is now worse than even right after the 
accident, as her condition has continued to deteriorate. 
14. Dr. Price examined Claimant on March 19, 2001 and made the following diagnoses: 
• Cervical thoracic acceleration/deceleration sprain/strain injury with posttramatic 
biomechanical dysfunction, muscular spasming; 
• Lumbrosacral and sacroiliac sprain/strain injury with posttraumatic bio mechanical 
dysfunction, muscular spasming; and 
• Right shoulder sprain/strain injury that involved the rotator cuff muscle with possible 
impingement, and right upper extremity symptoms. 
Dr. Price treated Claimant for these injuries until December of 2002. 
15. On August 30, 2001, an MRI scan was performed on Claimant. The scan demonstrated intact 
rotator cuff; an extensive tear of the superior labrum that is comparable to a slap tear; right 




shoulder diffuse parascapular strain syndrome; and component of clinical rotator cuff tendinitis 
impingement type syndrome. 
16. On September 25, 2001, on referral from Dr. Michael O'Brien, M.D., Claimant saw Dr. 
Thomas Goodwin, M.D., ("Dr. Goodwin"), an orthopedic surgeon at Boise Orthopedic Clinic for 
some complaints regarding her right shoulder; pain limitations in motion, and weakness in her 
right shoulder attributed to the accident on February 1, 2001. Upon examination, Dr. Goodwin 
diagnosed: 1) right shoulder diffuse parascapular strain syndrome 2) superior glenoid labral tear 
and 3) component of clinical rotator cuff tendinitis impingement type syndrome. He 
recommended nonsurgical management of her condition. 
17. On April 15, 2002, Claimant again saw Dr. Goodwin with complaints of pain in her right 
shoulder, she complained it was getting worse with light activities, such as riding a bicycle. He again 
recommended nonsurgical management of the condition. 
18. On July 25, 2002, Dr. Goodwin again saw Claimant. He examined her and made the following 
diagnoses: 1) right shoulder rotator cuff tendinits and impingement; 2) right shoulder labral tear; 3) 
posterior perilabral cyst extending into spinoglenoid notch of scapula with potential compression of 
suprascapular nerve. This time he recommended surgery. 
19. On July 26, 2002, Claimant had surgery on her right shoulder performed by Dr. Goodwin at 
Healthsouth Treasure Valley Hospital. The preoperative diagnoses were: 1) right shoulder labral tears; 2) 
rotator cuff impingement syndrome; and 3) Acromioclavicular joint osteoarthritis and chondro~alacia. 
The postoperative diagnoses were the same. 
20. Dr. Price continued to treat Claimant. On November 18, 2002, Dr. Price gave a prognosis that he 
expected in her cervical spine she would have episodes of symptomatic and functional regression 
occurring most probably about once a quarter and that these would involve tightening through the 




suboccipital region, which is at the base of the skull, leading to headaches and stiffness in the upper 
cervical spine and that it would probably take her anywhere from two to up to four treatments to get her 
past that. Dr. Price also noted that she may have some residuals in the mid-back area between the 
shoulder blades and that she would be more susceptible to premature degenerative change in her cervical 
spine related to the altered mechanics because of the accident on February 1, 2001. 
21. On November 25, 2002, Claimant saw Dr. Price, claiming she had turned her head and had a 
sudden onset of sharp pain in the cervical area he had been treating. Dr. Price continued to treat her for 
this condition, which he relates to the February 1, 2001 accident, until December 11, 2002. At this time 
she had residual cervical thoracic pain that was spreading from her trapezius ridge area upward into the 
base of her occiput. Also, mid-back pain predominantly across the bra line area that affected some of her 
endurance when she would be exercising. Dr. Price did not see Claimant again until 2006. 
22. On February 15, 2006, Dr. Price saw Claimant. She indicated she was having some headaches 
and neck pain, and she thought it was from sleeping wrong. She reported she was not having upper 
extremity symptoms but was sore through her shoulders with dominance on the left and that previously it 
had been more dominant toward the right side. Dr. Price gave a diagnosis that she had a cervical facet and 
a costovertebral impingement with a cervical torticollis, muscular spasming, myofascitis, and 
compensatory thoracolumbar mechanical strain. He saw her and treated her on two occasions after that. 
23. On June 20, 2007, Dr. Price next saw Claimant. She presented for evaluation and treatment of 
\ 
primary left-sided hip pain and cervical thoracic pain. She reported she had been on a backpacking trip 
and had felt that probably her cervical thoracic pain was related to that. The pain was extending up into 
the suboccipital region, which Dr. Price in 2002 had anticipated would probably happen to her. She 
reported herself experiencing a generalized pain, numbness, and tingling in both upper extremities with 
dominance on the right side, but she did not have focal weakness. She did have some endurance weakness 
that Dr. Price thought was related to some rotator cuff muscle impingement point problems that she was 
having. She also tested positive for some thoracic outlet syndrome symptoms and she possibly had some 




underlying disk etiology for radicular type symptoms. Dr. Price treated her for this condition on five 
occasions. 
24. On October 24, 2007, Claimant presented to Dr. Price because of tightness in her cervical 
thoracic region. He saw her and treated her on five occasions for that condition. The last treatment was 
on November 1, 2007. 
25. On January 14, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Price with right-sided dominant cervical thoracic 
pain and muscular tightness and spasm. She also complained of pain throughout the trapezius ridge and 
into the right levator scapula. She was treated on two occasions for this condition. She was scheduled for 
two more treatments on May 15 and 22, 2008 but did not appear for those. At this time Dr. Price 
suspected she could have a C6 disk that could be causing her some nerve root irritation, but she did not 
have hard or progressive neurologicals that would be supportive of nerve root compression. 
26. On February 27, 2008, Dr. Price t~~ated Claimant for paracervical thoracic muscular pain, 
tightness and spasm. She also had pain throughout the trapezius ridge and into the right levator scapula. 
He noted "C6 disk - weak right triceps" and C5-C6-C7 dysfunction resulting from the 2001 accident. Dr. 
Price treated Claimant for this condition on five occasions in March and four occasions in April of 2008. 
Dr. Price started Claimant on some home traction for self-maintenance because of the underlying 
degenerative changes that she had. He noted that she had improyed to the point that by the end of April 
his plan was to work with her one time per week for about two weeks and then go to a two-week interval. 
The plan was for her to begin her regular workouts again at the gym on May 8, 2008. 
27. On May 15, 2008, Claimant saw Dr. Price who noted her right cervical thoracic region was 
continuing to improve and he expected her to be on her workout regimen and able to take care of herself. 
28. Prior to the cycle accident on May· 25, 2008, Claimant was being treated by Dr. Price for 
muscular spasming and pain through the cervical thoracic region extending into the right shoulder. 
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2. Claimant's Post-Accident Medical History. 
29. When the cycle accident occurred on May 25, 2008, Claimant was sitting in the passenger seat 
behind the driver. Her back was supported by a backre.st. Claimant's right side, including her hand, arm 
and hip came in contact with the barrier. Claimant suffered abrasions and contusions on her right hand, 
which remains scarred. There were no abrasions on Claimant's elbow or shoulder. The contact with the 
barrier rotated Claimant's upper torso in a clockwise direction during the collision. Following the 
accident, Claimant was not feeling well. She experienced problems, including spasms, pain in her neck 
and her right shoulder, and she suffered from headaches. 
30. On May 26, 2008, Claimant presented at McMillan Medical Clinic and was seen by Dr. Natalie 
A. Domangue-Shiflett, M.D., ("Dr. Shiflett") for an open wound on her right hand. The Clinic personnel 
scrubbed the debris from her hand, which was painful and treated it. Claimant returned to McMillan 
Medical Clinic on May 27, 2008 for follow-up treatment of her right hand injury. 
31. On May 29, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Price for injuries suffered during the cycle accident. 
Dr. Price noted that her hand and side had been impacted into the barrier and her body, head, and shoulder 
had been violently swung backwards. Dr. Price reported on May 29, 2008, "[t]he patient [Claimant] 
reports that she has headache pain in the occipital region traveling to the frontal area, but predominantly 
in the occipital portion of the head. It has been constantly present since a short time following the 
accident, but it is of variable intensity." Upon Examination of Claimant, Dr. Price reported he found: 
• She had posterior paracervical muscular spasming that was extending from the upper 
portion of the neck in the suboccipital region down through the cervical-thoracic 
junction, and outward into the shoulders, downward into the shoulder blades or scapulae. 
• When Dr. Price stimulated or tested the suboccipital trigger points they reproduced her 
headache pains that she was complaining of and when it was done to the musculature, it 
substantially intensified the pain into the neck, out to the shoulders, down into the 
shoulder blades. There was radiation into the right shoulder and into the right scapula or 
shoulder blade. 
• Claimant was decreased in her extension or bending backwards of the neck by about 
25%, and this produced a middle-to-low pinching pain in the cervical spine. She could 
force through that but it was with marked pain intensification. 




• Claimant was decreased in her rotation to the right side by about one-third but it was 
full to the left side. 
• Claimant's lateral flexion to the left was decreased about 50% and to the right about 
25%. The end points of those motions were accompanied by substantial pain. 
• When Claimant had a cervical distraction test, pulling up on her neck, it was painful in 
the suboccipital region. 
• When Claimant had a shoulder depression test, it was painful on the opposite side with 
dominance on the right. 
• When Claimant had a foraminal compression test, which would be pressing down on 
the cervical spine vertically, it was painful, but if an extension or lateral flexion 
component was added, the pain intensified and was dominantly painful to the right side, 
causing radiation into the shoulder and shoulder blade itself. The function on her left 
shoulder in movement was normal and painless. 
• The function on her right shoulder in movement was restricted and painful in the upper 
portions of that movement. The right shoulder blade or scapula was hypomobile, showing 
significant decrease in mobility compared to normal. 
• The reduction of the circumduction or circular movement of the right shoulder was 
restricted about one-third in comparison to what was able to be accomplished on the left 
side; that abduction of the right shoulder was decreased about one-third on the right wide, 
or in other words lifting _it up, in comparison to the left. 
• Internal rotation or bringing the shoulder -- the hand back behind the back was 
decreased about 25% on the right side in comparison to the left. 
• The insertion point of the common tendon of the rotator cuff muscle group was very 
painful to palpation. 
• The rhomboid muscles or the muscles between the shoulder blades were spasmed 
bilaterally, extending into the spinal muscles. 
• The part of the rotator cuff muscle group in the teres minor and the infraspinatus 
muscles, which are on the back of the shoulder blade, were spasmed and painful. If those 
trigger points were tested or pressed on or stimulated, they reproduced paraesthesia and 
pain down the right upper extremity. 
• Claimant also had indication of possible thoracic outlet syndrome with positive testing 
with scalenus muscle involvement through a part of the cervical spine that reproduced 
some pain and paresthesia in the right upper extremity. 
• Claimant had substantial abrasions on the hand/wrist area. 
• Claimant showed significant endurance weakness in the triceps muscle on the right side, 
and the top two segments in her neck. 
• The CS through 7 segments in her cervical spine showed significant restriction 
biomechanically. 





• Between her shoulder blades the spinal segments involved in that area showed 
significant abnormal movement. 
• The musculature in the front of the cervical spine was strained and painful and weak on 
strength testing, especially if it was tested from an angle--a 45 degree angle from the 
patient's right or left. 
• In testing of the low back the Claimant was very flexible in that she could reach her 
mid-shin area with some pulling pain across her low back but her extension was not so 
flexible as she was limited about 50% because of low back pain. 
• Lateral flexion on side bending to the side toward the right was decreased about one-
third but it was full to the left. 
• Rotation to the right was decreased about 20% but full to the left. These restricted 
motions produced pain across the lumbosacral region but did not cause lower extremity 
symptoms. 
• The buttocks musculature was spasmed, particularly on the right side. Stimulation of 
trigger points there reproduced some of her pains in the lower extremities, like a sciatic 
neuralgia type of pain and it radiated grade 2, which would mean down to the knee. 
• When laying in a prone or face-down position, Claimant was restricted in lifting the 
right lower extremity, indicating sacroiliac joint dysfunction and lumbosacral pain. 
• In a sitting position, when she straightened her legs bilaterally with both legs going up, 
the chin brought to her sternum, and a straining maneuver performed, it significantly 
.. increased the pain the neck/upper back area. 
• In the lower extremities the anterior tibiallis muscle, which is the muscle that lifts the 
foot up toward the knee, showed significant weakness with endurance. 
• When Claimant bent backwards and to the right and to the left, she had significant 
increase in her low back pain but it did not cause lower extremity radiations. Her 
parathoracolumbar musculature was spasmed and weak when tested in both a clockwise 
and counterclockwise rotational direction. 
32. Many of these findings that were reported _by Dr. Price on May 29, 2008, had also been 
reported upon examination of Claimant by Dr. Price on March 19, 2001 when he treated her for 
the injuries she suffered from the rear-end collision. Under conclusions in the 2008 report, it says, 
"A cervicotharacic sprain/strain injury with posttraumatic biomechanical dysfunction and 
muscular spasming." This is almost identical to the conclusions in the 2001 report. Under 
conclusion #3 in 2008 report, it refers to "the lumbosacral/sacroiliac sprain/strain injury with 
posttraumatic biomechanical dysfunction and muscular spasming" and it says word for word the 
same thing in the 2001 report. Under conclusion #4 in the 2008 report, it states: "indications of. 




present sclerogenic right upper extremity pain/paraesthesia related to a rotator cuff injury and 
sclerogenic referral points being active ... " In the 2001 report at conclusion No. 4, it states, 
"Right upper extremity symptoms that could have a radicular component, but most probably 
involved sclerogenic symptoms related to the right shoulder." 
33. On May 29, 2008, Dr. Price took x-rays of Claimant that showed she had discogenic spondylosis 
or, in other words some wear and tear typ~ ?f arthritis at the C5-C6-C7 levels, which are the bottom three 
segments in the cervical spine and there was clear mechanical dysfunction in her neck between a forward 
flexion and extension template view of her neck. In the 2001 x-ray report of Claimant, Dr. Price reported: 
"These x-rays show the patient to have mild discogenic spondylosis at the C6-7 level." 
34. On May 29, 2008, Dr. Price also x-rayed the low back area and it showed that she had a tilt of the 
lumbar spine toward the left side and some torqueing or what is called obliquity of the pelvis and some 
inferior tilting of the sacral base toward the left side. 
35. Dr. Price opined that the injuries he found and reported when he examined Claimant on May 29, 
2008, were related to the motorcycle accident. 
36. On May 29, 2008, Dr. Price referred Claimant to Dr. James Bates, a physical medicine 
rehabilitation physician, for assistance medically. Iri a letter to Dr. Bates, Dr. Price states: 
• Claimant had a prior history of cervical disk involvement in the CS-6-7 areas; 
moderate discogenic spondylosis at those levels; he had recently seen her because of her 
C5-C6 disk. 
• She was doing home traction and was essentially pain free in the cervicothoracic 
region, with some residual tightness in the trapezius ridge and levator scapula muscles, 
and some intermittent radiation in the superior and medial scapulae. 
•Dr.Price was concerned about the flare up in the right upper extremity. Dr. Price was 
·referring to the fact that the shoulder was now very symptomatic. By "upper extremity" 
Dr. Price was talking about the shoulder and down the arm. 
37. On June 6, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Bates for consultation and treatment. Dr. Bates 
treated Claimant with injections of Cortisone, which provided only temporary relief and he prescribed 
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pain killers and pain patches for Claimant. She saw Dr. Bates in June, July, August, September and 
October of 2008. The last visit was October 9, 2008. 
38. On August 27, 2008, Dr. Price reevaluated Claimant. She presented complaining that she went 
out of town on vacation and that her shoulder pain had gradually intensified, spread into the right side, 
middle to low shoulder blade area and that she was having difficulty sleeping, and was frustrated. She 
requested that something be done to ease her pain. Dr. Price recommended an MRI to determine the 
extent of her cervical disk injuries and possible nerve root impingement. She also complained of having 
substantial pain through part of the rotator cuff muscle group and Dr. Price suspected she might have a 
tear in the labrum of her shoulder. 
39. On September 8, 2008, an MRI was performed on Claimant which showed a "new disk extrusion 
arising from the dorsal right disk margin at C7-Tl measuring approximately 9x3x4 millimeters in 
transverse and anterior to posterior and cranial to caudal height." Dr. Price explained that an "extrusion" 
is a type of herniation that has progressed to the point that the disk material has escaped the outside 
circumference of the disk and has migrated somewhat in a lobular type of fashion in some direction away 
from the disk and it has extruded or extended past the disk margin and creates somewhat of a lobular type 
of appearance. It may compress a nerve or it may be painful for the disk itself but not compress the nerve. 
40. Dr. Price opined that in Claimant's case, the extrusion was large enough to be causing nerve root 
compression. 
41. Dr. Price explained that the MRI showed a disk extrusion from the C7-Tl space that was not 
present when the x-ray was taken of that area on May 29, 2008 and that the x-ray taken on May 29, 2008 
showed a comparatively normal disk space and did not show significant arthritic change or degenerative 
change at the C7-Tl level. 
42. Dr. Price explained that he suspected a tear in Claimant's labrum in the right shoulder because 
she was continuing to have substantial pain in a portion of her range of motion and on circumduction, 
abduction, internal and now external rotation. He noted the combining of the mechanism of injury where 




her shoulder was pulled back and in that way forced backwards and into the shoulder socket itself along 
with the continued symptomatology in spite of the injection into the shoulder to try to relieve some of the 
rotator cuff tendinitis and impingement pain led him to believe from this experience that there may be a 
tear of the labrum itself. 
43. On September 14, 2008, Claimant presented to Alderman Medical Acupuncture of Idaho for 
acupuncture treatments. She received 10 acupuncture treatments between September 14-, 2008 and 
October 27, 2008. They did not resolve her pain issues. 
44. On October 29, 2008, on referral from John Alderman, OMD, L.L.C., Claimant presented to Dr. 
Kenneth M. Little, M.D., ("Dr. Little") a Neurological surgeon with Neuroscience Associates, Boise, 
Idaho, for consultation regarding a chief complaint of neck pain, trapezius pain, and right shoulder pain. 
This was the initial visit with Dr. Little, who noted that Claimant reported having neck pain, trapezius 
pain, right shoulder, and right mid scapular pain since the accident on May 25, 2008. She has not noticed 
any weakness in her arms. She initially had some right arm numbness and tingling involving her right 
radial forearm, index finger, and middle finger, which has subsided. She has been experiencing 
headaches. 
45. Dr. Little reported the MRI dated September 8, 2008 shows a new C7-Tl soft disc extrusion 
extending into the right ventral epidural space abutting the ventral dural sac adjacent to the anterior root 
of the right C8 nerve root. He noted that at C5-6 there is a loss of disc space height with mild to moderate 
broad based spondylitic ridging abutting the ventral cord surface. There is minimal neural foraminal 
narrowing, left greater than right at C5-6. At C6-7 there is disc space narrowing with mild circumferential 
broad based osseus spondylotic ridging. There is a small perineural cyst in the left neural foramina." Dr. 
Little's impression was "likely has right C8 radiculitits secondary to a dramatic disc protrusion at C7-Tl." 
"Complicating her symptomatology is a history of shoulder problems. Though I suspect her symptoms are 
not coming from her shoulder, it does remain a possibility." Dr. Little recommended a C7-Tl 
transforaminal epidural steroid injection" at C6 and suggested a "decompression of the C8 nerve root by 




way of anterior cervical approach." Because the injection at the C6 distribution eased Claimant's pain, Dr. 
Little opined the neck pain and radicular type arm pain was specifically in the C6 distribution. 
46. On November 24, 2008, Claimant had a C7-Tl anterior cervical decompression and fusion with 
iliac crest bone graft that was performed by Dr. Little. The preoperative diagnosis was right C8 
radiculopathy secondary to right C7-Tl traumatic herniated nucleus pulposus. The post-operative 
diagnosis was right C8 radiculopathy secondary to right C7-Tl traumatic herniated nucleus pulposus. 
47. Dr. Little opined that Claimant's injuries (the disk herniation) were caused by the cycle accident, 
based upon the MRI which showed mild degenerative changes at C7-Tl with a new disk extrusion plus 
the observation on the MRI that the disk extrusion was associated with quite a bit of edema or swelling, 
meaning it is more likely recent rather than old, and given that just prior to the accident she had not had 
neck pain and did not have radicular sympt?ms, nerve root impingement symptoms. 
48. On December 3, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Little post operation. She reported she was 
doing well and without arm pain. 
49. On December 31, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Little for followup. She reported she was 
doing very well, with no radicular arm pain, but she did complain of trapezius pain and posterior neck 
pain. 
50. On January 9, 2009, Claimant presented at Hands-On-Physical Therapy for therapy prescribed 
by Dr. Little. She continued to receive physical therapy on a regular basis from January 9, 2009 to March 
25, 2009 and from May 1 J, 2010 to June 3, 2010. 
51. On March 26, 2009, Claimant presented to Dr. Little for further followup. She reported 
improvement in much of her neck pain with resolution of the pain radiating into her face and well as the 
headaches. She complained of pain over her lateral right trapezius, under her right scapula and just below 
her right clavicle after rearranging clothes in her closet for over an hour. 
52. On April 27, 2010, on referral from Dr. Little, Claimant presented at Idaho Sports Medicine 
Institute and was seen by, Dr. Scot Scheffel, M.D. ("Dr. Scheffel") with complaints of right shoulder 




pain and intermittent right arm numbness. Dr. Scheffel noted Claimant had "long standing right trapezius 
pain, some of which preceded her surgery and has persisted since then. She was doing relatively well, but 
then started increasing a workout program and was doing a lot of overhead activity and noticed increasing 
pain in her trapezius and .also began having right arm numbness in the hand. The numbness is worse at 
night. Dr. Scheffel opined the trapezius and rhomboid pain was coming from some poor shoulder 
mechanics and recommended physical therapy. 
53. On August 18, 2011, Claimant presented to Dr. Scheffler for follow-up to recheck neck and 
shoulder pain. Her chart shows she had not really gotten any improvement with her exercises through 
,: 
physical therapy and she continued to have significant right-sided neck pain into the right trapezius that is 
much worse with heavy shoulder activity. She had grinding and popping in both shoulders. Dr. 
Scheffler' s impression was persistent right shoulder and neck pain, question secondary to 
acromioclavicluar joint etiology versus other shoulder pathology. He prescribed and administered 
injections in the right AC joint with 1 cc of lidocaine and 1-1/2 cc of Kenalog. Claimant continued 
treating with Dr. Scheffler from September 20, 2011 until November 4, 2011. 
54. On October 3, 2011, Claimant had an :MRI taken of her right shoulder. Dr. Price explained that 
the :MRI of the shoulder that was taken on October 3, 2011 verified that Claimant had a tear in the labrum 
in the right shoulder. He explained that the :MRI report showed a "non-displaced superior labral tear 
extending into the upper aspect of the anterior labrum" and also a "mild tendinosis involving the 
supraspinatus tendon without disruption." 
55. ..Dr. Price explained that the cartilage type of cushion inside the shoulder socket, that is called the 
labrum, was torn and there was a tendinitis, swelling, and inflammation of one of the rotator cuff muscle 
tendons called the supraspinatus muscle. 
· 56. On November 30, 201 l, upon referral from Dr. Little, Claimant was seen by Dr. Thomas 
Goodwin for complaints of right shoulder pain, weakness and loss of range of motion. Claimant reported 
to Dr. Goodwin that her shoulder had done well since the prior surgery until the cycle accident and that 




she had developed increasing shoulder and scapular pain. Claimant reported that she had to back off on 
her weightlifting activity as a result. 
57. Dr. Goodwin opined that the delay between the accident in May of 2008 and seeking treatment 
from him on November 30, 2011 is not uncommon. Dr. Goodwin's diagnosis was probable recurrent 
superior labral tear of her right shoulder and partial thickness rotator cuff tear of her right shoulder. . 
58. On Febru~ry 15, 2012, Claimant had a C5-6 anterior cervical discectomy and fusion with left iliac 
crest bone graft performed by Dr. Little at St. Luke's Regional Medical Center. The preoperative 
diagnoses were: C5-6 spondylosis, degene~ative disk disease and foraminal stenosis. The postoperative 
diagnoses were the same. Dr. Little reported that the surgery went well and Claimant recovered better 
than the first surgery. She wore a hard collar, then a soft collar during the period of recovery. 
59. On March 27, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was 
satisfactory unchanged anterior C5-C6 and C7-Tl fusions; C6-7 degenerative disease. 
60. On March 28, 2012, Claimant presented to Dr. Little with complaints of severe neck spasms, 
throbbing and paresthesias in her left arm after a walk. Her arm symptoms involve her posterior shoulder, 
triceps, ulnar forearm and hand, consistent with the C7 distribution. Dr. Little charted that he would keep 
her off work an additional two weeks. Dr. Little issued a prescription that required Claimant to remain off 
work through April 13, 2012. 
61. On April 12, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was C5-6 
and C7-l fusion with no change in alignment or evidence of hardware complication; persistent C6-7 
degenerative disk disease. 
62. Dr. Little prescribed return to work with restrictions on April 13, 2012, with limitation on 
reaching overhead or lifting with her right arm, no repetitive movement with her right hand; also to wear 
a hard collar as necessary and avoid repetitive motions of her head. 
63. On May 7, 2012, Claimant was seen again by Dr. Goodwin. He recommended that she have 
surgery to repair her right shoulder. 




64. Oh May 22, 2012, Claimant had surgery on her right shoulder by Dr. Goodwin at Treasure Valley 
Hospital. The preoperative diagnoses were: 1) right shoulder partial thickness rotator cuff tear; 2) superior 
labral tear, right shoulder, extending most likely into biceps tendon. The postoperative diagnoses were: 1) 
right shoulder partial thickness rotator cuff tear; 2) superior labral tear, right shoulder, extending most 
likely into biceps tendon; 3) humeral head and glenoid chondromalacia; 4) subdeltoid subacromial bursa! 
adhesions. 
65. Dr. Goodwin reported that the labral tear that Dr. Goodwin saw in this surgery was in the same 
location but more macerated, more torn, and it extended into the biceps tendon where the biceps attaches 
in the shoulder at the upper part of the labrum; it was in the same location but more significant. 
66. Dr. Goodwin explained that in 2002, he just took a little shaver to smooth off the labrum and 
make it smooth again. In 2012 he made an incision lower on the shoulder to reattach the biceps lower 
down with a polyethylene anchor screw. Comparing the 2002 and 2012 rotator cuff problem or 
impingement, the findings at the 2012 surgery were in the same location of the rotator cuff but more 
advanced. 
67. On July 1.9, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was 
satisfactory appearance anterior discect?my and fusion procedure C5-6 and C7-Tl; no abnormal 
movement or fusion levels; and mild movement at C3-4 and C4-5. 
68. On September 27, 2012, Dr. Little referred Claimant to a pain doctor. He reported her pain was 
improving but she needed further care by a pain specialist. Her pain has never completely resolved. 
D. Claimant's Claimed Injuries. 
1. Scrapes and Abrasions. 
69. Claimant was injured in the motorcycle accident and, as conceded by Respondent, she suffered 
scrapes and abrasions to her right hand and right hip, and is entitled to compensation for these injuries, 
without any deduction for contributory fault. 
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2. Right Shoulder. 
70. There is disagreement in the testimony and medicfll records whether the motorcycle accident 
caused the Iabral and rotator cuff tears in her right shoulder. The evidence clearly establishes that 
Claimant had preexisting right shoulder pathology, particularly resulting from the motor vehicle accident 
in 200lwhen she suffered right shoulder sprain/strain that involved the rotator cuff muscle with possible 
impingement, and right upper extremity symptoms. 
71. The MRI scan taken on August 30, 2001 demonstrated intact rotator cuff; an extensive tear of the 
superior labrum that is comparable to a slap tear; right shoulder diffuse parascapular strain syndrome; and 
component of clinical rotator cuff tendinitis impingement type syndrome. 
72. On July 25, 2002, Dr. Goodwin examined Claimant and made the following diagnoses: 1) right 
shoulder rotator cuff tendinits and impingement; 2) right shoulder labral tear; 3) posterior perilabral cyst 
extending into spinoglenoid notch of scapula with potential compression of suprascapular nerve. Dr. 
Goodwin prescribed surgery. 
73. On July 26, 2002, Claimant had surgery on her right shoulder performed by Dr. Goodwin at 
Healthsouth Treasure Valley Hospital. The ·postoperative diagnoses were: 1) right shoulder labral tears; 2) 
rotator cuff impingement syndrome; and 3) Acromioclavicular joint osteoarthritis and chondromalacia. 
74. Claimant testified that she recovered fully from the shoulder surgery and resumed her normal 
activities, which included mountain biking, golfing, weight lifting, hiking, snowshoeing, spin classes, 
Yoga and Pilates workouts. The relevant medical records support Claimant's testimony that she was 
asymptomatic with respect to her right shoulder prior to the cycle accident. 
75. Dr. Williams opined that the right shoulder conditions did not exist immediately following the 
cycle accident and therefore were not caused by it. The evidence does not support Dr. Williams' opinion. 
When Dr. Price examined Claimant on May 29, 2008, he reported, among other findings: 
• She had posterior paracervical muscular spasming that was extending from the upper 
portion of the neck in the suboccipital region down through the cervical-thoracic 
junction, and outward into the shoulders, downward into the shoulder blades or scapulae. 
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• When Dr. Price stimulated or tested the suboccipital trigger points they reproduced her 
headache pains that she was complaining of and when it was done to the musculature, it 
substantially intensified the pain into the neck, out to the shoulders, down into the 
shoulder blades. There was radiation into the right shoulder and into the right scapula or 
shoulder blade. · · 
• Claimant was decreased in her rotation to the right side by about one-third but it was 
full to the left side. 
• When Claimant had a shoulder depression test, it was painful on the opposite side with 
dominance on the right. 
• The function on her right shoulder in movement was restricted and painful in the upper 
portions of that movement. The right shoulder blade or scapula was hypomobile, showing 
significant decrease in mobility compared to normal. 
• The reduction of the circumduction or circular movement of the right shoulder was 
restricted about one-third in comparison to what was able to be accomplished on the left 
side; that abduction of the right shoulder was decreased about one-third on the right wide, 
or in other words lifting it up, in comparison to the left. 
• Internal rotation or bringing the shoulder -- the hand back behind the back was 
decreased about 25% on the right side in comparison to the left. 
• The insertion point of the common tendon of the rotator cuff muscle group was very 
painful to palpation. 
• The part of the rotator cuff muscle group in the teres minor and the infraspinatus 
muscles, which are on the back of the shoulder blade, were spasmed and painful. If those 
trigger points were tested or pressed on or stimulated, they reproduced paraesthesia and 
p~in down the right upper extremity. 
76. On August 27, 2008, Dr. Price reevaluated Claimant. She presented complaining that her 
shoulder pain had gradually intensified, spread into the right side, middle to low shoulder blade area and 
that she was having difficulty sleeping and was frustrated. She also complained of having substantial pain 
through part of the rotator cuff muscle group and Dr. Price suspected she might have a tear in the labrum 
of her shoulder. 
77. Dr. Price explained that he suspected a tear in Claimant's labrum in the right shoulder because 
she was continuing to have substantial pain in a portion of her range of motion and on circumduction, 
abduction, internal and now external rotation. He noted the combining of the mechanism of injury where 
her shoulder was pulled back and in that way forced backwards and into the shoulder socket itself along 
with the continued symptomatology in spite of the injection into the shoulder to try to relieve some of the 




rotator cuff tendinitis and impingement pain led him to believe from this experience that there may be a 
tear of the labrum itself. 
78. On September 14, 2008, Claimant presented to Alderman Medical Acupuncture of Idaho for 
acupuncture treatments. She received 10 acupuncture treatments between September 14, 2008 and 
October 27, 2008. They did not resolve her pain issues. 
79. On October 29, 2008, on referral from John Alderman, OMD, L.L.C., Claimant presented to Dr. 
Kenneth M. Little, M.D., neurological surgeon with Neuroscience Associates, Boise, Idaho, for 
consultation regarding a chief complaint of neck pain, trapezius pain, and right shoulder pain. Dr. Little 
noted that Claimant reported having neck pain, trapezius pain, right shoulder, and right mid scapular pain 
since the accident on May 25, 2008. She has not noticed any weakness in her arms. She initially had some 
right arm numbness and tingling involving her right radial forearm, index finger, and middle finger, 
which has subsided. 
80. On April 27, 2010, on referral from Dr. Little, Claimant presented at Idaho Sports Medicine 
Institute and was seen by, Dr. Scot Scheffel, M.D. ("Dr. Scheffel") with complaints of right shoulder 
pain and intermittent right arm numbness. Dr. Scheffel noted Claimant had "long standing right trapezius 
pain, some of which preceded her surgery and has persisted since then. She was doing relatively well, but 
then started increasing a workout program and was doing a lot of overhead activity and noticed increasing 
pain in her trapezius and also began having right arm numbness in the hand. The numbness is worse at 
night. Dr. Scheffel opined the trapezius and rhomboid pain was coming from some poor shoulder 
mechanics and recommended physical therapy. 
81. On August 18, 2011, Claimant pres~nted to Dr. Scheffler for followup to recheck neck and 
shoulder pain. Her chart shows she had not really gotten any improvement with her exercises through 
physical therapy and she continued to have significant right-sided neck pain into the right trapezius that is 
much worse with heavy shoulder activity. She had grinding and popping in both shoulders. Dr. 
Scheffler's impression was persistent right shoulder and neck pain, question secondary to 
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acromioclavicluar joint etiology versus other shoulder pathology. He prescribed and administered 
' injections in the right AC joint with 1 cc ofHdocaine and 1-1/2 cc of Kenalog. She continued treating 
with Dr. Scheffler from September 20, 2011 until November 4, 2011. 
82. On October 3, 2011, Claimant had an Iv1RI taken of her right shoulder. Dr. Price explained that 
the MRI of the shoulder that was taken on October 3, 2011 verified that Claimant had a tear in the labrum 
in the right shoulder. He explained that the Iv1RI report showed a "nondisplaced superior labral tear 
extending into the upper aspect of the anterior labrum" and also a "mild tendinosis involving the 
supraspinatus tendon without disruption." 
83. Dr. Price explained that the cartilage type of cushion inside the shoulder socket, that is called the 
labrum, was torn and there was a tendinitis; swelling, and inflammation of one of the rotator cuff muscle 
tendons called the supraspinatus muscle. 
84. Dr. Price opined the tear in the labrum in the right shoulder and the trauma to the shoulder 
involving the rotator cuff muscles resulted from the motorcycle crash. Dr. Price explained that a labral 
tear is always undiagnosed until you see it on Iv1RI or during a surgical procedure. 
85. Dr. Price deferred to Dr. Goodwin's opinion with respect to the prognosis on the shoulder. 
86. Upon referral from Dr. Little, on November 30, 2011, Claimant was seen by Dr. Thomas 
Goodwin for complaints of right shoulder pain, weakness and loss of range of motion. Claimant reported 
to Dr. Goodwin that her shoulder had done well since the prior surgery until the cycle accident and that 
she had developed increasing shoulder and scapular pain. Claimant reported that she had to back off on 
her weightlifting activity as a result. 
87. Dr. Goodwin opined that the delay betw~en the accident in May of 2008 and seeking treatment 
from him on November 30, 2011 is not uncommon. 
88. Dr. Goodwin's diagnosis on November 30, 2011, was probable recurrent superior labral tear of 
her right shoulder and partial thickness rotator cuff tear of her right shoulder. He did not recommend 
surgery at that time. 




89. Claimant was seen again by Dr. Goodwin on May 7, 2012. He recommended that she have· 
surgery to repair her shoulder. 
90. On May 22, 2012, Claimant had surgery on her right shoulder by Dr. Goodwin at Treasure Valley 
Hospital. The preoperative diagnoses were: 1) right shoulder partial thickness rotator cuff tear; 2) superior 
labral tear, right shoulder, extending most likely into biceps tendon. The postoperative diagnoses were: 1) 
right shoulder parti~l thickness rotator cuff tear; 2) superior labral tear, right shoulder, extending most 
likely into biceps tendon; 3) humeral head and glenoid chondromalacia; 4) subdeltoid subacromial bursa! 
adhesions. 
91. Dr. Goodwin reported that the labral tear that Dr. Goodwin saw in this surgery was in the same 
location but more macerated, more torn, and it extended into the biceps tendon where the biceps attaches 
in the shoulder at the upper part of the labrum; it was in the same location but more significant. 
92. In 2002, Dr. Goodwin just took a little shaver to smooth off the labrum and make it smooth again. 
In 2012 he made an incision lower on the shoulder to reattach the biceps lower down with a polyethylene 
anchor screw. Comparing the 2002 and 2012 rotator cuff problem or impingement, the findings at the 
2012 surgery were in the same location of the rotator cuff but a bit more advanced. 
93. Dr. Goodwin opined that what he saw in Claimant's shoulder in 2012 was more than just a 
degenerative wear and tear process; it was consistent with traumatic injury. 
94. Dr. Goodwin opined that Claimant's shoulder injuries were compatible with the type of injuries 
she would have sustained in the cycle accident in 2008. 
95. Dr. Goodwin opined that her shoulder injuries were caused by the cycle accident in 2008. 
96. Dr. Goodwin opined that based on his review of Dr. Price's records of treating Claimant, she was 
not asymptomatic regarding her upper back, the rhomboid, trapezius, and levator scapulai for which she 
was receiving treatment; but it could have been a stand-alone issue or it could have been related to 
shoulder or neck pathology, either one. It does not change his opinion relating to what he saw of her 
shoulder. 
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97. Dr. Goodwin opined that Claimant was symptomatic in the back of her shoulder on the date of the 
accident based on Dr. Price's records. Dr. Goodwin has doubts whether the cycle accident was the sole 
cause of her shoulder condition that he observed in 2012. He opined that the cycle accident could have 
aggravated a pre-existing condition. 
98. Dr. Goodwin opined that weight training by Claimant could possibly have played into some of 
this (complaints of pain in. her right shoulder and neck, and parascapular pain) in 2012. He also opined 
that the weight training could possibly have caused the labrum tear. 
99. Dr. Goodwin opined that now knowing that she had the pretreatment or the history before the 
accident and now knowing that she had these difficulties with weight lifting several years after the 
accident before she had her surgery, he cannot say with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the 
cycle accident was the sole and only cause of the condition he repaired in 2012. He did not offer an 
opinion of apportionment. 
100. Dr. Goodwin opined the torn labrum was the primary reason for the surgery he performed. 
101. The Arbitrator will not make a finding of causation or apportionment based on possibilities that 
exercise weight training could have caused or contributed to Claimant's injuries in her right shoulder. 
102. It is the finding of the Arbitrator that the evidence establishes that the cycle accident was the 
cause of the labral tear and rotator cuff tear_ in the Claimant's right shoulder and the evidence does not 
support a finding that there should be an apportionment of causation or damages resulting from these 
injuries. Claimant has met her burden of proof showing the cycle accident caused these injuries to her 
right shoulder and she is entitled to compensation for these injuries. 
3. C7-Tl Neck Surgery. 
103. On May 29, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Price for the injuries she suffered during the cycle 
accident. He performed a complete examination of Claimant as related above. 
104. Dr. Price explained that the only part of the injuries he observed when he examined Claimant 
following the motorcycle accident that predated the motorcycle crash would have been the C5, 6 and 7 
discogenic spondylosis. 




105. Dr. Price did not find any preexisting degenerative condition in the C7-Tl level of Claimant's 
spine. 
106. On September 8, 2008, an MRI was performed on Claimant, which showed a "new disk extrusion 
arising from the dorsal right disk margin at_C7-Tl measuring approximately 9x3x4 millimeters in 
transverse and anterior to posterior and cranial to caudal height." Dr. Price explained that an "extrusion" 
is a type of herniation that has progressed to the point that the disk material has escaped the outside 
circumference of the disk and has migrated somewhat in a lobular type of fashion in some direction away 
from the disk and it has extruded or extended past the disk margin and creates somewhat of a lobular type 
of appearance. It may compress a nerve o~ it may be painful for the disk itself but not compress the nerve. 
107. Dr. Price explained that in Claimant's case, the extrusion was large enough to be causing nerve 
root compression. 
108. Dr. Price explained that the MRI showed a disk extrusion from the C7-Tl space that was not 
present when the x-ray was taken of that area on May 29, 2008 and that the x-ray taken on May 29, 2008 
showed a comparatively normal disk space ·and did not show significant arthritic change or degenerative 
change at the C7-T 1 level. 
109. Dr. Price opined that the disk extrusion at the C7-Tl level was the result of the May 25, 2008 
motorcycle crash. He also opined that the prognosis for that area is going to be one of continual problems 
because of the altered mechanics associated with the fusion. Dr. Price explained that Claimant will have 
an acceleration of the degenerative changes in the cervical spine as a result of the motorcycle accident and 
the multilevel surgery on her cervical spine above and below the surgical fusion. 
110. Dr. Price deferred to Dr. Little on the prognosis of the surgical fusion. 
111. On October 29, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Little for consultation regarding a chief 
complaint of neck pain, trapezius pain, and ·right shoulder pain on referral from John Alderman, OMD, 





L.L.C. Dr. Little noted that Claimant reported having neck pain, trapezius pain, right shoulder, and right 
mid scapular pain since the accident on May 25, 2008. She has not noticed any weakness in her arms. She 
initially had some right arm numbness and tingling involving her right radial forearm, index finger, and 
middle finger, which has subsided. She has been experiencing headaches. 
112. Dr. Little reported the MRI dated September 8, 2008 shows a new C7-Tl soft disc extrusion 
extending into the right ventral epidural space abutting the ventral dural sac adjacent to the anterior root 
of the right C8 nerye root. At C5-6 there is a loss of disc space height with mild to moderate broad based 
spondylitic ridging abutting the ventral cord surface. There is minimal neural foraminal narrowing, left 
greater than right at C5-6. At C6-7 there is disc space narrowing with mild circumferential broad based 
osseus spondylotic ridging. There is a small perineural cyst in the left neural foramina." Dr. Little's 
impression was "likely has right C8 radiculitits secondary to a dramatic disc protrusion at C7-Tl." 
"Complicating her symptomatology is a history of shoulder problems. Though I suspect her symptoms are 
not coming from her shoulder, it does remain a possibility." Dr. Little recommended a C7-Tl 
transforaminal epidural steroid injection" at C6 and suggested a "decompression of the C8 nerve root by 
way of anterior cervical approach." Because the injection at the C6 distribution eased Claimant's pain, Dr. 
Little opined the neck pain and radicular type arm pain was specifically in the C6 distribution. 
113. On November 24, 2008, Claimant had a C7-Tl anterior cervical decompression and fusion with 
iliac crest bone graft that was performed by Dr. Little. The preoperative diagnosis was right C8 
radiculopathy secondary to right C7-Tl traumatic herniated nucleus pulposus. The post-operative 
diagnosis was right C8 radiculopathy secondary to right C7-Tl traumatic herniated nucleus pulposus. 
I 14. Dr. Little opined that Claimant's injuries (the disk herniation) were caused by the cycle accident, 
based upon the :MRI which showed mild degenerative changes at C7-Tl with a new disk extrusion plus 
the observation on the MRI that the disk extrusion was associated with quite a bit of edema or swelling, 
meaning it is more likely recent rather than old, and given that just prior to the accident she had not had 
neck pain and did not have radicular symptoms, nerve root impingement symptoms. 




115. Dr. Little opined that Claimant's injuries were a combination of her condition prior to the 
accident and her symptoms afterwards. 
116. Dr. Little had no knowledge of the existence of symptoms at C7-Tl prior to the cycle accident or 
the treatment she was getting from Dr. Price. He based his opinion that the accident led to the surgery on 
a lack of prior symptoms. 
l 17. Dr. Little opined that the existence of prior symptoms would indicate that the accident aggravated 
the prior c?ndition, but was not the sole cause of the condition. Dr. Little opined that he does not have 
enough information to opine on the apportionment of the prior condition at C7-Tl. 
118. Dr. Wilson opined that Claimant's treatment and surgery at C7-Tl should be apportioned 50% to 
a preexisting condition and 50% to the cycle accident. The Arbitrator finds that Dr. Wilson's opinion is 
based on speculation. The medical evidence presented by the attending physicians, Dr. Price and Dr. 
Little, does not support this conclusion. Both opined and the medical evidence supports their opinions 
that the extrusion at C7-TI was a new condition that was caused by the cycle accident and was the cause 
of the symptoms that required the surgery. 
119. The evidence as explained by Dr. price when he compared the results of the MRI with the prior x-
ray of Claimant, clearly establishes that the extrusion was not a preexisting condition. The x-ray taken on 
May 29, 2008 showed a comparatively normal disk space and did not show significant arthritic change or 
degenerative change at the C7-Tl level. Thus, the Arbitrator finds that the evidence does not support a 
finding that the cycle accident aggravated any preexisting condition at C7-Tl, which required the surgery. 
No apportionment can reasonably be made by the Arbitrator and the Respondent is liable for the entire 
damage for this injury. 
4. C5-C6 Neck Surgery. 
120. The evidence establishes that Claimant suffered C5-C6-C7 dysfunction resulting from the 200 l 
accident for which Claimant received treatment from Dr. Price up to and including in April of 2008. The 




plan was for her to continue treatments from Dr. Price one or two times per week and return to her regular 
workouts at the gym on May 8, 2008. The last visit to Dr. Price prior to the cycle accident was on May 
15, 2008. He noted that her right cervical thoracic region was continuing to improve and he expected her 
to return to her workout regimen and be able to take care of herself. He opined that at that point she was 
probably 90% - 95% asymptomatic from the injuries she received in the 2001 accident. 
121. Dr. Price opined that some of the injuries suffered by Claimant in the cycle accident were 
probably similar to those she had in 2001 when she had sustained a sprain/strain injury to her cervical 
spine and this time sustained a sprain and a strain injury to her cervical spine. 
122. Dr. Price opined that the injuries he found when he examined Claimant on May 29, 2008, were 
related to the cycle accident. Dr. Price opined that the only part of the injuries he observed when he 
examined Claimant following the motorcycle accident that predated the motorcycle crash would have 
been the C5, 6 and 7 discogenic spondylosis. 
123. The x-rays taken by Dr. Price on May 29, 2008 showed that Claimant had discogenic spondylosis 
at the C5, 6 and 7 levels and there was clear mechanical dysfunction in her neck between a forward 
flexion and extension template view of her neck. Dr. Price opined that there was an aggravation of disk 
problems in her cervical spine in the C6 region that were causing some radicular patterns, and that is the 
part that he felt was related to the old sprain injury because she had some pre-existing discogenic 
spondylosis or arthritis in that region that probably caused her some nerve root irritation and some 
patterns of pain that were similar in pattern to what she had before. 
124. Dr. Price opined that the injuries themselves were new but the areas of involvement in the C6 
region were similar through C5, 6 and 7. 
125. Dr. Price opined that the trauma Claimant had in 2000 and in 2001 had an accelerating effect 
upon the degeneration in her C5, 6 and 7 regions. These were evident in the x-rays that Dr. Price took in 
2001 and repeated in 2008. They are the wear and tear type of thinning and spurring and arthritic changes 




that one would expect to occur from trauma and age. Dr. Price used the two x-rays to illustrate his 
testimony showing narrowing and spurring that occurred between 2001 and 2008 at C5, 6 and 7. He 
opined that they are not substantial increases but they are increased. He further opined that the 2008 x-
rays show the normally expected mild progression of the degenerative change that he thought would 
happen at the C5, 6 and 7 levels. 
126. Dr. Price opined that because of the prior history of trauma and their anatomical positioning in 
the cervical spine, the C5, 6 and 7 areas were very susceptible to injury in these type of snapping type 
injuries, and that the injuries would have been a major aggravation to those segments at C5, 6 and 7. Dr. 
Price explained that by "aggravation" he means that it is something that a new insult, injury or trauma has 
been superimposed upon an area that may previously have been symptomatic but that the trauma was 
sufficient to re-injure or create new trauma on that same tissue again. 
127. On May 29, 2008, Dr. Price referred Claimant to Dr. James Bates, a physical medicine 
rehabilitation physician, for assistance medically. In a letter to Dr. Bates, Dr. Price states, in relevant part 
• Claimant had a prior history of cervical disk involvement in the C5-6-7 areas; moderate 
discogenic spondylosis at those levels; he had recently seen her because of her C5-C6 
disk. 
128. On June 6, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Bates for consultation and treatment. Dr. Bates 
treated Claimant with injections of Cortis~~e, which provided only temporary relief and he prescribed 
pain killers and pain patches for Claimant. She saw Dr. Bates in June, July, August, September and 
October of 2008. The last visit was October 9, 2008. 
129. On October 29, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Little for consultation regarding a chief 
complaint of neck pain, trapezius pain, and right shoulder pain. Dr. Little noted that Claimant reported 
having neck pain, trapezius pain, right shoulder, and right mid scapular pain since the accident on May 
25, 2008. She has not noticed any weakness in her arms. She initially had some right arm numbness and 
tingling involving her right radial forearm, index finger, and middle finger, which has subsided. She has 
been experiencing headaches. 





130. Dr. Little was aware of the neural foraminal narrowing at C5-6-7. He reported: "the MRI dated 
September 8, 2008 shows a new C7-Tl soft disc extrusion extending into the right ventral epidural space 
abutting the ventral dural sac adjacent to the anterior root of the right C8 nerve root. At C5-6 there is a 
loss of disc space height with mild to moderate broad based spondylitic ridging abutting the ventral cord 
surface. There is minimal neural foraminal narrowing, left greater than right at C5-6. At C6-7 there is disc 
space narrowing with mild circumferential broad based osseus spondylotic ridging. There is a small 
perineural cyst in the left neural foramina." Dr. Little's impression was "likely has right C8 radiculitits 
secondary to a dramatic disc protrusion at C7-Tl." "Complicating her symptomatology is a history of 
shoulder problems. Though I suspect her symptoms are not coming from her shoulder, it does remain a 
possibility." Dr. Little recommended a C7-Tl transforaminal epidural steroid injection" at C6 and 
suggested a "decompression of the C8 nerve root by way of anterior cervical approach." Because the 
injection at the C6 distribution eased Claimant's pain, Dr. Little opined the neck pain and radicular type 
arm pain was specifically in the C6 distribution. 
131. Dr. Little treated Claimant's C5-6 level and opined her condition was a combination of her 
condition prior to the accident and symptoms afterwards. 
132. Dr. Little opined the C5-6 disk problem was not a herniation; it was spondylosis impingement of 
the nerve that was creating pain. Dr. Little explained that the impingement of the nerve came from the 
process of spondylosis. Dr. Little opined that an MRI done in 2000 shows pre-existing spondylosis and 
bone spurring at the C5-6. He testified spondylosis is a progressive disease. Dr. Little opined that the 
spondylosis probably worsened between 2000 and the accident in 2008. 
133. On February 15, 2012, Claimant had a C5-6 anterior cervical discectomy and fusion with left iliac 
crest bone graft performed by Dr. Little at St. Luke's Regional Medical Center. The preoperative 
diagnoses were: C5-6 spondylosis, degenerative disk disease and foraminal stenosis. The postoperative 
diagnoses were the same. Dr. Little reported that the surgery went well and Claimant recovered better 
than the first surgery. She wore a hard collar, then a soft collar during the period of recovery. 
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134. On March 27, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was 
satisfactory unchanged anterior C5-C6 and C7-Tl fusions. 
135. On March 28, 2012, Claimant presented to Dr. Little with complaints of severe neck spasms, 
throbbing and paresthesias in her left arm after a walk. Her arm symptoms involve her posterior shoulder, 
triceps, ulnar forearm and hand, consistenf with the C7 distribution. Dr. Little charted that he would keep 
her off work an additional two weeks. Dr. Little issued a prescription that required Claimant to remain off 
work through April 13, 2012. 
136. On April 12, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was C5-6 
and C7-1 fusion with no change in alignment or evidence of hardware complication; persistent C6-7 
degenerative disk disease. 
137. Dr. Little prescribed return to work with restrictions on April 13, 2012, with limitation on 
reaching overhead or lifting with her right arm, no repetitive movement with her right hand; also to wear 
a hard collar as necessary and avoid repetitive motions of her head. 
138. On July 19, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was 
satisfactory appearance anterior discectomy and fusion procedure C5-6 and C7-Tl; no abnormal 
movement or fusion levels; and mild movement at C3-4 and C4-5. 
139. Dr. Little opined that the J\1R.Is of Claimant that were performed in September 2000, August 2008 
and October 3, 2011, all show C6-C7 to have problems, including disk space narrowing and bone 
spurring like the C5-C6. 
140. Dr. Little opined that after reviewing Dr. Price's report, Claimant's symptoms were almost 
resolved and essentially pain free with residual tightness in the trapezius of her scapula muscles and some 
intermittent radiation into the superior and medial scapula, but that she was not resolved prior to the cycle 
accident. 
141. Dr. Little opined that his operative findings at C5-6 were consistent with a long-standing 
preexisting C5-6 spondylosis. 




142. Dr. Little opined that the injury and surgery at the C5-6 level was caused by the cycle accident. 
He treated Claimant for her C5-6 foraminal stenosis (bone spur was narrowing the nerve opening). Dr. 
opined there were degenerative changes as shown by the iv1RI that were not symptomatic, which was 
aggravated and became symptomatic following the cycle accident. 
143. Dr. Little could not say the cycle accident was the sole and only cause of Claimant's symptoms 
and need for surgery because of the underlying spondylosis that existe9 prior to the cycle accident: Dr. 
Little could not give an opinion of apportionment between the condition or disability prior to the accident 
and the condition or disability caused by the accident. 
144. On September 27, 2012, Dr. Little referred Claimant to a pain doctor. He reported her pain was 
improving but she needed further care by a pain specialist. Her pain had never completely resolved. Dr. 
Little opined that Claimant's pain was the result of the cycle accident. 
145. It is the finding of the Arbitrator that the evidence establishes that Claimant had a long standing 
preexisting C5-6 spondylosis that was not symptomatic prior to the cycle accident, but was aggravated 
and became symptomatic following the cycle accident. The evidence also establishes that Claimant was 
injured in the C5-6 area in the 2001 rear-end accident and as reported by Claimant and Dr. Price, was 
only 90-95% recovered from the 2001 rear-end accident when she was injured in the cycle accident. This 
condition was symptomatic and Claimant was still receiving treatment from Dr. Prior up to the time of the 
accident. 
146. Dr. Wilson opined that based on his review of the ivIRis, Claimant would have had surgery at C5-
6 even had there been no accident because the iv1RI findings were consistent with a natural progression of 
her preexisting spondylosis. It may be that someday the spondylosis would progress to the point where 
surgery would be advisable, but there is no evidence that establishes that it would have been required on 
February 15, 2012 or when that date would arrive. The evidence does establish that it had not arrived on 
the date of the accident because the condition was asymptomatic on the date of the accident. The 
Arbitrator does not accept the opinion of Dr. Wilson that the spondylosis alone caused the need for the 
surgery at C5-6. 




147. The evidence establishes that the cycle accident aggravated the preexisting injury and spondylosis 
condition and was the major cause of the need for the surgery at the C5-6 level. 
148. The Arbitrator finds that the preexisting condition at C5-6 was aggravated by the cycle accident 
and that an apportionment can reasonably be made. The Arbitrator finds that 25% of the cost of surgery 
for the C5-6 area should be apportioned to the pre-existing condition and 75% should be apportioned to 
the injury at C5-6 that was caused by the accident. 
5. Lost Income. 
149. Claimant has asserted a claim for lost income from the date of the accident to the present in the 
amount of $135,000. Claimant has the burden of proving that she actually lost income as a result of the 
accident and the amount thereof. 
150. Claimant testified that following the accident in 2008, she did not feel well and was unable to 
work at the same level she had been working prior to the accident. She also missed work while attending 
medical appointments with Dr. Price, Dr. Bates, Dr. Alderman, Dr. Little, and during the neck surgery on 
November 24, 2008. Following the neck surgery in November of 2008, she was unable to work during the 
recovery period. She also missed substantial_ work hours for medical appointments with Dr. Price and Dr. 
Little in 2009, 2010 and 2011, therapy appointments with Hand-On Physical Therapy in 2009 and therapy 
appointments with Idaho Sports Medicine Institute in 2010 and 2011. Claimant also missed work for 
medical appointments with Dr. Goodman in 2011. Following the second surgery on February 15, 2012, 
Claimant was unable to work during the recovery period and she missed additional substantial work hours 
for medical and therapy appointments following the surgery. Claimant also missed work during and 
following the shoulder surgery on May 22, 2012. Following the shoulder surgery she was unable to work 
during the period of recovery. She continued to lose work during medical visits with Dr. Little in 2012. 
The evidence establishes that Claimant made a reasonable effort to work when she was able to do so, 
including working a second job at BCBG doing part-time retail sales beginning in 2009. The Arbitrator 
finds no evidence to support any claim that Claimant failed to mitigate her loss of income following the 
cycle accident. 




151. Dr. Nancy J. Collins, PhD CRC, ("Dr. Collins"), a vocational rehabilitation specialist in Boise, 
Idaho, opined that Claimant lost income of $135,000 during the 4.5 years following the cycle accident to 
the present. Dr. Collins also opined that Claimant may have some reduced income in the future but she 
did not project or opine on the amount. Thus, the Arbitrator will not award future lost income. 
152. Shannon Purvis, a vocational rehabilitation specialist in Boise, Idaho, opined that Claimant 
possessed the capacity to work following the cycle accident and that no objective evidence proved any 
loss of income by Claimant from the date of the accident to the date of the hearing. She criticized Dr. 
Collins opinion of lost income as being based only of production factors and not other factors, such as the 
recession. Ms. Purvis testified she would limit the loss income to the periods of recovery from surgery 
that Claimant experience, but she did not quantify the amounts lost. The opinions of Ms. Purvis are not 
based on or supported by the relevant evidence. 
153. The Arbitrator finds that Claimant lost income as a result of the cycle accident in the amount of 
$135,000. Dr. Collins explained that she based her opinion on the actual lost earnings that Claimant 
suffered and had taken into account other factors such as the loss of earnings opportunities relating to the 
recession and the reduction in real estate sales in Ada County during the relevant period of time. 
6. Medical Expenses. 
154. Claimant has asserted a claim for medical expenses that can be summarized as follows: 
• Alderman Medical Acupuncture of Idaho 
• Boise Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Clinic (Carpal Tunnel) 
• David N. Price, D.C. 
• Hands-On-Physical Therapy 
• Kenneth M. Little, M.D., Idaho Neurological 
• Idaho Neurological, Charisse H. Mack, P.A. 
• Idaho Sports Medicine 
• Primary Health 
• Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
• Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
• The Shoulder Clinic, Dr. Goodwin 
• Boise Anesthesia, P.A. 
• James H. Bates, M.D. 
• Gem State Radiology 
•. Intermountain Medical Imaging 
• Anesthesia Associates of Boise 
• Walgreens 






















• McMillan Medical Center 
•St.Luke's RMC 
• Biomet 
• A Caring Hand · 
• Treasure Valley Hospital 
• Physical Therapy of Idaho 








155. Dr. Price reviewed a summary of his billings for treating Claim.ant following the 2008 motorcycle 
crash in the amount of $6,108.58 and opined that the treatments were all necessary and the amount 
charged for the treatments was reasonable •. 
156. Dr. Little opined that his treatment of Claimant was necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
157. Dr. Little opined that the treatments by Hands-On Physical Therapy, which he prescribed, were 
necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
158. Dr. Little opined that the services of Idaho Sports Medicine physician, Dr. Sheffield, were 
necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
159. Dr. Little opined that the services of Boise Anesthesia, P.A. were necessary and the charges are 
reasonable. 
160. Dr. Little opined that the services of St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center were necessary and 
the charges are reasonable. 
161. Dr. Little opined that the services of Intermountain Medical Imaging were necessary and the 
charges are reasonable. 
162. Dr. Little opined that the services of St. Luke's Regional Medical Center for the second fusion 
were necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
163. Dr. Little opined that the services of St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center for lab work were 
necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
164. Dr. Little opined that the services of Anesthesia Associates for the second surgery were necessary 
and the charges are reasonable. 




165. Dr. Little opined that the prescriptions listed in the summaries of prescriptions from Walgreens 
were necessary anq the charges are reasonable. 
166. Dr. Goodwin opined that Claimant's treatment by Dr. Goodwin was necessary and the costs that 
are associated with that treatment are· reasonable. 
167. Dr. Goodwin opined that the physical therapy Claimant received was necessary and the costs are 
reasonable. 
168. Dr. Goodwin opined that the MRI scan of Claimant's shoulder in 2011 and the dye injected to 
better delineate shoulder pathology was necessary and the costs are reasonable. 
169. Dr. Goodwin opined that the services of Treasure Valley Hospital were necessary and the costs 
are reasonable. 
170. Dr. Goodwin opined the Biomet shoulder pack that was obtained from Biomet for Claimant was 
necessary and the cost is reasonable. 
171. Dr. Goodwin opined that the services of Physical Therapy of Idaho were necessary and the costs 
are reasonable. 
172. The Arbitrator finds that the medical services and costs summarized above in the amount of 
$134,223.63 are reasonable and necessary and were caused by the cycle accident, except as follows: 
• Boise Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Clinic for carpal tunnel treatment 
• Idaho Neurological, K. Little (25% of the 2012 costs of $13,321.19) 
• Idaho Neurological, C. Mack (25% of 2/15/12 cost of $2,812.57) 
• Anesthesia Associates of Boise (25% of 2/15/12 cost of $1,969.00) 
• Walgreens (25% of2012 costs of $412.59) 
•St.Luke's RMC (25% of 2/15/12 cost of $26,526.65) 
• A Caring Hand (25% of 2012 costs of $668.00) 









173. The Arbitrator finds that Claimant is entitled to an interim award of medical costs in the amount 
of $121,700.12. 
174. Claimant made a claim for future medical expenses of $5,000.00. Dr. Collins opined that 
Claimant may have future medical expenses in the amount of $5,000.00 but did not provide any basis for 
such opinion. Thus, the Arbitrator will not award future medical expenses. 





175. The evidence does not support a claim for household cleaning services and none will be awarded. 
7. General Damages. 
176. Claimant is entitled to an interim award of general damages for pain and suffering, loss of quality 
of life, physical limitations, aggravation to any preexisting condition and scaring on her Right hand, after 
disallowing general damages relating to the 25% apportionment for the C5-6 preexisting condition, in the 
amount of$ 150,000.00. 
IV. INTERIM A WARD 
As its Interim Award, the Arbitrator assesses the amount of damages for bodily injury suffered 
by Claimant in the motorcycle accident on May 25, 2008 as follows: 
I. Economic Damages: 
• Medical expenses: 
• Lost income: 
SUBTOTAL ECONOMIC DAMAGES: 
2. Noneconomic Damages: 
Pain and suffering, loss of quality of life, physical limitations, 




Right hand: $150,000.00 
TOTAL INTERIM AWARD: $406,700.12 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 16th day of January, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of January, 2013, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing ARBITRATOR'S DECISION AND INTERIM AW ARD by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: · 
Jon Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
jsteele@runftsteele.com 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
jat@elamburke.com 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
ARBITRATOR'S DECISION AND INTERIMAWARD-38 
81700.0040.5517163.2 
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Jeffrey A. Thomson 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
jat@elamburke.com 
ISB #3380 
Attorneys for Defendant 
NO. ~ 
A.M, ____ F_/L~M -
SEP 1 8 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ANNAMARIE MEYER 
DEPU'IY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PEGGY CEDILLO, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 1308697 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISALLOW COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Farmers Insurance Company ofldaho ("Farmers"), the Defendant in the above-entitled 
action, by and through its attorneys of record, Elam & Burke, PA., moves this court, pursuant to 
the Idaho Arbitration Act, the relevant contract provision and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
procedure, for an order disallowing an award of costs or attorney fees incurred in the arbitration 
of Peggy Cedillo-Steele's ("Cedillo-Steele") underinsured motorist claim, on the grounds and for 
the reasons that: 
1. Cedillo-Steele's insurance policy requires that all witness fees be paid by the 
party incurring them and all other expenses be shared equally; 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 1 
000376
2. No attorney fees are owed because: 
a. The fee agreement is illegal and thereby unenforceable; 
b. The arbitration agreement requires the party incurring the fees to pay the 
fees; and/or 
c. The fee agreement does not apply to fees incurred in arbitration. 
3. Alternatively, the amount of fees sought is unreasonable. 
This Motion is made and based upon the files and records in the above-entitled action, 
together with the supporting memorandum and affidavit filed herewith. 
DATED this _jf]_ day of September, 2013. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 2 
000377
.. - ~ . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /$ day of September, 2013, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows: 
John L. Runft 
Jon M. Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
Peter J. Johnson 
Johnson Law Group 
103 E. Indiana Ave., Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207 
U.S. Mail 
-_:_z-...,...Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
Via Facsimile - 343-3246 
/u.S.Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
__ Via Facsimile - (509) 326-7503 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 3 
000378
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~ -1.: 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
jat@elamburke.com 
ISB #3380 
Attorneys for Defendant 
NO. ~ 
FILED gQ.5 A.M, ____ P,M.__,_ _ _ 
SEP 1 8 2013 
CHR1Sfflfi1Hl!Ft 01 RICH, Clerk 
~y ANNAMAF-lli MgV§FI 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PEGGY CEDILLO, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMP ANY OF 
IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 1308697 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY A. 
THOMSON IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISALLOW COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Jeffrey A. Thomson, having first been duly sworn, upon his oath deposes and says as 
follows: 
1. I am a shareholder in the law firm of Elam & Burke, P.A., and at all relevant 
times counsel of record for Defendant. I have reviewed the contents of the file in this matter and 
make this affidavit based on personal knowledge. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY A. THOMSON IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TI 
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 1 
000379
.;. ,_. ,:,,. , 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of Peggy Cedillo's 
insurance policy with Farmers Insurance. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of the Arbitrator's 
Decision and Interim Award dated January 16, 2013. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of relevant portions of the 
deposition of Jon Steele taken September 26, 2012. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of the Engagement Letter 
for Legal Services between Peggy Cedillo-Steele and Runft & Steele Law Offices, dated 
November 22, 2011. 
DATED this /8 day of September, 2013. 
Jeffrey . Thomson 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before this J.]__ day of September, 2013. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: ---"M=er::..:.id=ie.=a~n ________ _ 
My Commission Expires: _0=l::.:../-=-10=-/=2-=-01:....:8::;.._ __ _ 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY A. THOMSON IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TI 
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /t& day of September, 2013, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows: 
John L. Runft 
Jon M. Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
Peter J. Johnson 
Johnson Law Group 
103 E. Indiana Ave., Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207 
U.S. Mail 
v' Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
Via Facsimile - 343-3246 . 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
__ Via Facsimile - (509) 326-7503 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY A. THOMSON IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TI 
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 3 
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Date of Loss: 
Specialized Processing Operations 
Document Retrieval and Retention Department 
True and Certified Record of Policy 
NOVEMBER 09, 2011 
PEGGY B CEDILLO 
75 16354 25 85 
1014413194 
MAY25,2008 
The pages attached and provided pursuant to your document request apply to the above-referenced policy. 
The policy has a term of6 months, effective May 15, 2008 to November 15, 2008. 
Any additional Declaration Sheet(s) included with these documents labeled as "change or change- misc." 
may reflect a mid-term change in the policy and therefore a time period less than the original policy term, 
however the dates reflect the most current policy information on file, up to and including the date of loss 
for the above-referenced claim. 
Document Retrieval and Retention Department 
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FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO, POCATELLO, IDAHO 
A STOCK INSURANCE COMPANY, HEREIN CALLED THE COMPANY 
DECLARATIONS 
Transaction type: CHANGE- MULTIPLE CAR DISCOUNT REMOVED, RATE CLASS 
The Effective date is from TIME APPLIED FOR. * * * * The policy may be renewed for an additional policy term, as specified 
in the renewal offer, each time the Company offers to renew by sending a bill for the required renewal premium, and the insured pays said 
premium in advance of the respective renewal date. The Policy is issued in reliance upon the statements in the Declarations. 
lnsured's name and address: 
PEGGY B CEDILLO 
10702 W ALBANY CT 
BOISE ID 83713-9573 
Issuing office: 
P. 0. BOX 4820 
POCATELLO, ID 83205 
Premium by coverage 
Policynumber: 75 16354-25-85 
Policy edition: 01 
Effectivedate: 06-01-2008 
Expiration date: 11 · 15 - 2 0 0 8 
Expiraliontime: 12: 00 NOON Standard Time 
PREMATIC NO L091789 
Agent M. Jay Reinke 
Agentno: 75 35 388 
XXX XXX 10,000 120 
XXX XXX 
500 
Agentphone: (208) 898-8833 
Medical 
268.30 27.10 xxxxxxxxxx 36.20 63.90 110.90 33.60 
Endorsement numbers 
E0022 E1027A E1047A El105G 
El154 E1167 KS Ell79I 
1180A E1200 El210 E1248 
E1301 E1417A S7540 Ell36 







Lienholder ot other interest: 
N_E.:LLS FARGO AYro FN 
POj3OX302p 
.CO.RAO.PLIJ;LPA,._ 1_5_1Q8.:..5~02.S. 
56-5002 6TH EDmON 8-07 75 16354-25-85 
Messages / rating information 
DED. WAIVED IF GLASS REPAIRED RATHER THAN REPLACED 
Car Symbols: BI/PD(17) MED/PIP(17) Phys.Damage( 2) 
Household Composition Code (A1204) 
THE REGISTERED OWNER IS WELLS FARGO AUTO 
COVERAGE FOR E1167 IS KS 
F/S INCLUDES CHANGES EFFECTIVE: 08/26/2007 
SEE ENDORSEMENT E0022. 
BUSINESS USE- OCCUPATIONAL. 
Policy activity (Submit amount due with enclosed invoice) 
$ Previous Balance 
177.00 Premium 
Fees 
Payments or Credits 
PREMATIC Total 
ANY 10TAl" BALANCE OR CREDIT 
OF $0. 00 OR LESS WILL 
BE APPLIED TO YOUR NEXT BILLING. 
BALANCES OVER $ 0 • 0 0 








COVERAGES -- Indicated by "COV" or the limit of Company's liability against each coverage. "NC" or "NOT 





Bodily Injury Liability 
Property Damage Liability 





Comprehensive Car Damage 
Collision - Upset 
Comprehensive Personal Liability -
Each occurrence. Medical Payments to 
Others - Each Person. Damage to 
Property of Others - See Policy for 
Limits per occurrence. 
Medical Expense Insurance, Family 
Medical Expense, and Guest Medical 
Expense - See Policy Provision. 
If policy contains the E-550 No-Fault 
Endorsement or No-Fault Coverage D, 
Auto Medical Expense Coverage does 
not apply. 
Coverage Shown By Premium 
NO-FAULT - See Endorsement E-550 (Illinois 




A premium amount shown reflects the 
charge for Towing & Road Service 
Coverage. 
A premium amount shown reflects the 
charge for one or more miscellaneous 
coverages added by endorsement to the 
policy. 
If a refund is due under this policy and the insured cannot be located, we may deduct a handling charge. (Not 
applicable in Kansas) 
Subject to the Loss Payable Provisions or any other loss payable endorsement attached to the policy, payment for loss 
thereunder is payable as interest may appear to the named insured and the Lienholder or Other Interest on the reverse 
side. 
LOSS PAYABLE PROVISIONS 
(Applicable only if lienholder is named, and no other Automobile loss payable endorsement is attached to the policy) 
It is agreed that any payment for loss or damage to the vehicle described in this policy shall be made on the following 
basis: 
(1) At our option, loss or damage shall be paid as interest may appear to the policyholder and the lienholder shown 
in the Declarations, or by repair of the damaged vehicle. 
(2) Any act or neglect of the policyholder or a person acting on his behalf shall not void the coverage afforded to the 
lienholder. 
(3) Change in title or ownership of the vehicle, or error in its description shall not void coverage afforded to the 
lienholder. 
The policy does not cover conversion, embezzlement or secretion of the vehicle by tl1e policyholder or anyone acting 
in his behalf while in possession under a contract with the lienholder. 
A paym~nt may be made to tl1e lienholder which we would not have been obligated to make except for tl1ese terms. 
In such event, we are entitled to all tl1e rights of tl1e lienholder to the extent of such payment. The lienholder shall do 
whatever is necessary to secure such rights. No subrogation shall impair the rigl1t of the lienholder to recover the full 
amount of its claim. 
We reserve the right to cancel tl1is policy at any time as provided by its terms. In case of cancellation or lapse we will 
notify the iienholder at the address shown in the Declarations. We will give the lienholder advance notice of not less 
than 10 days from the effective date of such cancellation or lapse as respects his interest. Mailing notice to the loss 
payee is sufficient to effect cancellation. 
The following applies as respects any loss adjusted with the mortgagee interest only: 
(1) Any deductible applicable to Comprehensive Coverage shall not exceed $250. 
(2) Any deductible applicable to Collision Coverage shall not exceed $250. 
This Declarations page when signed by us, becomes part of the policy numbered on the reverse side. It 
supersejes and controls anything to the contrary. It is subject to all the other terms of the policy. 




Your Personal Coverage Page is attached. 
3 Agreement 
Definitions ----~---· .. ··- 3 
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Additional Definitions ........ ... . . .. .. . . .. . 4 
Supplementary Payments 4 
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Other Insurance --------··-··-··----·- 6 
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We agree with you, in return for your premium payment, to insure you subject to all the terms of this policy. We will 
insure you for the coverages and the limits of liability shown in the Declarations of this policy. 
DEFINITIONS 
Throughout this policy "you" and "your" mean the "named insured" shown in the Declarations and spouse if a 
resident of the same household. "We" "us" and "our" mean the Company named in the Declarations which provides 
this insurance. In addition, certain words appear in bold type. They are defined as follows: 
Accident or occurrence means a sudden event, including continuous or repeated exposure to the same conditions, 
resulting in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended by the insured person. 
Bodily Injury means bodily injury to or sickness, disease or death of any person. 
Damages are the cost of compensating those who suffer bodily injury or property damage from an accident. 
Family membermeans a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption, who is a resident of your household. 
Occupying means in, on, getting into or out of. 
Private Passenger Car means a four wheel land motor vehicle of the private passenger or station wagon type 
actually licensed for use upon public highways. It includes any motor home with no more than six wheels and not 
used for business purposes. 
Property damage means physical injury to or destruction of tangible property, including loss of its use. 
State means the District of Columbia and any state, territory or possession of the United States, or any province of 
Canada. 
Utility car means a land motor vehicle having at least four wheels actually licensed for use upon public highways, 
with a rated load capacity of not more than 2,000 pounds, of the pickup, panel or van type. This does not mean a 
vehicle used in any business or occupation other than farming or ranching. However, it does include a newly acquired 
or replacement vehicle of the same type if its usage is the same as the utility car described in the Declarations. 
Utility trailer means a vehicle designed to be towed by a private passenger car and includes a farm wagon or farm 
implement while towed by a private passenger car or utility car. It does not include a trailer used as an office, 
store, display or passenger trailer. 
Your insured car means: 
1. The vehicle described in the Declarations of this policy or any private passenger car or utility car with which 
you replace it. You must advise us within 30 days of any change of private passenger car or utility car. If your 
policy term ends more than 30 days after the change, you can advise us anytime before the end of that term. 
2. Any additional private passenger car or utility car of which you acquire ownership during the policy period. 
Provided that: 
a. You notify us within 30 days of its acquisition, and 
b. As of the date of acquisition, all private passenger and utility cars you own are insured with a member 
company of the Farmers Insurance Group of Companies. . 
Ownership shall include the written leasing of a private passenger or utility car for a continuous period of at least 
six months. 
3. Any utility trailer:. 
a. That you own, or 
b. While attached to your insured car. 
4. Any private passenger car, utility car or utility trailer not owned by you or a family member while being 
temporarily used as a substitute for any other vehicle described in this definition because of its withdrawal from 
normal use due to breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction. · 
WHAT TO DO IN CASE OF ACCIDENT 
Notice 
In the event of an accident, or loss, notice must be given to us promptly. The notice must give the time, place and 
circumstances of the accident, or loss, including the names and addresses of injured persons and witnesses. 




A person claiming any coverage of this policy must also: 
1. Cooperate with us and assist us in any matter concerning a claim or suit. 
2. Send us promptly any legal papers received relating to any claim or suit. 
3. Submit to physical examinations at our expense by doctors we select as often as we may reasonably require. 
4. Authorize us to obtain medical and other records. 
5. Provide any written proofs of loss we require. 
6. Notify police within 24 hours and us within 30 days if a hit-and-run motorist is involved and an uninsured 
motorist claim is to be filed. 
7. If claiming car damage coverage: 
a. Take reasonable steps after loss to protect the vehicle and its equipment from further loss. We will pay 
reasonable expenses incurred in providing that protection.' 
b. Promptly report the theft of the vehicle to the police. 
c. Allow us to inspect and appraise the damaged vehicle before its repair or disposal. 
8. Submit to examination under oath upon our request. 
PART I - LIABILITY 
Coverage A - Bodily lniury 
Coverage B - Property Damage 
We will pay damages for which any insured person is legally liable because of bodily injury to any person and 
property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a private passenger car, a utility car, or a 
utility ttailer. ' 
We will defend any claim or suit asking for these damages We may settle when we consider it appropriate. 
We will not defend any suit or make additional payments after we have paid the limit of liability for the coverage. 
Additional Definitions Used In This Part Only 
Insured person as used in this part means: 
1. You or any family member, 
2. Any person using your insured car. 
3. Any other person or organization with respect only to legal liability for acts or omissions of: 
a. Any person covered under this part while using your insured car. 
b. You or any family member covered under this part while using any private passenger car, utility car or 
utility trailer other than your insured cat if not owned or hired by that person or organization. 
Insured person does not mean: 
1. The United States of America or any of its agencies. 
2. Any person for bodily injury or property damage arising from the operation of a vehicle by that person as an 
employee of the United States Government when the provisio.ns of the Federal Tort Claims Act apply. 
3. "Any person who uses a vehicle without having sufficient reason to believe that the use is with the permission of 
the owner. 
Your insured car as used in this part shall also include any other private passenger car, utility cat or utility ttailer 
not owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you' or a family membet But no vehicle shall be 
conside.red as your insured car unless the.re is sufficient .reason to believe that the use is with permission of the 
owner, and unless it is used by you or a family member. 
Suppleme~tary Payments 
In addition t(? our limit of liability, we will pay these benefits as respects an insured person: 
1. All costs we incur in the settlement of any claim or defense of any suit 
2. Interest after entry of judgment on any amount that does not exceed our limit of liability. 
3. a. Premiums on appeal bonds on any suit we defend. 
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b. Premiums on bonds to release attachments in any such suit for an amount not in excess of the applicable limit 
of liability of this policy. 
c. Up to $300 for the cost of bail bonds required because of accident or traffic law violation arising out of use of 
your insured car. 
We are not obligated to apply for or furnish any of the above bonds. 
4. Actual loss of wages or salary up to $50 a day, but not other income, when we ask you to attend a trial or hearing. 
5. Expenses you incur for immediate medical and surgical treatment for others necessary at the time of the accident 
resulting in bodily injuty covered by this part. 
6. Other reasonable expenses incurred at our request 
Exclusions 
This coverage does not apply to: 
1. Bodily injuty or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a vehicle while used to 
carry persons or property for a charge. This exclusion does not apply to shared-expense cat pools. 
2. Bodily injutyor property damage; 
a. Caused intentionally by or at the direction of an insured person, or 
b. Arising from any occurrence caused by a,1;1 intentional act of an insured person where the results are 
reasonably foreseeable. 
3. Bodily injuty or property damage with respect to which any person is an insured under nuclear energy 
insurance. This exclusion applies even if the limits of that insurance are exhausted. 
4. Bodily injuty to an e~ployee of an insured person arising in the course of employment. This exclusion does not 
apply to bodily injuty to a domestic employee unless workers' or workmen's compensation benefits are required. 
5. Bodily injury or property damage for any person while employed or otherwise engaged in the business or 
occupation of transporting, selling, repairing, servicing, storing or parking of vehicles designed for use mainly on 
public highways, including road testing or delivery. 
This exclusion does not apply to the ownership, maintenance or use of your insured car by you, any family 
member, or any partner, agent, or employee of you or any family member. This exclusion also does not apply to 
any other person who does not have other insurance available to him with limits equal to at least those of the Idaho 
Financial Responsibility Law. In such event, the insurance afforded that person will be limited to the requirements of 
the Idaho Financial Responsibility Law. 
6. Bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of any vehicle by any person 
employed or otherwise engaged in a business other than the business described in Exclusion 5. This exclusion does 
not apply to the maintenance or use of a: 
a. Private passenger car. 
b. Utility car that you own, if rated as a private passenger ca~ or 
c. Utility trailer used with a vehicle described in a. orb. above. 
7. Damage to property owned or being transported by an insured person. 
8. Damage to property rented to, or in the charge of, an insured person except a residence or private garage not 
owned by that person. 
9. Bodily injuty or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of any motorized vehicle 
with less than four wheels. 
10. Bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of any vehicle other than 
your insured car, which is owned by or furnished or available for regular use by you or a family member. 
11. a. Liability for bodily injury to an insured person other than you or a family member. 
b. Liability to any person or organization because of bodily injury to you. 
12. Liability assumed under any contract or agreement except liability of others you assume in a written contract 
relating to the use of an auto you do not own. 
13. Liability arising from the sponsoring or taking part in any organized or agreed-upon racing or speed contest or 
demonstration in which your insured car has active participation, or in practice or preparation for any such 
contest. 
56-5060 ISTEDITIOH (DI 9-88 5 G-02 (5060105 
000389
• l 
14. Bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use by any person of a vehicle 
in which you have transferred full ownership interest but the transfer does not comply with the transfer of 
ownership provisions of the state motor vehicle law. 
15. Punitive or exemplary damages or the cost of defense related to such damages. 
Limits of Liability 
The limits of liability shown in the Declarations apply subject to the following: 
1. The bodily injury liability limit for "each person" is the maximum for bodily injury sustained by one person in 
any occurrence. Any claim for loss of consortium or injury to the relationship arising from this injury shall be 
included in this limit. 
If the financial responsibility law of the place of the accident treats the loss of consortium as a separate claim, 
financial responsibility limits will be furnished. 
2. Subject to the bodily injury liability limit for "each person" the bodily injury liability limit for "each occurrence" 
is the maximum combined amount for bodily injury sustained by two or more persons in any occurrence. 
3. The property damage liability limit for "each occurrence" is the maximum for all damages to all property in 
any one occurrence. 
4. We will pay no more than the maximum limits provided by this policy regardless of the number of vehicles 
insured, insured person, claims, claimants, policies, or vehicles involved in the occurrence. 
5. Any amount payable by us to an insured person shall be reduced by any amount payable under any workers' or 
workmen's compensation or any similar medical or disability law. 
Out of State Coverage 
An insured person may become subject to the financial responsibility law, compulsory insurance law or similar law 
of another state or in Canada. This can happen because of the ownership, maintenance or use of your insured car 
when you travel outside of Idaho. We will interpret this policy to provide any broader coverage required by those 
laws, except to the extent that other liability insurance applies. No person may collect more than once foe the same 
elements of loss. 
Conformity with Financial Responsibility Laws 
When we certify this policy as proof under any financial responsibility law, it will comply with the law to the extent of 
the coverage required by the law. 
Other Insurance 
If there is other applicable Auto Liability Insurance on any other policy that applies· to a loss covered by this part, we 
will pay only our share. Our share is the proportion that our limits of liability bear to the total of all applicable limits. 
We will provide insurance for an insured person, other than you or a family member, up to the limits of the Idaho 
Financial Responsibility Law only. 
Any insurance we provide for a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any other collectible insurance. 
If any applicable insurance other than this policy is issued to you by us or any other member company of the Farmers 
Insurance Group of Companies, the total amount payable among all such policies shall not exceed the limits provided 
by the single policy with the highest limits of liability. 
PART 11- UNINSURED MOTORIST 
Coverage C · Uninsured Motorist Coverage 
(Including Underinsured Motorist Coverage) 
We will pay all sums which an insured person is legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator 
of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injwy sustained by the insured person. The bodily injury must 
be caused by accident and arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured motor vehicle. 
Determination as to whether an insured person is legally entitled to recover damages or the amount of damages 
shall be made by agreement between the insured person and us. If no agreement is reached, the decision will be 
made by arbitration. 
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Additional Definitions Used In This Part Only 
As used in this part: 
1. Insured person means: 
a. You or a family member. 
b. Any other person while occupying your insured cat. 
c. Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of bodily injwy to you, a family member, 
or another occupant of your insured car. 
But, no person shall be considered an insured person if the person uses a vehicle without having sufficient reason to 
believe that the use is with permission of the owner. 
2. Motor vehicle means a land motor vehicle or a trailer but does not mean a vehicle: 
a. Operated on rails or crawler-treads. 
b. Which is a farm type tractor, or any equipment designed or modified for use principally off public roads while 
not on public roads. 
c. Located for use as a residence or premises. 
3. Uninsured motor vehicle means a motor vehicle which is: 
a. Not insured by a bodily injury liability bond or policy at the time of the accident. 
b. · Insured by a bodily injwy liability bond or policy at the time of the accident which provides coverage in 
amounts less than the limits of Uninsured Motorist Coverage shown in the Declarations. 
c. A hit-and-run vehicle whose operator or owner has not been identified and which strikes: 
(1) You or any family member. 
(2) A vehicle which you or a family member are occupying. 
(3) Your insured car. 
d. Insured by a bodily injwy liability bond or policy at the time of the accident but the Company denies 
coverage or is or becomes insolvent. 
4. Uninsured motor vehicle,however, does not mean a vehicle: 
a. Owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family member. 
b. Owned or operated by a self-insured as contemplated by any financial .responsibility law, motor carrier law, or 
similar law. 
c. Owned by a governmental unit or agency. 
Exclusions 
This coverage shall not apply to the benefit of any insurer or self-insurer under any workers' or workmen's 
compensation law, or directly to the benefit of the United States, or any state or any political subdivision. 
This coverage shall not apply to punitive or exemplary damages or the cost of defense related to such damages. 
This coverage does not apply to bodily injwy sustained by a person: 
1. While occupying any vehicle owned by you or a family member for which insurance is not afforded under this 
policy or through being struck by that vehicle. 
2. If tl1at person or the legal representative of that person makes a settlement without our written consent 
3. While occupying your insured car when used to carry persons or property for a charge. This exclusion does not 
apply to shared-expense car pools. 
4. If the injured person was occupying a vehicle you do not own which is insured for this coverage under another 
policy. 
Limits of Liability 
The limits of liability shown in the Declarations apply subject to the following: 
1. The limit for "each person" is the maximum for bodily injury sustained by any person in any one occurrence. 
Any claim for loss of consortium or injury to the relationship arising from this injury shall be included in this limit. 
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financial responsibility limits will be furnished. 
2. Subject to the limit for "each person", the limit for "each occurrence" is the maximum combined amount for 
bodily injury sustained by two or more persons in any one occurrence. 
3. Subject to the law of the state of the occurrence, we will pay no more than these maximums regardless of the 
number of vehicles insured, insured persons, claims, claimants, policies, or vehicles involved in the occurrence. 
Other Insurance 
1. We will pay under this coverage only after the limits of liability under any applicable bodily injury liability bonds 
or policies have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements. 
2. The amount of Uninsured Motorist Coverage we will pay under Addition:tl Definitions 3b shall be reduced by the 
amount of any other bodily injury coverage available to any party held to be liable for the accident. 
3. Except as provided in paragraph 2 above, if any other collectible insurance applies to a loss covered by this part, 
we will pay only our share. Our share is the proportion that our limits of liability bear to the total of all applicable 
limits. 
4. We will not provide insurance for a vehicle other than your insured car, unless the owner of that vehicle has no 
other insurance applicable to this part. 
5. If any applicable insurance other than this policy is issued to you by us or any other member company of the 
Farmers Insurance Group of 9ompa11ies, the total amount payable among all such policies shall not exceed the 
limits provided by the single policy with the highest limits of liability. 
Arbitration 
If an insured person and we do not agree (1) that the person is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner 
or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, or (2) as to the amount of payment under this part, either that person or 
we may demand that the issue be determined by arbitration. 
In that event, an arbitrator will be selected by the insured person and us. If agreement on an arbitrator cannot be 
reached within (30) days, the judge of a court having jurisdiction will appoint the arbitrator. The expense of the 
arbitrator and all other expenses of arbitration will be shared equally. Attorney's fees and fees paid for the witnesses 
are not expenses of arbitration and will be paid by the party incurring them. 
The arbitrator shall determine (1) the existence of the operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, (2) that the insured 
person is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, and (3) 
the amount of payment under this pa.ct as determined by this policy or any other applicable policy. 
Arbitration will take place in the county where the insured person lives. Local court rules governing procedures and 
evidence will apply. The decision in writing of the arbitrator will be binding subject to the terms of this insurance. 
Formal demand for arbitration shall be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction. The court shall be located in the 
county and state of residence of the party making the demand. Demand may also be made by sending a certified 
letter to the party against whom arbitration is sought, with a return receipt as evidence. 
PART Ill - MEDICAL 
Coverage E - Medical Expense Coverage 
We will pay reasonable expenses incurred within three years from the date of accident for necessary medical 
seivices and funeral expenses because of bodily injury sustained by an insured person. 
Additional Definitions Used In This Port Only 
As used in this part, insured person or insured persons means: 
1. You or any family member while occupying, or through being struck by, a motor vehicle or trailer, designed for 
use on public roads. 
2. Any other person while occupying your insured car while the car is being used by you, a family member or 
another person if that petson has sufficient reason to believe that the use is with permission of the owner. 
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Medical services means necessary medical, surgical, dental, x-ray, ambulance, hospital, professional nursing and 
funeral services, and includes the cost of pharmaceuticals, orthopedic and prosthetic devices, eyeglasses and hearing 
aids. 
Medical services does not include the cost of any of the following: 
1. Hot tubs, spas, water beds, 
2. Exercise equipment, heating or vibrating devices, 
3. Membership in health clubs, 
4. Medical reports unless requested by us. 
Exclusions 
This coverage does not apply for bodily injury to any person: 
1. Sustained while occupying your insured car when used to carry persons for a charge. This exclusion does not 
apply to shared-expense car pools. 
2. Sustained while occupying any vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises. 
3. Sustained while occupying a motorized vehicle with less than four wheels. 
4. Sustained while occupying or, when struck by, any vehicle (other than your insured car) which is owned by or 
furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family member. 
5. Sustained while occupying a vehicle other than the car described in the Declarations while the vehicle is being 
used in the business or occupation of an insured person. 
6. Occurring during the course of employment if workers' or workmen's compensation benefits are required. 
7. Caused by war (declared or undeclared), civil war, insurrection, rebellion, revolution, nuclear reaction, radiation or 
radioactive contamination, or any consequence of any of these. 
8. During active participation in any organized or agreed-upon racing or speed contest or demonstration, or in 
practice or preparation for any such contest. 
Limit of Liability 
Regardless of the number of vehicles insured, insured persons, claims or policies, or vehicles involved in the 
accident, we will pay no more for medical expenses, including funeral expenses, than the limit of liability shown for 
this coverage in the Declarations for each person injured in any one accident. In no event shall the limit of liability 
for funeral expenses exceed $2,000 each person. 
Other Insurance 
If there is other applicable automobile medical insurance on any other policy that applies to a loss covered by this 
part, we will pay only our share. Our share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all 
applicable limits. · · 
Any insurance we provide to any insured person for a substitute or non-owned motor vehicle or trailer shall be 
excess over any other collectible insurance. 
If any applicable insurance other than this policy is issued to you by us or any other member company of the Farmers 
Insurance Group of Companies, the total amount payable among all such policies shall not exceed the limits provided 
by the single policy with the highest limits of liability. 
PART IV - DAMAGE TO YOUR CAR 
Coverage F - Comprehensive 
We will pay for loss to your insured car caused by any accidental means except collision, less any applicable 
deductibles. Any deductible amount will apply separately to each loss. 
Loss caused by missiles, falling objects, fire, theft or larceny, explosion, earthquake, windstorm, hail, water, flood, 
malicious mischief or vandalism, riot or civil commotion, colliding with a bird or animal, o.r breakage of glass is not 
deemed loss caused by collision. If breakage of glass results from a collision, you may elect to have it treated as loss 
caused by collision. 
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Coverage G - Collision 
We will pay for loss to your insured car caused by collision less any applicable deductibles. 
Any deductible shall apply separately to each loss. 
Coverage H - Towing and Rood Service 
We will pay for reasonable and necessary towing and labor costs incurred because of disablement of your insured 
car. The labor must be performed at the place of disablement 
Additional Definitions Used In This Port Only 
As used in this part: 
1. Collision means collision of your insured car with another object ·or upset of your insured car. 
2. Loss means direct and accidental loss of or damage to your insured car, including its equipment 
3. Your insuted car shall also include any other private passenger car, utility car, or utility trailer not owned by 
or furnished or available for the regular use of you or a family member. But no vehicle shall be considered as 
your insured car unless there is sufficient reason to believe that the use is with permission of the owner, and 
unless it is used by you or a family member. 
Supplementary Payments 
1. If you have comprehensive coverage, we will pay for transportation expenses incurred by you because of the total 
theft ofyourinsured car. We will pay up to $15 per day, but no more than $450. This coverage begins 48 hours 
after the theft has been reported to us and to the police and ends when the car is returned to use or when we offer 
settlement for the loss. 
2. We will pay up to, but not more than, $200 for loss of clothing or luggage in your insured car and belonging to 
you or a family member if the loss is caused br, 
a. Collision of your insured carwhile coveted by this policy. 
b. Fire, lightning, flood, earthquake, explosion, falling aircraft, or theft of the entire insured car; and loss occurs to 
your insured car from the same cause while covered for comprehensive by this policy. 
Exclusions 
This coverage does not apply to loss: 
1. To your insured car while used to carry persons or property for a charge. This exclusion does not apply to 
shared-expense car pools. 
2. Caused by war (declared or undeclared), civil war, insurrection, rebellion, revolution, nuclear reaction, radiation or 
radioactive contamination, or any consequence of any of these. 
3. Caused by ~eft to equipment designed for the reproduction of sound, or any radio receiving or radio receiving and 
transmitting equipment. This applies to such equipment as a tape player, tape recorder, citizens band radio and 
two-way mobile .radio, telephone, radar detector, television or scanning monitor receiver. It also applies to any 
electronic device incorporating any of this equipment, as well as accessories and antennas. 
This exclusion does not apply to that equipment which is permanently installed in the opening of the dash or 
console of your insured car normally used by the motor vehicle manufacturer for the installation of a radio or 
sound reproducing device. 
4. Caused by theft to tapes, records, reels, cassettes, cartridges, carrying cases or other devices for use with equipment 
designed for the reproduction of sound. 
5. To a camper body, canopy or utility ttailet owned by you or a family member and not described in the 
Declarations. But, coverage does apply to a camper body, canopy or utility trailer ownership of which you acquire 
during the policy period if you ask us to insure it within 30 days after you acquire it 
6. To awnings, cabanas or equipment designed to provide additional living facilities. 
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7. Due and confined to wear and tear, freezing, mechanical or electrical breakdown or failure, or road damage to 
tires. But coverage does apply if the loss results from burning of wiring. Also coverage does apply if the loss 
results from the total theft of your insured car. 
8. To a vehicle not owned by you when used in auto business operations. 
9. During any organized or agreed-upon racing or speed contest or demonstration in which your insured car has 
active participation, or in practice or preparation for any such contest. 
10. To a van, pickup, or panel truck due to increased cost of repair or replacement of the following furnishings or 
equipment 
a. special carpeting, insulation, wall paneling, furniture or bars. 
b. facilities for cooking and sleeping including enclosures or bathroom facilities. 
c. height-extending roofs. 
d. murals, paintings or other decals or graphics. 
Limits of Liability 
Our limits of liability for loss shall not exceed the lowest of: 
1. The actual cash value of the stolen or damaged property. 
2. The amount necessary to repair or replace the property or parts with other of like kind and quality, less 
depreciation. 
3. $500 for a utility trailer not owned by you or a family member. 
Payment of Loss 
We may pay the loss in money or repair or replace damaged or stolen property. We may, at any time before the loss 
is paid or the property is replaced, return, at our expense, any stolen property either to you or to the address shown in 
the Declarations, with payment for the resulting damage. We may keep all or part of the property at the agreed or 
appraised value. 
Appraisal 
You or we may demand appraisal of the loss. Each will appoint and pay a competent and disinterested appraiser and 
will equally share other appraisal expenses. The appraisers, or a judge of a court having jurisdiction, will select an 
umpire to decide any differences. Each appraiser will state separately the actual cash value and the amount of loss. 
An award in writing by any two appraisers will determine the amount payable, which shall be binding subject to the 
terms of this insurance. 
No Benefit to Bailee 
This coverage shall not directly or indirectly benefit any carrier or other bailee for hire liable for loss to your insuted 
car. 
Other Insurance 
If there is other applicable similar insurance on any other policy that applies to a loss covered by this part, we will pay 
only our share. Our share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all applicable limits. This 
coverage does not apply to any substitute or non-owned car if there is similar coverage on it. 
Any insurance we provide for a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any other collectible insurance. 
If any applicable insurance other than this policy is issued to you by us or any other member company of the Farmers 
Insurance Group of Companies, the total amount payable among all such policies shall not exceed the limits provided 
by the single policy with the highest limits of liability. 
PART V - CONDITIONS 
1. Policy Period and Territory 
This policy applies only to accidents, occurrences, and losses during the policy period shown in the Declarations 
which occur within the United States, its territories or possessions, or Canada, or while the car is being shipped 
between their ports. 




This policy with the Declarations includes all agreements between you and us relating to this insurance. No other 
change or waiver may be made in this policy except by endorsement or new declarations or new policy issued by us. 
The premium for each term of this policy is determined by information in our possession at the inception of that 
term. Any changes in this information which would affect the rating of your policy will allow us to make an 
additional charge or refund on a pro rata basis. If a premium adjustment is necessary we will make the adjustment as 
of the effective date of the change. 
When we broaden coverage during the policy period without charge, the policy will automatically provide the 
broadened coverage when effective in your state. We may make other changes or replace this policy, to conform to 
coverage currently in use at the next policy period. The change or new policy will be delivered to you, or mailed to 
you at your mailing address shown in the Declarations at least 30 days before the effective date of the new policy 
period. 
Policy terms which conflict with laws of Idaho are hereby amended to conform to such laws. 
3. Legal Action Against Us 
We may not be sued unless there is full compliance with all the terms of this policy. We may not be sued under the 
Liability Coverage until the obligation of a person we insure to pay is finally determined either by judgment against 
that person at the actual trial or by written agreement of that person, the claimant and us. No one shall have any right 
to make us a party to a suit to determine the liability of a person we insure. 
4. Transfer Of Your Interest 
Interest in this policy, may not be assigned without our written consent. But, if the insured named in the Declarations, 
or the spouse of the insured resident in the same household dies, tl1e policy will cover: 
a. The survivor. 
b. The legal representative of the deceased person while acting within the scope of duties of a legal representative. 
c. Any person having proper custody of your insured car until a legal representative is appointed. 
5. Our Right to Recover Payment 
In the event of any payment under this policy, we are entitled to all the rights of recovery of the person to whom 
payment was made against another. That person must sign and deliver to us any legal papers relating to that recovery, 
do whatever else is necessary to help us exercise those rights and do nothing after loss to prejudice our rights. 
When a person bas been paid damages by us under this policy and also recovers from another, the amount 
recovered from the other shall be held by that person in trust for us and reimbursed to us to the extent of our 
payment. 
This condition does not apply if prohibited by state law. 
It may be necessary for us to make payment under the Uninsured Motorist Coverage due to the insolvency of another 
insurance carrier. In such a case, our right to recover payment is limited to proceedings directly against the insolvent 
insurer or receiver. We will exercise those rights which the person insured by the insolvent insurer might otherwise 
have had, if he or she had personally made the payment. 
6. Two or More Cars Insured 
With respect to any accident or occurrence to which this and any other auto policy issued to you by any member 
company of the Farmers Insurance Group of Companies applies, the total limit of liability under all the policies shall 
not exceed the highest applicable limit of liability under any one policy. 
7. Bankruptcy 
We ru:e not relieved of any obligation under this policy because of the bankruptcy or insolvency of any insured 
person. 
8. Termination or Reduction of Coverage 
a. Cancellation, nonrenewal or reduction of coverage: 
(1) You may cancel this policy by advising us in writing when at a future date the cancellation is to be effective. 
56-5060 ISTEDmOH !DI 9-88 12 ll-02 (506010( 
000396
,. I 
(2) We may cancel, change the renewal date, or cancel or reduce all or any portion of any coverage by mailing 
notice to you, your representative, or any lienholder shown in the policy at the address shown in the 
Declarations or by delivering the notice: 
(a) Not less than 10 days prior to the effective date of such cancellation, reduction, or change of renewal 
date: 
(i) For nonpayment of premium, or 
(ii) If the policy has been in force less than 60 days. 
(b) Not less than 20 days prior to the effective date of cancellation for all other cases. 
If we cancel or reduce all or any portion of any coverage, the notice we send you will describe that portion 
we are cancelling or reducing. 
(3) Our right to cancel is limited only if this policy has been in force for 60 days, or is a renewal. We can cancel 
or nonrenew this policy if it has been in effect more than 60 days only if any of the following apply: 
(a) You fail to pay the premium when due. 
(b) The insurance was obtained through material misrepresentation. 
(c) Any insured person made a false or fraudulent claim or knowingly aided another person in making such 
a claim. 
(q.) You fail to disclose fully your motor vehicle accidents and moving violations, or losses covered under 
any automobile physical damage or comprehensive coverage for the preceding 36 months if called for in 
the application. 
(e) You fail to disclose in the application any information necessary for acceptance or proper rating. 
(£) You violate any terms and conditions of this policy. 
(g) You, any resident of your household, or any person who regularly and frequently operates your insured 
car: 
~) has had his or her driver's license suspended or revoked within the 36 months prior to the notice of 
cancellation or nonrenewal of coverage. 
@) is or becomes subject to epilepsy or heart attacks, and does not produce a physician's certificate 
stating that he or she can operate a motor vehicle safely. 
(ill) has an accident or conviction record, physical or mental condition which are such that his or her 
operation of an automobile might endanger the public safety. 
Qv) has been convicted, or forfeited bail, during the 36 months immediately preceding the notice of 
cancellation or nonrenewal of coverage for: 
(aa) Criminal negligence resulting in death or homicide arising out of the operation of a motor 
vehicle. 
(ab) assault arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle. 
(ac) operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated or under the influence of drugs. 
(ad) leaving the scene of an accident without stopping to report it. 
(ae) making false statements in an application for a driver's license. 
(a£) theft or unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. 
(ag) any felony. 
(v) has been convicted of, or forfeited bail for, three or more violations within the 36 months 
immediately preceding the notice of cancellation or nonrenewal, of any law, ordinance or regulation 
limiting the speed of motor vehicles, or any of the provisions of the motor vehicle laws of any state. 
Violations may be repetitions of the same offenses or different offenses. 
(vi) has, while this policy is in force, engaged in a prearranged speed contest while operating or riding in 
your insured car. 
(vii) has, within 36 months prior to the notice of cancellation or nonrenewal been addicted to the use of 
narcotics or other drugs. 
(viii) uses alcoholic beverages to excess. 
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(h) Your insured car is: 
(i) so mechanically defective that its operation might endanger public safety. 
(ii) used in carrying passengers for hire or compensation. This does not include car pools. 
(iii) used in the business of transportation of flammables or explosives. 
(iv) an authorized emergency vehicle. 
(v) subject to an inspection law and has not been inspected or, if inspected, has failed to qualify within 
the period specified under such inspection law. 
(vi) substantially changed in type or condition during the policy period, increasing the risk substantially, 
or so as to give clear evidence of a use other than the original use. 
(4) Part 3 above does not limit our right to add a deductible not exceeding $100 under Coverage F of this policy 
as a condition to renewal. 
(5) We will not cancel or nonrenew if: 
(a) You agree in writing to exclude a person other than you by name from operation of your insured car. 
(b) You also agree to exclude coverage to yourself for any negligence which may be imputed by law to you, 
which may arise out of the maintem.nce, operation or _use of a motor vehicle by such excluded person. 
Notice of cancellation or nonrenewal for nonpayment of premium must be mailed or delivered to you with the reason 
for cancellation or nonrenewal. If cancellation or nonrenewal is for any other circumstance, we will send you the 
reason for such cancellation or nonrenewal with the notice or we will send you a statement of your right to request 
the reason. 
A written request must be mailed or delivered to us not less than 10 days prior to the effective date of cancellation. 
We will furnish you with a statement giving the reason or grounds for the notice of cancellation. 
Nonrenewol 
If we mail or deliver a notice of nonrenewal to you, we will send you either the reason for nonrenewal or a statement 
of your right to request the reason for such nonrenewal. A written request must be made not less than 15 days prior 
to the effective date of nonrenewal. 
We will mail to you at the address shown in the Declarations, or deliver to you, notice of nonrenewal not less than 30 
days before the end of the policy period, if we decide not to renew or continue this policy. 
This provision shall not apply in any of the following cases: 
1. You fail to pay the premium when due. 
2. We show a willingness to renew. 
If your policy is renewed, we still may cancel it at our option, if grounds for cancellation existed before the effective 
date of the renewal. 
b. Automatic Termination 
This policy will automatically terminate at the end of the policy period if you or your representative do not.accept our 
offer to renew it. Your failure to pay the required renewal premium as we require means that you have declined our 
offer. 
If other insurance is obtained on your insured cat, any similar insurance afforded under this policy for that car will 
cease on the effective date of the other insurance. 
c. Other Provisions 
(1) If different requirements for cancellation and nonrenewal or termination of policies become applicable 
because of the laws of Idaho, we will comply with those requirements. 
(2) Proof of mailing shall be sufficient proof of notice. We may deliver a notice instead of mailing it. 
(3) The effective date and hour stated on the notice for cancellation of the entire policy shall become the end of 
the policy period. 
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(4) The effective date and time stated on the notice for reductions of coverage or cancellation of a portion of the 
coverage, shall be the effective date of the change. The notice shall be part of the policy. It is an endorsement 
(5) Termination or change may result in a premium refund. If so, we will send it to you. Our making or offering 
of a refund is not a condition of cancellation. 
If you cancel, the refund will be computed in accordance with the customary short rate table and procedure. 
If we cancel or reduce coverage, the refund will be computed on a pro rata basis. 
9. No Duplication of Benefits 
Any amount paid under Coverage E will be applied against any other coverage of this policy applicable to the loss so 
that there is no duplication of Coverage E benefits. In no event shall a coverage limit be reduced below any amount 
required by law. 
Optional Payment Plan on Renewal of Policy 
If we send you an offer to renew any or all of the coverages in your policy, we will send you a Renewal Premium 
Notice. You may pay the premium either in full or in two equal installments. 
If paid in installments, we will add a service charge when the policy is renewed. 
The first premium installment, including the service charge, shall be payable on or before the policy renewal date. The 
second installment shall be payable not later than 60 days after the renewal date. 
SPECIAL PROVISIONS 
Policy fees which you pay are not part of the premium, but are fully earned when coverage is effective. They are not 
refundable (except as noted in a. and b. below), but may be applied as a credit to policy fees required for other 
insurance accepted by us. 
a. If we cancel this policy during or at the end of the first policy period, we shall refund all policy fees. 
b. If you cancel this policy during or at the end of the first policy period because it does not agree with the 
application and is not as represented by the agent, we shall refund all policy fees. 
This policy shall not be effective unless countersigned on the Declarations Page by a duly authorized representative 
of the Company named on the Declarations Page. 
The Company named on the Declarations has caused this policy to be signed by the officers shown below. 
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Dear Valued Customer, 
The endorsement below can eliminate the deductible costs for an auto glass claim. 
For no additional charge, we will not apply the deductible for Comprehensive when you 
choose to repair rather than replace damaged auto safety glass. If you choose to replace 
the glass, however, the deductible will apply. Please read the endorsement for complete 
details. 
Thank you for choosing Farmers~ If you have any questions, please contact your Farmers 
agent who will be happy to help you with this and your other insurance needs. 
SAFETY GLASS - WAIVER OF DEDUCTIBLE 
PART IV - DAMAGE TO YOUR CAR - COVERAGE F 
E1417A 
1st Edition 
It is agreed that if a loss to auto safety glass is repaired rather than replaced, the deductible applying to 
Coverage F - Comprehensive under Part IV - Damage to Your Car is waived. If the auto safety glass is 
replaced, the deductible applying to Comprehensive will remain in force. 
This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise 
subject to all ,other terms of the policy. 
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ENDORSEMENTAMENrnNG 
DEDUCTIBLE PROVISIONS UNDER PART V 
(E • Z READER CAR POLICY) 
E1301 
1st Edition 
It is agreed that provisions contained in Part V - Conditions, Section 8. - Termination or Reduction of 
Coverage, which pertain to our right to add a $100 deductible under Coverage F or G are deleted and 
replaced with the following: 
"Subject to any applicable state law, Section 8. does not limit our right to add or increase a deductible 
under Coverage F and/or G of this policy as a condition to renewal." 
This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise 
subject to all other terms of the policy. 




AMENDING CUSTOMIZING EQUIPMENT EXCLUSION 
YOUR E-Z READER CAR POLICY 
It is agreed that your policy is amended as follows: 
Under PART IV - DAMAGE TO YOUR CAR, Exclusion number 10 is deleted and replaced with: 
E1248 
1st Edition 
To a van, pick-up or panel truck due to increased cost of repair or replacement of the following furnishings or 
equipment: 
a. Special carpeting, insulation, wall covering, furniture or bars. 
b. Dining, kitchen and sleeping facilities including enclosures or bathroom facilities. 
c. Height-extending roofs. 
d. Murals, specials paint and/or methods of painting, decals or graphics. 
This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise 
subject to all other terms of the policy. 




USE EXCLUSION TO PART 11 
It is agreed that the following exclusion is added to the Exclusions under Part II of your policy. 
E1210 
1st Edition 
Uninsured Motorist Coverage (and Underinsured Motorist Coverage if applicable) does not apply to 
damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any vehicle other than your insured car 
(or your insured motorcycle if this is a motorcycle policy), which is owned by or furnished or available 
for the regular use by you or a family member. 
This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise 
subject to all other terms of the policy. 
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AMENDED BUSINESS USE EXCLUSION 
(Your E - Z Reader Car Policy) 
E12QQ 
1st Edition 
It is agreed that Exclusion 6. Under PART I - LIABILITY is deleted and replaced with the following: 
Bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of any vehicle by any 
person employed or otherwise engaged in a business other than the business described in Exclusion 5. 
This exclusion does not apply to the maintenance or use of a: 
a. Private passenger car. 
b. Utility car that you own, if rated as a private passenger car, or 
c; Utility trailer used with a vehicle described in a. or b. above. 
However, this exclusion does apply to any vehicle: 
1. While used in employment by any person whose primary duties are the delivery of products or services; 
or, 
2. While used in any employment in an emergency occupation on a full-time, part-time, or volunteer basis. 
Such occupations include, but are not limited to, Fire Fighting, Ambulance, or Police activities. However, 
this exclusion does not apply to the vehicle described in the Declarations or any private passenger car 
or utility car with which you replace it. 
3. Which is one of a fleet or pool of vehicles which are provided for the use of an insured person in the 
course of his or her employment, unless such vehicle is specifically listed in the Declarations. 
This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise 
subject to all other terms of the policy. 
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SCHEDULE FOR HIGHER 




For an additional premium, it is agreed that the following optional limits are added to UNDERinsured 








Combined Single Limit 
A7095101 
000406
Coverage C - 1 UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage 
E1179i 
1st Edition 
For an additional premium it is agreed that UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage C-1 is added to Part II of your 
policy. 
We will pay all sums which an insured person is legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or 
operator of an UNDERinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by the insured person. 
Limits of Liability 
a. Our liability under the UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage cannot exceed the limits of the UNDERinsured 
Motorist Coverage stated in this policy, and our maximum liability under the UNDERinsured Motorist 
Coverage is the lesser of: 
1. The difference between the amount paid in damages to the insured person by and for any person or 
organization who may be legally liable for the bodily injury, and the limit of UNDERinsured Motorist 
Coverage; or 
2. The amount of damages established but not recovered by any agreement, settlement, or judgment 
with or for the person or organization legally liable for the bodily injury. 
b. We will pay up to the limits of liability shown in the schedule below as shown in the Declarations. (Note: 























c. The limit for "each person" is the maximum for bodily injury sustained by any person in any one 
occurrence. Any claim for loss of consortium or injury to the relationship arising from this injury shall be 
included in this limit. 
If the financial responsibility law of the place of the accident treats the loss of consortium as a separate 
claim, financial responsibility limits will be furnished. 
d. Subject to the limit for "each person," the limit for "each occurrence" is the maximum combined amount 
for bodily injury sustained by two or more persons in any one occurrence. 
Additional Definitions Used In This Part Only 
a. Insured person means: 
1. You or a family member. 
2. Any other person while occupying your insured car or your insured motorcycle. 
3. Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of bodily injury to you, a family 
member, or other occupant of your insured car or your insured motorcycle. 
But, no person shall be considered an insured person if the person uses a vehicle without having sufficient 
reason to believe that the use is with permission of the owner. 
b. Motor vehicle means a land motor vehicle or a trailer but does not mean a vehicle: 
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1. Operated on rails or crawler-treads. 
2. Which is a farm type tractor or any equipment designed or modified for use principally off public roads 
while not on public roads. 
3. Located for use as a residence or premises. 
c. Underinsured Motor Vehicle - means a land motor vehicle when: 
1. the ownership, maintenance or use is insured or bonded for bodily injury liability at the time of the 
accident; and 
2. its limit for bodily injury liability is less than the amount of the insured person's damages. 
An underinsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor vehicle: 
(a) insured under the liability coverage of this policy; 
(b) furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family member; 
(c) owned by any governmental unit or agency; 
(d) which are farm tractors and other off road designed vehicles and equipment; 
(e) defined as an "uninsured motor vehicle" in your policy; 
(Q which is self insured within the meaning of any financial responsibility law which applies. 
Other Insurance 
1. We will pay under this coverage only after the limits of liability under any applicable bodily injury liability 
bonds or policies have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements. 
2. The amount of UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage we will pay shall be reduced by the amount of any 
other bodily injury coverage available to any party held to be liable for the accident. 
3. If any other collectible insurance applies to a loss covered by this part, we will pay only our share. Our 
share is the proportion that our limits of liability bear to the total of all applicable limits. 
4. We will not provide insurance for a vehicle other than your insured car or your insured motorcycle, 
unless the owner of that vehicle has no other insurance applicable to this part. 
5. If any applicable insurance other than this policy is issued to you by us or any other member company of 
the Farmers Insurance Group of Companies, the total amount payable among all such policies shall not 
exceed the limits provided for the single vehicle with the highest limits of liability. 
Under Part II of the policy the provisions that apply to Exclusions and Arbitration remain the same and apply 
to this endorsement. 
This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise 
subject to all other terms of the policy. 
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LOSS OF USE ENDORSEMENT 
E1167 
4th Edition 
For an additional premium, we will pay your extra expense arising from any of the options you have 
purchased as described in the schedule below and designated in the Declarations. The chosen option 










We will pay you $1 0 per day while your insured car is in the custody of a garage for 
repairs resulting from a collision. The maximum payable is $100. If your insured car is a 
total loss (regardless of salvage value) we will pay you $100. 
We will pay you $15 per day while your insured car is in the custody of a garage for 
repairs resulting from a Collision or Comprehensive loss. The maximum payable is $300. 
If your insured car is a total loss (regardless of salvage value) we will pay you $300. This 
option does not cover total theft of your insured car. 
Car Return Expenses: If Coverage K-1, K-2 or K-4 loss occurs more than 50 miles from 
your residence, we will pay you for the reasonable and necessary extra expense for 
commercial transportation, gasoline, lodging and meals incurred to return your insured 
car, after it is repaired, to your residence or destination. The maximum payable for car 
return expenses is $200. 
We will pay you $25 per day while your insured car is in the custody of a garage for 
repairs resulting from a Collision or Comprehensive loss. If your insured car is a total 
loss (regardless of salvage value) we will pay you $500. 
We will pay you an amount in excess of the amount paid per day under paragraph 1 of 
Supplementary Payments in Part IV of this policy, resulting from total theft of your insured 
car. The maximum we will pay for the combined total of paragraph 1 of Supplementary 
Payments and K4 is $25 per day. 
The maximum payable under K-4 is $500. 
K-5 We will pay you $50 per day while your insured car is in the custody of a garage for 
repairs resulting from a Collision or Comprehensive loss. If your insured car is a total 
loss (regardless of salvage value) we will pay you $1000. 
If loss occurs more than 50 miles from your residence we will also pay your car return 
expenses for the reasonable and necessary extra expense for commercial transportation, 
gasoline, lodging and meals incurred to return your insured car, after it is repaired, to your 
residence or destination. The maximum payable for car return expenses is $500. 
We will pay you an amount in excess of the amount paid per day under paragraph 1 of 
Supplementary Payments in Part IV of this policy resulting from the total theft of your 
insured car. The maximum we will pay for the combined total of paragraph 1 of 
Supplementary Payments and K5 is $50 per day. 
The maximum payable under K-5 is $1,000. 
The insurance afforded by this endorsement does not apply to any collision or comprehensive loss 
occurring before the effective date of this endorsement as shown in the Declarations. 
This endorsement is also subject to the following provisions: 
1. Coverage applies only to your insured car other than a private passenger car, utility car, or utility 
trailer not owned by you or a family member while being temporarily used as a substitute vehicle. 
2. If you are paid under this endorsement, we shall have your rights to seek recovery. You shall do 
whatever is necessary to secure such rights. You shall do nothing to prejudice these rights. 
3. The premium charged for this insurance is fully earned unless the entire policy is cancelled. (Not 
applicable in Michigan). 
This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise 
subject to all other terms of the policy. 
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ENDORSEMENT AMENDING DEFINITION E1154 
OF INSURED PERSON UNDER PART I • LIABILITY 2nd Edition 
It is agreed that under Part I - Liability, items 2 and 3 under "Insured Person does not mean:" are amended 
to read as follows: 
2. Any person, including but not limited to a family member, for bodily injury or property damage arising 
from the operation of a vehicle by that person as an employee of the United States Government when the 
provisions of the Federal Tort Claim Act apply. 
3. Any person, including but not limited to a family member, who uses a vehicle without having sufficient · 
reason to believe that the use is with the permission of the owner. 
This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise 
subject to all other terms of the policy. 
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ENDORSEMENT AMENDING DEFINITION 
OF UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE 
It is agreed that under Part II - Uninsured Motorist, the following changes apply: 
E11O5G 
1st Edition 
1. The words "(Including Underinsured Motorist Coverage)," if shown in the title "Coverage C," are deleted 
from the title "Coverage C." (Does not apply to E-2 Reader Motorcycle Policy.) 
2. Item 3b of "Additional Definitions Used In This Pa~ Only" is deleted. 
3. Paragraph 2 (paragraph 1-Your E-2 Reader Motorcycle Policy) under "Other Insurance" is deleted. 
4. The words "Except as provided in paragraph 2 above" (paragraph 1-Your E-Z Reader Motorcycle Policy) 
are deleted from paragraph 3 (paragraph 2-Your E-2 Reader Motorcycle Policy) under "Other Insurance." 
This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise 
subject to all other terms of the policy. 
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Dear Valued Customer: 
This endorsement attaches to and is part of your policy. It changes the Other Insurance section of Part I -
Liability in your policy. The change consists of removing the second paragraph in that section, which states. 
We will provide for an insured person, other than you or a family member, up to the limits of the 
Financial Responsibility Law only. 
Removing that paragraph broadens your liability coverage by allowing payment up to the limit of liability on 
the policy. 
Thank you for choosing Farmers'; we appreciate your business. Please contact your Farmers agent if you 
have a question about this change or your insurance coverage. 
ENDORSEMENT AMENDING PART I - LIABILITY 
(Your E-Z Reader Car Policy) 
It is agreed that Your E-Z Reader Car Policy is amended as follows: 




If there is other applicable Auto Liability Insurance on any other policy that applies to a loss covered by this 
part, we will pay only our share. Our share is the proportion that our limits of liability bear to the total of all 
applicable limits. 
Any insurance we provide for a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any other collectible insurance. 
If any applicable insurance other than this policy is issued to you by us or any other member company of the 
Farmers Insurance Group of Companies, the total amount payable among all such policies shall not exceed 
the limits provided by the single policy with the highest limits ofliability. 
This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrru:y. It is otherwise 
subject to all other terms of the policy. 
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Dear Valued Customer: 
The endorsement below amends Part IV - Damage to Your Car, Limits of Liability section of your 
policy to clarify our long standing practice for adjusting claims. We pay the amount needed to 
replace or repair lost or damaged property with property of like kind and quality; or with new 
property less an adjustment for physical deterioration and/ or depreciation. Property of like kind 
and quality includes parts made by the vehicle manufacturer and parts from other sources. 
If you have any questions regarding this change or any other insurance concerns, please contact 
your Farmers® insurance agent. 
ENDORSEMENT E1027A 
AMENDING PART IV - DAMAGE TO YOUR CAR 1st Edition 
It is agreed that your policy is amended as follows: 
Under Part IV - Damage to Your Car, Limits of Liability, item 1. (Item 2. in AZ, ID, IA, MI, MO, MT, OH, 
OK and WI) is deleted and replaced by the following: 
1. The amount necessary to repair or replace the property or parts with other of like kind and quality; or with 
new property less an adjustment for physical deterioration and/ or depreciation. Property of like kind and 
quality includes, but is not limited to, parts made for or by the vehicle manufacturer. It also includes parts 
from other sources such as rebuilt parts, quality recycled (used) parts and parts supplied by non-original 
equipment manufacturers. 
This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise 
subject to all other terms of the policy. 
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MONTHL V PAYMENT AGREEMENT E0022 
1st Edition 
In consideration of the premium deposit, we agree to the following: 
(1) The policy period is amended to one Calendar month. It will commence with the effective date 
shown in the Declarations. 
(2) The policy shall continue in force for successive monthly periods if the premium is paid when due. 
The premium is due no later than on the expiration date of the then current monthly period. 
(3) The monthly premium shall be subject to future adjustment. Such adjustment will apply the then 
current rate on the semi-annual or annual anniversary of the policy whichever is indicated in the 
Declarations as applicable. 
This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise 
subject to all other terms of the policy. 
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ENDORSEMENT AMENDING PART Ill - MEDICAL 
Coverage E - Medical Expense Coverage 
Your EZ Reader Car Policy 
It is agreed that your policy is amended as described below: 
Part III - MEDICAL is deleted and replaced with the following: 
PART 111- MEDICAL 




We will pay reasonable expenses for necessary medical services incurred within three years from the 
date of the accident because of bodily injury sustained by an insured person which was discovered and 
treated within one year of the accident. 
Additional Definitions Used In This Part Only 
As used in this part, insured person means: 
1. You or any family member while occupying, or through being struck by, a motor vehicle or trailer, 
designed for use on public roads. 
2. Any other person while occupying your insured car while the car is being used by you, a family 
member or another person if that person has sufficient reason to believe that the use is with permission 
of the owner. 
Necessary Medical Services means medical services which are usual and customary for treatment of the 
injury, including the number or duration of treatments, in the county in which those services are provided. 
Necessary Medical Services are limited to necessary medical, surgical, dental, x-ray, ambulance, hospital, 
professional nursing and funeral services, and include the cost of pharmaceuticals, orthopedic and prosthetic 
devices, eyeglasses, and hearing aids. We will reimburse you for any necessary medical services already 
paid by you. 
Necessary Medical Services do not include: 
1. Treatment, services, products or procedures that are: 
a. Experimental in nature, for research, or not primarily designed to serve a medical purpose; or 
b. Not commonly and customarily recognized throughout the medical profession and within the United 
States as appropriate for the treatment of bodily injury; or 
2. The use of. 
a. Thermography or other related procedures of a similar nature; or 
b. Acupuncture or other related procedures of a similar nature. 
3. Purchase, rental cost, or use of. 
a. Hot tubs, spas, water beds, 
b. Exercise equipment, 
c. Heating or vibrating devices, 
d. Furniture or equipment not primarily designed to serve a medical purpose, 
e. Memberships in health clubs, 
f. Medical reports unless requested by us. 
Reasonable Expenses means expenses which are usual and customary for necessary medical services in 
the county in which those services are provided. We will reimburse you for any reasonable expenses 
already paid by you. 
Exclusions 
This coverage does not apply for bodily injury to any person: 
1. Sustained while occupying your insured car when used to carry persons for a charge. This exclusion 
does not apply to shared-expense car pools. 
2. Sustained while occupying any vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises. 
3. Sustained while occupying a motorized vehicle other than a private passenger car or utility car. 
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4. Sustained while occupying or when struck by any vehicle (other than your insured car) which is owned 
by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family member. 
5. Sustained while occupying a vehicle other than the car described in the Declarations while the vehicle is 
being used in the business or occupation of an insured person. 
6. Due to heart attacks, strokes, and other medical conditions or illnesses not causally related to an accident. 
7. Occurring during the course of employment if workers' compensation benefits are required. 
8. Caused by war (declared or undeclared), civil war, insurrection, rebellion, revolution, nuclear reaction, 
radiation, or radioactive contamination, or any consequence of any of these. 
9. During active participation in any organized or agreed-upon racing or speed contest or demonstration, or 
in practice or preparation for any such contest. 
10. Where medical expenses are paid or payable by any governmental entity. 
Determination of Coverage 
Determination of what are reasonable expenses and/ or necessary medical services may be submitted to 
an independent medical consultant. Determination as to whether an insured person is legally entitled to 
recover, and in what amount shall be made by agreement between the insured person and us. If no 
agreement is reached, the decision will be made by arbitration. 
Arbitration 
If an insured person and we do not agree, (1) that the person is entitled to recover for medical services, (2) 
that the medical services are a result of a covered accident, or (3) as to the nature, frequency, or cost of the 
medical services, either that person or we may demand that the issue be determined by arbitration. 
In that event, an arbitrator will be selected by the insured person and us. If agreement on an arbitrator 
cannot be reached within 30 days, the judge of a court having jurisdiction will appoint the arbitrator. The 
expense of the arbitrator and all other expenses of the arbitration will be shared equally. Attorney fees and 
fees paid for the witnesses are not expenses of arbitration and will be paid by the party incurring them. 
The arbitrator shall determine (1) if the medical services are as a result of a covered accident, (2) if the 
medical services incurred are reasonable and necessary, and (3) the amount of any payment under this part as 
determined by this policy. 
Arbitration will take place in the county where the insured person lives. Local court rules governing 
procedures and evidence will apply. The decision in writing of the arbitrator will be subject to the terms of 
this insurance. 
Limit of Liability 
Regardless of the number of vehicles insured, insured persons, claims or policies, or vehicles involved in the 
accident, we will pay no more for medical expenses including funeral expenses, than the limit of liability 
shown for this coverage in the Declarations for each person injured in any one accident. In no event shall 
the limit of liability for funeral expenses exceed $2,000 each person. 
Other Insurance 
If there is other applicable automobile medical insurance on any other policy that applies to a loss covered by 
this part, we will pay only our share. Our share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total of 
all applicable limits. 
Any insurance we provide to any insured person for a substitute or non-owned motor vehicle or trailer, 
shall be excess over any other collectible insurance. 
If any applicable insurance other than this policy is issued to you by us or any other member company of the 
Farmers Insurance Group of Companies, the total amount payable among all such policies shall not exceed 
the limits provided by the single policy with the highest limits of liability. 
Our Righ.t to Recover Payment 
When a person has been paid damages by us under this policy and also recovers from another, the amount 
recovered from the other will be held by that person in trust for us and reimbursed to us to the extent of our 
payment. 
This condition does not apply if prohibited by stat~ law. 
This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise 
subject to all other terms of the policy. 
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COMPANY NAME: FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO, POCATELLO, IDAHO 
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This certificate is subject to all of the terms, conditions and limitations set forth in the policy(ies) and endorsements 
attached to it. It is furnished as a matter of information only and does not change, modify or extend the policy in any 
way. It supersedes all previously issued certificates. 
PART II 
ADDITIONAL INSURED ENDORSEMENT El 136 
5th Edition 
We provide the coverages indicated by "COV,'' or the limit of the Company's liability, on the above 
Certificate of Insurance. We provide this coverage in respect to the vehicle described above, to the person or 
organization named below as an additional insured. 
This coverage applies only: 
(1) while the named insured is the owner, or has care, custody, or control of the above described 
vehicle, and 
(2) when liability arises out of the acts and omissions of the named insured. 
This coverage does not apply: 
(1) where liability arises out of negligence of the additional insured, its agents, or employees, unless the 
agent or employee is the named insured, or 
(2) to any defect of material, design or workmanship in any equipment of which the additional insured is 
the owner, lessor, manufacturer, mortgagee, or beneficiary. 
If any court shall interpret this endorsement to provide coverage other than what is stated in the Certificate 
of Insurance, then our limits of liability shall be the limits of bodily injury liability and property damage 
liability specified by any motor vehicle financial responsibility law of the state, province, or territory where 
the named insured resides, as applicable to the vehicle described above. 
If there is no such law, our limit of liability shall be $5,000 on account of bodily injury sustained by one 
person in any one occurrence and subject to this provision respecting each person, $10,000 on account of 
bodily injury sustained by two or more persons in any one occurrence. Our total liability for all damages 
because of all property damage sustained by one or more persons or organizations as the result of any one 
occurrence shall not exceed $5,000. 
The insurance afforded by the policy described above is subject to all terms of the policy and any 
endorsements attached to it. This endorsement does not increase the limits of the policy. 
Upon cancellation or termination of this policy or policies from any cause we will mail 15 days 
notice in writing to the other interest shown below. ~,,J 
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COVERAGES -- Indicated by "COV" or the limit of Company's liability against each coverage. "NC" or "NOT COV" means "NOT 







Bodily Inju,:y Liability 
Property Damage Liability 
Benefits for Bodily Injury (including property 
damage coverage if policy issued in New 
Mexico) caused by Uninsured Motorists 
Medical Expense Insurance, Family Medical 
Ei,.-pensc, and Guest Medical Expense - See 
Policy Provision. 
If policy contains the E-550 No-Fault 
Endorsement or No-Fault Covernge D, Auto 
Medical Ei.-pense Coverage does not apply. 
See Endorsement E-550 (Illinois E-2250) or 






Comprehensive Car Damage 
Collision - Upset 
Comprehensive Personal Liability - Each 
occurrence. 
Medical Payments to Others -
Each Person. 
Damage to Property of Others -
Sec Policy for Limits per occurrence. 
Towing & Road Service Coverage. 
One or more miscellaneous covernges added 
by endorsement to the policy. 
(Applicable only iflienholder is named, and no other Automobile loss payable endorsement is attached to the policy) 
It is agreed that any payment for loss or damage to the vehicle described in this policy shall be made on the following 
basis: 
(1) At our option, loss or damage shall be paid as interest may appear to the policyholder and the lienholder shown 
in the Declarations, or by repair of the damaged vehicle. 
(2) Any act or neglect of the policyholder or a person acting on.his behalf shall not void the coverage afforded to the 
lienholder. 
(3) Change in title or ownership of the vehicle, or error in its description shall not void coverage afforded to the 
lienholder. 
The policy does not cover conversion, embezzlement or secretion of the vehicle by the policyholder or anyone acting 
in his behalf while in possession under a contract with the lienholder. 
A payment may be made to the lienholder which we would not have been obligated to make except for these terms. 
In such event, we are entitled to all the rights of the lienholder to the extent of such payment. The lienholder shall do 
whatever is necessary to secure such rights. No subrogation shall impair the right of the lienholder to recover the full 
amount of its claim. 
We reserve the right to cancel this policy at any time as provided by its terms. In case of cancellation or lapse we will 
notify the lienholder at the address shown in the Declarations. We will give the lienholder advance notice of not less 
than 10 days from the effective date of such cancellation or lapse as respects his interest. Mailing notice to the loss 
payee is sufficient to effect cancellation. 
The following applies as respects any loss adjusted with the mortgagee interest only: 
(1) Any deductible applicable to Comprehensive Coverage shall not exceed $250. 
(2) Any deductible applicable to Collision Coverage shall not exceed $250. 
91-1136 5ill EDffiON 10.07 Ell365CA 
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Case No. 81700-0040 
ARBITRATOR'S DECISION AND 
INTERIM AW ARD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This arbitration involves claims for damages under the underinsured motorist provisions 
of a policy of insurance that was issued by Respondent, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho to 
Claimant, Peggy B. Cedillo. The claims are disputed by Respondent. The dispute has been 
submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the agreement to arbitrate, which is contained in the 
insurance policy. The agreement to arbitrate, the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act, Idaho Code§ 7-
901, et seq., the Pre-Hearing Orders that were entered by the arbitrator in this matter, and the 
Stipulations of the Parties dated February 22, 2012 and April 5, 2012 govern these proceedings. 
An evidentiary hearing was commenced on November 20, 2012 in Boise, Idaho before 
the duly appointed arbitrator, Merlyn W. Clark. Claimant, Peggy B. Cedillo, appeared in person 
represented by her attorney, Jon M. Steele, Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC. Jeffrey A. 
Thomson, Elam & Burke, P.A., appeared with Ron Ramsey, a representative of Respondent, on 
behalf of Respondent. Oral and documentary evidence was presented by the parties. The 
evidentiary hearing was completed on November 21, 2012. At the close of the hearing the parties 
ARBITRATOR'S DECISION AND INTERIM AWARD- 1 
EXHIBIT2 
000419
,. •J I 
stipulated to submit simultaneous written closing arguments on or before December 10, 2012 and 
simultaneous written responses on or before December 17, 2012. The written closing arguments 
have been submitted and the matter is n9w fully submitted for a decision and interim award. 
II. ISSUE FOR DECISION 
The issue to be decided by this arbitration is the amount of payment due under the 
underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage in the policy of insurance that was issued to Claimant 
by Respondent. The parties have agreed that an Interim Award will be issued reflecting a gross 
award of damages as would be recoverable for bodily injury caused by Jon Steele's negligence in 
operating his motorcycle. See Prehearing Order No. 2, p.2. After the issuance of an Interim 
Award, a Final Award will be issued reflecting any setoffs, collateral source reductions, 
subrogations or prejudgment interest. Id. 
Because the insurance clause in the insurance policy that covers Claimant expressly 
provides that "[t]he expense of the arbitrator and all other expenses of arbitration will be shared 
equally" by the parties and "[a]ttorney's fees and fees paid for the witnesses are not expenses of 
arbitration and will be paid by the party incurring them," this Arbitrator has no authority to 
award expenses of arbitration or attorney fees and costs to either party in this proceeding. 
III. EVIDENCE, FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND DECISIONS 
A. The Insurance Coverage. 
1. Claimant is insured under a policy of insurance that was issued by Respondent. The 
policy provided underinsured motorist coverage to Claimant on May 25, 2008. 
2. Claimant was injured in a motorcycle accident on May 25, 2008 and has made a claim for 
damages under the underinsured motori~t coverage of the policy. The claim is disputed by the 
insurer. 




3. The policy of insurance contains an arbitration clause, which provides for binding 
arbitratio~ if the insurer and insured disagree whether the insured is legally entitled to recover 
damages from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle or the amount thereof. 
The arbitration clause further provides: 
In that event, an arbitrator will be selected by the insured person and us. If 
agreement on an arbitrator cannot be reached within (30) days, the judge of a 
court having jurisdiction will appoint the arbitrator. The expense of the arbitrator 
and all other expenses of arbitration will be shared equally. Attorney's fees and 
fees paid for the witnesses are not expenses of arbitration and will be paid by the . 
paity incurring them. 
The arbitration will take place in the county where the insured person lives. Local 
court mies governing procedures and evidence will apply. The decision in writing 
of the arbitrator will be binding subject to the terms of this insurance. Formal 
demand for arbitration shall be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction. The 
court shall be located in the county and state of residence of the party making the 
demand. Demand may also be made by sending a certified letter to the party 
against whom arbitration is sought, with a return receipt as evidence. 
See the Insurance Policy. 
n. The Motorcycle Accident. 
4. On May 25, 2008, Claimant was injured while riding as a passenger on a motorcycle that 
was being operated by Jon Steele ("Steele"), who is now her husband. They were married on 
December 8, 2008. The accident happened on Warm Springs Ave., below the Mesa area, east of Boise 
in Ada County, Idaho. The cycle, which was being driven by Steele in an easterly direction at a speed of 
about 30 mph, drifted to the right side of the road and sideswiped a concrete barrier, known as a Jersey 
barrier, which was situated on the south side of the road. Steele's actions were the sole cause of the 
accident because he failed to control the cycle and allowed it to drift to the right and into the barrier. 
5. When the cycle accident occurred on May 25, 2008, Claimant was sitting in the passenger seat 
behind the driver. Her back was supported by a backrest. Claimant's right side, including her hand, ann 
and hip came in contact with the barrier. Claimant suffered abrasions and contusions on her right hand, 




which remains scarred. There were no abrasions on Claimant's elbow or shoulder. The contact with the 
barrier rotated Claimant's upper torso in a clockwise direction during the collision. 
6. When the cycle accident occurred, Claimant was not wearing protective clothing such as leathers, 
gloves or a helmet, but there is no evidence that the injuries she suffered, except perhaps the injury to the 
back of her hand, would have been materially reduced by such protective wear. 
7. The collision with the barrier damaged the gas tank, foot pegs and other areas on the right side of 
the cycle. The cycle remained operable after the collision. The driver brought the cycle to a controlled 
stop and then drove the cycle and Claimant to Steele's residence. Claimant then drove herself home. The 
accident was not reported to law enforcement authorities. 
C. Claimant's Medical History. 
8. The extent of injuries suffered by Claimant in the accident and the cause of such injuries are 
disputed by the Respondent, which makes certain aspects of Claimant's prior physical condition and 
medical history relevant. 
1. Claimant's Pre-Accident Medical History. 
9. In 2000, Claimant was stiuck in the right shoulder by the min-or on her motor vehicle 
when a passing motorist struck the mirror and it broke off and flew through an open window into 
her right shoulder. 
10. On February 1, 2001, Claimant was in a motor vehicle accident during which her vehicle, a 
Dodge Durango, was struck from the rear by a pickup truck going about 50 mph. Claimant was injured in 
that collision. 
11. Claimant was seen on February I, 200 I by Dr. Ten-y Little, M.D., ("Dr. Terry Little") for the 
injuries Claimant suffered in the February I, 200 I accident. 
12. On March 19, 2001, Dr. David Price, D.C., ("Dr. Price") saw Claimant on referral from Dr. 
Terry Little for injuries from the February 1, 200 I accident. She told Dr. Price she had a history of a prior 
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accident involving her right shoulder. She told him that in June of 2000, she was driving a motor vehicle 
with the window rolled down and was sideswiped by another vehicle, breaking the mirror off and 
throwing it against Claimant's right shoulder. She was being treated by Dr. Welker for the 2000 accident. 
Claimant told Dr. Price she was substantially better from a pain standpoint and was almost back to full 
function, estimating she was probably 90 - 95% recovered from the prior injury. 
13. On March 19, 200 I, Dr. Price reported that Claimant "reports pain in her head that is 
predo111i11a11tly iu the temple, frontal aud siuus areas aud has a constant headache since the time of the 
accident. It is variable -- it is of variable intensity. Generally, she feels the headaches have probably 
worsened slightly." Dr. Price also reported in 2001 "patient [Claimant] has pain in the cervical spine that 
is presently bilaterally. This is a deep aching pain, stiffness, and soreness with sharpness on movements in 
extension or toward the right side." Dr. Price also reported in 200 I, "The patient [Claimant] has been 
experiencing symptoms of pain, numbness and tingling down the right lateral upper arm, crossing into the 
medial forearm and into the #4 and 5 digits on the right hand." Claimant told Dr. Price that following the 
February I, 2001 accident she had immediate onset of headache and neck pain. She reported she has new 
pains and an exacerbation of her old pains and feels like she is now worse than even right after the 
accident, as her condition has continued to deteriorate. 
14. Dr. Price examined Claimant on March 19, 2001 and made the following diagnoses: 
• Cervical thoracic acceleration/deceleration sprain/strain injury with posuramatic 
biomeclmnical dysfunction, muscular spasming; 
• Lumbrosacral and sacroiliac sprain/strain injury with posttraumatic bio mechanical 
dysfunction, muscular spasming; and 
• Right shoulder sprain/strain injury that involved the rotator cuff muscle with possible 
impingement, and right upper extremity symptoms. 
Dr. Price treated Claimant for these injuries until December of 2002. 
15. On August 30, 200 I, an l'vlRI sea~ was performed on Claimant. The scan demonstrated intact 
rotator cuff; an extensive tear of the superior labrum that is comparable to a slap tear; right 
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shoulder diffuse parascapular strain syndrome; and component of clinical rotator cuff tendinitis 
impingement type syndrome. 
16. On September 25, 2001, on referral from Dr. Michael O'Brien, M.D., Claimant saw Dr. 
Thomas Goodwin, M.D., ("Dr. Goodwin"), an orthopedic surgeon at Boise Orthopedic Clinic for 
some complaints regarding her right shoulder; pain limitations in motion, and weakness in her 
right shoulder attributed to the accident on February 1, 2001. Upon examination, Dr. Goodwin 
diagnosed: 1) right shot1lder diffuse parascapular strain syndrome 2) superior glenoid labral tear 
and 3) component of clinical rotator cuff tendinitis impingement type syndrome. He 
recommended nonsurgical management of her condition. 
17. On April IS, 2002, Claimant again saw Dr. Goodwin with complaints of pain in her right 
shoulder, she complained it was getting worse with light activities, such as riding a bicycle. He again 
recommended nonsurgical management of the condition. 
18. On.July 25, 2002, Dr. Goodwin again saw Claimant. He examined her and made the following 
diagnoses: l) right shoulder rotator cuff tendinits and impingement; 2) right shoulder labral tear; 3) 
posterior perilabral cyst extending into spinoglenoid notch of scapula with potential compression of 
suprascapular nerve. This time he recommended surgery. 
19. On July 26, 2002, Claimant had surgery on her right shoulder petformed by Dr. Goodwin at 
Healthsouth Treasure Valley Hospital. The preoperative diagnoses were: l) right shoulder Jabral tears; 2) 
rotator cuff impingement syndrome; and 3) Acromioclavicular joint osteoarthritis and chondromalacia. 
The postoperative diagnoses were the same. 
20. Dr. Price continued to treat Claimant. On November 18, 2002, Dr. Price gave a prognosis that he 
expected in her cervical spine she would have episodes of symptomatic and functional regression 
occurring most probably about once a quarter and that these would involve tightening through the 
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suboccipital region, which is at the base of the skull, leading to headaches and stiffness in the upper 
cervical spine and that it would probably take her anywhere from two to up to four treatments to get her 
past that. Dr. Price also noted that she may have some residuals in the mid-back area between the 
shoulder blades and that she would be more susceptible to premature degenerative change in her cervical 
spine related to the altered mechanics because of the accident on February I, 2001. 
21. On November 25, 2002, Claimant saw Dr. Price, claiming she had turned her head and had a 
sudden onset of sharp pain in the cervical area he had been treating. Dr. Price continued to treat her for 
this condition, which he relates to the February I, 2001 accident, until December 11, 2002. At this time 
she had residual cervical thoracic pain that was spreading from her trapezius ridge area upward into the 
base of her occiput. Also, mid-back pain predominantly across the bra line area that affected some of her 
endurance when she would be exercising. Dr. Price did not see Claimant again until 2006. 
22. On February 15, 2006, Dr. Price saw Claimant. She indicated she was having some headaches 
and neck pain, and she thought it was from sleeping wrong. She reported she was not having upper 
extremity symptoms but was sore through her shoulders with dominance on the left and that previously it 
had been more dominant toward the right side. Dr. Price gave a diagnosis that she had a cervical facet and 
a costovertebral impingement with a cervical torticollis, muscular spasming, myofascitis, and 
compensatory thoracolumbar mechanical strain. He saw her and treated her on two occasions after that. 
23. On June 20, 2007, Dr. Price next saw Claimant. She presented for evaluation and treatment of 
primary left-sided hip pain and cervical thoracic pain. She reported she had been on a backpacking trip 
and had felt that probably her cervical thoracic pain was related to that. The pain was extending up into 
the suboccipital region, which Dr. Price in 2002 had anticipated would probably happen to her. She 
reported herself experiencing a generalized pain, numbness, and tingling in both upper extremities with 
dominance on the right side, but she did not have focal weakness. She did have some endurance weakness 
that Dr. Price thought was related to some rotator cuff muscle impingement point problems that she was 
having. She also tested positive for some thoracic outlet syndrome symptoms and she possibly had some 
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underlying disk etiology for radicular type symptoms. Dr. Price treated her for this condition on five 
occasions. 
24. On October 24, 2007, Claimant presented to Dr. Price because of tightness in her cervical 
thoracic region. He saw her and treated her on five occasions for that condition. The last treatment was 
on November 1, 2007. 
25. On January 14, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Price with right-sided dominant cervical thoracic 
pain and muscular tightness and spasm. She also complained of pain throughout the trapezius ridge and 
into the right levator scapula. She was treated on two occasions for this condition. She was scheduled for 
two more treatments on May 15 and 22, 2008 but did not appear for those. At this time Dr. Price 
suspected she could have a C6 disk that could be causing her some nerve root irritation, but she did not 
have hard or progressive neurologicals that would be supportive of nerve root compression. 
26. On February 27, 2008, Dr. Price tr~ated Claimant for paracervical thoracic muscular pain, 
tightness and spasm. She also had pain throughout the trapezius ridge and into the right levator scapula. 
He noted "C6 disk - weak right triceps" and C5-C6-C7 dysfunction resulting from the 2001 accident. Dr. 
Price treated Claimant for this condition on five occasions in March and four occasions in April of 2008. 
Dr. Price started Claimant on some home traction for self-maintenance because of the underlying 
degenerative changes that she had. He noted that she had improved to the point that by the end of April 
his plan was to work with her one time per week for about two weeks and then go to a two-week interval. 
The plan was for her to begin her regular work_outs again at the gym on May 8, 2008. 
27. On May 15, 2008, Claimant saw Dr. Price who noted her right cervical thoracic region was 
continuing to improve and he expected her to be on her workout regimen and able to take care of herself. 
28. Prior to the cycle accident on May 25, 2008, Claimant was being treated by Dr. Price for 
muscular spasming and pain through the cervical thoracic region extending into the right shoulder. 
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2. Claimant,s Posl-Acciclenl Medical History. 
29. When the cycle accident occurred on May 25, 2008, Claimant was sitting in the passenger seal 
behind the driver. Her back was supported by a backrest. Claimant's right side, including her hand, arm 
and hip came in contact with the barrier. Claimant suffered abrasions and contusions on her right hand, 
which remains scarred. There were no abrasions on Claimant's elbow or shoulder. The contact with the 
barrier rotated Claimant's upper torso in a clockwise direction during the collision. Following the 
accident, Claimant was not feeling well. She experienced problems, including spasms, pain in her neck 
and her right shoulder, and she suffered from headaches. 
30. On May 26, 2008, Claimant presented at McMillan Medical Clinic and was seen by Dr. Natalie 
A. Domangue-Shiflett, M.D., ("Dr. Shiflett") for an open wound on her right hand. The Clinic personnel 
scrubbed the debris from her hand, which was painful and treated it. Claimant returned to McMillan 
Medical Clinic on May 27, 2008 for follow-up treatment of her right hand injury. 
3 I. On May 29, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Price for injuries suffered during the cycle accident. 
Dr. Price noted that her hand and side had been impacted into the barrier and her body, head, and shoulder 
had been violently swung backwards. Dr. Price reported on May 29, 2008, "[t]he patient [Claimant] 
reports that she has headache pain in the occipital region traveling to the frontal area, but predominantly 
in the occipital portion of the head. lt has been constantly present since a short time following the 
accident, but it is of variable intensity." Upon Examination of Claimant, Dr. Price reported he found: 
• She had posterior paracervical muscular spasming that was extending from the upper 
portion of the neck in the suboccipital region down through the cervical-thoracic 
junction, and outward into the shoulders, downward into the shoulder blades or scapulae. 
• When Dr. Price stimulated or tested the suboccipital trigger points they reproduced her 
headache pains that she was complaining of and when it was done to the musculature, it 
substantially intensified the pain into the neck, out to the shoulders, down into the 
shoulder blades. There was radiation into the right shoulder and into the right scapula or 
shoulder blade. 
• Claimant was decreased in her extension or bending backwards of the neck by about 
25%, and this produced a middle-to-low pinching pain in the cervical spine. She could 
force through that but it was with marked pain intensification. 




• Claimant was decreased in her rotation to the right side by about one-third but it was 
full to the left side. · 
• Claimant's lateral flexion to the left was decreased about 50% and to the right about 
25%. The end points of those motions were accompanied by substantial pain. 
• When Claimant had a cervical distraction test, pulling up on her neck, it was painful in 
the suboccipital region. 
• When Claimant had a shoulder depression test, it was painful on the opposite side with 
dominance on the right. 
• When Claimant had a foraminal compression test, which would be pressing down on 
the cervical spine vertically, it was painful, but if an extension or lateral flexion 
component was added, the pain intensified and was dominantly painful to the right side, 
causing radiation into the shoulder and shoulder blade itself. The function on her left 
shoulder in movement was normal and painless. 
• The function on her right shoulder in movement was restricted and painful in the upper 
portions of that movement. The right shoulder blade or scapula was hypo mobile, showing 
significant decrease in mobility compared to normal. 
• The reduction of the circumduction or circular movement of the right shoulder was 
restricted about one-third in comparison to what was able to be accomplished on the left 
side; that abduction of the right shoulder was decreased about one-third on the right wide, 
or in other words lifting it up, in comparison to the left. 
• Internal rotation or bringing the shoulder -- the hand back behind the back was 
decreased about 25% on the right side in comparison to the left. 
• The insertion point of the common tendon of the rotator cuff muscle group was very 
painful to palpation. 
• The rhomboid muscles or the muscles between the shoulder blades were spasmed 
bilaterally, extending into the spinal muscles. 
• The part of the rotator cuff muscle group in the teres minor and the infraspinatus 
muscles, which are on the back of the shoulder blade, were spasmed and painful. If those 
trigger points were tested or pressed on or stimulated, they reproduced paraesthesia and 
pain down the right upper extremity. 
• Claimant also had indication of possible thoracic outlet syndrome with positive testing 
with scalenus muscle involvement through a part of the cervical spine that reproduced 
some pain and paresthesia in the right upper extremity. 
• Claimant had substantial abrasions on the hand/wrist area. 
• Claimant showed significant endurance weakness in the triceps muscle on the right side, 
and the top two segments in her neck. 
• The C5 through 7 segments in her cervical spine showed significant restriction 
biomechanical ly. 
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• Between her shoulder blades the spinal segments involved in that area showed 
significant abnormal movement. 
• The musculature in the front of the cervical spine was strained and painful and weak on 
strength testing, especially if it was tested from an angle--a 45 degree angle from the 
patient's right or left. 
• In testing of the low back the Claimant was very flexible in that she could reach her 
mid-shin area with some pulling pain across her low back but her extension was not so 
flexible as she was limited about 50% because of low back pain. 
• Lateral flex ion on side bending to the side toward the right was decreased about one-
third but it was full to the left. 
• Rotation to the right was decreased about 20% but full to the left. These restricted 
motions produced pain across the lumbosacral region but did not cause lower extremity 
symptoms. 
• The buttocks musculature was spasmed, particularly on the right side. Stimulation of 
trigger points there reproduced some of her pains in the lower extremities, like a sciatic 
neuralgia type of pain and it radiated grade 2, which would mean down to the knee. 
• When laying in a prone or face-down position, Claimant was restricted in lifting the 
right lower extremity, indicating sacroiliac joint dysfunction and lumbosacral pain. 
• In a sitting position, when she straightened her legs bilaterally with both legs going up, 
the chin brought to her sternum, and a straining maneuver performed, it significantly 
increased the pain the neck/upper back area. 
• In the lower extremities the anterior tibiallis muscle, which is the muscle that lifts the 
foot up toward the knee, showed significant weakness with endurance. 
• When Claimant bent backwards and to the right and to the left, she had significant 
increase in her low back pain but it did not cause lower extremity radiations. Her 
parathoracolumbar musculature was spasmed and weak when tested in both a clockwise 
and counterclockwise rotational direction . 
.. 
32. Many of these findings that were reported by Dr. Price on May 29, 2008, had also been 
reported upon examination of Claimant by Dr. Price on March 19, 2001 when he treated her for 
the injuries she suffered from the rear-end collision. Under conclusions in the 2008 report, it says, 
"A cervicotharacic sprain/strain injury with posttraumatic biomechanical dysfunction and 
muscular spasming." This is almost identical to the conclusions in the 2001 report. Under 
conclusion #3 in 2008 report, it refers to "the lumbosacral/sacroiliac sprain/strain injury with 
posttraumatic biomeclmnical dysfunction and muscular spasming" and it says word for word the 
same thing in the 2001 report. Under conclusion #4 in the 2008 report, it states: "indications of 
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present sclerogenic right upper extremity pain/paraesthesia related to a rotator cuff injury and 
sclerogenic referral points being active ... " lu the 200 I report at conclusion No. 4, it states, 
"Right upper extremity symptoms that could have a radicular component, but most probably 
involved sclerogenic symptoms related to the right shoulder." 
33. On May 29, 2008, Dr. Price took x-rays of Claimant that showed she had discogenic spondylosis 
or, in other words some wear and tear type of arthritis at the C5-C6-C7 levels, which are the bottom three 
segments in the cervical spine and there was clear mechanical dysfunction in her neck between a forward 
fle~ion and extension template view of her neck. In the 2001 x-ray report of Claimant, Dr. Price reported: 
"These x-rays show the patient to have mild discogenic spondylosis at the C6-7 level." 
34. On May 29, 2008, Dr. Price also x-rayed the low back area and it showed that she had a till of the 
lumbar spine toward the left side and some torqueing or what is called obliquity of the pelvis and some 
inferior tilting of the sacral base· toward the left side. 
35. Dr. Price opined that the injuries he found and reported when he examined Claimant on May 29, 
2008, were related to the motorcycle accident. 
36. On May 29, 2008, Dr. Price referred Claimant to Dr. James Bates, a physical medicine 
rehabilitation physician, for assistance medically. In a letter to Dr. Bates, Dr. Price states: 
• Claimant had a prior history of cervical disk involvement in the CS-6-7 areas; 
moderate discogenic spondylosis at those levels; he had recently seen her because of her 
CS-C6 disk. 
• She was doing home traction and was essentially pain free in the cervicothoracic 
region, with some residual tightness in the trapezius ridge and levator scapula muscles, 
and some intermittent radiation in the superior and medial scapulae. 
•Dr.Price was concerned about the flare up in the right upper extremity. Dr. Price was 
referring to the fact that the shoulder was now very symptomatic. By "upper extremity" 
Dr. Price was talking about the shoulder and down the arm. 
37. On June 6, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Bates for consultation and treatment. Dr. Bates 
treated Claimant with injections of Cortisone, which provided only temporary relief and he prescribed 
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pain killers and pain patches for Claimant. She saw Dr. Bates in June, July, August, September and 
October of 2008. The last visit was October 9, 2008. 
38. On August 27, 2008, Dr. Price reevaluated Claimant. She presented complaining that she went 
out of town on vacation and that her shoulder pain had gradually intensified, spread into the right side, 
middle to low shoulder blade area and that she was having difficulty sleeping, and was frustrated. She 
requested that something be done to ease her pain. Dr. Price recommended an MRI to determine the 
extent of her cervical disk injuries and possible nerve root impingement. She also complained of having 
substantial pain through part of the rotator cuff muscle group and Dr. Price suspected she might have a 
tear in the labrum of her shoulder. 
39. On September 8, 2008, an MRI was performed on Claimant which showed a "new disk extrusion 
arising from the dorsal right disk margin at C7-TI measuring approximately 9x3x4 millimeters in 
transverse and anterior to posterior and cranial to caudal height." Dr. Price explained that an "extrusion" 
is a type of herniation that has progressed to the point that the disk material has escaped the outside 
circumference of the disk and has migrated somewhat in a lobular type of fashion in some direction away 
from the disk and it has extruded or extended past the disk margin and creates somewhat of a lobular type 
of appearance. It may compress a nerve or it may be painful for the disk itself but not compress the nerve. 
40. Dr. Price opined that in Claimant's case, the extrusion was large enough to be causing nerve root 
compression. 
41. Dr. Price explained that the MRI showed a disk extrusion from the C7-TI space that was not 
present when the x-ray was taken of that area on May 29, 2008 and that the x-ray taken on May 29, 2008 
showed a comparatively normal disk space and did not show significant arthritic change or degenerative 
change at the C7-TI level. 
42. Dr. Price explained that he suspected a tear in Claimant's labrum in the right shoulder because 
she was continuing to have substantial pain in a portion of her range of motion and on circumduction, 
abduction, internal and now external rotation. He noted the combining of the mechanism of injury where 
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her shoulder was pulled back and in that way forced backwards and into the shoulder socket itself along 
with the continued symptomatology in spite of the injection into the shoulder to try to relieve some of the 
rotator cuff tendinitis and impingement pain led him to believe from this experience that there may be a 
tear of the labrum itself. 
43. On September 14, 2008, Claimant presented to Alderman Medical Acupuncture of Idaho for 
acupuncture treatments. She received IO acupuncture treatments between September 14, 2008 and 
October 27, 2008. They did not resolve her pain issues. 
44. On October 29, 2008, on referral from John Alderman, OMD, L.L.C., Claimant presented to Dr. 
Kenneth M. Little, M.D., ("Dr. Little") a Neurological surgeon with NeuroScience Associates, Boise, 
Idaho, for consultation regarding a chief complaint of neck pain, trapezius pain, and right shoulder pain. 
This was the initial visit with Dr. Little, who noted that Claimant reported having neck pain, trapezius 
pain, right shoulder, and right mid scapular pain since the accident on May 25, 2008. She has not noticed 
any weakness in her arms. She initially had some right arm numbness and tingling involving her right 
radial forearm, index finger, and middle finger, which has subsided. She has been experiencing 
headaches. 
45. Dr. Little reported the MRI dated September 8, 2008 shows a new C7-T I soft disc extrusion 
extending into the right ventral epidural space abutting the ventral dural sac adjacent to the anterior root 
of the right C8 nerve root. He noted that at CS-6 there is a loss of disc space height with mild to moderate 
broad based spondylitic ridging abutting the ventral cord surface. There is minimal neural foraminal 
narrowing, left greater than right at CS-6. At C6-7 there is disc space narrowing with mild circumferential 
broad based osseus spondylotic ridging. There is a small perineural cyst in the left neural foramina." Dr. 
Little's impression was "likely has right CS radiculitits secondary to a dramatic disc protrusion at C7-Tl ." 
"Complicating her symptomatology is a history of shoulder problems. Though I suspect her symptoms are 
not coming from her shoulder, it does remain a possibility." Dr. Little recommended a C7-TI 
transforaminal epidural steroid injection" at C6 and suggested a "decompression of the C8 nerve root by 
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way of anterior cervical approach." Because the injection at the C6 distribution eased Claimant's pain, Dr. 
Little opined the neck pain and radicular type arm pain was specifically in the C6 distribution. 
46. On November 24, 2008, Claimant had a C7-Tl anterior cervical decompression and fusion with 
iliac crest bone graft that was performed by Dr. Little. The preoperative diagnosis was right C8 
radiculopathy secondary to right C7-TI. traumatic herniated nucleus pulposus. The post-operative 
diagnosis was right C8 radiculopathy secondary to right C7-Tl traumatic herniated nucleus pulposus. 
47. Dr. Little opined that Claimant's injuries (the disk herniation) were caused by the cycle accident, 
based upon the MRI which showed mild degenerative changes at C7-TI with a new disk extrusion plus 
the observation on the MRI that the disk extrusion was associated with quite a bit of edema or swelling, 
meaning it is more likely recent rather than old, and given that just prior to the accident she had not had 
neck pain and did not have radicular sympt?ms, nerve root impingement symptoms. 
48. On December 3, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Little post operation. She reported she was 
doing well and without arm pain. 
49. On December 31, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Little for followup. She reported she was 
doing very well, with no radicular arm pain, but she did complain of trapezius pain and posterior neck 
pain. 
50. On January 9, 2009, Claimant presented at Hands-On-Physical Therapy for therapy prescribed 
by Dr. Little. She continued to receive physical therapy on a regular basis from January 9, 2009 to March 
25, 2009 and from May 11, 20 IO to June 3, 20 I 0. 
51. On March 26, 2009, Claimant presented to Dr. Little for further followup. She reported 
improvement in much of her neck pain with resolution of the pain radiating into her face and well as the 
headaches. She complained of pain over her lateral right tr~pezius, under her right scapula and just below 
her right clavicle after rearranging clothes in her closet for over an hour. 
52. On April 27, 2010, on referral from Dr. Little, Claimant presented at Idaho Sports Medicine 
Institute and was seen by, Dr. Scot Scheffel, M.D. ("Dr. Scheffel") with complaints of right shoulder 
ARBITRATOR'S DECISION AND INTERIM AW ARD - 15 
81700.0040.5517163.2 
000433
pain and intermittent right arm numbness. Dr. Scheffel noted Claimant had "long standing right trapezius 
pain, some of which preceded her surgery and has persisted since then. She was doing relatively well, but 
then started increasing a workout program and was doing a lot of overhead activity and noticed increasing 
pain in her trapezius and also began having right arm numbness in the hand. The numbness is worse at 
night. Dr. Scheffel opined the trapezius and rhomboid pain was coming from some poor shoulder 
mechanics and recommended physical therapy. 
53. 011 August 18, 2011, Claimant presented to Dr. Scheffler for follow-up to recheck neck and 
shoulder pain. Her chart shows she had not really gotten any improvement with her exercises through 
physical therapy and she continued to have significant right-sided neck pain into the right trapezius that is 
much worse with heavy shoulder activity. She had grinding and popping in both shoulders. Dr. 
Scheffler's impression was persistent right shoulder and neck pain, question secondary to 
acromioclavicluar joint etiology versus other shoulder pathology. He prescribed and administered 
injections in the right AC joint with I cc of lidocaine and 1-1/2 cc ofKenalog. Claimant continued 
I 
treating with Dr. Scheffler from September 20, 2011 until November 4, 2011. 
54. On October 3, 2011, Claimant had an MRI taken of her right shoulder. Dr. Price explained that 
the MR1 of the shoulder that was taken on October 3, 2011 verified that Claimant had a tear .in the lab rum 
in the right shoulder. He explained that the MRI report showed a "non-displaced superior labral tear 
extending into the upper aspect of the anterior labrum" and also a "mild tendinosis involving the 
supraspinatus tendon without disruption." 
55. Dr. Price explained that the cartilage type of cushion inside the shoulder socket, that is called the 
labrum, was torn and there was a tendinitis, swelling, and inflammation of one of the rotator cuff muscle 
tendons called the supraspinatus muscle. 
56. On November 30, 2011, upon referral from Dr. Little, Claimant was seen by Dr. Thomas 
Goodwin for complaints of right shoulder pain, weakness and loss of range of motion. Claimant reported 
to Dr. Goodwin that her shoulder had done well since the prior surgery until the cycle accident and that 
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she had developed increasing shoulder and scapular pain. Claimant reported that she had to back off on 
her weightlifting activity as a result. 
57. Dr. Goodwin opined that the delay between the accident in May of 2008 and seeking treatment 
from him on November 30, 2011 is not uncommon. Dr. Goodwin's diagnosis was probable recurrent 
superior labral tear of her right shoulder and partial thickness rotator cuff tear of her right shoulder. 
58. On February 15, 2012, Claimant had a C5-6 anterior cervical discectomy and fusion with left iliac 
crest bone graft performed by Dr. Little at St. Luke's Regional Medical Center. The preoperative 
diagnoses were: C5-6 spondylosis, degene~ative disk disease and foraminal stenosis. The postoperative 
diagnoses were the same. Dr. Little reported that the surgery went well and Claimant recovered better 
than the first surgery. She wore a hard collar, then a soft collar during the period of recovery. 
59. On March 27, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was 
satisfactory unchanged anteriorC5-C6 and C7-TI fusions; C6-7 degenerative disease. 
60. On March 28, 2012, Claimant presented to Dr. Little with complaints of severe neck spasms, 
throbbing and parcsthcsias in her left arm after a walk. Her arm symptoms involve her posterior shoulder, 
triceps, ulnar forearm and hand, consistent with the C7 distribution. Dr. Little charted that he would keep 
her off work an additional two weeks. Dr. Little issued a prescription that required Claimant to remain off 
work through April 13, 20 L2. 
61. On April 12, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was C5-6 
nnd C7-I. fusion with no change in alignmeht or evidence of hardware complication; persistent C6-7 
degenerative disk disease. 
62. Dr. Little prescribed return to work with restrictions on April 13, 2012, with limitation on 
reaching overhead or lifting with her right arm, no repetitive movement with her right hand; also to wear 
a hard collar as necessary and avoid repetitive motions of her head. 
63. On May 7, 2012, Claimant was seen again by Dr. Goodwin. He recommended that she have 
surgery to repair her rigl1t shoulder. 




64. On May 22, 2012, Claimant had surgery on her right shoulder by Dr. Goodwin at Treasure Valley 
Hospital. The preoperative diagnoses were: I) right shoulder partial thickness rotator cuff tear; 2) superior 
labral tear, right shoulder, extending most likely into biceps tendon. The postoperative diagnoses were: 1) 
right shoulder partial thickness rotator cuff tear; 2) superior labral tear, right shoulder, extending most 
likely into biceps tendon; 3) humeral head and glenoid chondromalacia; 4) subdeltoid subacromial bursa! 
;idhesions. 
65. Dr. Goodwin reported that the labral tear that Dr. Goodwin saw in this surgery was in the same 
location but more macerated, more tom, and it extended into the biceps tendon where the biceps attaches 
in the shoulder at the upper part of the labrum; it was in the same location but more significant. 
66. Dr. Goodwin explained that in 2002, he just took a little shaver to smooth off the labrum and 
make it smooth again. In 2012 he made an incision lower on the shoulder to reattach the biceps lower 
down with a polyethylene anchor screw. Comparing the 2002 and 2012 rotator cuff problem or 
impingement, the findings at the 2012 surgery were in the same location of the rotator cuff but more 
advanced. 
67. On July 19, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was 
satisfactory appearance anterior discectomy and fusion procedure C5-6 and C7-Tl; no abnormal 
movement or fusion levels; and mild movement at C3-4 and C4-5. 
68. On September 27, 2012, Dr. Little referred Claimant to a pain doctor. He reported her pain was 
improving but she needed further care by a pain specialist. Her pain has never completely resolved. 
D. Claimanfs Claimed Injuries. 
1. Scrapes and Abrasions. 
69. Claimant was injured in the motorcycle accident and, as conceded by Respondent, she suffered 
scrapes and abrasions to her right hand and right hip, and is entitled to compensation for these injuries, 
without any deduction for contributory fault. 
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2. Right Shoulder. 
70. There is disagreement in the testimony and medicµ! records whether the motorcycle accident 
caused the labral and rotator cuff tears in her right shoulder. The evidence clearly establishes that 
Claimant had preexisting right shoulder pathology, particularly resulting from the motor vehicle accident 
in 200 I when she suffered right shoulder sprain/strain that involved the rotator cuff muscle with possible 
impingement, and right upper extremity symptoms. 
71. The MRI scan taken on August 30, 200 I demonstrated intact rotator cuff; an extensive tear of the 
superior labrum that is comparable to a slap tear; right shoulder diffuse parascapular strain syndrome; and 
component of clinical rotator cuff tendinitis impingement type syndrome. 
72. On July 25, 2002, Dr. Goodwin examined Claimant and made the following diagnoses: I) right 
shoulder rotator cuff tendinits and impingement; 2) right shoulder labral tear; 3) posterior perilabral cyst 
extending into spinoglenoid notch of scapula with potential compression of suprascapular nerve. Dr. 
Goodwin prescribed surgery. 
73. On July 26, 2002, Claimant had surgery on her right shoulder performed by Dr. Goodwin at 
HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hospital. The'postoperative diagnoses were: I) right shoulder labral tears; 2) 
rotator cuff impingement syndrome; and 3) Acromioclavicular joint osteoarthritis and chondromalacia. 
74. Claimant testified that she recovered fully from the shoulder surgery and resumed her normal 
activities, which included mountain biking, golfing, weight lifting, hiking, snowshoeing, spin classes, 
Yoga and Pilates workouts. The relevant medical records support Claimant's testimony that she was 
asymptomatic with respect to her righ,t shoulder prior to the cycle accident. 
75. Dr. Williams opined that the right shoulder conditions did not exist immediately following the 
cycle accident and therefore were not caused by it. The evidence does not support Dr. Williams' opinion. 
When Dr. Price examined Claimant on May 29, 2008, he reported, among other findings: 
• She had posterior paracervical muscular spasming that was extending from the upper 
portion of the neck in the suboccipital region down through the cervical-thoracic 
junction, and outward into the shoulders, downward into the shoulder blades or scapulae. 
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• When Dr. Price stimulated or tested the suboccipital trigger points they reproduced her 
headache pains that she was complaining of and when it was done to the musculature, it 
substantially intensified the pain into the neck, out to the shoulders, down into the 
shoulder blades. There was radiation into the right shoulder and into the right scapula or 
shoulder blade. 
• Claimant was decreased in her rotation to the right side by about one-third but it was 
full to the left side. 
• When Claimant had a shoulder depression test, it was painful on the opposite side with 
dominance on the right. 
• The function on her right shoulder in movement was restricted and painful in the upper 
portions of that movement. The right shoulder blade or scapula was hypomobile, showing 
significant decrease in mobility compared to normal. 
• The reduction of the circumduction or circular movement of the right shoulder was 
restricted about one-third in compa,ison to what was able to be accomplished on the left 
side; that abduction of the right shoulder was decreased about one-third 011 the right wide, 
or in other words lifting it up, in comparison to the left. 
• Internal rotation or bringing the shoulder -- the hand back behind the back was 
decreased about 25% on the right side in comparison to the left. 
• The insertion point of the common tendon of the rotator cuff muscle group was very 
painful to palpation. 
• The part of the rotator cuff muscle group in the teres minor and the infraspinatus 
muscles, which are on the back of the shoulder blade, were spasmed and painful. If those 
trigger points were tested or pressed 011 or stimulated, they reproduced paraesthesia and 
pain down the right upper extremity. 
76. On August 27, 2008, Dr. Price reevaluated Claimant. She presented complaining that her 
shoulder pain had gradually intensified, spread into the right side, middle to low shoulder blade area and 
that she was having difficulty sleeping and was frustrated. She also complained of having substantial pain 
through part of the rotator cuff muscle group and Dr. Price suspected she might have a tear in the labrum 
of her shoulder. 
77. Dr. Price explained that he suspected a tear in Claimant's labrum in the right shoulder because 
she was continuing to have substantial pain in a po1tio11 of her range of motion and 011 circumduction, 
abductio11, internal and now external rotation. He noted the combining of the mechanism of injury where 
her shoulder was pulled back and in that way forced backwards and into the shoulder socket itself along 
with the continued symptomatology in spite of the injection into the shoulder to try to relieve some of the 
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rotator cuff tendinitis and impingement pain led him to believe from this experience that there may be a 
tear of the labrum itself. 
78. On September 14, 2008, Claimant presented to Alderman Medical Acupuncture ofldaho for 
acupuncture treatments. She received IO acupuncture treatments between September 14, 2008 and 
October 27, 2008. They did not resolve her pain issues. 
79. On October 29, 2008, on referral from John Alderman, OMO, L.L.C., Claimant presented to Dr. 
Kenneth M. Little, M.D., neurological surgeon with Neuroscience Associates, Boise, Idaho, for 
consultation regarding a chief complaint of neck pain, trapezius pain, and right shoulder pain. Dr. Little 
noted that Claimant reported having neck pain, trapezius pain, right shoulder, and right mid scapular pain 
since the accident on May 25, 2008. She has not noticed any weakness in her arms. She initially had some 
right arm numbness and tingling involving her right radial forearm, index finger, and middle finger, 
which has subsided. 
80. On April 27, 2010, on referral from Dr. Little, Claimant presented at Idaho Sports Medicine 
Institute and was seen by, Dr. Scot Scheffel, M.D. ("Dr. Scheffel") with complaints of right shoulder 
pain and intermittent right arm nu_mbness. Dr. Scheffel noted Claimant had "long standing right trapczius 
pain, some of which preceded her surgery and has persisted since then. She was doing relatively well, but 
then started increasing a workout program and was doing a lot of overhead activity and noticed increasing 
pain in her trapezius and also began having right arm numbness in the hand. The numbness is worse at 
night. Dr. Scheffel opined the trapezius and rhomboid pain was coming from some poor shoulder 
mechanics and recommended physical therapy. 
81. On August I 8, 201 I, Claimant presented to Dr. Scheffler for followup to recheck neck and 
shoulder pain. Her chart shows she had not really gotten any improvement with her exercises through 
physical therapy and she continued to have significant right-sided neck pain into the right trapezius that is 
much worse with heavy shoulder activity. She had grinding and popping in both shoulders. Dr. 
Scheffler's impression was persistent right shoulder and neck pain, question secondary to 
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acromioclavicluar joint etiology versus other shoulder pathology. He prescribed and administered 
injections in the right AC joint with I cc of lidocaine and 1-1/2 cc of Kenalog. She continued treating 
with Dr. Scheffier from September 20, 2011 until November 4, 2011. 
82. On October 3, 2011, Claimant had an MRI taken of her right shoulder. Dr. Price explained that 
Lhe MR.I of Lhe shoulder Lhat was taken on OcLober 3, 2011 verified Lhat Claimant had a tear in the labrum 
in the right shoulder. He explained that the MRI report showed a "nondisplaced superior labral Lear 
extending into the upper aspect of the anterior labrum" and also a "mild tendinosis involving the 
supraspinatus tendon without disruption." 
83. Dr. Price explained that the cartilage type of cushion inside the shoulder socket, that is called the 
Iabrum, was torn and there was a tendinitis; swelling, and inflammation of one of the rotator cuff muscle 
tendons called the supraspinatus muscle. 
84. Dr. Price opined the tear in the labrum in the right shoulder and the trauma to the shoulder 
involving the rotator cuff muscles resulted from the motorcycle crash. Dr. Price explained that a labral 
tear is always undiagnosed until you see it 011 MRI or during a surgical procedure. 
85. Dr. Price deferred to Dr. Goodwin's opinion wilh respect to the prognosis on Lhe shoulder. 
86. Upon referral from Dr. Little, on November 30, 2011, Claimant was seen by Dr. Thomas 
Goodwin for complaints of right shoulder pain, weakness and loss of range of motion. Claimant reported 
to Dr. Goodwin that her shoulder had done well since the prior surgery until the cycle accident and that 
she had developed increasing shoulder and scapular pain. Claimant reported that she had to back off on 
her weightlifting activity as a result. 
87. Dr. Goodwin opined that the delay between the accident in May of 2008 and seeking treatment 
from him on November 30, 2011 is not uncommon. 
88. Dr. Goodwin's diagnosis on November 30, 2011, was probable recurrent superior labral tear of 
her right shoulder and partial thickness rotalor cuff tear of her right shoulder. He did not recommend 
surgery at that time. 
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89. Claimant was seen again by Dr. Goodwin on May 7, 2012. He recommended that she have 
surgery lo repair her shoulder. 
90. On May 22, 2012, Claimant had surgery on her right shoulder by Dr. Goodwin al Treasure Valley 
Hospital. The preoperative diagnoses were: 1) right shoulder paitial thickness rotator cuff tear; 2) superior 
labral tear, right shoulder, extending most likely into biceps tendon. The postoperative diagnoses were: 1) 
right shoulder partial thickness rotator cuff tear; 2) superior labral tear, right shoulder, extending most 
likely into biceps tendon; 3) humeral head and glenoid chondromalacia; 4) subdelloid subacromial bursa) 
adhesions. 
91. Dr. Goodwin reported that the labral tear that Dr. Goodwin saw in this surgery was in the same 
location but more macerated, more torn, and it extended into the biceps tendon where the biceps attaches 
in the shoulder al the upper patt of the labrum; it was in the same location but more significant. 
92. In 2002, Dr. Goodwin just took a little shaver lo smooth off the labrum and make it smooth again. 
In 2012 he made an incision lower on the shoulder to reattach the biceps lower down with a polyethylene 
anchor screw. Comparing the 2002 and 2012 rotator cuff problem or impingement, the findings al the 
2012 surgery were in the same location of the rotator cuff but a bit more advanced. 
93. Dr. Goodwin opined that what he saw in Claimant's shoulder in 2012 was more than just a 
degenerative wear and tear process; it was consistent with traumatic injury. 
94. Dr. Goodwin opined that Claimant's shoulder injuries were compatible with the type of injuries 
she would have sustained in the cycle accident in 2008. 
95. Dr. Goodwin opined that her shoulder injuries were caused by the cycle accident in 2008. 
96. Dr. Goodwin opined that based on his review of Dr. Price's records of treating Claimant, she was 
not asymptomatic regarding her upper back, the rhomboid, trapezius, and Ievator scapulai for which she 
was receiving treatment; but it could have been a stand-alone issue or it could have been related to 
shoulder or neck pathology, either one. It does not change his opinion relating to what he saw of her 
shoulder. 
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97. Dr. Goodwin opined Lhal Claimant was symplomalic in lhe back of her shoulder on lhe dale of Lhe 
accidenl based on Dr. Price's records. Dr. Goodwin has doubts whether lhe cycle accidenl was Lhe sole 
cause of her shoulder condilion Lhal he observed in 2012. He opined lhal lhe cycle accidenl could have 
aggravated a pre-existing condition. 
98. Dr. Goodwin opined Lhal weight training by Claimant could possibly have played inlo some of 
Lhis (complaints of pain in her right shoulder and neck, and parnscapular pain) in 2012. He also opined 
Lhal Lhe weighl training could possibly have caused Lhe labrum Lear. 
99. Dr. Goodwin opined Lhal now knowing lhal she had lhe prelrealmenl or Lhe history before lhe 
accidenl and now knowing Lhal she had these difficullies wilh weighl lifting several years afler lhe 
accidenl before she had her surgery, he cannol say wilh a reasonable degree of medical certainly Lhal lhe 
cycle accident was Lhe sole and only cause of lhe condition he repaired in 2012. He did nol offer an 
opinion of apportionment 
I 00. Dr. Goodwin opined Lhe Lorn labrum was Lhe primary reason for lhe surgery he performed. 
IO I. The Arbilralor will nol make a finding of causal ion or apportionment based on possibilities Lhal 
exercise weighl training could have caused or conlribuled lo Claimant's injuries in her righl shoulder. 
I 02. IL is lhe finding of lhe Arbilralor Lhal Lhe evidence establishes lhal the cycle accident was Lhe 
cause of lhe labrnl Lear and rotator cuff Lear_ in Lhe Claimant's righl shoulder and lhe evidence does nol 
suppmt a finding lhal lhere should be an apportionme·nl of causation or damages resulting from these 
injuries. Claimant has inel her burden of proof showing Lhe cycle accidenl caused these injuries to her 
right shoulder and she is entitled to compensation for these injuries. 
3. C7-T1 Neck Surgery. 
I 03. On May 29, 2008, Claimant presented Lo Dr. Price for the injuries she suffered during Lhc cycle 
accident He performed a complete examination of Claimant as related above. 
I 04. Dr. Price explained lhal lhe only part of the injuries he observed when he examined Claimant 
following the motorcycle accidenl lhal predated the motorcycle crash would have been Lhe C5, 6 and 7 
discogenic spondylosis. 
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I 05. Dr. Price did not find any preexisting degenerative condition in the C7-T I level of Claimant's 
spine. 
I 06. On September 8, 2008, an MRI was performed on Claimant, which showed a "new disk extrusion 
arising from the dorsal right disk margin at .C7-T I measuring approximately 9x3x4 millimeters in 
transverse and anterior to posterior and cranial to caudal height." Dr. Price explained that an ·"extrusion" 
is a type of herniation that has progressed to the point that the disk material has escaped the outside 
circumference of the disk and has migrated somewhat in a lobular type of fashion in some direction a way 
from the disk and it has extruded or extended past the disk margin and creates somewhat of a lobular type 
of appearance. It may compress a nerve or it may be painful for the disk itself but not compress the nerve. 
107. Dr. Price explained that in Claimant's case, the extrusion was large enough to be causing nerve 
root compression. 
108. Dr. Price explained that the MRI showed a disk extrusion from the C7-TI space that was not 
present when the x-ray was taken of that area on May 29, 2008 and that the x-ray taken on May 29, 2008 
showed a comparatively normal disk space·and did not show significant arthritic change or degenerative 
change at the C7-TI level. 
I 09. Dr. Price opined that the disk extrusion at the C7-TI level was the result of the May 25, 2008 
motorcycle crash. He also opined that the prognosis for that area is going to be one of continual problems 
because of the altered mechanics associated with the fusion. Dr. Price explained that Claimant will have 
an acceleration of the degenerative changes in the cervical spine as a result of the motorcycle accident and 
the multilevel surgery on her cervical spine above and below the surgical fusion. 
110. Dr. Price deferred to Dr. Little on the prognosis of the surgical fusion. 
11 I. On October 29, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Little for consultation regarding a chief 
complaint of neck pain, trapezius pain, and ·right shoulder pain on referral from John Alderman, OMD, 
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L.L.C. Dr. Little noted that Claimant reported having neck pain, trapezius pain, right shoulder, and right 
mid scapular pain since the accident on May 25, 2008. She has not noticed any weakness in her arms. She 
initially had some right arm numbness and tingling involving her right radial forearm, index finger, and 
,niddle finger, which has subsided. She has been experiencing headaches. 
112. Dr. Little reported the MRI dated September 8; 2008 shows a new C7-T I soft disc extrusion 
extending into the right ventral epidural space abutting the ventral dural sac adjacent to the anterior root 
of the right CS nerve root. At CS-6 there is a loss of disc space height with mild to moderate broad based 
spondylitic ridging abutting the ventral cord surface. There is minimal neural foraminal narrowing, left 
greater than right at CS-6. At C6-7 there is disc space narrowing with mild circumferential broad based 
osseus spondylotic ridging. There is a small perineural cyst in the left neural foramina." Dr. Little's 
impression was "likely has right CS radiculitits secondary to a dramatic disc protrusion at C7-T I." 
"Complicating her symptomatology is a histo1y of shoulder problems. Though I suspect her symptoms are 
not coming from her shoulder, it does remain a possibility." Dr. Little recommended a C7-T I 
transforaminal epidural steroid injection" at C6 and suggested a "decompression of the CS nerve root by 
way of anterior cervical approach." Because the injection at the C6 distribution eased Claimant's pain, Dr. 
Little opined the neck pain and radicular type arm pain was specifically in the C6 distribution. 
113. On November 24, 2008, Claimant had a C7-TI anterior cervical decompression and fusion with 
iliac crest bone graft that was performed by Dr. Little. The preoperative diagnosis was right C8 
radiculopathy secondary to right C7-Tl traumatic herniated nucleus pulposus. The post-operative 
diagnosis was right C8 radiculopathy secondary to right C7-TI traumatic herniated nucleus pulposus. 
114. Dr. Little opined that Claimant's injuries (the disk herniation) were caused by the cycle accident, 
based upon the MRI which showed mild degenerative changes at C7-TI with a new disk extrusion plus 
the observation on the MRI that the disk extrusion was associated with quite a bit of edema or swelling, 
meaning it is more likely recent rather than old, and given that just prior to the accident she had not had 
neck pain and did not have radicular symptoms, nerve root impingement symptoms. 
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115. Dr. Little opined that Claimant's injuries were a combination of her condition prior to the 
accident and her symptoms afterwards. 
116. Dr. Little had no knowledge of the existence of symptoms at C7-T I prior to the cycle accident or 
the treatment she was getting from Dr. Price. He based his opinion that the accident led to the surgery on 
a lack of prior symptoms. 
117. Dr. Little opined that the existence of prior symptoms would indicate that the accide11t aggravated 
the prior condition, but was not the sole cause of the condition. Dr. Little opined that he does not have 
enough information to opine on the apportionment of the prior condition at C7-T I. 
118. Dr. Wilso11 opined that Claimant's treatment and surgery al C7-T I should be apportioned 50% to 
a preexisting condition and 50% to the cycle accident. The Arbitrator finds that Dr. Wilso11's opinion is 
based on speculation. The medical evidence presented by the attending physicians, Dr. Price and Dr. 
Little, does not suppo1t this conclusion. Both opined and the medical evidence supports their opinions 
thatthe extrusion at C7-TJ was a new condition that was caused by the cycle accident and was the cause 
of the symptoms that required the surgery. 
I J 9. Tbe evidence as explained by Dr. price when he compared the results of the MRI with the prior x-
ray of Claimant, clearly establishes that the extrusion was not a preexisting condition. The x-ray taken 011 
May 29, 2008 showed a comparatively normal disk space and did not show significant arthritic change or 
degenerative change at the C7-TJ level. Thus, the Arbitrator finds that the evidence does not support a 
finding that the cycle accident aggravated auy preexisting condition at C7-T I, which required the surgery. 
No apportionment can reasonably be made by the Arbitrator and the Respondent is liable for the entire 
damage for this injury. 
4. C5-C6 Neck Surgery. 
J 20. The evidence establishes that Claimant suffered C5-C6-C7 dysfunction resulting from the 200 I 
accident for which Claimant received treatment from Dr. P_rice up to and including in April of 2008. The 
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plan was for her to continue treatments from Dr. Price one or two times per week and return to her regular 
workouts at the gym on May 8, 2008. The last visit to Dr. Price prior to the cycle accident was on May 
15, 2008. He noted that her right cervical thoracic region was continuing to improve and he expected her 
to return to her workout regimen and be able to take care of herself. He opined that at that point she was 
probably 90% - 95% asymptomatic from the injuries she received in the 2001 accident. 
121. Dr. Price opined that some of the injuries suffered by Claimant in the cycle accident were 
probably similar to those she had in 2001 when she had sustained a sprain/strain injury to her cervical 
spine and this time sustained a sprain and a strain injury to her cervical spine. 
122. Dr. Price opined that the injuries he found when he examined Claimant on May 29, 2008, were 
related to the cycle accident. Dr. Price opined that the only part of the injuries he observed when he 
examined Claimant following the motorcycle accident that predated the motorcycle crash would have 
been the CS, 6 and 7 discogenic spondylosis. 
123. The x-rays taken by Dr. Price on May 29, 2008 showed that Claimant had discogenic spondylosis 
at the CS, 6 and 7 levels and there was clear mechanical dysfunction in her neck between a forward 
flexion and extension template view of her neck. Dr. Price opined that there was an aggravation of disk 
problems in her cervical spine in the C6 region that were causing some radicular patterns, and that is the 
part that he felt was related to the old sprain injury because she had some pre-existing discogenic 
spondylosis or arthritis in that region that probably caused her some nerve root irritation and some 
patterns of pain that were similar in pattern to what she had before. 
124. Dr. Price opined that the injuries themselves were new but the areas of involvement in the C6 
region were similar through CS, 6 and 7. 
125. Dr. Price opined that the trauma Claimant had in 2000 and in 200 I had an accelerating effect 
upon the degeneration in her CS, 6 and 7 regions. These were evident in the x-rays that Dr. Price took in 
200 I and repeated in 2008. They arc the wear and tear type of thinning and spurring and arthritic changes 
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that one would expect to occur from trauma and age. Dr. Price used the two x-rays to illustrate his 
testimony showing narrowing and spurring that occurred between 2001 and 2008 at CS, 6 and 7. He 
opined that they are not substantial increases but they are increased. He further opined that the 2008 x-
rays show the 11or111ally expected mild progression of the degenerative change that he thought would 
happen at the CS, 6 and 7 levels. 
126. Dr. Price opined that because of the prior history of trauma and their anatomical positioning in 
the cervical spine, the CS, 6 and 7 areas were very susceptible to injury in these type of snapping type 
injuries, and that the injuries would have been a major aggravation to those segments at CS, 6 and 7. Dr. 
Price explained that by "aggravation" he means that it is something that a new insult, injury or trauma has 
been superimposed upon an area that may previously have been symptomatic but that the trauma was 
sufficient to re-injure or create new trauma on that same tissue again. 
127. On May 29, 2008, Dr. Price referred Claimant to Dr. James Bates, a physical medicine 
rehabilitation physician, for assistance medically. In a letter to Dr. Bates, Dr. Price states, in relevant part 
• Clai111a11t had a prior history of cervical disk involvement in the CS-6-7 areas; moderate 
discogeuic spondylosis at those levels; he had recently seen her because of her C5-C6 
disk. 
128. On J uue 6, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Bates for consultation and treatment. Dr. Bates 
treated Claimant with injections of CortiS~f!e, which provided only temporary relief and he prescribed 
pain killers and pain patches for Claimant. She saw Dr. Bates in June, July, August, September and 
October of 2008. The last visit was October 9, 2008. 
I 29. On October 29, 2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Little for consultation regarding a chief 
complaint of neck pain, trapezius pain, and right shoulder pain. Dr. Little noted that Claimant reported 
havi1ig neck pain, trapezius pain, right shoulder, and right mid scapular pain since the accident 011 May 
25, 2008. She has not noticed any weakness in her arms. She initially had some right arm numbness and 
tingling involving her right radial forearm, index finger, and middle finger, which has subsided. She has 
been experiencing headaches. 
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130. Dr. Little was aware of the neural foraminal narrowing at CS-6-7. He reported: ''the MRI dated 
September 8, 2008 shows a new C7-Tl soft disc extrusion extending iuto the right ventral epidural space 
abutting the ventral dural sac adjacent to the anterior root of the right C8 nerve root. Al CS-6 there is a 
loss of disc space height with mild to moderate broad based spondylitic ridging abutting the ventral cord 
surface. There is minimal neural foraminal narrowing, left greater than right al CS-6. Al C6-7 there is disc 
space narrowing with mild circumferential broad based osseus spondylotic ridging. There is a small 
perineum! cyst in the left neural foramirm." Dr. Little's impression was "likely has right C8 radiculitits 
secondary to a dramatic disc protrusion at C7-Tl ." "Complicating her symptomatology is a history of 
shoulder problems. Though I suspect her symptoms are not coming from her shoulder, it does remain a 
possibility." Dr. Little recommended a C7-TI transforaminal epidural steroid injection" at C6 and 
suggested a "decompression of the C8 nerve root by way of anterior cervical approach." Because the 
injection at the C6 distribution cased Claimant's pain, Dr. Little opined the neck pain and radicular type 
arm pain was specifically in the C6 distribution. 
131. Dr. Little treated Claimant's CS-6 level and opined her condition was a combination of her 
condition prior lo the accident and symptoms afterwards. 
132. Dr. Little opined the CS-6 disk problem was not a herniation; it was spondylosis impingement of 
the nerve that was creating pain. Dr. Little explained that the impingement of the nerve came from the 
process of spondylosis. Dr. Little opined that an MRI done in 2000 shows pre-existing spondylosis and 
bone spurring at the CS-6. He testified spondylosis is a progressive disease. Dr. Little opined that the 
spondylosis probably worsened between 2000 and the accident in 2008. 
133. On February 15, 2012, Claimant had a CS-6 anterior cervical discectomy and fusion with left iliac 
crest ·bone graft performed by Dr. Lillie al St. Luke's Regional Medical Center. The preoperative 
diagnoses were: CS-6 spondylosis, degenerative disk disease and foraminal stcnosis. Tl1c postoperative 
diagnoses were the same. Dr. Little reported that the surgery went well and Claimant recovered better 
than the first surgery. She wore a hard collar, then a soft collar during the period of recovery. 
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134. On March 27, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was 
satisfactory unchanged anterior C5-C6 and C7-Tl. fusions. 
135. On March 28, 2012, Claimant presented to Dr. Little with complaints of severe neck spasms, 
throbbing and paresthesias in her left arm after a walk. Her arm symptoms involve her posterior shoulder, 
triceps, ulnar forearm and hand, consistent with the C7 distribution. Dr. Little charted that he would keep 
her off work an additional two weeks. Dr. Little issued a prescription that required Claimant to remain off 
work through April 13, 2012. 
136. On April 12, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion. was C5-6 
and C7-I fusion with no change in alignment or evidence of hardware complication; persistent C6-7 
degenerative disk disease. 
137. Dr. Little prescribed return to work with restrictions on April 13, 2012, with limitation on 
reaching overhead or lifting with her right arm, no repetitive movement with her right hand; also to wear 
a hard collar as necessary and avoid repetitive motions of her head. 
138. On July 19, 2012, Claimant had x-rays at St. Luke's Medical Imaging. The conclusion was 
satisfactory app,rance anterior discectom~ and fusion procedure C5-6 and C7-Tl; no abnormal 
movement or fusion levels; and mild movement at C3-4 and C4-5. 
139. Dr. Little opined that the MRis of Claimant that were perfonned in September 2000, August 2008 
and October 3, 2011, all show C6-C7 to have problems, including disk space narrowing and bone 
spurring like the C5-C6. 
140. Dr. Little opined that after reviewing Dr. Price's report, Claimant's symptoms were almost 
resolved and essentially pain free with residual tightness in the trapezius of her scapula muscles and some 
intermittent radiation into the superior and medial scapula, but that she was not resolved prior to the cycle 
accident. 
141. Dr. Little opined that his operative findings at C5-6 were consistent with a long-standing 
preexisting C5-6 spondylosis. 
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142. Dr. Lillie opined that the injury and surgery at the C5-6 level was caused by the cycle accident. 
He treated Claimant for her C5-6 foraminal stenosis (bone spur was narrowing the nerve opening). Dr. 
opined there were degenerative changes as shown by the rvIRI that were not symptomatic, which was 
aggravated and became symptomatic following the cycle accident. 
143. Dr. Little could not say the cycle accident was the sole and only cause of Claimant's symptoms 
and need for surgery because of the underlying spondylosis that existed prior to the cyck accident. Dr. 
Lillie could not give an opinion of apportionment between the condition or disability prior to the accident 
and the condition or disability caused by the accident. 
144. On September 27, 2012, Dr. Little refen·ed Claimant to a pain doctor. He reported her pain was 
improving but she needed further care by a pain specialist. Her pain had never completely resolved. Dr. 
Lillie opined that Claimant's pain was the result of the cycle accident. 
145. It is the finding of the Arbitrator that the evidence establishes that Claimant had a long standing 
preexisting C5-6 spondylosis that was not symptomatic prior to the cycle accident, but was aggravated 
and became symptomatic following the cycle accident. The evidence also establishes that Claimant was 
injured in the C5-6 area in the 2001 rear-end accident and as reported by Claimant and Dr. Price, was 
only 90-95% recovered from the 200 I rear-end accident when she was injured in the cycle accident. This 
condition was symptomatic and Claimant was still receiving treatment from Dr. Prior up to the time of the 
accident. 
146. Dr. Wilson opined that based on his review of the MRis, Claimant would have had surgery at C5-
6 even had there been no accident because the MRI findings were consistent with a natural progression of 
her preexisting spondylosis. It may be that someday the spondylosis would progress to the point where 
surgery would be advisable, but there is no evidence that establishes that it would have been required on 
February 15, 2012 or when that date would al'J'ive. The evidence does establish that it had not arrived on 
the date of the accident because the condition was asymptomatic on the date of the accident. The 
Arbitrator does not accept the opinion of Dr. Wilson that the spondylosis alone caused the need for the 
surgery at C5-6. 
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147. The evidence establishes that the cycle accident aggravated the preexisting injury and spondylosis 
condition and was the major cause of the need for the surgery at the CS-6 level. 
148. The Arbitrator finds that the preexisting condition at CS-6 was aggravated by the cycle accident 
and that an apportionment can reasonably be made. The Arbitrator finds that 25% of the cost of surgery 
for the CS-6 area should be appo1tioned to the pre-existing condition and 75% should be apportioned to 
the injury at CS-6 that was caused by the accident. 
5. Lost Income. 
149. Claimant has asserted a claim for lost income from the date of the accident to the present in the 
amount of£ 135,000. Claimant has the burden of proving that she actually lost income as a result of the 
accident and the amount thereof. 
150. Claimant testified that following the accident in 2008, she did not feel well and was unable to 
work at the same level she had been working prior to the accident. She also missed work while attending 
medical appointments with Dr. Price, Dr. Bates, Dr. Alderman, Dr. Little, and during the neck surgery on 
November 24, 2008. Following the neck surgery in November of 2008, she was unable to work during the 
recovery period. She also missed substantial work hours for medical appointments with Dr. Price and Dr. 
Little in 2009, 2010 and 201 I, therapy appointments with Hand-On Physical Therapy in 2009 and therapy 
appointments with Idaho Sports Medicine Institute in 20 IO and 2011. Claimant also missed work for 
medical appointments with Dr. Goodman in 2011. Following the second surgery on February 15, 2012, 
Claimant was unable to work during the recovery period and she missed additional substantial work hours 
for medical and therapy appointments following the surgery. Claimant also missed work during and 
following the shoulder surgery on May 22, 2012. Following the shoulder surgery she was unable to work 
during the period of recovery. She continued to lose work during medical visits with Dr. Little in 201.2. 
The evidence establishes that Claimant made a reasonable effort to work when she was able to do so, 
including working a second job at BCBG doing part-time retail sales beginning in 2009. The Arbitrator 
finds no evidence to support any claim that Claimant failed to mitigate her loss of income following the 
cycle accident. 
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I 5 I. Dr. Nancy J. Coll ins, PhD CRC, ("Dr. Collins"), a vocational rehab iii tation specialist in Boise, 
Idaho, opined that Claimant lost income of $135,000 during the 4.5 years following the cycle accident to 
the present. Dr. Collins also opined that Claimant may have some reduced income in the future but she 
did not project or opine on the amount. Thus, the Arbitrator will not award future lost income. 
152. Shannon Purvis, a vocational rehabilitation specialist in Boise, Idaho, opined that Claimant 
possessed the capacity to work following the cycle accident and that no objective evidence proved any 
loss of income by Claimant from the date of the accident to the date of the hearing. She criticized Dr. 
Collins opinion of lost income as being based only of production factors and not other factors, such as the 
recession. Ms. Purvis testified she would limit the loss income to the periods of recovery from surgery 
that Claimant experience, but she did not quantify the amounts lost. The opinions of Ms. Purvis are not 
based on or supported by the relevant evidence. 
153. The Arbitrator finds that Claimant lost income as a result of the cycle accident in the amount of 
$135,000. Dr. Collins explained that she based her opinion on the actual lost earnings that Claimant 
suffered and had taken into account other factors such as the loss of earnings opportunities relating to the 
recession and the reduction in real estate sales in Ada County during the relevant period of time. 
6. Medical Expenses. , 
154. Claimant has asserted a claim for medical expenses that can be summarized as follows: 
• Alderman Medical Acupuncture of Idaho 
• Boise Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Clinic (Carpal Tunnel) 
• David N. Price, D.C. 
• Hands-On-Physical Therapy 
• Kenneth M. Little, M.D., Idaho Neurological 
• Idaho Neurological, Charisse H. Mack, P.A. 
• Idaho Sports Medicine 
• Primary Health 
• Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
• Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
• The Shoulder Clinic, Dr. Goodwin 
• Boise Anesthesia, P.A. 
• James H. Bates, M.D. 
• Gem State Radiology 
• Intermountain Medical Imaging 
• Anesthesia Associates of Boise 
• Walgreens 




















• McMillan Medical Center 
•St.Luke's RMC 
• Biomet 
• A Caring Hand 
• Treasure Valley Hospital 
• Physical Therapy of Idaho 








155. Dr. Price reviewed a sunnuary of his billings for treating Claimant following the 2008 motorcycle 
crash in the amount of $6, I 08.58 and opined that the treatments were all necessary and the amoum 
charged for the treatments was reasonable .. 
156. Dr. Lillie opined that his treatment of Claimant was necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
157. Dr. Lillie opined that the treatments by Hands-On Physical Therapy, which he prescribed, were 
necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
158. Dr. Lillie opined that the services ofldaho Sports Medicine physician, Dr. Sheffield, were 
necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
159. Dr. Lillie opined that the services of Boise Anesthesia, P.A. were necessary and the charges are 
reasonable. 
160. Dr. Lillie opined that the services of St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center were necessary and 
the charges are reasonable. 
I 6 I. Dr. Lillie opined that the services of lntennountain Medical Imaging were necessary and the 
charges are reasonable. 
162. Dr. Lillie opined that the services of St. Luke's Regional Medical Center for the second fusion 
were necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
163. Dr. Little opined that the services of St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center for lab work were 
necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
164. Dr. Lillie opined that the services of Anesthesia Associates for the second surge1y were necessary 
and the charges are reasonable. 




165. Dr. Little opined that the prescriptions listed in the summaries of prescriptions from Walgreens 
were necessary and the charges are reasonable. 
166. Dr. Goodwin opined that Claimant's treatment by Dr. Goodwin was necessary and the costs that 
arc associated with that treatment are reasonable. 
167. Dr. Goodwin opined that the physical therapy Claimant received was necessary and the costs are 
reasonable. 
168. Dr. Goodwin opined that the MRI scan of Claimant's shoulder in 2011 and the dye injected to 
better delineate shoulder pathology was necessary and the costs are reasonable. 
169. Dr. Goodwin opined that the services of Treasure Valley Hospital were necessary and the costs 
are reasonable. 
170. Dr. Goodwin opined the Biomet shoulder pack that was obtained from Biomet for Claimant was 
necessary and the cost is reasonable. 
171. Dr. Goodwin opined that the services of Physical Therapy of Idaho were necessary and the costs 
are reasonable. 
172. The Arbitrator finds that the medical services and costs summarized above in the amount of 
$134,223.63 are reasonable and necessary and were caused by the cycle accident, except as follows: 
• Boise Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Clinic for carpal tunnel treatment 
• Idaho Neurological, K. Little (25% of the 2012 costs of $13,321.19) 
• Idaho Neurological, C. Mack (25% of 2/15/ l 2 cost of $2,812.57) 
• Anesthesia Associates of Boise (25% of 2/15/12 cost of $1,969.00) 
• Walgreens (25% of 2012 costs of $412.59) 
•St.Luke's RMC (25% of2/15/12 cost of $26,526.65) 
• A Caring Hand (25 % of 2012 costs of $668.00) 









173. The Arbitrator finds thatClaimant is entitled to an interim award of medical costs in the amount 
of$121,700.12. 
174. Claimant made a claim for future medical expenses of $5,000.00. Dr. Collins opined that 
Claimant may have future medical expenses in the amount of $5,000.00 but did not provide any basis for 
such opinion. Thus, the Arbitrator will not award future medical expenses. 




175. · The evidence does not support a claim for household cleaning services and none will be awarded. 
7. Gcncrnl Dnmngcs. 
176. Claimant is entitled to an interim award of general damages for pain and suffering, loss of quality 
of life, physical limitations, aggravation to any preexisting condition and scaring on her Right hand, after 
disallowing general damages relating to the 25% apportionment for the C5-6 preexisting condition, in the 
amount of$ 150,000.00. 
IV. INTERIM AW ARD 
As its Interim Award, the Arbitrator assesses the amount of damages for bodily injury suffered 
by Claimant in the motorcycle accident on May 25, 2008 as follows: 
I. Economic Damages: 
• Medical expenses: 
• Lost income: 
SUBTOTAL ECONOMIC DAMAGES: 
2. Noneconomic Damages: 
Pain and suffering, loss of. quality of life, physical limitations, 




Right hand: $150.000.00 
TOTAL Ii"\ITERIM AWARD: $406,700.12 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 16th day of January, 2013. 
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Elam & Burke, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
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we would not see each other at all, but that we would I would. 
meet on that day at Chandler's for one sort of meeting. 2 Q. And, so, if we looked at Dr. Alderman's 
And we did. And on that date, she said she never ... report and determined when he first saw her, that would ., 
wanted to see me again. 4 be the time that you began seeing her again on a 
Q. Okay. At what point did that never want to 5 regular basis? 
see you again change to let's get married? 6 A. That would be the day, yeah. Yeah. 
A. Well, I didn't give up. I pursued her. I 7 Q. And when you say "excruciating pain", what 
wanted to marry her. I loved her. And I felt that -- 8 pain was she having? 
I knew how much it hurt -- the hurt I had imposed on 9 A. Through her neck and head. It was completely 
her. And I wanted forgiveness. IO debilitating. She was unable to see straight. She was 
Q. The hurt that you imposed on her was the hurt 11 unable to sit up. She was scared. And it was quite 
of being disloyal to her? 12 shocking to see how badly she hurt. 
A. Yes. 13 Q. Okay. From the point at which you were 
Q. And that was the reason why she didn't want 14 married until the present, have you and Peggy 
to see you again? 15 maintained separate finances? 
A. Yes. 16 A. Yes. I have an account and Peg has an 
Q. What was it that changed her mind? 17 account. And we don't have any joint accounts. 
A. That changed her mind? 18 Q. Does Peggy pay all of her bills out of her 
Q. Yes. 19 account and you pay your bills out, or do you pay 
A. I think what changed her mind is I convinced 20 community interest bills jointly? 
her to change her mind. 21 A. Well, Peg has her house still. And she pays 
Q. Do you recall what it was that convinced her 22 all the bills on her house. It's rented out. So, that 
to change her mind? 23 helps her. And she pays most of her bills. And I pay 
A. I told her I loved her. I told her I cared 24 some of the ones that she doesn't have income to pay. 
for her. I told her I was miserable without her and 25 Q. So, would you consider her house her separate -
[Page 8] [Page 10] 
that I wanted to get back together with her. 1 property? 
Q. Between the time of the accident and the time 2 A. Absolutely. 
of your marriage, how often did you see her? 3 Q. The current house you live in, which property 
A. Between the time May of2008 and the time of 4 is that? 
our marriage? 5 A. It's a rented house. 
Q. Correct. 6 Q. And are you guys payingjointly for the rent? 
A. I didn't see her -- Well, after the crash, 7 A. I'm paying for the rent. I mean, jointly, 
we went and sought medical treatment together. And I 8 yeah. 
went with her as often as I could. I don't remember 9 Q. Medical expenses that have been incurred, 
the specific times. And then things tapered off. I IO who's been paying those? 
didn't see her at all. We decided not to see each I I A. Well, what the insurance company hasn't paid, 
other until that August date that we had set. So, I 12 Peg has paid a portion of those and I pay the balance. 
don't know if that-- You know, we hadn't seen each 13 Q. On a percentage basis, what would you say 
other for a month or six weeks maybe. 14 you've paid compared to her? 
Q. And when did you start seeing her again on a 15 A. I don't know. 
fairly regular basis? 16 Q. More than 50 percent? 
A. I think it was a S'unday. And I don't 17 A. Have I paid more than 50 percent than what 
remember what month. But she called me. I think it 18 Peg has paid? 
was a Sunday morning. And she was in excruciating pain 19 Q. Have you paid more than 50 percent of the 
and crying, and said she didn't know what to do. And I 20 bills that have been paid, medical bills that have been 
didn't know what to do, but I told her I would come 21 paid? 
over. And I did. And she was in excruciating pain. 22 A. No, I don't think so. I think the insurance 
And I called a friend of mine, Dr. Alderman, who at 23 company has paid the majority, right. 
that time had had an office on State Street. And I 24 Q. Between you and Peg, and those bills that 
asked him to look at Peggy that day. And he said he 25 haven't been paid by anybody else, what percentage have 
[Page 9] [Page 11] 
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you paid? I 
A. I don't know. 2 
Q. Do you have a dollar amount that you know 3 
that you've paid? 4 
A. I don't. 5 
Q. Would you be able to determine that? 6 
A. Yeah. Yes. 7 
Q. Do you and Peg have some sort of an 8 
arrangement as to paying you back if some further 9 
monies come into her possession? I 0 
A. We never talked about it. 11 
Q. No written agreement, obviously; correct? 12 
A. No agreement, no. 13 
Q. And never talked about it. So, there's no 14 
oral agreement as to what happens to the bills you've 15 
paid? 16 
A. Well, they'd come in. And I made payment 17 
arrangements on some of them. And Peg made payment 18 
arrangements on some of them. And we've got, I think, I 9 
some that are unpaid. But we haven't made any 20 
arrangement, no. 21 
Q. All right. Have you been previously married? 22 
A. Yes. 23 
Q. To whom? 24 
A. I was married to Kathy Kemp Steele. 25 
[Page 12] 
I Q. Any other marriages? 1 
2 A. No 2 
3 Q. And what years were you married to her? 3 
4 A. We were married in 1973 and we divorced in 4 
5 1999. 5 
6 Q. And do you have any children? 6 
7 A. Yes, three boys. 7 
8 Q.. I don't know if I asked Peggy this or not. 8 
9 Do you and she have any common children? 9 
10 A. Well, no. Austin, Peg's son, is my stepson. IO 
11 He's 17. 11 
12 Q. At the time of the accident, were the two 12 
13 girls, Kaysha and Sumer, out of the household by then? 13 
14 A. Yes. 14 
15 Q. Are you taking any medications today that 15 
16 would prevent you from giving any full and complete 16 
17 answers? 17 
18 A. No. 18 
19 Q. Have any physical or mental incapacity that 19 
20 would prevent you from giving full or complete answers? 20 
21 A. No. 21 
22 Q. Give me a thumbnail sketch of your education. 22 
23 A. My education. I graduated from high school 23 
24 in Cedar Rapids, Iowa in 1968. I graduated from the 24 
25 University of Iowa in 1972. I enrolled in the M.B.A. 25 
[Page 13] 
[6] (Pages 12 to 15) 
program at the University of Iowa, but did not complete 
it. I then attended Drake University Law School, 
graduated in 1975. I've attended numerous seminars 
over the years as a lawyer, including National 
Institute of Trial Advocacy, the Advanced Institute of 
Trial Advocacy, the Trial Lawyers College in Wyoming. 
And that's probably about it, yeah. 
Q. What brought you to Idaho? 
A. At the time, I was working for the Iowa 
Supreme Court. And my wife and I decided we did not 
want to live in Iowa. And we had decided we wanted to 
live either in Arizona -- As a matter of fact, I also 
attended Arizona State University Law School for one 
semester. 
We decided we wanted to live in Idaho. And 
in October of 197 5, I flew into Boise on a Sunday night 
and stayed at the Boise Motel, got up the next morning 
and looked at law firms. And I walked downtown and 
went up the Bank of Idaho building, where I believe 
Elam Burke was located, and told the receptionist I was 
there to look for a job. And she called Phil Barber 
out, who I'd never met. And I told Phil Barber I was 
there looking for a job. And he said, well, we don't 
have any openings right now, but I hear the Simplot 
company is looking for someone. So, he gave me 
[Page 14] 
directions to the Simplot company. And I went over 
there. And they hired me by noon. And then they moved 
us to Boise. 
Q. And you worked as in-house counsel? 
A. In-house counsel, yeah. 
Q. And for how long did you work there? 
A. For two years. 
Q. And then where did you go? 
A. I joined some other lawyers. The firm was 
Ellis, Brown, Sheils & Steele. 
Q. And how long did you work for that firm? 
A. I was with them for 10 years, I believe. 
Q. And then where did you go? 
A. And then I left the practice of law for 
several years. 
Q. And why did you leave the practice of law? 
A. Because I was burned out on the law. 
Q. And what did you do then? 
A. I took my family on a trip around the world 
and came back and became a real estate developer. 
Q. All right. Any location that we would be 
familiar with that you developed? 
A. On Pennsylvania A venue in southeast Boise, 
64-unit apartments that are now condominiumized, used 
to be called Pepper Hill, but I think they've changed 
[Page 15] 
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Jon M. Steele September 26, 2012 Cedillo v. Farmers Insurance Co. 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF IDAHO) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
I, REBECCA BOWKER, Certified Shorthand Repor~er 
and Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho, do 
hereby certify: 
That prior to being examined, the witness named in 
the foregoing deposition was by me duly sworn to 
testify to the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth; 
That said deposition was taken down by me in 
shorthand at the time and place therein named and 
thereafter reduced to typewriting, and that the 
foregoing transcript contains a full, true and verbatim 
record of said deposition. 
I further certify that I have no interest in the 
event of this action. 
2012. 
WITNESS my hand and seal this 4th day of October, 
REBECCA BOWKER, 
CSR, RPR and Notary Public 
in and for the State of 
Idaho. 
My Commission Expires: 6-9-15 




RUNFT & S .... 2ELE 
LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
John L. Runfc I Jon M. Scc:dc: 
Peggy Cedillo Steele 
4707 W. Clearview Dr. 
Boise, ID 83703 
November 22, 2011 
Re: Engagement Letter for LegaH Servkes 
Dear Ms. Cedillo Steele: 
The purpose of this letter is to set forth the terms and conditions of the engagement of 
this law firm ("Law Firm") as lawyers for you in your underinsurance claim with Farmers 
Insurance Co. Mr. John L. Ru.oft will be the responsible attorney. 
This confirms that you an~ the Law Firm have agreed that the Law Firm will take this 
matter and represent you as your lawyer in pursuing your above referenced claim on a 
contingency basis, whereby legal fees will be paid only when, and if, you recover monetary 
damages on your claim in this matter, whether by settlement, or by decision of the district 
court. The Law Firm's portion of the recovery for payment oflegal fees will be as follows: 
33 1/3% of any recovery obtained. Subrogation payments, if any, made from proceeds of 
recovery on your above claim will be made after the fees and costs owed to this Law Firm 
are calculated and paid. We will confer with you and obtain your consent before filing any 
litigation in this matter. Any appeal will be filed only with your consent and approval. 
However, in the event of an appeal, by any party, the Law Firm's portion of the recovery for 
payment of legal fees will increase to 40% of any recovery. · 
You will be responsible for reimbursing the Law Firm for its costs and disbursements 
in the event of a recovery. In the event ofrecovery, the Law Firm's costs and disbursements 
will be first paid from any proceeds of recovery. The amount of attorney's fees will be 
calculated, however, as a percentage (see above) of the total recovery before the payment of 
said costs and disbursements. The balance remaining after payment of said costs, 
disbursements, attorney's fees, and subrogated interests will be paid to you with a full 
accounting of same. 
runfr~reelc:.cllm 
Phone: {208) 333·8506 Fu: (208) 343,3246 I Boise, [d:1ho 83702 ,,-- -
[n chc: A!.isk.i Cc:nccr !0lO W. Main Scr.:c:. Suicc '100 I Fourth Floor 
l 
j 




Further tenns of our representation are set forth in the Appendix to this letter. 
We look forward to working with you and appreciate your confidence in entrusting 
your representation to us. 
Please sign and date the enclosed copy of this letter and return it to me to 
acknowledge your acceptance of the foregoing tenns. 
Please call if you have any questions. 
Sincere! ~ 
{L,t~ 
ohn L. Runft 




Appendix to Engagement Letter 
Dated November 22, 2011 
Between Run.ft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
and 
Peggy Cedillo Steele 
Disbursements. You will be responsible for reimbursing the Law Firm for its out-of -
pocket expenses incurred on your behalf ("disbursements") from any recovery in this matter. 
Such disbursements may include, without limitation, long distance phone calls, travel, 
telefax, photocopying, computerized legal research, delivery services, filing fees, deposition 
costs, expert witness fees and charges, document preparation and document storage, court 
costs and transcripts and other incidental expenses, such as overtime, secretarial or word 
processing assistance incurred due to your specific time constraints. 
Payment and Distribution of Recovery Proceeds: Payment of any and all recovery 
proceeds shall be paid to you and this Law Firm jointly and delivered or sent to this Law 
Firm for distribution in accordance with the terms of this engagement letter. Any check 
received by the Law Firm as and for recovery proceeds shall be endorsed by both you and the 
law firm and promptly negotiated and the proceeds deposited in the Law Firm's attorney trust 
account for distribution in accordance with the terms of this engagement letter. 
Termination of Representation; Retention and Disposition of Documents. Unless 
previously terminated, or otherwise agreed in writing, our representation of you in this matter 
will terminate upon the resolution of this matter and The Law Firm's sending to you a letter 
notifying you ofthe final resolution of this matter and, in the event of a recovery, a final 
statement and accounting for services rendered and disbursements made. At your request, 
your papers and property will be returned to you promptly upon such final resolution. 
You may terminate this Law Firm's representation of you at any time. We may 
terminate our representation of you for any reason consistent with the applicable rules of 
professional conduct, including breach of the terms of this engagement letter. Following such 
termination, any otherwise non-public information you have supplied to us which is retained 
by us will be kept confidential in accordance with applicable rules of professional conduct. 
In the event you or the Law Firm terminate this Law Firm's representation of you in 
this matter prior to final resolution of this matter, the Law Firm may file an attorney's lien for 
its legal services to date, or reach an acceptable agreement with your new lawyers regarding 
this Law Firm's attorney fees, disbursements and regarding your papers and property. In the 
event of a recovery in this matter after termination of this Law Firm's representation of you, 
you will be responsible for This Law Firm's fees for services and expenses incurred prior to 
termination, including those incurred in transferring any matters to your new counsel. In the 
event of any tennination of our representation, you acknowledge our right to retain all files 
and other documents relating to matters as to which we are then or have previously 
represented you as a lien pending against any recovery in this matter for our receipt of 
payment in full for our legal services and disbursements. Subject to the foregoing, for 
various reasons, including the minimization of unnecessary storage expenses, we reserve the 
right to destroy or otherwise dispose of any documents or other materials retained by us 







• This Law Fi.rm 's own files pertaining to the matter will be retained by the Law Finn. 
These files include, for example, Law Firm administrative records, time and expense reports, 
personnel and staffing materials, and credit and accounting records; and internal lawyers; 
work product such as drafts, notes, internal memoranda, and legal and factual research, 




JOHN L. RUNFT (ISB # 1059) 
JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
I 020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-9495 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: JSteele@runftsteele.com 
Attorneys for Peggy Cedillo 
-NO. -----:::Fll.:0::::"'i;,:::-,qr+fl~h·,,___ A.M, ____ r,M ___ _ 
SEP 2 5 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cierk 
By ANNAMARIE MEYER 
DEPVIY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 











CASE NO. CV OC 1308697 
MOTION TO STRIKE EXHIBIT 7 
ATTACHED TO THE AFFIDAVIT OF 
JEFFREY A. THOMSON IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY 
FEES 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, Peggy B. Cedillo, by and through her counsel of record, Jon M. 
Steele, and moves to strike Exhibit 7 attached to the Affidavit of Jeffrey A. Thomson in Support 
of Defendant's Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees. Exhibit 7 to the Affidavit has been 
previously struck from the record by the Arbitrator. 
This Motion is supported by a Memorandum and Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in Support 
filed herewith. 
Oral Argument is requested. 
MOTION TO STRIKE EXHIBIT 7 ATTACHED TO THE AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY A. 
THOMSON IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 




DATED this 7)1' day of September 2013. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By:_J----...::,OJ=--M--=---41--s----""'tl'------'EL-li1-=-n---
Attomey for Plaintiff 
MOTION TO STRIKE EXHIBIT 7 ATTACHED TO THE AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY A. 
THOMSON IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES - Page 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this ..2Q_---%-ay of September 2013, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO STRIKE EXHIBIT 7 ATTACHED TO THE 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY A. THOMSON IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES was served upon opposing counsel as 
follows: 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam Burke 
251 Front St., Ste 300 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance Company 
Of Idaho 
Peter J. Johnson 
Johnson Law Group 
103 E. Indiana Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance Company 
Ofidaho 
Via Facsimile 
~ Via Personal Delivery 
Via U.S. Mail 
Via E-mail --
Via Facsimile 
~ Via Personal Delivery 
N.. Via U.S. Mail 
Via E-mail 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: J ~?WJ 
JOM~TEELE 
Attorney for Peggy Cedillo 
MOTION TO STRIKE EXHIBIT 7 ATTACHED TO THE AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY A. 
THOMSON IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 




JOHN L. RUNFT (ISB # 1059) 
JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone:(208)333-9495 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: jmsteele@runftlaw.com 
Attorneys for Peggy Cedillo 
No. ___ FiTI:rrtH-f:tol...,,___ 
A.M. _____ FIL~~ q"'-1 
SEP 2 5 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cierk 
By ANNAMARIE MEYER 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 












County of Ada ) 
) 
CASE NO. CV QC 1308697 
AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO STRIKE 
COMES NOW, Jon M. Steele, being over the age of eighteen years and competent to 
make this Affidavit, after first being duly sworn, and upon his own personal knowledge, states as 
follows: 
I. That I am an attorney in good standing with the Idaho State Bar and counsel for 
Plaintiff in the above arbitration and this confirmation. 
2. That I make this Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Exhibit 7 
attached to the Affidavit of Jeffrey A. Thomson in Support of Motion to Disallow Costs. 




3. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Arbitrator's Final Order 
No. 12 Re: Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of Prejudgment Interest Award and 
Claimant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Counsel for Respondent. 
4. At page 3 of the Final Order it states: "The Arbitrator finds that the report of Mr. 
Reinstein (Exhibit B) is inadmissible and it will be disregarded by the Arbitrator." 
5. The same report of Mr. Reinstein is attached to the Affidavit of Jeffrey Thomson 
in Support of Motion for Modification and/or Correction of Arbitration Award as Exhibit 7. 
Further, your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this 'LStbday of September 2013. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
. ,-LL 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this2i.:, day of September 2013. 
f--s c n s ':)C ~ ::At N1bn}/ 
Notary Public for the State of Idaho 
Residing a~: ~U)")fJ(\, __ 
My Comrmss1on Expues: -s-- (<1' ,-/1 
AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE -
Page2 
000469
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
2,.H1 The undersigned hereby certifies that oh this _ _:; ,-, day of September 2013, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE was served upon opposing counsel as follows: 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam Burke 
251 E. Front St., Ste 300 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance Company 
Ofidaho 
Peter J. Johnson 
Johnson Law Group 
103 E. Indiana Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance Company 
Ofldaho 
Via Facsimile 
X- Via Personal Delivery 
Via U.S. Mail 
Via E-mail 
Via Facsimile --
--Via Personal Delivery 
X Via U.S. Mail 
Via E-mail 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Attorney for Peggy Cedillo 























Case No. 81700-0040 
FINAL ORDER NO.12RE: 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AW ARD 
AND CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO 
STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
FOR RESPONDENT 
Introduction 
Pending before the Arbitrator are Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration seeking 
modification of the award of prejudgment interest in this matter and Claimant's Motion to Strike 
Affidavit of Counsel for Respondent that is submitted in support of Respondent's Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
Pursuant to Order No. 11, issued by the Arbitrator on May 21, 2013, the parties have 
submitted memoranda in support of and in opposition to the motions. On June 10, 2013, the 
parties inf01med the Arbitrator that they waived oral arguments on the motions. The motions are 
deemed to be submitted for decision as of June 10, 2013. 
On July 10, 2013, the Arbitrator issued Draft Order No. 12 Re: Respondent's Motion for 
Reconsideration of Prejudgment Interest Award and Claimant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of 
Counsel for Respondent and invited counsel for the parties to submit comments on the proposed 
Order. Counsel for the parties have each submitted a response to the Draft Order No. 12, which 
have been considered by the Arbitrator and, when appropriate, are addressed in this Final Order 
No.12. 
FINAL ORDER NO 12 RE: RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST A WARD AND CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE E·nki'bi't A 




MOTION TO STRIKE 
Claimant has filed a motion to strike paragraphs B, E, and F of the Affidavit of Counsel 
for Respondent that is submitted in support of Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration on the 
grounds that the matters set forth in paragraphs B, E, and F fail to comply with Arbitration 
Orders, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and are irrelevant and immaterial to any issue in this 
Arbitration. In support of her Motion to Strike, Claimant submitted the Affidavit of Jon. M. 
Steele [in Support of] Claimant's Motion to Strike and in Opposition to Farmer's Motion for 
Reconsideration of Prejudgment Interest Award and a Memorandum in Support of Claimant's 
Motion to Strike and in Opposition to Farmer's Motion for Reconsideration of Prejudgment 
Interest A ward. 
Exhibit Bis a copy of the "Expert Witness Repmt of Dennis R. Reinstein." Exhibit Eis a 
copy of a document labeled "Prejudgment Interest Awarded for Medical Bills" that is identified 
in the Affidavit as "the calculation of prejudgment interest awarded for medical bil1s" that was 
prepared by Respondent's counsel. Exhibit Fis a document labeled "Cedillo Award Interest: 
Non-Medical" that is identified in the Affidavit as "the calculation of prejudgment interest 
awarded for non-medical expenses" that was prepared by Respondent's counsel. 
Claimant argues that Exhibits B, E and F should be stricken because they are based on a 
report of Dennis Reinstein, who was Claimant's retained expert that did not testify during the 
arbitration hearing in this matter and because Respondent never disclosed Reinstein as an expert 
witness for Respondent prior to the evidentiary hearing in the matter or prior to the submission of 
the Affidavit of Respondent's Counsel. Claimant cites White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 104 P.3d 
356 (2004), wherein the Idaho Supreme Court held that a party cannot call the opposing party's 
expert witness if there has been no disclosure of such testimony and no notice of the identity of 
the specific expert to be relied upon, and the general substance of the testimony or its relation to 
the legal theory of the party attempting to call the witness. Claimant also cites Aguilar v. 
FINAL ORDER NO 12 RE: RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AW ARD AND CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT - 2 
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Coonrod, 151 Idaho 642, 262 P.3d 671 (2011), which similarly holds that the failure to 
adequately disclose an expert witness is grounds to exclude the testimony of such witness and 
that the general reservation of rights to call the opposing party's experts does not satisfy the 
disclosure requirements of I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4). 
In Respondent's Opposition to Claimant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Counsel, 
Respondent states that Mr. Reinstein's expert report (Exhibit B) was not provided as expert 
opinion or testimony but rather to show it is feasible to calculate accrued interest amounts for 
each and every medical bill that was incurred by Claimant. Respondent fmther states that the 
prejudgment interest calculations set forth in Exhibits E and Fare not part of Mr. Reinstein' s 
report but rather reflect calculations made by counsel for Respondent to calculate prejudgment 
interest on the actual medical bills awarded after adjustments were made to the Interim Award. 
The Arbitrator finds that the report of Mr. Reinstein (Exhibit B) is inadmissible and it 
will be disregarded by the Arbitrator. The remainder of the motion to strike will be denied. If an 
affidavit contains some inadmissible matter, the whole affidavit need not be stricken or 
disregarded; a court [arbitrator] may strike or disregard the inadmissible part and consider the 
rest of the affidavit. See Marty v. State, 122 Idaho 766, 769, 838 P.2d 1384, 1387 (1992). In 
ruling on the merits of the motion for reconsideration, the Arbitrator will consider the evidence, 
other than the report of Mr. Reinstein that is presented in the Affidavit of Counsel for 
Respondent. 
III. 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of Prejudgment Interest Award seeks 
adjustment of the amount of prejudgment interest that was included in the Final Award to 
account for a payment by Respondent to Claimant that was made after the Interim Award was 
issued but before the Final Award was issued. The Affidavit of Counsel that is submitted in 
support of Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration establishes that Respondent paid to 
FINAL ORDER NO 12 RE: RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AW ARD AND CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT - 3 
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Claimant the sum of $100,332.95 on March 25, 2013, which was the amount of the adjusted 
Interim A ward. This payment was made thirty-six (36) days before the Final Award was issued. 
The Arbitrator was not informed of this payment and did not consider it in the calculation of 
prejudgment interest that was made by the Arbitrator and awarded in the Final Award. The 
Motion for Reconsideration also seeks a recaJculation and adjustment of prejudgment interest on 
medical expenses, lost income and general damages based on information submitted with the 
Motion. 
A. Jurisdiction to Consider the Motion for Reconsideration. 
Before the Arbitrator can consider the merits of the Motion for Reconsideration, the 
Arbitralor must determine whether the Arbitrator has authority or jurisdiction to entertain the 
Motion. In determining the scope of the post-award authority of an arbitrator, the arbitrator 
should consider the interrelationship between any applicable institutional rules, the relevant 
arbitration law, and the doctrine of functus officio. See generally, James M Gaitis, THE COLLEGE 
OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS GUIDE TO BEST PRACTICES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 2d. ed., p. 
191 (2010). In this matter, there are no applicable institutional rules such as the AAA Rules, 
JAMs Rules or the CPR Rules, but the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act,§ 7-909 is applicable, and 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule ll(a)(2)(B) is implicated. 
l. Functus Officio. 
Generally, in the absence of a contractual provision to the contrary, an arbitrator is 
prohibited from modifying a final award for the purpose of correcting legal or factual substantive 
errors that affect the arbitrator's determination 011 the merits. This restriction is based 011 the 
common law doctrine offimctus officio, which holds that once an arbitrator renders a final 
decision, the arbitrator ceases to have jurisdiction over the dispute or authority to alter the 
decision. See, e.g., La Vale Plaza, Inc., v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 378 F. 2d 569,572 (3d Cir. 1967). 
See also, American Foreign Ins. Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 94 P.3d 699 (2004). 
FINAL ORDER NO 12 RE: RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AW ARD AND CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT - 4 
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The relevance of the functus officio doctrine depends on whether the parties' arbitration 
agreement has provided for arbitration procedures that render the doctrine moot. Because there is 
no legal prohibition against parties agreeing that an arbitrator may reconsider the merits of his or 
her award, parties are free to provide thatfunctus officio principles do not apply. See, e.g., Volt 
Info. Scis. v. Bd. oJTrs., 489 U.S. 468,479 (1989); UHC Mgmt. Co. Inc. v. Computer Scis. 
Corp., 148 F.3d 992,997 (8th Cir. 1998) ("Parties may choose to be governed by whatever rules 
they wish regarding how arbitration itself will be conducted."). Absent an agreement or 
applicable rule that provides otherwise, however, the principles of functus officio strictly prohibit 
an arbitrator from reconsidering the merits of a case once he or she has issued a final award. See, 
e.g., Landis v. Pinkertons, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 890 (Ct. App. 2004); WMA Securities, Inc. v. 
Wynn, 105 F. Supp. 2d 833 (S.D. Ohio 2000, aff'd, 32 F. App'x. (6th Cir., 2002)). 
There is no express agreement in this matter thatfunctus officio principles do not apply, 
except to the extent that the parties agreed that this arbitration proceeding will be governed by 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which include Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B). Rule l l(a)(2)(B) allows a 
pruty to file a motion for reconsideration "of any interlocutory orders of the trial court at any 
time before the entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen ( 14) days after the entry of the 
final judgment" or for reconsideration of "any order of the trial court made after entry of final 
judgment ... within fourteen (14) days from the entry of such order .... " Additional restrictions 
in the Rule exist that are not applicable in this matter. 
Notwithstanding the lack of an agreement renderingfunctus officio principles 
inapplicable in this matter, there are three generally recognized exceptions to the doctrine of 
functus officio. These exceptions are designed to ensure that an award may be corrected or 
clarified to reflect the intent of the arbitrator at the time the original final award was issued. 
a. First Exception. Under the first exception, an arbitrator generally retains 
authority to correct clerical, computation, or similar errors in a final award. Errors of this nature 
tend to involve mistranscriptions of data, transposition of numbers, mathematical errors, or 
FINAL ORDER NO 12 RE: RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 
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misdescriptions of persons, places, or things. The very nature of such errors usually demonstrates 
that their cmTection will not be inconsistent with the arbitrator's intent as reflected in the final 
award. See, e.g., La Vale Plaza, Inc., v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 378 F. 2d 569, 572 (3d Cir. 1967); 
Eastern Seaboard Constr. Co. v. Gray Constr., Inc., 533 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1995) (arbitrator's 
final award did not provide for the subcontractor's undisputed contract balance to be set off from 
the damages awarded to the contractor; arbitrator amended the award to reflect the set off). 
The Motion for Reconsideration in this matter fits within this exception to the extent that 
it establishes that the Arbitrator issued the Final Award on April 29, 2013, but erroneously 
calculated prejudgment interest to April 30, 2013, a difference of one day at 12% per annum on 
the initial amount. It also fits within this exception to the extent that it establishes that the 
calculation of prejudgment interest fails to account in the Final Award for the payment to 
Claimant of $100,332.95 on March 25, 2013. 
b. Second Exception. Under the second exception, an arbitrator generally retains 
the authority to correct or supplement an award to determine an issue submitted for 
determination but unresolved in the award. See La Vale, 378 F.2d at 573. The Motion for 
Reconsideration in this matter does not appear to fit within this exception. One might argue that 
the issue of the proper methodology to be applied to calculate the award of prejudgment interest 
upon the special damages was submitted to the Arbitrator for determination and that the 
Arbitrator failed to resolve the issue. The Arbitrator rejects this argument because the Arbitrator 
resolved the issue by holding, correctly or incorrectly, that the calculation of prejudgment 
interest based on the incun-ed cost for each medical treatment as of the date it was incurred or as 
of the date it was paid was not feasible. The Arbitrator concluded that the calculation of 
prejudgment interest on the special damages was not feasible for the Arbitrator to perform based 
on the record that was then before the Arbitrator. Respondent has now submitted supplemental 
information in the Affidavit of Counsel for Respondent that makes feasible and demonstrates 
such calculation. 
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c. Third Exception. Under the third exception, an arbitrator generally retains the 
authority to issue a clarification of the intent of the original award, such as an amendatory 
statement that resolves an ambiguity. This exception to functus officio is that arbitrators may 
clarify an award when there is demonstrable ambiguity regarding the intention of the award or 
concerning whether the parties' claims and defenses have been fully determined. See, e.g., 
Eastern Seaboard Constr. Co. v. Gray Constr., Inc., 533 F.3cl 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1995). The Motion 
for Reconsideration in this matter does not fit within this exception. 
2. Idaho Code§ 7-909. 
The common law doctrine of functus officio as applied in Idaho has been moclifiecl, if not 
abrogated, by Idaho Code§ 7-909 and related statutes. It appears clear to the Arbitrator that the 
lclaho Legislature intended to modify the doctrine of functus officio to codify the first exception 
to the doctrine. See, e.g., Cox v. St. Anthony Bank and Trust Co., 41 lclaho 776,242 P. 785 
(1925) (In construing a statute, it is to be presumed that no change in the common law was 
intended, unless the language employed clearly indicates such an intention.). 
Section 7-909 authorizes an arbitrator to modify or correct a final award upon the 
grounds stated in LC. § 7-913(a), paragraphs ( 1) (evident miscalculation of figures or an evident 
mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award] or (3) [award 
is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the controversy], upon application of 
a party, provided the application is made within twenty (20) clays after delivery of the award to 
the applicant. 
In this case, the Final Award was served on the Parties via email, as stipulated by the 
parties (see Pre-Hearing Order No. 1 Re Scheduling at <JI 20) on April 29, 2013. Thus, 
Respondent was required to submit its application to modify or correct the award on or before 
May 19, 2013, which is a Sunday. The Motion for Reconsideration was received by the 
Arbitrator on May 20, 2013, the 21st day following the service of the Final Award. However, 
because the Parties have stipulated that this arbitration proceeding is governed by the Idaho 
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Rules of Civil Procedure, (see Pre-Hearing Order No. 1 re Scheduling, !JI 10), I.R.C.P. 6(a) 
governs the computation of the 20-day time period. Under Rule 6(a), where the last day of a 
designated period of time falls on the Sunday, the last day is not included in the calculation. 
Thus, the 20 day period for submitting the application for modification ended on May 20, 2013 
and the Motion for Reconsideration was therefore timely. Consequently, the Arbitrator has 
jurisdiction under Section 7-909 to consider the Motion for Reconsideration as an application to 
modify or coITect the award of prejudgment interest in this case. 
The Arbitrator concludes that the Motion for Reconsideration in this matter fits witl1in 
this statute to the extent that it establishes that the Arbitrator issued the Final Award on April 29, 
2013, but erroneously calculated prejudgment interest to April 30, 2013 and to the extent that it 
establishes that the calculation of prejudgment interest fails to account in the Final Award for the 
payment to Claimant of $100,332.95 on March 25, 2013. The Arbitrator also concludes, as is 
more thoroughly explained below, that I. C. § 9-909 does not authorize the Arbitrator to change 
the methodology used to calculate prejudgment interest on the special damages that are awarded 
in this matter. 
3. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure ll(a)(2)(B). 
Respondent has asserted that the Motion is properly before the Arbitrator under Rule 
ll(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure because tl1e Parties agreed that this arbitration 
proceeding is governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B), a motion 
for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any time before 
entry of final judgment or a motion for reconsideration of any order of the trial court made after 
entry of final judgment may be filed within fourteen (14) days from the entry of final judgment, 
subject to limitations that do not apply to this Motion. Although, a question may be raised 
whether the Rule would permit a motion for reconsideration of a "final judgment" as opposed to 
an "order of the trial court made after entry of a final judgment," the question need not be 
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addressed because the motion for reconsideration in this case was not submitted to the Arbitrator 
within fourteen (14) days as required by the Rule. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has established that an arbitrator's award is not a judgment 
of a tribunal for the purpose of applying the interest rate applicable to judgments. In short, an 
arbitrator's "final award" is not a judicial "final judgment." See Bingham County Comm 'n v. 
Interstate Elec. Co., 108 Idaho 181,697 P.2d 1195 (Ct. App. 1985). 
Respondent argues that because the arbitration proceeding is governed by Rule 
1 l(a)(2)(B), the motion for reconsideration of the Final Award may be brought at any time prior 
to or within 14 days after the entry of a "final judgment" by a court confirming, modifying or 
vacating the final award. The Arbitrator concludes that is not a fair reading or application of 
Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) in an arbitration proceeding. To allow a party to move for reconsideration of a 
final arbitration award at any time prior to the entry of a final judgment by a court during a 
proceeding to confirm the award, modify the award, remand the award, or vacate the award 
would eviscerate the purpose of the rule, which imposes limits on the initiation of motions for 
reconsideration. In effect there would never be any limitation on the authority of a party to seek 
reconsideration of any arbitration award, even after a party has filed an action to challenge or 
confirm the award. Moreover, that would abrogate the statutory scheme under the Idaho Uniform 
Arbitration Act that limits the power of arbitrators to change an award under J.C. § 7-909, the 
power of a court to vacate an award under I. C. § 7-912, and the power of a court to modify or 
correct an award under LC. § 7-913. I cannot conclude that was the intent of the parties to his 
arbitration when they agreed that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure would govern this 
proceeding. Moreover, I conclude that the parties do not have authority to stipulate that these 
statutes are abrogated or rendered inapplicable in this proceeding by their stipulation to apply the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to this arbitration proceeding. 
Under section 7-909, the application to have the arbitrator modify or correct an award 
must be brought within twenty (20) days after delivery of the award to the applicant. Under 
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section 7-912, an application to vacate an award must be brought within ninety (90) days after 
delivery of the award to the applicant, except when the application is based on com.1ption, fraud 
or other undue means when the time for filing commences to run from discovery of the grounds. 
Under section 7-913, an application to vacate an award must be brought within ninety (90) days 
after delivery of the award to the applicant. Under each statute, the grounds for relief are limited 
to those specified in each respective statute. Under Respondent's view of Rule L l(a) (2)(B), 
none of these restrictions would apply because a party would be authorized to file a motion for 
reconsideration of the final award for any reason, seeking any relief, at any time until the final 
judgment is entered by the court or within 14 days after the final judgment is entered in the 
judicial proceeding. 
Furthermore, allowing a party to move for reconsideration of the final award of the 
arbitrator, after the award has been delivered to the parties, and while a motion to vacate, modify 
or confirm an award is pending before a district court prior to the entry of the court's final 
judgment, would, in effect, expand the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and the court to reconsider an 
award that would violate the restrictions in sections 7-909, 7-912 and 7-913. It would also be 
contrary to the Idaho appellate decisions holding that review by a district comt of an arbitration 
award is restricted to a determination of whether any grounds for relief stated in the Uniform 
Arbitration Act exists. See, Reece v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., 139 Idaho 487, 80 P.3d 
1088 (2003); Bingham County Comm'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 105 Idaho 36,665 (P.2d 1046 
(1983); Cady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 113 Idaho 667, 747 P.2d 76 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Respondent argues in its Response to the Draft Order No. 12, that parties to an arbitration 
can completely opt out of the Idaho Unifo1m Arbitration Act, but cites no authority for that 
proposition. If Respondent is asserting that parties can elect to be bound by the Federal 
Arbitration Act, rather than the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act, that proposition is supported by 
law. See, e.g., Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 118 P.3d 141 (2005). However, if 
Respondent is asserting that parties that are subject to Idaho law can participate in some form of 
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proceeding that is not within the authority of the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act or the Federal 
Arbitration Act, there would be no authority that would allow them to confirm and enforce an 
award under the Idaho Uniform Act. For example, in one case where the parties purportedly 
opted out of the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act, and simply agreed to have the project architect 
determine their disputes, the court held that the architect's decision in favor of the homeowner in 
a dispute with the contractor did not constitute an arbitration award for purposes of section 7-911 
(confirmation of an award) because the architect was not an arbitrator under the Idaho Uniform 
Arbitration Act. See Martel v.Bulotti, 138 Idaho 451, 65 P.3d 192 (2003). 
I do not agree with Respondent's proposed application of Rule ll(a)(2)(B) in this 
arbitration proceeding. Rather, I conclude that Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) should be applied, if at all in 
this context, only to allow a party to move for reconsideration of the Final Award in the 
arbitration proceeding under the same constraints that would apply to a motion for 
reconsideration of a final judgment as may be brought in a judicial proceeding. Because the 
Respondent did not submit the motion for reconsideration within 14 days from the issuance of 
the Final Award, the Arbitrator will not consider Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration 
under this Rule. 
It is also appropriate to note that even if the Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration 
would be considered by the Arbitrator under Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B), the result would be the same. 
Under the law of Emery, Walton, Schilling, and Greenough, as discussed below, the motion to 
recalculate prejudgment interest based on the dates each medical expense was incurred or paid, 
and the date that the amounts of lost income and general damages were determined by the 
Arbitrator would still be denied. 
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n. Merits of the Motion for Reconsideration. 
The Arbitrator concluded in the Final Award that the established case law in Idaho, as 
enunciated in Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 
130 P.3d l 127 (2006) (overruling that portion of Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 766 
P.2d 1227 (1988) holding that interest is accrued on an award of damages from the date of the 
accident and subsequent cases that followed the Brinkman rnle), requires that prejudgment 
interest begins to accrue when the insured has provided enough information to allow the insurer 
a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability. In this case, the date when 
prejudgment interest began to accrne is August 25, 2009, the date on which Farmers valued 
Claimant's case at $25,000.00. However, in the Final Award, the Arbitrator did not consider the 
distinction between accrual of interest on special damages as opposed to the accrual of interest 
on general damages that is established in Brinkman. 
To fully understand how the law of prejudgment interest is applied in underinsured and 
uninsured motorist cases and the scope of the Greenough decision, it is necessary to study 
Bn'nkman and its progeny. Brinkman v. AID Insurance Co., 115 Idaho 346, 766 P.2d 1227 
(1988), involved a claim by an insured against his insurer for injuries suffered in a collision with 
an underinsured motorist. Brinkman incmTed medical expenses over a period of time. 
Brinkman's injuries continued to cause recurrent low back pain, inability to participate in 
strenuous work or athletic activities and a permanent limp that would likely require future 
medical expenses such as a hip replacement. AID was notified of the accident while Brinkman 
was still in the hospital and began investigating shortly thereafter. AID made payments of 
$5,000, $5,000 and $75,000. The case went to trial and a jury verdict was rendered in favor of 
the insured for his past and future medical expenses, additional tuition expenses and general 
damages. The trial court awarded prejudgment interest on certain of the medical expenses, but 
refused to award prejudgment interest upon the entire amount of the jury award. The trial court 
held that interest should be allowed as to certain fixed economic damages that were established 
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by the evidence, namely the past medical costs up to the time of trial and the additional tuition 
expenses up to the time of trial. AID argued that interest could not accrue on the tuition expenses 
because they were not liquidated. The Supreme Court disagreed with AID, finding that the figure 
was ascertainable from university publications and was capable of being computed with 
mathematical certainty prior to trial. The Supreme Court agreed with AID that it was entitled to 
credit for the payments that were made and that interest stopped accruing on the amount paid 
when each payment was made. 
The Supreme Comt held that AID was liable for prejudgment interest on the entire 
amount awarded by the jury, but did not hold that the computation of prejudgment interest on the 
whole amount awarded begins to accme from the date of the accident. The Court stated: 
"Prejudgment interest accrues on the general damages from the date of the accident, because that 
is the date Aid's contractual duties accmed. However, to the extent it can be established that 
certain fixed damages such as medial expenses were not incurred until a later date, that date 
establishes the commencement of the interest obligation. In sum, the entire verdict is 
appropriately subject to the accumulation of prejudgment interest, provided that the three 
payments of $5,000, $5,000 and $75,000 terminate the accrual of interest on those amounts as of 
the dates of their respective payment." Id., 115 Idaho at 354, 766 P.2d at 1235 (emphasis 
added). 
Brinkman establishes that the insured is entitled to prejudgment interest on the entire 
verdict, but the calculation does not accrue interest on the entire verdict from the date of the 
accident. Rather, Brinkman holds that the computation of prejudgment interest on general 
damages accrues from the date of the accident regardless whether they were liquidated or 
capable of mathematical calculation; that payments by the insurer terminate the accrual of 
interest on the amounts paid as of the date of the respective payments; and that interest on special 
damages such as medical expenses that were not incmTed until a date later than the date of the 
accident, accrues from the date such expenses are actually incurred. 
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Brinkman was followed by Emery v. United Pacific Insurance Co., 120 Idaho 244, 815 
P.2d 442 (1991). Emery involved an action to confirm an arbitration award in favor of the 
insured against her insurer under the underinsured motorist provisions of her insurance policy for 
injuries suffered in an accident. In the action to confirm, the insured sought attorney fees, costs 
and prejudgment interest from the date of the accident. The trial court granted the motion for 
prejudgment interest on the entire award from the date of the accident and the Supreme Court 
affirmed, holding that the insured was entitled to prejudgment interest on the entire award, 
including the award for general damages, from the time of the injury. There is no discussion in 
the majority opinion in Eme,y, as there was in Brinkman, about treating the accrual of interest on 
special damages from the date they are incurred rather than from the date of the accident. 
A close reading of Brinkman and Emery reveals that the majority in Emery misread and 
misapplied the rule in Brinhnan that the accmal of prejudgment interest upon medical expenses 
and other fixed expenses begins when the expense is incurred, rather than when the accident 
occurred. The Emery comt held that prejudgment iiiterest should be allowed on the entire 
arbitration award, including general damages, from the date of the accident. 
Bakes, Chief Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part, pointed out that allowing 
interest on damages that are unliquidated is contrary to prior cases, citing Farm Development 
Corp. v. flemandez, 93 Idaho 918,478 P.2d 298 (1970) and other decisions, and that LC.§ 28-
22-104(1) does not authorize prejudgment interest on future lost wages, future medical expense, 
future pain and suffering, and other physical and emotional problems resulting from personal 
injuries. 
In Walton v. Hartford Insurance Co., 120 Idaho 616, 818 P.2d 320 (1991), which 
involved facts similar to those in Emery, the Supreme Court followed its decision in Emery, 
holding that plaintiff was entitled to prejudgment interest on the entire award from the date of the 
accident. Bakes, Chief Justice, reiterated his dissenting opinion in Emery. 
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In Schilling v. Allstate Insurance Co., 132 Idaho 927,980 P.2d 1014 (1999), the insured 
who was injured in a motorcycle accident caused by another driver, filed a claim under his 
underinsured motorist coverage. An arbitration panel awarded him damages but no prejudgment 
interest. The trial court modified the arbitration award to include prejudgment interest on the 
entire award from the date of the accident and the Supreme Court affirmed, citing Brinkman, 
Emery, and Walton for the proposition that prejudgment interest begins to accrue on the entire 
award of special and general damages from the date of the accident when the case involves 
claims under underinsured or uninsured insurance policy provisions. 
Based on these decisions, the Arbitrator concludes that the governing law of Idaho is that 
prejudgment interest on special and general damages accrues from the date of the accident, 
regardless of when the special damages were inctmed. 
In Greenough, the court changed the manner in which prejudgment interest is calculated 
in underinsured and uninsured motorist cases with respect to the date that the interest begins to 
accrue. The Greenough case involved a claim under the uninsured motorist covered of the 
insured who was killed in the motor vehicle accident. The insurer, after initially disputing 
liability, paid the policy limit of $50,000, but no attorney fees or prejudgment interest. The son 
of the insured filed an action for fees and interest. The trial court ruled that prejudgment interest 
should begin to accrne from the date of the accident, relying upon Brinkman and its progeny. The 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that pr~judgment interest begins to accme when money 
becomes due as provided under the express terms of the insurance contract, rather than the date 
of the accident. 
The Greenough decision addresses only when prejudgment interest commences to accrue 
on general damages. Greenough does not address the issue of prejudgment interest on special 
damages. Nothing is mentioned about special damages. To quote the Greenough court: "In 
Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., (citation omitted), we established a bright-line prejudgment interest 
mle for underinsured or uninsured motorist claims in first party automobile insurance cases. This 
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rnle stated that 'prejudgment interest accrnes on the general damages from the date of the 
accident, because that is the date [ the insurer's] contractual duties accrned.' Brinkman ( citation 
omitted). We followed the Brinkman rnle in three subsequent cases. See Schilling v. Allstate Ins. 
Co. (citation omitted), Emery v. United P. Ins. Co. (citation omitted); Walton v. Hartford Ins. Co. 
( citation omitted) .... " 142 Idaho at 592, 130 P.3d at l 130. Notably, in Schilling, Emery and 
Walton, the Court did not recognize any difference in the date of accrual of interest on special 
damages from general damages that was created in Brinkman. 
In Cranney v. Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co., 145 Idaho 6, 175 P.3d 168 (2007), the 
arbitration award included prejudgment interest. The insurer petitioned the district court to 
modify the award and argued that: (1) the award was erroneous under a rnle, with respect to an 
award of benefits under an underinsured motorist policy, that damages had to be liquidated or 
capable of mathematical computation for prejudgment interest to be awarded; and (2) the award 
could be modified because the award of prejudgment interest constituted an "evident 
miscalculation of figures" for purposes of Idaho Code§ 7-913(a)(l). The Court did not address 
the issue about the proper method for computing and awarding prejudgment interest upon 
general or special damages under an underinsured motorist policy. Rather, the Court noted that 
the issue presented by the appeal was whether the district court had authority to modify the 
arbitrator's award of prejudgment interest, even if it was wrong under Idaho Code§ 28-22-104. 
The Cranney court held that the evident miscalculation of figures that would permit 
modification of an arbitration award under Section 7-913(a)(l) had to be a mathematical error in 
calculating the amount of the award, not a legal error in the element or measure of damages 
when making the award and that Section 7-913(a)(l) did not permit an arbitration award to be 
modified for a nonmathematical e1Tor in awarding prejudgment interest. The Court relied on its 
holding in American Foreign Ins. Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 398, 94 P.3d 699, 703 (2004), 
in which the arbitrator had modified the award to exclude an award of prejudgment interest upon 
certain worker's compensation benefits that were not to be included in the award. On appeal, the 
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Court in Reichert held that the arbitrator had no authority to modify the award under Section 7-
913(a)(l) because there was no evident miscalculation of figures. The Court stated, "'There was 
no mathematical error.' 140 Idaho at 401, 94 P.3d at 706." Cranney, 145 Idaho at 9, 175 P.3d at 
171. 
Respondent, in support of its motion for reconsideration, urges the Arbitrator to follow 
the special concurring opinion of Justice W. Jones, in which Chief Justice Eismann concurred in 
Cranney. Justice Jones opines that the authority of an arbitrator to award interest on the amount 
"due" by express contract as provided in I. C. § 28-22-104 in uninsured or underinsured motorist 
cases does not exist when the amount of prejudgment interest is not "capable of mathematical 
computation" from the date of the accident or even from the date of the proof of loss when it is 
unknown what the amount "due' is until it is determined by the arbitrator. Justice W. Jones 
states: "The arbitrator's award can include past medical expenses and lost wages, but also can 
include damages for pain and suffering, future lost wages and future medical expenses, all of 
which are unknown until the arbitrator renders his decision. Moreover, in awarding future 
damages, the arbitrator will presumably discount the amount awarded for such future loses to 
present value" Justice W. Jones further states "It is basically illogical, unjust and unconscionable 
to award prejudgment interest on sums of money representing damages which have not yet 
occurred, but which will only occur sometime in the future ..... " Id. 
This Arbitrator agrees with Justice W. Jones and believes this view comports with the 
Brockman rule, but is compelled to apply the law as mandated by Emery, Walton, Schilling, and 
Greenough, rather than as Justice W. Jones and Chief Justice Eismann would prefer it be applied. 
Moreover, the Arbitrator is constrained to modify the Final Award to make adjustments that are 
not authorized under Idaho Code§ 7-909. See, e.g., American Foreign Ins. Co. v. Reichert, 140 
Idaho 394, 398, 94 P.3d 699, 703 (2004). 
In her response to the Draft Order No. 12, Claimant argues that calculating 
prejudgment interest from the date that the insurer has sufficient information to evaluate the 
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claim is fair and reasonable in light of the three public policy reasons for awarding prejudgment 
interest in underinsurance claims cases. The public policy reasons are: (1) to compensate a 
claimant for the loss of use of value of a damage award due to a delay in payment; (2) to prevent 
the insurer from being unjustly enriched for the use value of the money due to the delay in 
payment; and (3) to promote the prompt settlement of claims. See, Uninsured and Underinsured 
Motorist Insurance, Rev. 3n:1 Ed., Vol. 3, Ch. 39, "Damages: Herein of Coverage for 'Interest' 
and Punitive Damages," p. 344. The Arbitrator does not disagree with these policy reasons, but 
they do not address the issue about the methodology for calculating prejudgment interest upon 
special damages as opposed to general damages. 
Respondent, in its Response to Draft Order No. 12, argues that Greenough and Dillon are 
distinguishable and inapplicable to this UIM claim, and that the Arbitrator is not bound to apply 
them in this case. The Arbitrator is not persuaded by the Respondent's arguments. The key facts 
in Greenough and in the instant case are that both involve an express contract, the contract for 
first party insurance coverage. In Greenough, the contract provided that payment for loss would 
be made within 60 days after a sworn proof of loss was received. In the instant case, the contract 
does not require a sworn proof of loss. As is discussed above, Greenough only addresses when 
prejudgment interest begins to accrue on general damages. It does not address the accrual of 
interest on special damages, although one can conclude that the Court would apply the same 
rationale to hold that prejudgment interest on special damages would commence on the date that 
the insurer is provided sufficient information that it can investigate and determine its liability or 
such other date as may be provided in the contract of insurance. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
The Arbitrator finds and concludes that the Motion for Reconsideration has merit and 
should be granted to the extent it establishes that the Arbitrator issued the Final Award on April 
29, 2013, but erroneously calculated prejudgment interest to April 30, 2013. However, any 
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adjustment in the award that would result from correcting this error is subsumed in the 
adjustments that are hereafter made. 
The Arbitrator finds and concludes that the Motion for Reconsideration has merit and 
should be granted to the extent it seeks a recalculation of prejudgment interest that accounts for 
the payment of$ I 00,332.95 on March 25, 2013. Payment terminates the running of statutory 
interest on the amount paid. See Brinhnan v. AID Insurance Co., 115 Idaho 346, 766 P.2d 1227 
(1988); Packard v Joint School District #171, 104 Idaho 604,614,661 P.2d 770, 780 
(Ct.App.1983). Payment of the adjusted Interim Award stopped the accrual of prejudgment 
interest on the amount paid. The Final Award includes interest on that amount to April 30, 2013. 
The pre-judgment interest award on the Initial Amount should be recalculated to the end of 
March 24, 2013. This reduces the Final Award of prejudgment interest by $1,187.50. 
The Arbitrator finds and concludes that the remainder of the Motion for Reconsideration 
must be denied. As discussed above, the Arbitrator concludes that the controlling law, as 
established in Emery, Walton, Schilling, and Greenough mandates that prejudgment interest on 
the Final Award, both for special damages and general damages, be calculated from the date that 
the insurer had sufficient inf01mation to investigate and determine its liability in this matter. 
Moreover, even if the Arbitrator has erred in this conclusion, the Arbitrator has no authority to 
correct the error because it is not a mathematical error. See Cranney v. Mut. Of Enumclaw, Inc. 
Co., 145 Idaho 6, 175 P.3d 168 (2007); Am. Foreign Ins. Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 94 P.3d 
699 (2004). 
Respondent is entitled to a credit of $1,187.50 as a result of its additional payment of 
$100,332.95 on March 25, 2013. Respondent's March 25, 2013 payment of $100,332.95 was 
applied to the outstanding prejudgment interest of $103,135.46. Crediting Respondent with 
$1,187.50 for 36 days of interest results in prejudgment interest owed as of March 25, 2013 in 
the amount of $101,947.96. Applying Respondent's payment of $100,332,95 to the outstanding 
prejudgment interest of $101,947.96, results in unpaid interest of $1,615.01 as of March 25, 
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2013. Adding this amount to the adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 results in a total 
obligation of $101,947.96 as of March 25, 2013. Prejudgment interest at the rate of 12% per 
annum continues to accrue on the unpaid adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 from March 
25, 2013 until confirmed in a final judgment or paid, whichever sooner occurs. 
An Amended Final Award will be issued to conform to this Order. 
DATED this 24th day of July, 2013. 
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• • 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of July, 2013, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing ORDER NO. 12 RE: RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AW ARD by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Jon Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 1020 W. Main 
Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
jsteele@rnnftsteele.com 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
jat@elamburke.com 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
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JOHN L. RUNFT (ISB # 1059) 
JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-9495 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: jsteele@runftsteele.com 
Attorneys for Peggy Cedillo 
• 
NO·---,~TM1-,,. __ 
AM. ____ F_IL~~ £tog = 
SEP l 5 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. AICH Clerk 
By ANNAMARIE MEYER 
OePU'IY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 











CASE NO. CV OC 1308697 
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
MODIFICATION AND/OR 
CORRECTION OF ARBITRATION 
AWARD 
Plaintiff Cedillo respectfully submits the following Reply Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Modification and/or Correction of Arbitration Award. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 2, 2012, Mr. Merlyn Clark was appointed Arbitrator in this matter. He was 
asked to resolve Plaintiffs underinsurance claim for bodily injury damages suffered by her in a 
motorcycle crash on May 25, 2008. Plaintiff had purchased a policy of insurance from 
Defendant Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho ("Defendant") which included underinsurance 
motorist coverage in the amount of $500,000. The arbitration was binding. 
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Plaintiff's injuries were severe. She suffered through two separate neck fusion surgeries 
and a shoulder surgery. She incurred over $130,000 in medical bills and she has yet to recover 
from her injuries. 
Attorney Steele was the owner and driver of the motorcycle and it was attorney Steele's 
negligence that caused the crash. At the time of the crash, Plaintiff and attorney Steele were 
living separately but were dating. In December of 2008, Plaintiff and attorney Steele were 
married. In 2011 Plaintiff signed a contingent fee agreement with attorney Steele's law firm, 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC, concerning her underinsurance claim. 
Plaintiff, as found by the Arbitrator, had provided a "proof of loss" to Defendant on July 
25, 2009. Defendant responded to that proof of loss by sending a $25,000 check to Plaintiff on 
August 28, 2009. Defendant made no further payments to Plaintiff until October 18, 2012 (4 ½ 
years after the crash) when it paid $155,000 to Plaintiff. The arbitration hearing was held on 
November 20 and 21, 2012. 
On March 25, 2013, after the arbitration hearing but prior to the Arbitrator issuing his 
Final Award, Defendant paid the amount of $100,332.95, which was applied to prejudgment 
interest. Defendant twice asked the Arbitrator to have this payment re-designated as a principal 
payment so that it could avoid the payment of prejudgment interest. The Arbitrator properly 
refused Defendant's motions and unequivocally awarded Plaintiff prejudgment interest of over 
$100,000 and affirmed the March 25, 2013 payment received to be designated first to 
prejudgment interest, secondly to the principal debt 
On September 11, 2013, Defendant paid the additional amount of $101,947.96. See, 
Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in Opposition to Farmers' Motion for Modification and/or Correction 
of Arbitration Award, Exhibits I and J. Per the Arbitrator's award and orders, Plaintiff applied 
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this payment to the remaining interest balance of $7,223.31 and the balance to the Final Award. 
After applying all payments made by Defendant there remains due and owing a principal debt 
balance of $5,608.30 plus interest from September 12, 2013. See, Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in 
Opposition to Farmers' Motion for Modification and/or Correction of Arbitration Award, 
Exhibits J. Plaintiff believes Defendant's continued refusal to accept the Arbitrator's rulings to 
be frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. 
Plaintiff has incurred and paid costs claimed as a matter of right of $14,262.68 and 
discretionary costs of $19,888.94. See, Amended Verified Memorandum of Costs, Attorney 
Fees, and Prejudgment Interest. Additionally, Plaintiff has incurred and paid the Arbitrator 
$18,517.97 for which she does not seek reimbursement. See, Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in 
Opposition to Farmers' Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees, Exhibit D. 
In addition to costs, Plaintiff seeks an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 
41-1839. The total amount sought by Plaintiff is now as follows: 
Total Costs as a Matter of Right $ 14,262.88 
Total Discretionary Costs $ 19,888.94 
Unpaid Principal Amount from Interim Award $ 5,608.30 
Prejudgment Interest from 09/12/13 - 10/15/13 $ 62.56 





Defendant's motion for Modification and/or correction of Arbitration Award has been 
denied twice by the Arbitrator. This Court should summarily deny this motion for the following 
reasons: 
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A. Farmers' has admitted its obligation to pay prejudgment interest. 
B. Farmers' same motion, made in arbitration, was not timely. 
C. Farmers' same motion was twice denied by the Arbitrator on its merits. 
D. The Arbitrator's prior rulings are res judicata. 
E. Farmers' motion made in this Court is not timely. 
F. The District Court has no jurisdiction to modify or change the Arbitrator's 
rulings. 
G. The Arbitrator's ruling is correct. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Judicial review of the decision of an arbitrator under the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) 
is limited. Chicoine v. Ginall, 127 Idaho 225, 227, 899 P.2d 438, 440 (1995). The Arbitrator's 
decision is binding on the reviewing court both as to questions of law and fact. Hughes v. 
Hughes, 123 Idaho 711, 713, 851 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Ct. App. 1993). Even where a reviewing 
court might consider some of the arbitrator's rulings on questions of law to be error, the 
arbitrator's decision is nevertheless binding on the reviewing court. Bingham County Comm 'n v. 
Interstate Electric Co., 105 Idaho 36, 42 n. 7, 665 P.2d 1046, 1052 n. 7 (1983). As this Court 
stated in Hecla Mining Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., 101 Idaho 557, 617 P.2d 861 (1980): 
The essential nature of arbitration is that the parties, by consensual 
agreement, have decided to substitute the final and binding judgment of an 
impartial entity conversant with the business world for the judgment of the 
courts. They seek to avoid the cost, in both time and money, of formal 
judicial dispute resolution. But when the parties bargain for the binding 
decision of an arbitrator, they necessarily accept the fact that his 
interpretation of the facts, the law, and the equities of the situation may 
not be entirely satisfactory to them. 
Id at 562, 617 P.2d at 866. 
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The limited review exercised by this Court when asked to confirm or vacate an 
arbitrator's award was set forth in Bingham: 
An inquiry by a district court is limited to an examination of the award to 
discern if any of the grounds for relief stated in the Uniform Arbitration 
Act exist. 
Judicial intrusion is limited to the extraordinary situation indicated, abuse of arbitral 
power or exercise of power beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. Hecla Mining Co. v. Bunker 
Hill Co., 101 Idaho 557, 562, 617 P.2d 861, 866 (1980). 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Farmers Admits It Owes Prejudgment Interest. 
Farmers has admitted its obligation to pay prejudgment interest. Farmers initially urged 
the Arbitrator to award no more than $7,884.61 in prejudgment interest. Farmers then proposed 
that the Arbitrator reduce his prejudgment interest award of $103,135.46 to $35,719.16. See, 
Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Modification and/or 
Correction of Arbitration Award, Exhibit B. ("Based on these grounds ... Farmers requests the 
prejudgment interest award of $103,135.46 be reduced to $35,719.16.") Farmers admits its 
obligation to pay prejudgment interest; its disagreement is to the amount that has been awarded 
by the Arbitrator. 
B. Farmers' Same Motion Was Denied By The Arbitrator As Not Timely. 
"Because the Respondent did not submit the motion for reconsideration 
within 14 days from the issuance of the Final A ward, the Arbitrator will 
not consider Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration under this Rule." 
See, Final Order No. 12 Re: Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of 
Prejudgment Interest Award and Claimant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit 
of Counsel for Respondent. 
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C. Farmers' Motion Was Twice Denied By The Arbitrator On Its Merits. 
"[T]he Arbitrator concludes that the controlling law, as established in 
Emery, Walton, Schilling, and Greenough mandates that prejudgment 
interest on the Final A ward, both for special damages and general 
damages, be calculated from the date that the insurer had sufficient 
information to investigate and determine its liability in this matter. 
Moreover, even if the Arbitrator has erred in this conclusion, the 
Arbitrator has no authority to correct the error because it is not a 
mathematical error. See, Cranney v. Mut. of Enumclaw, Inc. Co., 145 
Idaho 6, 175 P.3d 168 (2007); Am. Foreign Ins. Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 
394, 94 P.3d 699 (2004). 
Final Order No. 12 Re: Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of 
Prejudgment Interest Award and Claimant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit 
of Counsel for Respondent. 
Farmers' same motion was denied a second time by the Arbitrator. 
The Arbitrator is now asked to correct or amend the Amended Final 
Award to change the methodology that was applied by the Arbitrator in 
reaching the determination to apply the March 25, 2013 payment first to 
accrued interest rather than the unpaid adjusted Interim A ward of damages 
of $100,332.95. Respondent argues that the March 25, 2013 payment was 
made before the Arbitrator made its prejudgment interest award of 
$103,135.46 and there was no prejudgment interest award to which the 
payment could be applied. Respondent contends that it paid off the award 
of damages, not prejudgment interest. 
The Arbitrator rejects the Respondent's argument that it did not 
owe prejudgment interest to the Clamant simply because the amount of 
interest has not been calculated and awarded as of the date of 
Respondent's payment to Claimant. The law of Idaho clearly provides that 
the Claimant is entitled to prejudgment interest on unpaid claims. The fact 
that the actual amount of prejudgment interest that was owed by 
Respondent to Claimant had not been calculated as of the date of 
-Respondent's payment is immaterial. When calculated by the Arbitrator, it 
was accurately determined that the amount of accrued prejudgment 
interest exceeded the amount of the payment by $1,615.01. To follow 
Respondent's logic and apply the payment to the principle balance, rather 
than the accrued interest, would leave the Claimant with a balance of 
accrued interest owed and no right to collect interests on the money owed. 
This application of the payment would deny Claimant of the right under 
section 28-22-104 to collect interest at the rate of 12% per annum "on 
money after the same becomes due." The right to prejudgment interest is 
"money after the same becomes due." Thus, regardless of whether the 
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payment was applied to principle or accrued interest, the Claimant is 
entitled to collect interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the amount that 
was due her on the date of the payment and thereafter until it is fully paid. 
It is also the finding and conclusion of the Arbitrator that the 
application for modification or correction of the Amended Final Award to 
have the payment applied to the principle balance rather than the accrued 
interest does not constitute a request to correct an evident miscalculation 
of figures or an evident mistake in the description of any person, thing or 
property referred to in the award, nor a request to correct an award that is 
imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the controversy 
as required under Sections 7-909 and 7-913(1) and(3). 
Final Order No. 13 Re: Respondent's Application to Modify or Correct 
Amended Final Award and/or Motion for Reconsideration. 
D. The Arbitrator's Prior Rulings Are Res Judicata. 
The doctrine of res judicata mandates the Arbitrator's ruling be upheld. See, Wolfe v. 
Farm Bureau Insurance Service Company of Idaho, 128 Idaho 398, 913 P.2d 1168 (1996). 
E. Farmers' Motion Made In This Court Is Not Timely. 
Idaho Code § 7-911 requfres the District Court to confirm the award " ... unless within the 
time limits hereinafter impose, grounds are urged for vacating ... the award .... " 
The applicable time limits are imposed by Idaho Code § 7-912, which require the 
application to set aside the award for the specific grounds there stated to be made within 90 days 
of entry of the ward. A party seeking to vacate an arbitration award must meet these statutory 
requirements. Bingham Count Commissioners v. Interstate Electrict Co., 105 Idaho 36,665 P.2d 
1046 (1983). 
The Arbitrator's Final Award was entered on April 29, 2013. The 90 day time period has 
long expired. 
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The District Court Has No Jurisdiction To Modify Or Change The Arbitrator's 
Rulings. 
Courts possess very limited authority to review arbitration awards under Idaho's Uniform 
Arbitration Act. Idaho Code§ 7-901-922; Mumfordv. Miller, 143 Idaho 99,100,137 P.3d 1021, 
1022 (2006). The Arbitrator's decision is binding on the reviewing court both as to questions of 
law and fact. Driver v. SI Corp., 139 Idaho 423, 426, 80 P.3d 1024, 1027 (2003). The Court 
lacks jurisdiction to modify or change the Arbitrator's decisions. 
G. The Arbitrator's Ruling Is Correct. 
The Greenough case provides that prejudgment interest is calculated from the date that 
the insured has submitted a sufficient proof of loss which provides the insurer with enough 
information to allow the insurer a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine liability. 
See, Arbitrator's Final Award, p. 7. As the Arbitrator pointed out, Greenough overruled that 
portion of Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 766 P.2d 1227 (1988) holding that interest is 
accrued on an award from the date of the accident. Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of 
Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 1127 (2006). 
The Greenough rule is reasonable for a number of reasons. First, this case is a contract 
action, not a personal injury action. Although damages are defined as personal injury damages, 
the underlying relationship is contractual. In Greenough, the contract addressed the format of 
the proof of loss and specified a time period for the insurer to investigate and determine its 
liability. In this case, neither the format nor the time period for investigation were addressed in 
the contract of insurance. If those issues had been addressed in the contract of insurance, the 
parties would be bound by their agreement. But without those standards the Arbitrator carefully 
and thoroughly analyzed the proof of loss information submitted and the date that Farmers had 
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been provided sufficient information to investigate and determine its liability. In this case that 
date was August 25, 2009, the date on which Farmers valued Cedillo's case at $25,000. 
This valuation was wildly and grossly inadequate based upon the information Cedillo had 
already provided Farmers. Had Farmers made a reasonable offer in August of 2008 this matter 
would have been concluded. It is only because of Farmers' gross undervaluation that Cedillo 
was forced to Arbitration. Using the date of sufficient proof of loss as the start date for 
calculating prejudgment interest encourages the insurer to make fair and reasonable offers. 
Underinsurance is a matter of public policy and there are three public policy reasons for 
awarding prejudgment interest. First, it compensates plaintiff for the loss of use value of a 
damage award due to a delay in payment. Second, it prevents the insurer from being unjustly 
enriched for the use value of the money due to the delay in payment. Third, it promotes the 
prompt settlement of claims. See, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance, Revised 3rd 




For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court enter confirmation 
of the arbitration and enter judgment in her favor in the amount of $167,249.65 
DATED this#day of September 2013. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By:_J_~+-----,,m~-ff¥---'---TEEL-E -
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 2.%y of September 2013, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR MODIFICATION AND/OR CORRECTION OF ARBITRATION AWARD was 
served upon opposing counsel as follows: 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam Burke 
251 E. Front St., Ste 300 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance Company 
Of Idaho 
Peter J. Johnson 
Johnson Law Group 
103 Indiana Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance Company 
Of Idaho 
Via Facsimile --
__ Via Personal Delivery 
Via U.S. Mail 
Via E-mail 
Via Facsimile 
_._ Via Personal Delivery 
_x_ Via U.S. Mail 
Via E-mail 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By· JJ@J 
. JONM.SEEL 
Attorney for Peggy Cedillo 
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JOHN L. RUNFT (ISB # 1059) 
JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-9495 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: jmsteele@runftlaw.com 
Attorneys for Peggy Cedillo 
:~-,_:__, -.:_ -,......-.:_Fl-,-L~-,-tt-l~t-r,Qrt-te...--. -::: 
SEP~ 5 2013 
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk 
By ANNAMARIE MEYER 
01!Pu,'V 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PEGGY CEDILLO, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 












CASE NO. CV OC 1308697 
AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN 
OPPOSITION TO FARMER'S 
MOTION FOR MODIFICATION 
AND/OR CORRECTION OF 
ARBITRATION AWARD 
COMES NOW, Jon M. Steele, being over the age of eighteen years artd competent to 
make this Affidavit, after first being duly sworn, and upon his own personal knowledge, states as 
follows: 
1. That I am an attorney in good standing with the Idaho State Bar and counsel for 
Plaintiff in the above arbitration and confirmation. 
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2. That I make this Affidavit in Opposition to Farmer's Motion for Modification 
and/or Correction of Arbitration Award. 
3. The Arbitrator's Final Award was entered on April 29, 2013. See, Exhibit A 
attached.· 
4. The Arbitrator's Final Award states the following: 
Claimant asserts that the date for commencement of prejudgment 
interest on her claim is August 25, 2009. Based on the foregoing facts, this 
Arbitrator finds that Claimant provided enough information to obligate 
Farmers to investigate and determine its rights and liabilities in a fair and 
accurate manner prior to and with her letter dated July 28, 2009, and 
concludes as a matter of law that prejudgment interest began to accrue in 
this case on August 25, 2009, which is the date that Farmers provided 
Claimant with its valuation of the amount due under the Underinsured 
Motorist coverage of her policy. 
Respondent's contention that Claimant should be required to file a 
new proof of loss for each surgery she received is rejected. No such 
requirement is imposed by law or the insurance contract that was issued to 
Claimant and there is no public policy reason why a new proof of loss 
should be required for each new medical procedure received by Claimant. 
See, Exhibit A, p. 9. 
5. On May 30, 2013 Farmers moved for reconsideration of the Arbitrator's 
-
prejudgment interest award. See, Exhibit B, Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of 
Prejudgment Interest A ward. 
6. On May 30, 2013, Cedillo filed her Memorandum in Support of her Motion to 
Strike and in Opposition of Farmer's Motion for Reconsideration of Prejudgment Interest 
Award. See, Exhibit C attached. 
7. On July 24, 2013 the Arbitrator issued his Final Order No. 12 re: Respondent's 
Motion for Reconsideration of Prejudgment Interest Award and Claimant's Motion to Strike 
Affidavit of Counsel for Respondent. See, Exhibit D attached. 
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8. The Arbitrator's Final Order No. 12 (Exhibit D) states the following: 
The Arbitrator finds and concludes that the Motion for 
Reconsideration has merit and should be granted to the extent it 
seeks a recalculation of prejudgment interest that accounts for the 
payment of $100,332.95 qn March 25, 2013. Payment terminates 
· the running of statutory interest on the amount paid. See Brinkman 
v. AID Insurance Co., 115 Idaho 346, 766 P.2d 1227 (1988); 
Packard v Joint School District #171, 104 Idaho 604, 614, 661 
P.2d 770, 780 (Ct. App. 1983). Payment of the adjusted Interim 
A ward stopped the accrual of prejudgment interest on the amount 
paid. The Final Award includes interest on that amount to April 30, 
2013. The pre-judgment interest award on the Initial Amount 
should be recalculated to the end of March 24, 2013. This reduces 
the Final Award of prejudgment interest by $1,187.50. 
The Arbitrator finds and concludes that the remainder of 
the Motion for Reconsideration must be denied. As discussed 
above, the Arbitrator concludes that the controlling law, as 
established in Emery, Walton, Schilling, and Greenough mandates 
that prejudgment interest on the Final Award, both for special 
damages and general damages, be calculated from the date that the 
insurer had sufficient information to investigate and determine its 
liability in this matter. Moreover, even if the Arbitrator has erred in 
this conclusion, the Arbitrator has no authority to correct the error 
because it is not a mathematical error. See Cranney v. Mut. Of 
Enumclaw, Inc. Co., 145 Idaho 6, 175 P.3d 168 (2007); Am. 
Foreign Ins. Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 94 P.3d 699 (2004). 
Respondent is entitled to a credit of $1,187.50 as a result of 
its additional payment of $100,332.95 on March 25, 2013. 
Respondent's March 25, 2013 payment of $100,332.95 was applied 
to the outstanding prejudgment interest of $103,135.46. Crediting 
Respondent with $1,187.50 for 36 days of interest results in 
prejudgment interest owed as of March 25, 2013 in the amount of 
$101,947.96. Applying Respondent's payment of $100,332.95 to 
the outstanding prejudgment interest of $101,947.96, results in 
unpaid interest of $1,615.01 as of March 25, 2013. Adding this 
amount to the adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 results in a 
total obligation of $101,947.96 as of March 25, 2013. Prejudgment 
interest at the rate of 12% per annum continues to accrue on the 
unpaid adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 from March 25, 
2013 until confirmed in a final judgment or paid, whichever sooner 
occurs. 
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Final Order No. 12 re: Respondent's Mot for Reconsideration of 
Prejudgment Interest Award and Claimant's Mot to Strike 
Affidavit of Counsel for Respondent, pp. 19-20, Exhibit D 
9. Based upon the Arbitrator's Final Order No. 12, the Arbitrator entered the 
Amended Final Order. See, Exhibit E attached. 
10. Farmers then moyed again to Modify or Correct the Amended Final Award and/or 
Motion for Reconsideration on the same grounds. See, Exhibit F attached 
11. On August 2, 2013, Cedillo filed her Response to Farmers' Application to Modify 
or Correct Amended Final Award and/or Motion for Reconsideration. See, Exhibit G attached. 
12. On August 21, 2013, the Arbitrator denied Farmers second motion for 
reconsideration of prejudgment interest award in his Final Order No. 13 re: Respondent's App to 
Modify or Correct Amended Filial Award and/or Motion for Reconsideration. See, Exhibit H 
attached. 
13. On September 11, 2013, Farmers delivered a check for $101,947.96 and a letter to 
Attorney Steele's office. See, Exhibit I attached 
14. On September 18, 2013, Attorney Steele sent a letter to Attorney Thomson. See, 
Exhibit J attached. 
Further, your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this~ day of September 2013. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
B~_, __ J~-rl--~---~-----
JON\t STEELE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) l 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J_S day of September 013. 
tc 
Notary Public for the State ofldaho 
Residing at: \\jQn\{0~ 
My Commission Expires: 3,.. \q-\ °' 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/le-\;-) 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this_ L-:J_ day of September 2013, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN OPPOSITION TO 
FARMER'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION AND/OR CORRECTION OF 
ARBITRATION AW ARD was served upon opposing counsel as follows: 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam Burke 
251 E. Front St., Ste 300 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance Company 
Ofidaho 
Peter J. Johnson 
Johnson Law Group 
103 E. Indiana Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance Company 
Ofidaho 
. Via Facsimile + Via Personal Delivery 
Via U.S. Mail 
Via E-mail 
Via Facsimile 
Via Personal Delivery 
X Via U.S. Mail 
Via E-mail 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: ~1 ~ 
JON M. STEELE 
Attorney for Peggy Cedillo 
AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN OPPOSITION TO FARMER'S MOTION FOR 






















Case No. 81700-0040 
ARBITRATOR'S FINAL AWARD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This arbitration involves claims for damages under the underinsured motorist provisi011s 
of a policy of insurance that was issued by Respondent, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho 
("Farmers") to Claimant, Peggy B. Cedillo. The claims are disputed by Respondent. The dispute 
has been submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the agreement to arbitrate, which is 
contained in the insurance policy. The agreement to arbitrate, the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act, 
Idaho Code§ 7-901, et seq., the Pre-Hearing Orders that were entered by the arbitrator in this 
matter, and the Stipulations of the Parties dated February 22, 2012 and April 5, 2012 govern 
these proceedings. _ 
An evidentiary hearing was commenced on November 20, 2012 in Boise, Idaho before 
the duly appointed arbitrator, Merlyn W. Clark. Claimant, Peggy B. Cedillo, appeared in person 
represented by her attorney, Jon M. Steele, Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC. Jeffrey A. 
Thomson, Elam & Burke, P.A., appeared with Ron Ramsey, a representative of Respondent, on 
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behalf of Respondent. Oral and documentary evidence was presented by the parties and the 
matter was submitted for a decision and interim award. 
The Arbitrator's Decision and Interim Award was issued January 16, 2013. The Interim 
Award assessed the amount of damages for bodily injury suffered by Claimant in the motorcycle 
accident on May 25, 2008 as follows: 
I. Economic Damages: 
• Medical expenses: 
• Lost income: 
SUBTOTAL ECONOMIC DAMAGES: 
2. Noneconomic Damages: 
Pain and suffering, loss of quality of life, physical limitations, 




Right hand: - $150.000.00 
TOT AL INTERIM AW ARD: $406,700.12 
II. ISSUE FOR DECISION 
The parties have agreed "that following issuance of the Interim Award, the arbitrator will 
conduct post Interim Award proceedings to determine what, if any, adjustments would be made 
in the amount of the Interim Award for prejudgment interest, setoffs or collateral sources and 
subrogation issues prior to issuance of the final award by the arbitrator." (Prehearing Order No. 
2.) This is the Final Award that assesses the amounts for adjustments in the amount of the 
Interim Award. 
The parties, through their respective counsel, submitted memoranda and exhibits stating 
the positions of the parties with respect to adjustments to be made in the Interim Award. A 
hearing was held on February 26, 2013, during which counsel for the parties presented oral 




arguments in support of their respective positions. The matter is now fully submitted for entry of 
the Final A ward. 
Because the insurance clause in the insurance policy that covers Claimant expressly 
provides that "[t]he expense of the arbitrator and all other expenses of arbitration will be shared 
equally" by the parties and "[a]ttomey's fees and fees paid for the witnesses are not expenses of 
arbitration and will be paid by the pa1ty incurring them," this Arbitrator has no authority to 
award expenses of arbitration or attorney fees and costs to either party in this proceeding. 
III. FACTS, ANALYSIS AND DECISIONS 
A. Adjustments for Payments Made on Behalf of the Tortfeasor, Mr. Steele. 
-1. Payments by Progressive Insurance. Progressive paid Claimant $100,000 plus 
medical payment coverage benefits of $5,000 on behalf of its insured, Mr. Steele. Farmers is 
entitled to credit for the amounts paid by Progressive. The Interim Award does not factor in these 
payments and it must be adjusted to do so. 
2. UIM Payments by Farmers. Farmers paid Claimant UIM benefits of $25,000 on 
August 25, 2009 and an additional $155,000 in UIM benefits on October 18, 2012, for which 
Farmer~ is entitled to credit. The Interim Award does not factor in this payments and it must be 
adjusted to do so. 
3. Adjustment for Contractual Reductions. The medical "cost" summary·· 
submitted by Claimant was for the amount billed by the caregivers. The evidence establishes that 
the amount billed for some of the medical expenses was reduced prior to payment. To avoid a 
"windfall" Claimant is entitled to recover only the amount of medical expenses actually paid. 
The Interim Award disallowed the charges incurred at Boise Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation Clinic and reduced the charges of (1) Idaho Neurological for K. Little, (2) Idaho 
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Neurological for C. Mack, (3) Anesthesia Associates and (4) St. Luke's for charges related to the 
February 15, 2012 surgery by 25%. Contractual adjustments for the services provided by these 
. entities were reduced proportionately. Respondent has submitted evidence that supports a 
finding that the amount of contractual adjustments made to the amount billed, minus the 25% 
reduction for those charges having contractual adjustments, totals $19,234.81. (See Kathryn 
Brandt Affidavit, 'I[ 7 and Ex. A attached thereto.) The Arbitrator finds and concludes that the 
Interim Award should be reduced by this amount. 
4. Adjustment for Further Reductions to Medical Expenses Awarded Due to 
25 % Apportionment for C5-C6 Preexisting Condition. 
In calculating the Interim Award, the Arbitrator apportioned 25% of the cost of the C5-
C6 treatmentto Claimant's preexisting condition. (Arbitration Decision and Interim Award, p. 
33.) Based on that finding the Arbitrator reduced by 25% the medical expenses associated with 
treatment of the C5-C6 medical issue. The following medical expenses were not reduced but the 
evidence indicates that they are also related to treatment of Claimant's C5-C6 disk and should be 
reduced by 25%. 
a. February 8, 2012, St. Al's bill in the amount of $1,036.00, portions of Exs. 17 and 
40 show that this bill is related to the pre-exiting preparation for C5-C6 surgery. 
25% of the $1,036.00 in medical expenses results in a reduction of $259.00. 
b. Physical Therapy of Idaho. Exhibit 50 shows that the physical therapy was for 
both the C5-C6 and the C7-Tl issue. Attributing 50% of this $2,893.00 bill 
(Exhibit 24)) to C5-C6 and reducing that amount by 25% result-; in a further 
reduction of $361.63. 
c. Idaho Sports Medicine treatment from April 27, 2010 to November 18, 2011. 
Exhibit 32 shows that part of the treatment given relates to C5-C6, including a 
right C6 nerve block. Apportioning the $3,003.00 bill (Ex. 11) one-half to C5-C6 
and one-half to the shoulder and making a further reduction of 25% equals a 
reduction of $375.38. 
d. Primary Health visit on September 9, 2011. Exhibit 39 shows that this visit was 
for the C5-C6 problem. A reduction of 25% to the $113.00 bill equals $28.25. 
ARBITRATOR'S FINAL AWARD - 4 
81700-0040:5768132.I 
000512
e. Intermountain Medical Imaging. Exhibit 12 shows that on October 3, 2011 the 
imaging was related to C5-C6. A 25% reduction of the $1,206.80 bill equals 
$301.70. 
f. St. Luke's visit dated January 11, 2012. Portions of Exhibits 20 and 45 show that 
this visit was for the C6 nerve root block. The $1,221.58 bill should be reduced by 
25% leading to a further reduction of $305.40. 
The total reductions due to the application of the 25% apportionment calculated above is 
$1,631.36. The Arbitrator finds and concludes that this correction should be made to the Interim 
Award. It reduces the Interim Award $1,631.36. 
5. Payments Purportedly Made by Mr. Steele. 
Some argument has been presented that the Arbitrator should also credit Farmers with 
any payments that were made by Mr. Steele directly to Claimant's caregivers. There is no 
evidence that allows the Arbitrator to make this calculation. Moreover, some of the purported 
payments were allegedly made while Mr. Steele and Claimant were married, and thus were likely 
made from community funds, which would entitle her to recover such payments or include them 
in her claim against Farmers. 
6. Adjustment for Award of "A Caring Hand" Bill. 
The Arbitrator awarded medical expenses in the amount of $668.00 for a bill from "A 
Caring Hand." (See Ex. 21.) The Arbitrator finds that the award of this amount is not supported 
by the evidence and the amount of $668.00 minus the 25% reduction already applied by the 
Arbitrator of $167.00 should be reduced from the Interim Award in the amount of $501.00. 
7. The Regence Blue Shield Subrogation Interest. 
The subrogation claim of Regence Blue Shield is a matter between Regence Blue Shield 
and Claimant. It is not within the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to make ~j1djilttment for this 
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subrogation claim. Moreover, the Arbitrator has no jurisdiction or authority to direct how 
payment of the Regence claim should be made and will not attempt to do so. 
8. Collateral Source Rule. 
Respondent, through its counsel, has informed the Arbitrator that Respondent is not 
seeking an offset under the collateral source rule in this proceeding and it will not be considered 
by the Arbitrator in this Final A ward. 
9. The Adjusted Interim Award. 
The Interim Award must be reduced by the amount of payments made by Progressive on 
behalf of Mr. Steele ($105,000.00); the amount of the prior UIM payments made by Farmers 
($180,000.00); the amount of the contractual adjustments made to the medical expenses 
($19,234.81); the amount represented by a uniform application of the 25% apportionment to all 
C5-C6 related medical expenses ($1,631.36); and the amount of the adjustment for the "A Caring 
Hand" bill ($501.00). The Arbitrator finds that after making the adjustments, the adjusted Interim 
Award is $100,332.95 plus the award of prejudgment interest.. 
B. Prejudgment Interest. 
1. Commencement of Prejudgment Interest. An award of prejudgment interest 
upon a claim for underinsured motorist ("UIM") benefits is governed by Idaho Code§ 28-22-104 
and Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 
1127 (2006). Section 28-22-104 provides, in relevant part, that when there is no express contract 
in writing fixing a different rate of interest, interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents (12¢) on 
the hundred by the year on money after the same becomes due. 
In Greenough, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that under Idaho Code§ 28-22-104, 
prejudgment interest can be awarded as a matter of law from the date the sum became due in 
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cases where the amount claimed, even though not liquidated, is capable of mathematical 
computation. The Court further stated that in insurance cases money becomes due as provided 
under the express terms of the insurance contract; therefore, the insured is not entitled to 
prejudgment interest until he or she complies with the applicable contract provisions. 
Greenough, 142 Idaho at 592, 130 P.3d at 1130. 
The Greenough Court held that prejudgment interest began to accrue sixty days after 
submission of sufficient proof of loss, not on the date of the accident, because the applicable · 
insurance policy required payment within 60 days after receipt of a signed, sworn proof of loss. 
The Greenough Court also held that a submitted proof of loss is sufficient when the insured 
provides the insurer with enough infonnation to allow the insurer a reasonable opportunity to 
investigate and determine its liability and that the amount of information that should be provided 
in a proof of loss is proportional to the amount reasonably available to the insured. When 
enough information is provided in a proof of loss, the insurer is obligated to investigate and/or 
determine its rights and liabilities in a fair and accurate manner. Greenough, 142 Idaho at 593, 
130 P.3d at 1131. 
The policy of insurance that was issued to Claimant contains no provision requiring a 
proof of loss to initiate a claim under the policy. Thus, adopting the rationale of the Greenough 
decision, it is the finding and conclusion of this Arbitrator that prejudgment interest began to 
accrue in this case when Claimant provided the insurer with enough information to allow the 
insurer a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability. 
Claimant notified Farmers of her underinsurance claim on June 5, 2009. On that date, 
she advised Farmers that she had made a demand for Mr. Steele's policy limits of $100,000 and 
that she would be making a claim under her policy of underinsurance. On June 17, 2009, 
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Farmers acknowledged the receipt of Claimant's demand letter to Mr. Steele's insurer and notice 
that she sought Mr. Steele's policy limits. 
On July 9, 2009, Claimant advised Farmers that she had settled her claim against Mr. 
Steele for his policy limits of $100,000. Claimant, by Farmers' letter dated July 27, 2009, was 
then directed to correspond with Mr. Ron W. Ramsey, Senior General Adjuster for Farmers. On 
July 28, 2009, Claimant by letter addressed to Mr. Ramsey, again advised Farmers that she had 
settled her claim against Mr. Steele for his policy limits of $100,000 and an additional $5,000 in 
medical coverage. She informed Farmers that her medical records and reports which documented 
her injuries had previously been submitted to her local agent, Mr. Jay Reinke. She also enclosed 
a copy of her demand letter to Progressive Northwest Insurance, Mr. Steele's insurer, the Full 
Release of All Claims with Indemnity against Mr. Steele, and her previous letters addressed to 
Farmers Insurance. She also informed Farmers that her medical expenses at that time totaled 
$53,048.62. She stated "[i]n light of my continuing pain, discomfort, ongoing medical treatment, 
the effects upon my daily life, and my future life expectancy, I hereby demand that you pay me 
policy limits [$500,000] and medical coverage." She stated that the enclosed documents had all 
been previously delivered to Fanners Insurance, contained a detailed account of her injury, 
medical care, medical expenses, her painful recovery and her damages. She also informed 
Farmers that she and Mr. Steele were then married and that she understood Farmers would 
conduct an investigation of Mr. Steele's financial condition before resolving her claim. She 
asked that the claim be resolved within the next thirty days. (See letter to Mr. Ron Ramsey, 
Farmers Insurance, dated July 28, 2009.) By letter dated July 29, 2009, from Farmers to 
Claimant, Farmers acknowledged receipt of her claim for injuries arising from the accident on 
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May 25, 2008, while riding as a passenger on a motorcycle driven by Mr. Steele. Her claim for 
medical expenses was denied. 
Subsequently, following further investigation, Farmers sent Claimant a check for $25,000 
with a letter dated August 25, 2009. In the letter, Farmers explained that the check represented 
Farmers' valuation of the amount due Claimant under the Underinsured Motorist coverage of her 
policy based upon her letter dated July 28, 2009 and the information provided. Farmers informed 
Claimant that she had provided no information about a wage loss claim, so none was included in 
the valuation. Farmers informed Claimant that she could submit additional information for its 
consideration. Farmers also claimed an offset for the settlement funds paid by Progressive 
Insurance Company, Mr. Steele's insurer for Bodily Injury coverage and medical payments of 
$5,000. (See Letter dated August 25, 2009.) 
Claimant asserts that the date for commencement of prejudgment interest on her claim is 
August 25, 2009, Based on the foregoing facts, this Arbitrator finds that Claimant provided 
enough information to obligate Farmers to investigate and determine its rights and liabilities in a 
fair and accurate manner prior to and with her letter dated July 28, 2009, and concludes as a 
matter of law that prejudgment interest began to accme in this case on August 25, 2009, which is 
the date that Farmers provided Claimant with its valuation of the amount due under the 
Underinsured Motorist coverage of her policy. 
Respondent's contention that Claimant should be required to file a new proof of loss for 
each surgery she received is rejected. No such requirement is imposed by law or the insurance 
contract that was issued to Claimant and there is no public policy reason why a new proof of loss 
should be required for each new medical procedure received by Claimant. 
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2. Methodology for Calculation of Prejudgment Interest. 
This Arbitrator cannot accept Claimant's contention that the award of prejudgment 
interest applies to the damage award of $406,700.12 commencing on the proof of loss date, 
August 25, 2009, because it would not account for payments that were made by Progressive or 
by Fanners. Claimant cites American Foreign Insurance Company v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 
400, 94 P.3d 699, 705 (2204) as authority for her contention. This Arbitrator was the arbitrator in 
the Reichert case. In Richert the arbitrator was restricted under the terms of an agreement 
between the pmties that prevented the arbitrator in Reichert from considering the worker's 
compensation offset and subrogation issues in the calculation of prejudgment interest. In 
Reichert the arbitrator erroneously included the issues in the calculation of the final award. The 
Supreme Court held that the Reichert arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to do so because of the 
restrictive agreement. No such agreement or restriction applies in this case that is now before the 
Arbitrator. In this matter, the parties have agreed to allow the Arbitrator to consider these issues 
in determining the Final A ward. 
As noted by Respondent in its Response to Claimant's Brief in Support of Final Award, 
Reichert supports Farmers' position that prejudgment interest is calculated on the Final Award 
and from a date that avoids a windfall to the Claimant. In Reichert, because the Arbitrator did not 
have jurisdiction over the issues, the district court was tasked with handling the issues of the 
worker's compensation offset and subrogation. 140 Idaho at 404, 94 P.3d at 709. The Supreme 
Court upheld the district court's prejudgment interest calculation, ruling that offsets for money 
, already received shall be deducted from the arbitration award and the prejudgment interest shall 
be recalculated based on a reduction to the gross award of the amounts paid by the worker's 
compensation insurer. 140 Idaho at 402, 94 P.3d at 707. The Supreme Court noted that the 
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purpose of the offset provisions is consistent with the public policy against double recovery and 
these provisions are valid. 140 Idaho at 400, 94 P.3d at 705. The Court concluded that recovery 
of prejudgment interest on amounts paid would result in a windfall to the insured. Id. 
Section 28-22-104 provides that interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents on the 
hundred by the year on "money after the same becomes due." (I.C. § 28-22-104(1)2.). Thus, it is 
incumbent on this Arbitrator to determine when payments were due from Fanners to Claimant 
and the amounts thereof as interest accrued on said amounts. In other words, Claimant was 
entitled to interest on the money that was owed to her by Farmers and unpaid from the dates it 
was due and owing, but unpaid, to the extent that said amounts are capable of mathematical 
computation. (See Dillon v. Montgomery, 138 Idaho 614,617, 67 P.3d 93, 96 (2003).) 
The policy of insurance at issue in the setoff clause provides that the amount owed to 
Claimant under the UIM coverage is the amount of damages established but not otherwise 
recovered from the person legally liable for the bodily injury. (See Insurance policy, p. 8, 
Endorsement El 179i.) Thus, logic dictates that the determination of the amounts due and owing 
to Claimant under the UIM coverage for the purpose of computing prejudgment interest, are any 
amounts that accrue over and above the payments of $105,000 that were made by the insurer for 
Mr. Steele. In other words, the payments made by Mr. Steele's insurer must be taken off the 
front end of the Farmer's obligation rather than the back end, i.e., the Final Award, as proposed 
by Claimant. Thus, the obligation of Farmers to pay the medical expenses of Claimant did not 
begin to accrue until the unpaid medical expenses exceeded $105,000. Also, Farmers is entitled 
to credit for payments made by Farmers as of the date the two payments were actually made. 
Claimant has asserted that this setoff clause is not enforceable and should not be applied 
by the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator is not persuaded that the rationale of the Court in Talbot v. 
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Fanners, 133 Idaho 428, 987 P.2d 1043 (1999) is applicable in this case because the facts of this 
case are distinguishable from those in Talbot. Moreover, the parties have agreed by stipulation 
that the Arbitrator does not have jurisdiction to determine the validity/enforceability of the setoff 
provision found in Endorsement Ell 79i of the policy at issue. The parties stipulated to "reserve 
the issue of enforceability of the setoff clause for determination by the District Court should 
Claimant wish to raise that issue .... " The pa1ties further agreed that "the Arbitrator has 
jurisdiction to apply Farmer's setoff clause found in Endorsement El 179i in arriving at his Final 
Award. (See Stipulation dated April 5, 2012, pp.2-3.) Thus, the Arbitrator will apply the set off 
provision in determining the Final Award. 
Because it is not feas.ible to calculate the accrued amounts due for each and every invoice 
Claimant received as of the date of receipt thereof, the Arbitrator will not attempt to do so. 
Rather, the Arbitrator will calculate the prejudgment interest based on an adjusted amount of the 
final award from the date of the proof of loss less the payments that were received by Claimant 
as of the dates such payments were received by Claimant. 
3. Calculation of Prejudgment Interest. 
The Interim Award after the adjustments are made to reduce the Interim Award for the 
contractual adjustments made to the medical expenses ($19,234.81); the amount represented by a 
uniform application of the 25% apportionment to all C5-C6 related medical expenses 
($1,631.36); and the amount of the adjustment for the "A Caring Hand" bill ($501.00) is 
$385,784.01, the "Initial Amount" for calculating prejudgment interest. 
Payments were received from Progress Insurance Company by Claimant in the amount of 




payment of $25,000.00 was received by Claimant from Farmers on August 25, 2009, the date of 
proof of loss, which further reduces the Initial Amount to $255,784.01. 
The Arbitrator finds and concludes that prejudgment interest at the rate of 12% per 
annum commenced on the Initial Amount of $255,784.01 and accrued at the rate of 12% per 
annum from August 25, 2009 to October 18, 2012 (1,150 days), when Claimant received a UIM 
payment from Fanners of $155,000, which reduced the Initial Amount to $100,784.01. 
Prejudgment interest at the rate of12% per annum accrued on the reduced Initial Amount of 
$100,784.01 from October 18, 2012 to the date of the Final Award, April 30, 2013 (194 days). 
· The amount of prejudgment interest fro in August 25, 2009 to October 18, 2012 is 
$96,707.38. The amount of prejudgment interest from October 18, 2012 to April 30, 2013 is 
$6,428.08. The total amount of prejudgment interest is $103,135.46. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND FINAL AW ARD 
The Final Award to Claimant against Farmers is TWO HUNDRED THREE 
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT DOLLARS AND FORTY-ONE CENTS 
($203,468.41). 
Prejudgment interest at the rate of twelve percent per annum ( 12 % ) shall continue to 
accrue on the adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 until the Final Award is affirmed by a 
Judgment or paid, whichever sooner occurs. 
I 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 29th day of April, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of April, 2013, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing ARBITRATOR'S FINAL A WARD by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
Jon Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
jsteele@runftsteele.com 
Jeffrey A Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
jat@elamburke.com 
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__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
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__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-mail 
__ Telecopy 




J efli:ey A. Tfiomsbh 
ELAM & BU~, !?;_A. 
251 E.cFront SJ.,. Ste. 30U 
ItO. 13-ox 1539 
Boise, Ioaho 83701 
Ieleph9ne: (208) 343..,5454 
F~csimile: (208) 3841-5,844 
jat@efamburke:co_.rn 
ISB.#3380. 
Attorneys tbr'f ~rnf~.fs Insurance 
Cgmpany of 1qaho 
IN THE MATIP:R OF THE ARBITRATION-BEfWE_EN 
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, ; MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
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r. 'INTRJ>IfUc;TJO_N · . . 
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The amount of the Final Award was paid before tli_e finaiAward'Was 
issued thereby cuttmg offthe accruat o:f'preJudgmerit interest;' and 
Calculation of ptejudgw._eD.t'int~rest on medical exP,~nse~~- the fosrinconie 
award a~g. the,g~neral ;damage award is in ~rror. . 
B~sed ogthesegrounds, as di§q_us_~~g:mQie.:fuIIy below, Fanne!S requests the'prejud~ment 




The Amount of the Final Award was Paid Before the Final Award was Entered. 
Prejudgment interest was calculated up to April 30, 2013, the day after the Final Award 
was issued. The Final A ward further stated that prejudgment interest "shall continue to accrue 
on the adju~ted Interim Award of$100,33~.95 until the Final Award is affirmed by a Judgment or 
paid, whichever sooner occurs." On March 25, 2013, the adjusted Interim Award of$100,332.95 
was paid. (Thomson Affidavit filed herewith, Ex. A.) This payment occurred thirty-six (36) 
days before the Final A ward was issued. 
Payment terminates the running of statutory prejudgment interest. See Packard v. Joint 
School District #171, 104 Idaho 604,614,661 P.2d 770, 780 (Ct. App. 1983). Payment on 
March 25, 2013 of the adjusted Interim A~ard stopped the accrual of prejudgment interest on 
that amount. The Final Award includes interest on that amount to April 30, 2013. The 
prejudgment interest award should be recalculated to end on March 24, 2013. This reduces the 
Final Award of prejudgment interest by $1, 187.50.1 
B. Calculation of Prejudgment Interest Beginning on August 25, 2009 on Medical 
Expenses Yet to be Incurred, Income Yet to be Lost and On Unl~quidated General 
Damages is in Error. 
Under Greenough, prejudgment interest no longer begins to accrue from the date of the 
accident. Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mutl. Ins. Co., 142 ldaho 589, 130 P.3d 1127 (2002). 
Prejudgment interest now begins to accrue from either: (I) the ~ate established by the insurance 
contract terms; or (2) the date when enough information has been presented to allow an insurer to 
1If, as discussed below, the prejudgment interest award is recalculated, any recalculation · 
should ·end on the date of payment rather th~ the date of the Final Award. 
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make a reasoned and informed decision on liability and/or the amount of damages. Id., 142 
Idaho at 593, 130 P.3d at 1131. The Greenough decision, however, is limited when 
prejudgment interest begins to accrue on damages that have accrued prior to one of these dates 
("Proof of Loss date") because these are the only damages that are liquidated and capable of 
mathematic calculation. 
Greenough expressly holds that prejudgment interest can only be awarded from the date 
the sum became due and is capable of mathematic calculation. Greenough, 142 Idaho at 592, 
130 P.3d at 1130. Greenough further holds that prejudgment interest accrues on the ainount 
owing under the policy as of that date (i.e., Proof of Loss date). Id. Greenough does not hold 
nor establish that the Proof of Los~ date triggers prejudgment interest on future medical bills or 
future damages. This is true because these sums are not yet due and are therefore not yet 
liquidated and are absolutely incapable of mathematical calculation. 
A case issued subsequent to Greenough supports these prejudgment interest axioms and 
their application to UIM arbitration awarqs. In Cranney v. Mutt. of Enumclaw, 145 Idaho 6, 175 
P.3d 169 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed Mutual ofEnumclaw's argument that 
"prejudgment interest is not reasonable on an award of benefits under an underinsured motorist 
policy until the amount due under that coverage is liquidated." Id., 145 Idaho at 8, 175 P.3d at 
170. In response, the Court revisited Greenough 's holding that prejudgment interest accrues only 
on damages that are liquidated or capable of mathematical computation as of the Proof of Loss 
date. The Court in Cranney stated: 
Mutual of Enumclaw asks us to hold that prejudgment interest is 
not recoverable on an award of benefits under an underinsured 
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motorist policy until the amount due under that coverage is 
liquidated. We have already so held. 
Id, 145 Idaho at 8, 175 P .3d at 170. (Emphasis added.)2 Pointing to Reichert, the Court held 
that prejudgment interest is allowed on money due "when it is capable of mathematical 
computation." Id. 
The special concurrence in Cranney sheds further light on the Supreme Court's 
discus.sion (albeit in dicta) that prejudgment interest is not recoverable on an award ofUIM 
benefits until the amount due under the coverage is liquidated or capable of mathematical 
computation. 
In uninsured or underinsured motorist cases such as the present 
one, the amount of prejudgment interest is not "capable of 
mathematical calculation" from the date of the accident or even 
from the date of the proof of loss because it is unknown what the 
amount "due" is until it is determined by the arbitrator. 
Id. (Emphasis added.) For instance, says the concurring opinion, damages for pain and suffering 
are unknown until the Arbitrator renders his opinion. Id. 3 
Using Greenough as it was intended and applying the Supreme Court's clarification in 
Cranney of how prejudgment interest accrues on UIM arbitration awards, it is error to award 
prejudgment interest on medical expenses that had not yet been incurred, income that had not yet 
been lost or general damages that had not yet been suffered. 
2~'Liquidated" means the ability to ascertain the precise amount of the damages. BLACK'S 
LAW DICTJONARY, 8th Ed., p. 949. 
3It is interesting to note that the author of the majority opinim;i, Justice Eismann, joined in 
the special concurrence. 
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Medical expenses are liquidated and are capable of mathematical calculation as of the 
date of the medical bill. Prejudgment interest should accrue on medical expenses only after a bil1 
~ . 
is received, not from the date of the Proof of Loss ( except for medical expenses incurred prior to 
this date). Lost income is neither liquidated or mathematically calculable until it is lost and there 
is a sufficient Proof of Loss. Unless these two criteria exist, lost income damages sho1:1ld not 
accrue interest until after the Arbitrator's ·award. General damages are not considered liquidated 
or mathematically calculable until the Arbitrator makes an award. Prejudgment interest on these 
damages should not accrue until that award. 
For the reasons discussed more thoroughly below, prejudgment interest should be 
recalculated on medical expenses, lost income and general damages. 
1. Prejudgment Interest Should Be Calculated on Medical Expenses From the 
Proof of Loss Date for Medical Expenses Incurred Up to that Date and From 
Each Individual Medical Expense for Medical Expenses Incurred After that 
Date. 
The Cranney special concurrence states "that Idaho law allows an Arbitrator to grant 
prejudgment interest in uninsured and underinsured arbitration cases, but the prejudgment 
interest should apply only to liquidated amounts from the date the expenses are incurred and 
should not include prejudgment interest on unliquidated claims or future losses." Id. (Emphasis 
added.) Here, the Final Arbitration Award states "[b]ecause it is not feasible to_calculate the 
accrued amounts due for each and every invoice Claimant received as of the date of the receipt 
thereof, the Arbitrator will not attempt to do so." (Arbitrator Final Award, p. 12.) 
The Claimant has the burden of proving the amount of prejudgment interest. To the 
extent that the Arbitrator felt it was not feasible to calculate prejudgment interest on each invoice 
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for medical expenses, the Claimant failed to meet her burden and interest on medical expenses 
should not be allowed in any amount. 
That it was and is feasible to calculate prejudgment interest on each invoice is proved by 
the fact that Claimant retained an expert to complete that very task.4 Claimant's expert, Dennis 
R~instein, calculated interest on past medical exp~nses at the rate of 12% simple interest for the 
amounts exceeding ninety (90) days from the date of service through October 31, 2012. 
(Thomson Aff., Ex. B, p. 6.) Claimant's expert calculated that total prejudgment interest on past 
medical expenses was $30,081.00 through October 31, 2012. Id This calculatj.on is instructive 
on two points: (1) it is feasible to calculate prejudgment interest on each invoice; and (2) 
· Claimant had that information available to her but failed to provide it to the Arbitrator, choosing 
instead to ask for prejudgment interest on the entire gross award from the date of the Proof of 
Loss. 
The expert based his calculations on $134,647.00 in past medical expenses plus 
$5,000.00 for future medical expenses. Id, The Final Award of prejudgment interest was 
calculated based on the adjusted amount of past medical expenses incurred of $100,332.95 and 
awarded nothing in future medical expenses. (See Interim Award, ,r,r 173-174.) 
Using the actual, adjusted arbitration award of past medical expenses, prejudgment 
interest can be calculated on these liquidated amounts from the dates set forth on Exhibit 2, the 
medical expense exhibit admitted into evidence at the Arbitration hearing. (Thomson Aff., Ex. 
C.) Based on Greenough, the medical expenses incurred before August 25, 2009 do not begin 
4Claimant' s expert's report calculated prejudgment interest is dated October 28, 2012, 
long before the Interim or Final Award. 
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accruing prejudgment interest until August 25, 2009 because this would be the first date that 
Farmers had a duty to pay any UIM benefits. Based on Cranney, prejudgment interest accrues on 
medical expenses incurred after that date from the date of the invoice. Recalculated prejudgment 
interest on medical expenses based on rules established for UIM cases equals $29,347.66. 
2. Prejudgment Interest on Lost Income Should Not Begin Accruing Until the 
Date of the Interim Award. 
In the Interim Award dated January 16, 2013, the Arbitrator determined an amount for 
lost income of $135,000.00 "during the 4.5 years following the cycle accident to the present." 
(Initial Award, ,r 151.) Therefore, on August 25, 2009 Claimant had not yet lost more than three 
years of income. On that date, more than three years of Claimant's lost income was neither 
liquidated nor mathematically calculable. 
In addition, the Arbitrator recognized that on the Proof of Loss date (August 25, 2009) 
Claimant had not provided Farmers any information about a wage loss claim. (Final Award, p. 
9.) In fact, a close review of the July 28, 2009 "Proof of Loss" letter reveals Claimant did not 
make a claim for past or future wage losses. (Thomson Aff., Ex. D (Ex. 10 to Steele's First 
Affidavit).) The Arbitrator recognized that Claimant had the burden of proving that she actually 
lost income as a result of the accident and the amount thereof (Interim Award, ,r 149.) No such 
proof existed on August 25, 2009. The information relied on by the Arbitrator to establish lost 
income was testimony at the Arbitration hearing from Claimant and Dr. Collins. (Id at ,r,r 150, 
151.) Under these circumstances and as further discussed below, prejudgment interest on lost 
income should begin accruing on January 16, 2013, the date of the Interim Award rather than on 
August 25, 2009. 
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First, there was no claim for lost wages as of August 25, 2009. Farmers was not put on 
notice of any such claim by the "Proof of Loss" on that date and Claimant had provided no 
information from which Farmers could investigate, let alone ·calculate the amount of such 
damages. Without earnings information, tax returns, attendance records or any other relevant 
documents, Farmers could not mathematically calc~late any possible amount ~or lost income. As 
stated in Cranney's special concurrence, the amount of prejudgment interest was not "capable of 
mathematical computation" from the date of the Proof of Loss because it was unknown what the 
amount "due" was until it was determined by the Arbitrator. Cranney, 145 Idaho at 8, 175 P.3d 
at 170. Calculating prejudgment interest on lost-income from the date of the Interim Award 
(January 16, 2013) until the date of payment (March 25, 2013) equals $3,018.08. 
· 3. Prejudgment Interest on General Damages Does Not Begin to Accrue Until 
After General Damages Were Awarded in the Interim Award. 
As discussed in the special concurrence in Cranney, a general damage award is neither 
liquidated nor capable of mathematical computation until it is determined by the Arbitrator. 
Cranney, 145 Idaho at 8, 175 P .3d at 170. The Arbitrator did not determine the amount of 
general damages until January 16, 2013. The amount of general damages was determined on that -
date to be $150,000.00. 
It was error to have started the prejudgment interest clock on general damages on 
August 25, 2009 for two reasons: (1) general damages are not liquidated and could not be 
mathematically calculated on that date because the amount is not known until the Arbitrator 
makes an award; and (2) the majority of general damages had not yet been suffered. Calculated 
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prejudgment interest from the date of the Interim Award until the date of payment on general 
damages equals $3,353.42. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Farmers urges the Arbitrator to reconsider its prejudgment interest award and recalculate 
the amount of prejudgment interest owed based the following formulas: 
1. Medical expenses: 12% times the amount of medical expenses incurred 
prior to August 25, 2009 from August 25, 2009 to the date of payment 
(March 25, 2013) plus 12% times the date of the invoice for all medical 
expenses incurred after August 25, 2009, less adjustments, until the date 
of payment (March 25, 2013). This equals $29,347.66; 
2. Lost income: 12% times $135,000.00 from the date of the Interim Award 
(January 16, 2013) to the date of payment (March 25, 2013). This equals 
$3,018.08; 
3. General damages: 12% times $150,000.00 from the date of the Interim 
Award (January 16, 2013) to the date of payment (March 25, 2013). This 
equals $3,353.42. 
The prejudgment interest award of $103,135.46 should be reduced to $35,719.16. 
DATED this 7.0 ·day of May, 2Ql3. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
L 
By:_-½'-t'Fr-.,.__r------------
e A. Thomson, of the firm 
ttorneys for Farmers Insurance 
ompany ofidaho 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the '2-Dday of May, 2013, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows: 
Jon M. Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
~U.S.Mail 
__ v Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
Facsimile - 947-2424 
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JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
JOHN L. RUNFT (ISB # 1059) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Id~o 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-8506 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: JSteele@runftsteele.com 
Attorneys for Claimant 
INRE: MATTER OF ARBITRATION 
PEGGYB. CEDILLO ) 
) 
Claimant, ) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
vs. ) AND IN OPPOSITION TO FARMERS' 
) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 





On May 20, 2013 Farmers filed its Motion for Reconsideration of Prejudgment Interest 
Award. Farmers' Motion is without merit and should be summarily denied. The Arbitrator's 
calculation of prejudgment interest in the amount of $103,135.46 as of April 29, 2013 is correct. 
However, Farmers is entitled to a credit of $1,187.50 for an additional payment made on March 
25, 2013. 
. . 
1. THOMSON'S AFFIDAVIT SHOULD BE STRICKEN 
Farmers Moti?n relies upon the expe~ report of Dennis Rei1;1,stein (Cedillo's retain~d 
expert). As the Arbitrator recalls, whether Farmers could call Reinstein as a witness was an issue 
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at the arbitration hearing. The Arbitrator's ruling was clear and unequivocal, Farmers was not 
allowed to call Reinstein as a witness. 
The Arbitration Orders required Farmers to disclose their expert reports on November 13, 
2012. These expert witness reports were disclosed on November 14, 2012. Farmers disclosed 
three expert witness reports, Dr. Wilson, Dr. Williams, and Shannon Purvis. Farmers has made 
no disclosure of Reinstein as a witness. Farmers also failed to make any reservation of rights to 
call additional or other ·witnesses than listed. 
Cedillo sent Farmers interrogatories pertaining to both its defenses and its experts. 
Farmers has never disclosed Reinstein as an expert. See, Exhibits A and B to the Affidavit of 
Jon Steele filed in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Affidavit of Counsel (hereafter "Steele 
Affidavit"). Farmers made no general reservation of rights to call experts disclosed by Cedillo. 
Idaho courts have repeatedly held that the failure to timely disclose or timely supplement 
discovery response to disclose the identity of experts and the substance of expert testimony 
warrants exclusion of that testimony at trial. See, e.g. Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 25 P.3d 810 
(2002). In White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 104 P.3d 356 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court 
expressly prohibited a party from calling the opposing party's expert witness if there has been no 
disclosure of such testimony. As the Court pointed out, the Idaho discovery rules contain no 
provision addressing whether a party may call the opposing party's experts at trial. Id, 140 
Idaho at 889, 104 P.3d at 363. However, in maintaining the spirit and purpose of the rules on 
discovery the court specifically stated: 
· ... general reservation of rights to call the other party's witnesses is not the 
type of disclosure envisioned by the rule, in that it does not apprise the 
opposing party of the identity of the specific expert to be relied upon and 
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does not reveal the general substance of that testimony or its relation to the 
legal theory of (the party attempting to call the witness.) 
Id. Citing Gallo v. Peninsula Hospital, 164 Cal. App. 3d 899, 903-904, 211 Cal. Rptr. 27, 30 
(1985). 
Similarly, the rules of discovery are premised upon the idea that "no party should build 
its case by foraging for opinions from the experts of the other party." Graham v. Gielchinsky, 
126 N.J. 361, 599 A.2d 149 (1991). Citing Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 792 (10th 
Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 918, 101 S. Ct. 1363, 67 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1981). 
There is a strong policy against permitting a non-diligent party from free-riding off the 
opponent's industry and diligence. See, Ager v. Janee C. Stormont Hospital, 622 F.2d 496, 502 
(10th Cir. 1980) (Noting that "the structure of Rule 26 was largely developed around the doctrine 
of unfairness designed to prevent a party from building his own case by means of his opponent's 
financial resources, superior diligence and more aggressive preparation"); In re Shell Oil 
Refinery, 132 F.R.D. 437 (E.D. La. 1990) (applying Rule 26(b)(4)(B)'s "intended purposes of 
protecting trial strategy and preventing one party from having a free ride at the expense of the 
other party"); Wolf v. Sherwood, A Div. of Harsco Corp., 828 F. Supp. 1562, 1568 (D. Utah 
1993) ("The rule is designed to promote fairness by precluding unreasonable access to an 
opposing party's diligent trial preparation."). 
In the Wolf case~ the federal court also recognized that allowing a party to pillage the 
expert opinions of an opponent discourages settlement in contravention of public policy and 
further upsets the expectations of the parties, the court and the policy of law which encourages 
diligence and discourages profit from the work product and industry of the opponent. See, Wolf, 
828 F. Supp. at 1568. 
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The most recent Idaho case dealing with this issue is Aguilar v. Coonrod, 151 Idaho 642, 
262 P.3d 671 (2011) (copy attached as Exhibit E to the Steele Affidavit). In Aguilar, the 
defendant (Dr. Coonrod) failed to disclose Aguilar's expert as a witness. Defendant did, 
however, claim a general reservation of rights to call the experts disclosed by Aguilar. However, 
a general reservation fails to comply with the requirements of l.R.C.P. 26(b)(4). See, Aguilar v. 
Coonrod, 151 Idaho 642, 262 P.3d 671 (2011). The Idaho Supreme Court ruled that Dr. 
Coonrod was properly barred from calling Aguilar's expert. 
A review of Farmers' discovery responses (Exhibits A & B to Steele Affidavit), Farmers 
Arbitration Witness List (Exhibit C to Steele Affidavit), and Farmers' Pre-Hearing Brief (Exhibit 
D to Steele Affidavit) reveal that Farmers has not disclosed Reinstein as an expert witness. 
The submission of the Reinstein expert report violates the scheduling orders of this 
Arbitration, violates the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and violates the strong policy _o{ 
prohibiting Farmers from receiving a free ride at Cedillo's expense. Farmers' unilateral 
submission of the Reinstein expert report deprives Cedillo of the opportunity to question 
Reinstein concerning how and why these calculations were made. 
2. THERE ARE No GROUNDS FOR MODIFICATION. 
Idaho Code § 7-909 provides that the Arbitrator may modify or correct the award upon 
the grounds stated in paragraphs (1) and (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 7-913 Idaho Code, or 
for the purpose of clarifying the award. 
Idaho Code§ 7-913(a)(l) and (3) state as follows: 
(1) There was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake 
in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award; 
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(3) The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of 
the controversy. 
Farmers does not contend that there was " ... an evident miscalculation of figures," nor 
does Farmers contend that "[t]he award is imperfect in form, not affecting the merits of the 
controversy." In fact, there is no reference to the statutory grounds for modification or 
correction cited in either the Affidavit of Counsel or in Farmers' Memorandum in Support of 
Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of Prejudgment Interest Award. 
Farmers asks the Arbitrator to start over again, to use a method of calculation that is 
contrary to Idaho law, to use a method that has not been raised in this arbitration and to use a 
method that is contrary to its previous contentions on this issue. 
Previously Farmers has argued that Cedillo is only entitled to $7,884.61 in prejudgment 
interest as interest should be paid only on the amount of the Final Award. See, Farmers 
Insurance Company of Idaho's Response to Claimant's Brief in Support of Final Award, p. 5. 
Farmers has also argued that Cedillo is only entitled to $3,991.79 in prejudgment interest 
as interest should only be paid after new proofs of loss are made after each surgery. Farmers' 
Brief in Support of Motion for Final Award, p. 6. 
Each method argued by Farmers is contrary to Idaho law. The Arbitrator carefully and 
accurately set out his reasoning for commencing interest on August 25, 2009. The arbitrator 
credited Farmers with the appropriate amounts, reducing the initial amount by Farmers payments 
and other amounts. 
The Arbitrator's decision does not credit Farmers with its payment of $100,332.95 made 
on March 25, 2013 because the Arbitrator was unaware that Farmers had made this additional 
payment. Crediting Farmers with this additional payment will obviously reduce the amount 
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owed by the amount of $1,187.50. There exists no legal justification for Farmers calculations of 
prejudgment interest. 
3. The Arbitrator's Calculation of Prejudgment Interest Beginning on August 25, 2009 
is Correct. 
The Arbitrator made a reasoned decision based upon the facts and the law. The 
Arbitrator found that Cedillo had provided Farmers with enough information to allow it a 
reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability in a fair and accurate manner 
prior to and with her letter dated July 28, 2009. The Arbitrator concluded as a matter of law that 
prejudgment interest began to accrue on August 25, 2009, the date that Farmers provided Cedillo 
with its valuation of the amount due under the UIM contract. The Arbitrator flatly rejected 
Farmers' contention that Cedillo be required to submit a new proof of loss for each surgery, 
which is exactly what Farmers contends, again. 
UIM coverage is mandated by law and is a matter of public policy. Idaho Code § 41-
2502(1 ). See also, Hill v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 150 Idaho 619, 249 
P.3d 812 (2011). ("the Legislature clearly enacted the UIM amendments to protect the citizens of 
this State from being undercompensated for their injuries .... ") 
Farmers reliance upon a concurring opinion in Cranney v. Mutual. Of Enumclaw, 145 
Idaho 6, 175 P.3d 169 (2007) is unpersuasive. The Cranney court stated the following: 
The evident miscalculation of figures under Idaho Codes 7-913(a)l must 
be a mathematical error in calculating the amount of the award, not a legal 
error in the elements or measure of damages when making the award. 
Id at 9 and 171. 
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The Cranney concurrence relied upon by Farmers is not the law. Frumers' motion is a 
request that the Arbitrator ignore Idaho law. The Motion does not raise the issue of 
mathematical error. 
cCONCJLUSllON 
The Arbitrator used the proper method of determining prejudgment interest. Farmers is 
entitled to a credit of $1,187.50 as a result of its additional payment of$100,332.95 on March 25, 
2013. Farmers March 25, 2013 payment of$100,332.95 was applied to the outstanding 
prejudgment interest. Crediting Faimers with $1,187.50 for 36 days of interest results in 
prejudgment interest owed as of March 25, 2013 in the amount of$101,947.96. Applying 
Frumer payment of$100,332.95 to the outstanding prejudgment interest of$101,947.96, results 
in unpaid interest of $1,615.01 as of March 25, 2013. Adding this amount ($1,615.01) to the 
adjusted Interim Award of$100,332.95 results in a total obligation of$101,947.96 as of March 
25, 2013. Prejudgment interest at the rate of 12% per annum continues to accrue on the unpaid 
adjusted Interim Award of$100,332.95 from March 25, 2013. 
30,_ DATED this_,_ day of May 2013. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By:_JO_·d~4-~-~ i~J -
Attorney for Claimant 
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CJERTilJFlICATJE OJF §JERVJICJE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this ]a kday of May 2013, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MJEMOJRANID>UM ][N §U:IPJPORT OJF CLA][MAN'f'§ MOl'lION TO 
STJRlIKIE AND ][N OJPJPO§JIT][ON TO JFARMJER§' MOTION JFOR RJECONSilID>JEJRATJION 
OJF JPRJEJUID>GMJENT JINTJERJE§T AW ARID> was served upon opposing counsel as follows: 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam Burke 
251 E. Front St:, Ste 300 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance Company 
Ofldaho 
Merlyn W. Clark 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
877 W. Main St., Ste 1000 
PO Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Arbitrator 
Via Facsimile 
_____).(__ Via Personal Delivery 
Via U.S. Mail 
Via E-mail 
Via Facsimile 
_){ Via Personal Delivery 
Via U.S. Mail 
Via E-mail 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By:.·CJ1~ 
JONM. STEEL 
Attorney for Claimant 
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Ca&e No. 81700-0040 
FINAL ORDER NO. 12 RE: 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AWARD 
AND CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO 
STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
FOR RESPONDENT 
Introduction 
Pending before the Arbitrator are Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration seeking· 
modification of the award of prejudgment interest in this matter and Claimant's Motion to Strike 
Affidavit of Counsel for Respondent that is submitted in support of Respondent's Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
Pursuant to Order No. 11~ issued by the Arbitrator on May 21, 2013, the parties have 
submitted memoranda in support of and in opposition to the motions. On June 10, 2013, the 
paities informed the Arbitrator that they waived oral arguments on the motions. The motions are 
deemed to be submitted for deci$iOn as of June 10, 2013. 
On July 10, 2013, the Arbitrator issued Draft Order No. 12 Re: Respondent's Motion for 
Reconsideration of Prejudgment Interest Award and Claimant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of 
Counsel forRespondent and invited counsel for the pruties to submit comments on the proposed 
Order. Counsel for the parties have each submitted a response to the Draft Order No. 12, which 
have been considered by the Arbitrator and, when appropriate, are addressed in this Final Order 
No.12. 
FINAL ORDER Nd 12 RE: RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST Aw ARD AND CLAIMANT' s MOTION TO STRIKE E .. .,.t.1'b1·t D 
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11 •. 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
Claimant has filed a motion to strike paragraphs B, E, and F of the Affidavit of Counsel 
for Respondent that is submitted in support of Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration on the 
grounds that the matters set forth 'in paragraphs B, E, and F fail to comply with Arbitration 
Orders, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and are irrelevant· and immaterial to any issue in this 
Arbitration. In support of her Motion to Strike, Claimant submitted the Affidavit of Jon. M. 
Steele [in Support of] Claimant's Motion to Strike and in Opposition to Farmer's Motion for 
Reconsideration of Prejudgment Interest Award and a Memorandum in Support of Claimant's 
Motion to Strike and in Opposition to Farmer's Motion for Reconsideration of Prejudgment 
Interest Award. 
Exhibit B is a copy of the "Expert Witness Report of Dennis R. Reinstein." Exhibit E is a 
copy of a document labeled "Prejudgment Interest Awarded for Medical Bills" that is identified 
in the Affidavit as "the calculation of prejudgment interest awarded for medical bills" that was 
prepared by Respondent's counsel. Exhibit Fis a document labeled "Cedillo Aw~d Interest: 
Non-Medical" that is identified in the Affidavit as "the calculation of prejudgment interest 
awarded for non-medical expenses" that was prepared by Respondent's counsel. 
Claimant argues that Exhibits B, E and F should be stricken because they are based on a 
report of Dennis Reinstein, who was Claimant's retained expert that did not testify during the 
arbitration hearing in this matter and because Respondent never disclosed Reinstein as an expert 
_ witness for Respondent prior to the evidentiary hearing in the matter or prior to the submission of 
the Affidavit of Respondent's CowISel. Claimant cites White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 104 P3d 
356 (2004), wherein the Idaho Supreme Court held that a party cannot call the opposing party's 
expert witness if there has been no disclosure of such testimony and no notice of the identity of 
the specific expert to be relied upon, and the general substance of the testimony or its relation to 
the legal theory of the party attempting to call the witness. Claimant also cites Aguilar v. 
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Coonrod, 151 Idaho 642, 262 P.3d 671 (2011), which similarly holds that the failure to 
adequately disclose an expe1t witness is grounds to exclude the testimony of such witness and 
that the general reservation of rights to call the opposing party's experts does not satisfy the 
disclosure requirements of I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4). 
In Respondent's Opposition to Claimant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Counsel, 
Respondent states that Mr. Reinstein's expert report (Exhibit B) was not provided as expert 
opinion or testimony but rather to show it is feasible to calculate accrued interest amounts for 
each and every medical bill that was incurred by Claimant. Respondent further states that the 
prejudgment interest calculations set forth in Exhibits E and F are not part of Mr. Reinstein' s 
report but rather reflect calculations made by counsel for Respondent to calculate prejudgment 
interest on the actual medical bills awarded after adjustments were made to the Interim Award. 
The Arbitrator finds that the rep01t of Mr. Reinstein (Exhibit B) is inadmissible and it 
will be disregarded by the Arbitrator. The remainder of the motion to strike will be denied. If an 
affidavit contains some inadmissible matter, the whole affidavit need not be stricken or 
disregarded; a court [arbitrator] may strike or disregard the inadmissible part and consider the 
rest of the affidavit. See Marty v. State, 122 Idaho 766, 769, 838 P.2d 1384, 1387 (1992). In 
ruling on the merits of the motion for reconsideration, the Arbitrator will consider the evidence, 
other than the report of Mr. Reinstein tha~ is presented in the Affidavit of Counsel for 
Respondent. 
III. 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of Prejudgment Interest Award seeks 
adjustment of the amount of prejudgment interest that was included in the Final Award to 
account for a payment by Respondent to Claimant that was made after the Interim Award was 
issued but before the. Final Award was issued. The Affidavit of Counsel that is submitted in 
support of Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration establishes that Respondent paid to. 
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Claimant the sum of $100,332.95 on March 25, 2013, which was the amount of the adjusted 
Interim Award. This payment was made thirty-six (36) days before the Final Award was issued. 
The Arbitrator was not informed of this payment and did not consider it in the calculation of 
prejudgment interest that was made by the Arbitrator and awarded in the Final Award. The 
Motion for Reconsideration also seeks a recalculation and adjustment of prejudgment interest on 
medical expenses, lost income and general damages based on information submitted with the 
Motion. 
A. Jurisdiction to Consider the Motion for Reconsideration. 
Before the Arbitrator can consider the merits of the Motion for Reconsideration, the 
Arbitrator must determine whether the Arbitrator has authority or jurisdiction to entertain the 
Motion. In determining the scope of the post-award authority of an arbitrator: the arbitrator 
should consider the interrelationship between any applicable institutional rules, the relevant 
arbitration law, and the doctrine offunctus officio. See generally, James M Gaitis, THE COLLEGE 
OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS GUIDE TO BEST PRACTICES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 2d. ed., p. 
191 (2010). In this matter, there are no applicable institutional rules such as the AAA Rules, 
JAMs Rules or the CPR Rules, but the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act,§ 7-909 is applicable, and 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule l l(a)(2)(B) is implicated. 
1: Functus Officio. 
Generally, in the absence of a contractual provision to the contrary, an arbitrator is 
prohibited from modifying a final award for the purpose of correcting legal or factual substantive 
errors that affect the arbitrator's determination on the merits. This restriction is based on the 
common law doctrine of.fimctus officio, which holds that once an arbitrator renders a final 
decision, the arbitrator ceases to have jurisdiction over the dispute or authority to alter the 
decision. See, e.g., La Vale Plaza, Inc., v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 378 F. 2d 569,572 (3d Cir. 1967). 
See also, American Foreign Ins. Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 94 P.3d 699 (2004). 
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The relevance of the ftmctus officio doctrine depends on whether the parties' arbitration 
agreement has provided for arbitration procedures that render the doctrine moot. Because there is 
no legal prohibition against parties agreeing that an arbitrator may reconsider the merits of his or 
her award, parties are free to provide thatftmctus officio principles do not apply. See, e.g., Volt 
Info. Scis. v. Bd. ofTrs., 489 U.S. 468,479 (1989); UHC Mgmt. Co. Inc. v. Computer Scis. 
Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1998) ("Parties may choose to be governed by whatever rules 
they wish regarding how arbitration itself will be conducted."). Absent an agreement or 
applicable rule that provides otherwise, however, the principles of functus officio strictly prohibit 
an arbitrator from reconsidering the merits of a case once he or she has issued a final award. See, 
e.g., Landis v. Pinkertons, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 890 (Ct. App. 2004); WMA Securities, Inc. v. 
Wynn, 105 F. Supp. 2d 833 (S.D. Ohio 2000, aff'd, 32 F. App'x. (6th Cir., 2002)). 
There is no express agreement in this matter thatftmctus officio principles do not apply, 
except to the extent that the parties agreed that this arbitration proceeding will be governed by 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which include Rule ll(a)(2)(B). Rule ll(a)(2)(B) allows a 
party to file a motion for reconsideration "of any interlocutory ?rders of the trial court at any 
time before the entry of final judgment but not lat~r than fomteen ( 14) days after the entry of the 
final judgment" or for reconsideration of "any order of the trial court made after entry of final 
judgment ... within fourteen (14) days from the entry of such order .... " Additional restrictions 
in the Rule exist that are not applicable in this matter. 
Notwithstanding the lack of an agreement renderingfunctus officio principles 
inapplicable in this matter, there are three generally recognized exceptions to the doctrine of 
ftmctus officio. These exceptions are designed to ensure that an award may be corrected or 
clarified to reflect the intent of the arbitrator at the time the original final award was issued. 
a. First Exception. Under the first exception, an arbitrator generally retains 
authority to correct clerical, computation, or similar errors in a final award. Errors of this nature 
tend to involve mistranscriptions of data, transposition of numbers, mathematical errors, or 
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misdescriptions of persons, places, or things. The very nature of such errors usually demonstrates 
that their c01Tection will not be inconsistent with the arbitrator's intent as reflected in the final 
award. See, e.g., La Vale Plaza, Inc., v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 378 F. 2d 569, 572 (3d Cir. 1967); 
Eastern Seaboard Constr. Co. v. Gray Constr., Inc., 533 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1995) (arbitrator's 
final award did not provide for the subcontractor's undisputed contract balance to be set off from 
the damages awarded to the contractor; arbitrator amended the award to reflect the set off). 
The Motion for Reconsideration in this matter fits within this exception to the extent that 
· it establishes that the Arbitrator issued the Final Award on April 29, 2013, but erroneously 
calculated prejudgment interest to April 30, 2013, a difference of one day at 12% per annum on 
the initial amount. It also fits within this exception to the extent that it establishes that the 
calculation of prejudgment interest fails to account in the Final Award for the payment to 
Claimant of $100,332.95 on March 25, 2013. 
b. Second Exception. Under the second exception, an arbitrator generally retains 
the authority to correct or supplement an award to determine an issue submitted for 
determination but unresolved in the award. See La, Vale, 378 F.2d at 573. The Motion for 
Reconsideration in this matter does not appear to fit within this exception. One might argue that 
the issue of the proper methodology to be applied to calculate the award of prejudgment interest 
upon the special damages was submitted to the Arbitrator for determination and that the 
Arbitrator failed to resolve the issue. The Arbitrator rejects this argument because the Arbitrator 
resolved the issue by holding, correctly or incorrectly, that the calculation of p~judgment 
inter~st based on the incurred cost for each medical treatment as of the date it was incurred or as 
of the date it was paid was not feasible. The Arbitrator concluded that the calculation of 
prejudgment interest on the special damages was not feasible for the Arbitrator to perform based 
on the record that was then before the Arbitrator. Respondent has now submitted supplemental 
infonnation in the Affidavit of Counsel for Respondent that makes feasible and demonstrates 
such calculation. 
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c. Third Exception. Under the third exception, an arbitrator generally retains the 
authority to issue a clarification of the intent of the original award, such as an amendatory 
statement that resolves an ambiguity. This exception to functus officio is that arbitrators may 
clarify an award when there is demonstrable ambiguity regarding the intention of the award or 
concerning whether the parties' claims and defenses have been fully determined. See, e.g., 
Eastern Seaboard Constr. Co. v. Gray Constr.; Inc., 533 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1995). The Motion 
for Reconsideration in this matter does not fit within this exception. 
2. Idaho Code§ 7-909. 
The common law doctrine of functus officio as applied in Idaho has been modified, if not 
abrogated, by Idaho Code§ 7-909 and related statutes. It appears clear to the Arbitrator that the 
Idaho Legislature intended to modify the doctrine offunctus officio to codify the first exception 
to the doctrine. See, e.g., Cox v. St. Anthony Bank and Trust Co., 41 Idaho 776, 242 P. 785 
(1925) (In constming a statute, it is to be presumed that no change in the common law was 
intended, unless the language employed clearly indicates such an intention.). 
Section 7-909 authorizes an arbitrator to modify or correct a final award upon the 
grounds stated in LC. § 7-913(a), paragraphs (l) [evident miscalculation of figures or an evident 
mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award] or (3) [award 
is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the controversy], upon application of 
a party, provided the application is made within twenty (20) days after delivery of the award to 
the applicant. 
In this case, the Final Award was served on the Parties via email, as stipulated by the 
paities (see Pre-Hearing Order No. 1 Re Scheduling at <JI 20) on April 29, 2013. Thus, 
Respondent was required to submit its application, to modify or correct the award on or before 
May 19, 2013, which is a Sunday. The Motion for Reconsideration was received by the 
Arbitrator on May 20, 2013, the 21st day following the service of the Final Award. However, 
because the Parties have stipulated that this arbitration proceeding is governed by .the Idaho 
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Rules of Civil Procedure, (see Pre-Hearing Order No. 1 re Scheduling, <J[ 10), I.R.C.P. 6(a) 
governs the computation of the 20-day time period. Under Rule 6(a), where the last day of a 
designated period of time falls on the Sunday, the last day is not included in the calculation. 
Thus, the 20 day period for submitting the application for modification ended on May 20, 2013 
and the Motion for Reconsideration was therefore timely. Consequently, the Arbitrator has 
jurisdiction under Section 7-909 to consider the Motion for Reconsideration as an application to 
modify or correct the award of prejudgment interest in this case. 
The Arbitrator concludes that the Motion for Reconsideration in this matter fits within 
this statute to the extent that it establishes that the Arbitrator issued the Final Award on April 29, 
2013, but erroneously calculated prejudgment interest to April 30, 2013 and to the extent that it 
establishes that the calculation of prejudgment interest fails to account in the Final Award for the 
payment to Claimant of $100,332.95 on March 25, 2013. The Arbitrator also concludes, as is 
more thoroughly explained below, that I. C. § 9-909 does not authorize the Arbitrator to change 
the methodology used to calculate prejudgment interest on the special damages that are awarded 
in this matter. 
3. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure ll(a)(2)(B). 
Respondent has asserted that the Motion is properly before the Arbitrator under Rule 
1 l(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure because the Parties agreed that this arbitration 
proceeding is governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B), a motion 
for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any time before 
entry of final judgment or a motion for reconsideration of any order of the trial comt made after 
entry of final judgment may be filed within fourteen (14) days from the entry of final judgment, 
subject to limitations that do not apply to this Motion. Although, a question may be raised 
whether the Rule would permit a motion for reconsideration of a "final judgment" as opposed to 
an "order of the trial court made after entry of a final judgment," the question need not be 
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addressed because the motion for reconsideration in this case was not submitted to the Arbitrator 
within fomteen (14) days as required by the Rule. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has established that an arbitrator's award is not a judgment 
of a tribunal for the purpose of applying the interest rate applicable to judgments. In short, an 
arbitrator's "final award" is not a judicial "final judgment." See Bingham County Comm 'n v. 
Interstate Elec. Co., 108 Idaho 181,697 P.2d 1195 (Ct. App. 1985). · 
Respondent argues that because the arbitration proceeding is governed by Rule 
1 l(a)(2)(B), the motion for reconsideration of the Final Award may be brought at any time prior 
to or within 14 days after the entry of a "final judgment" by a court confirming, modifying or 
vacating the final award. The Arbitrator concludes that is not a fair reading or application of 
Rule ll(a)(2)(B) in an arbitration proceeding. To allow a party to move for reconsideration of a 
final arbitration award at any time prior to the entry of a final judgment by a court during a 
proceeding to confirm the award, modify the award, remand the award, or vacate the award 
would eviscerate the purpose of the mle, which imposes limits on the initiation of motions for 
reconsideration. In effect there would never be any limitation on the authority of a party to seek 
reconsideration of any arbitration award, even after a party has filed an action to challenge or 
confirm the award. Moreover, that would abrogate the statutory scheme under the Idaho Uniform 
Arbitration Act that limits the power of arbitrators to change an award under LC. § 7-909, the 
power of a comt to vacate an award under I. C. § 7-912, and the power of a court to modify or 
correct an award under LC. § 7-913. I cannot conclude that was the intent of the parties to his 
arbitration when they agreed that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure would govern this 
proceeding. Moreover, I conclude that the parties do not have authority to stipulate that these 
statutes are abrogated or rendered inapplicable in this proceeding by their stipulation to apply the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to this arbitration proceeding. 
Under section 7-909, the application to have the arbitrator modify or correct an award 
must be brought within twenty (20) days after delivery of the award to the applicant. Under 
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section 7-912, an application to vacate an award must be brought within ninety (90) days after 
delivery of the award to the applicant, except when the application is based on conuption, fraud 
or other undue means when the time for filing commences to run from discovery of the grounds. 
Under section 7-913, an application to vacate an award must be brought within ninety (90) days 
after delivery of the award to the applicant. Under each statute, the grounds for relief are limited 
to those specified in each respective statute. Under Respondent's view of Rule ll(a) (2)(B), 
none of these restrictions would apply because a party would be authorized to file a motion for 
reconsideration of the final award for any reason, seeking any relief, at any time until the final 
judgment is entered by the court or within 14 days after the final judgment is entered in the 
judicial proceeding. 
Furthermore, allowing a party to move for reconsideratioi1 of the final award of the 
arbitrator, after the award has been delivered to the parties, and while a motion to vacate, modify 
or confinn an award is pending before a district court prior to the entry of the court's final 
judgment, would, in effect, expand the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and the court to reconsider an 
award that would violate the restrictions in sections 7-909, 7-912 and 7-913. It would also be 
contrary to the Idaho appellate decisions holding that review by a district court of an arbitration 
award is restricted to a determination of whether any grounds for relief stated in the Uniform 
Arbitrat_ion Act exists. See, Reece v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., 139 Idaho 48?, 80 P.3d 
1088 (2003); Bingham County Conzm'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 105 Idaho 36,665 (P.2d 1046 
(1983); Cady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 113 Idaho 667, 747 P.2d 76 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Respondent argues in its Response to the Draft Order No. 12, that parties to an arbitration 
can completely opt out of the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act, but cites no authority for that 
proposition. If Respondent is asserting that pa:ties can elect to be bound by the Federal 
Arbitration Act, rather than the Idaho Unifor~ Arbitration Act, that proposition is supported by 
law. See, e.g., Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 118 P.3d 141 (2005). However, if 
Respondent is asserting that parties that are subject to Idaho law can participate in some form of 
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proceeding that is not within the authority of the Idaho Unifonn Arbitration Act or the Federal 
Arbitration Act, there would be no authority that would allow them to confirm and enforce an 
award under the Idaho Uniform Act. For example, in one case where the parties purportedly 
opted out of the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act, and simply agreed to have the project architect 
determine their disputes, the court held that the architect's decision in favor of the homeowner in 
a dispute with the contractor did not constitute an arbitration award for purp~ses of section 7-911 
(confirmation of an award) because the architect was not an arbitrator under the Idaho Unifonn 
Arbitration Act. See Martel v.Bulotti, 138 Idaho 451, 65 P.3d 192 (2003). 
I do not agree with Respondent's proposed application of Rule ll(a)(2)(B) in this 
arbitration proceeding. Rather, I conclude that Rule ll(a)(2)(B) should be applied, if at all in 
this context, only to allow a party to move for reconsideration of the Final Award in the 
arbitration proceeding under the same constraints that would apply to a motion for 
reconsideration of a final judgment as may be brought in a judicial proceeding. Because the 
Respondent did not submit the motion for reconsideration within 14 days from the issuance of 
the Final Award, the Arbitrator will not consider Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration 
under this Rule. 
It is also appropriate to note that even if the Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration 
would be considered by the Arbitrator under Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B), the result would be the same. 
Under the law of Emery, Walton, Schilling, and Greenough, as discussed below, the motion to 
1:ecalculate prejudgment interest based on the dates each medical expense was incmTed or paid, 
and the date that the amounts of lost income and general damages were determined by the 
Arbitrator would still be denied. 
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B. Merits of the Motion for Reconsideration. 
The Arbitrator concluded in the Final Award that the established case law in Idaho, as 
enunciated in Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 
130 P.3d 11.27 (2006) (overruling that portion of Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., ll5 Idaho 346, 766 
P.2d 1227 (1988) holding that interest is accrned on an award of damages from the date of the 
accident and subsequent cases that followed the Brinkman rnle), requires that prejudgment 
interest begins to accrne when the insured has provided enough information to allow the insurer 
a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability. In this case, the date when 
prejudgment interest began to accrne is August 25, 2009, the date on which Farmers valued 
Claimant's case at $25,000.00. However, in the Final Award, the Arbitrator did not consider the 
distinction between accrual of interest on special damages as opposed to the accrual of interest 
on general damages that is established in Brinkman. 
To fully understand how the law of prejudgment interest is applied in underinsured and 
uninsured motorist cases and the scope of the Greenough decision, it is necessary to study 
Brinkman and its progeny. Brinkman v. AID Insurance Co., 115 Idaho 346, 766 P.2d 1227 
(1988), involved a claim by an insured against his insurer for injuries suffered in a collision with 
an underinsured niotorist. Brinkman incmred medical expenses over a period of time. 
Brinkman's injuries continued to cause recurrent low back pain, inability to participate in 
strenuous work or athletic activities and a permanent limp that would likely require future 
medical expenses such as a hip replacement. AID was notified of the accident while Brinkman 
was still in the hospital and began investigating sho1tly thereafter. AID made payments of 
$5,000, $5,000 and $75,000. The case went to trial and a jury verdict was rendered in favor of 
the insured for his past and future medical expenses, additional tuition expenses and general 
damages. The trial court awarded prejudgment interest on ce11ain of the medical expenses, but 
refused to award prejudgment interest upon the entire amount of the jury award. The trial comt 
held that interest should be allowed as to certain fixed economic damages that were established 
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by the evidence, namely the past medical costs up to the time of trial and the additional tuition 
expenses up to the time of trial. AID argued that interest could not accrue on the tuition expenses 
because they were not liquidated. The Supreme Court disagreed with AID, finding tha~ the figure 
was ascertainable froJTI university publications and was capable of being computed with 
mathematical certainty prior to trial. The Supreme Court agreed with AID that it was entitled to 
credit for the payments that w.ere made and that interest stopped accruing on the amount paid 
when each paym.ent was made. 
The Supreme Comt held that AID was liable for prejudgment interest on the entire 
amount awarded by the jury, but did not hold that the computation of prejudgment interest on the 
whole amount awarded begins to accrue from the date of the accident. The Comt stated: 
"Prejudgment interest accrues on the general damages from the date of the accident, because that 
is the date Aid's contractual duties accrned. However, to the extent it can be established that 
certain fixed damages such as medial expenses were not incurred until a later date, that date 
establishes the commencement of the interest obligation. In sum, the entire verdict is 
appropriately subject to the accumulation of prejudgment interest, provided that the three 
payments of $5,000, $5,000 and $75,000 terminate the accrual of interest on those amounts as of 
the dates of theirrespective payment." Id., 115 Idaho at 354, 766 P.2d at 1235 (emphasis 
added). 
Brinkman establishes that the insured is entitled to prejudgment interest on the entire 
verdict, but the calculation does not accrue .interest on the entire verdict from the date of the 
accident. Rather, Brinkman holds that the computation of prejudgment interest on general 
damages accmes from the date of the accident regardless whether they were liquidated or· 
capable of mathematical calculation; that payments by the insurer terminate the accrual of 
interest on the amounts paid as of the date of the respective payments; and that interest on special 
damages such as medical expenses that were not incurred until a date later than the date of the 
accident, accmes from the date such expenses are actually incurred. 
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Brinkman was followed by Emery v. United Pacific Insurance Co., 120 Idaho 244, 815 
P.2d 442 (1991). Emery involved an action to confam an arbitration award in favor of the 
insured against her insurer under the underinsured motorist provisions of her insurance policy for 
injuries suffered in an accident. In the action to confirm, the insured sought attorney fees, costs 
and prejudgment interest from the date of the accident. The trial court granted the motion for 
prejudgment interest on the entire award from the date of the accident and the Supreme Court 
affirmed, holding that the insured was entitled to prejudgment interest on the entire award, 
including the award for general damages, from the time of the injury. There is no discussion in 
the majority opinion in Emery, as there was in Brinlanan, about treating the accrual of interest on 
special damages from the date they are incurred rather than from the date of the accident. 
A close reading of Brinkman and Emery reveals that the majority in Emery misread and 
misapplied the rule in Brinlanan that the accmal of prejudgment interest upon medical expenses 
and other fixed expenses begins when the expense is incurred, rather than when the accident 
occurred. The Emery court held that prejudgment interest should be allowed on the entire 
arbitration award, including general damages, from the date of the accident. 
Bakes, Chief Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part, pointed out that allowing 
interest on damages that are unliquidated is contrary to prior cases, citing Farm Development 
Corp. v. Hernandez, 93 Idaho 918,478 P.2d 298 (1970) and other decisions, and that LC.§ 28-
22-104(1) does not authorize prejudgment interest on future lost wages, future medical expense, 
future pain and suffering, and other physical and emotional problems resulting from personal 
injuries. 
In Walton v. Hartford Insurance Co., 120 Idaho 616, 818 P.2d 320 (1991), which 
involved facts similar to those in Emery, the Supreme Comt followed its decision in Emery, 
holding that plaintiff was entitled to prejudgment interest on the entire award from the date of the 
accident. Bakes, Chief Justice, reiterated his dissenting opinion in Emery. 
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In Schilling v. Allstate Insurance Co., 132 Idaho 927, 980 P.2d 1014 (1999), the insured 
who was injured in a motorcycle accident caused by another driver, filed a claim under his 
underinsured motorist coverage. An arbitration panel awarded him damages but no prejudgment 
interest. The trial court modified the arbitration award to include prejudgment interest on the 
entire award from the date of the accident and the Supreme Court affirmed, citing Brinkman, 
Emery, and Walton for the proposition that prejudgment interest begins to accrue on the entire 
award of special and general damages from the date of the accident when the case involves 
claims under underinsured or uninsured insurance policy provisions. 
Based on these decisions, the Arbitrator concludes that the governing law of Idaho is that 
prejudgment interest on special and general damages accmes from the date of the accident, 
regardless of when the special damages were incurred. 
In Greenough, the court changed the mrumer in which prejudgment interest is calculated 
in underinsured and uninsured motorist cases with respect to the date that the interest begins to 
accme. The Greenough case involved a claim under the uninsured motorist covered of the 
insured who was killed in the motor vehicle accident. The insurer, after initially disputing 
liability, paid the policy limit of $50,000, but no attorney fees or prejudgment interest. The son 
of the insured filed an action for fees and interest. The trial court rnled that prejudgment interest 
should begin to accrne from the date of the accident, relying upon Brinkman and its progeny. The 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that prejudgment interest begins to accrne when money 
becomes due as provided under the express terms of the insurance contract, rather than the date 
of the accident. 
The Greenough decision addresses only when prejudgment interest commences to accrue 
on general damages. Greenough does not address the issue of prejudgment interest on special 
damages. Nothing is mentioned about special damages. To quote the Greenough court: "In 
Brinlanan v. Aid Ins. Co., (citation omitted), we established a bright-line prejudgment interest 
rule for underinsured or uninsured motorist claims in first party automobile insurance cases. This 
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mle stated that 'prejudgment interest accmes on the general damages from the date of the 
accident, because that is the date [the insurer's] contractual duties accrued.' Brinkman (citation 
omitted). We followed the Brinkman rule in three subsequent cases. See Schilling v. Allstate Ins. 
Co. (citation omitted), Emery v. United P. Ins. Co. (citation omitted); Walton v. Hartford Ins. Co. 
(citation omitted) .... " 142 Idaho at 592, 130 P.3d at 1130. Notably, in Schilling, Emery and 
Walton, the Court did not recognize any difference in the date of accrual of interest on special 
damages from general damages that was cr~ated in Brinlanan. 
In Cranney v. Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co., 145 Idaho 6, 175 P.3d 168 (2007), the 
arbitration award included prejudgment interest. The insurer petitioned the district court to 
modify the award and argued that: (1) the award was erroneous under a rule, with respect to an 
award of benefits under an underinsuted motorist policy, that damages had to be liquidated or 
capable' of mathematical computation for prejudgment interest to be awarded; and (2) the award 
could be modified because the award of prejudgment interest constituted an "evident 
miscalculation of figures" for purposes of Idaho Code§ 7-913(a)(l). The Court did not address 
the issue about the proper method for computing and awarding prejudgment interest upon 
general or special damages under an underinsured motorist policy. Rather, the Court noted that 
the issue presented by the appeal was whether the district comt had authority to modify the 
arbitrator's award of prejudgment interest, even if it was wrong under Idaho Code § 28-22-104. 
The Cranney court held that the evident miscalculation of figures that would pennit 
modification of an arbitration award under Section 7-913(a)(l) had to be a mathematical error in 
calculating the amount of the award, not a legal error in the element or measure of damages 
when making the award and that Section 7-913(a)(l) did not permit an arbitration award to be 
modified for a nonmathematical error in awarding prejudgment interest. The Court relied on its 
holding in American Foreign Ins. Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 398, 94 P.3d 699, 703 (2004), 
in which the arbitrator had modified the award to exclude an award of prejudgment interest upon 
certain worker's compensation benefits that were not to be included in the award. On appeal, the 
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Court in Reichert held that the arbitrator had no authority to modify the award under Section 7-
913(a)(l) because there was no evident miscalculation of figures. The Comt stated, "'There was 
no mathematical error.' 140 Idaho at 401, 94 P.3d at 706." Cranney, 145 Idaho at 9, 175 P.3d at 
171. 
Respondent, in support of its motion for reconsideration, urges the Arbitrator to follow 
the special concurring opinion of Justice W. Jones, in which Chief Justice Eismann concurred in 
Cranney. Justice Jones opines that the authority of an arbitrator to award interest on the amount 
"due" by express contract as provided in I. C. § 28-22-104 in uninsured or underinsured motorist 
cases does not exist when the amount of pl'ejudgment interest is not "capable of mathematical 
computption" from the date of the accident or even from the date of the proof of loss when it is 
unknown what the amount "due' is until it is determined by the arbitrator. Justice W. Jones 
states: "The arbitrator's award can include past medical expenses and lost wages, but also can 
include damages for pain and suffering, future lost wages and future medical expenses, all of 
which are unknown until the arbitrator renders his decision. Moreover, in awarding future 
damages, the arbitrator will presumably discount the amount awarded for such future loses to 
present value" Justice W. Jones further states "It is basically illogical, unjust and unconscionable 
to award prejudgment interest on sums of money representing damages which have not yet 
occurred, but which will only occur sometime in the future ..... " Id. 
This Arbitrator agrees with Justice W. Jones and believes this view comports with the 
Brockman rule, but is compelled to apply the law as mandated by Emery, Walton, Schilling, and 
Greenough, rather than as Justice W. Jones and Chief Justice Eismann would prefer it be applied. 
Moreover, the Arbitrator is constrained to modify the Final Award to make adjustments that are 
not authorized under Idaho Code § 7-909. See, e.g., American Foreign Ins. Co. v. Reichert, 140 
Idaho 394, 398, 94 P.3d 699, 703 (2004). 
In her response to the Draft Order No. 12, Claimant argues that calculating 
prejudgment interest from the date that the insurer has sufficient information to evaluate the 
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claim is fair and reasonable in light of the three public policy reasons for awarding prejudgment 
interest in underinsurance claims cases. The public policy reasons are: (1) to compensate a 
claimant for the loss of use of value of a damage award due to a delay in payment; (2) to prevent 
the insurer from being unjustly enriched for the use value of the money due to the delay in 
payment; and (3) to promote the prompt settlement of claims. See, Uninsured and Underinsured 
Motorist Insurance, Rev. 3rd Ed., Vol. 3, Ch. 39, "Damages: Herein of Coverage for 'Interest' 
and Punitive Damages," p. 344. The Arbitrator does not disagree with these policy reasons, but 
they do not address the issue about the methodology for calculating prejudgment interest upon 
special damages as opposed to general damages. 
Respondent, in its Response to Draft Order No. 12, argues that Greenough and Dillon are 
distinguishable and inapplicable to this UIM claim; and that the Arbitrator is not bound to apply 
them in this case. The Arbitrator is not persuaded by the Respondent's arguments. The key facts 
in Greenough and in the instant case are that both involve an express contract, the contract for 
first party insurance coverage. h1 Greenough, the contract provided that payment for loss would 
be made within 60 days after a sworn proof of loss was received. In the instant case, the contract 
does not require a sworn proof of loss. As is discussed above, Greenough only addresses when 
prejudgment interest begins to accme on general damages. It does not address the accrual of 
interest on special damages, although one can conclude that the Court would apply the same 
rationale to hold that prejudgment interest on special damages would commence on the date that 
the insurer is provided sufficient information that it can investigate and determine its liability or 
such other date as may be provided in the contract of insurance. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
The Arbitrator finds and concludes that the Motion for Reconsideration has merit and 
should be granted to the extent it establishes that the Arbitrator issued the Final Award on April 
29, 2013, but erroneously calculated prejudgment interest to April 30, 2013. However, any 
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adjustment in the award that would result from correcting this error is subsumed in -the 
adjustments that are hereafter made. 
The Arbitrator finds and concludes that the Motion for Reconsideration has merit and 
should be granted to the extent it seeks a recalculation of prejudgment interest that accounts for 
the payment of $100,332.95 on March 25, 2013. Payment terminates the running of statutory 
interest on the amount paid. See Brinkman v. AID Insurance Co., 115 Idaho 346, 766 P.2d 1227 
(1988);Packard v Joint School District #171, 104 Idaho 604,614,661 P.2d 770, 780 
(Ct.App.1983). Payment of the adjusted Interim Award stopped the accrual of prejudgment 
interest on the amount paid. The ~'inal Award includes interest on that amount to AprH 30, 2013. 
The pre-judgment interest award on the Initial Amount should be recalculated to the end of 
March 24, 2013. This reduces the Final Award of prejudgment interest by $1,187.50. 
The Arbitrator finds and concludes that the remainder of the Motion for Reconsideration 
must be denied. As discussed above, the Arbitrator concludes that the controlling law, as 
established in Emery, Walton, Schilling, and Greenough mandates that prejudgment interest on 
the Final Award, both for special damages and general damages, be calculated from the date that 
the insurer had_ sufficient information to investigate and determine its liability in this ma~ter. 
Moreover, even if the Arbitrator has erred in this conclusion, the Arbitrator has no authodty to 
co1Tect the error because it is not a mathematical error. See Cranney v. Mut. Of Enumclaw, Inc. 
Co., 145 Idaho 6, 175 P.3d 168 (2007); Am. Foreign Ins. Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 94 P.3d 
699 (2004). 
Respondent is entitled to a credit of $1,187.50 as a result of its additional payment of 
$100,332.95 on March 25, 2013. Respondenes March 25, 2013 payment of $100,332.95 was 
applied to the outstanding prejudgment interest of $103,135.46. Crediting Respondent with 
$1,187.50 for 36 days of interest results in prejudgment interest owed as of March 25, 2013 in 
the amount of $101,947.96. Applying Respondent's payment of $100,332,95 to the outstanding 
prejudgment interest of $101,947.96, results in unpaid interest of $1,615.01 as of March 25, 
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2013. Adding this amount to the adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 results in a total 
obligation of $101,947.96 as of March 25, 2013. Prejudgment interest at the rate of 12% per 
annum continues to accrue on the unpaid adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 from March 
25, 2013 until confirmed in a final judgment or paid, whichever sooner occurs. 
An Amended Final Award will be issued to conform to this Order. 
DATED this 24th day of July, 2013. 
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Case No. 81700-0040 
AMENDED FINAL AW ARD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This arbitration involves claims for damages under the underinsured motorist provisions 
of a policy of insurance that was issued by Respondent, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho 
("Farmers" or "Respondent") to Claimant, Peggy B. Cedillo ("Claimant"). The claims are 
disputed by Respondent. The dispute has been submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the 
agreement to arbitrate, which is contained in the insurance policy. The agreement to arbitrate, the 
Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act, Idaho Code§ 7-901, et seq., the Pre-Hearing Orders that were 
entered by the arbitrator in this matter, and the Stipulations of the Parties dated February 22, 
2012 and April 5, 2012 govern these proceedings. 
The Final Award was issued on April 29, 2013. In the Final Award, Claimant was 
awarded the sum of $203,468.41, consisting of the Adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 plus 
accrued prejudgment interest of $103,135.46. It was further ordered that prejudgment interest at 
the rate of twelve percent per annum (12%) shall continue to accrue on the Adjusted Interim 
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Award of $100,332.95 from the date of the Final Award until the Final Award is confirmed by a 
final judgment of a court or paid, whichever sooner occurs. 
·on May 20, 2013, Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Prejudgment 
Interest Award, in which Respondent seeks adjustment of the amount of prejudgment interest 
that was included in the Final Award to account for a payment by Respondent to Claimant that 
was made after the Interim A ward was issued but before the Final Award was issued. The 
Affidavit of Counsel that is submitted in support of Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration 
establishes that Respondent paid to Claimant the sum of $100,332.95 on March 25, 2013, which 
was the amount of the Adjusted Interim Award. The fact that this payment was made by 
Respondent and received by Claimant is not disputed by Claimant. This payment was made 
thirty-six (36) days before the Final Award was issued. The Arbitrator was not informed of this 
payment and did not consider it in the calculation of prejudgment interest that was made by the 
Arbitrator and awarded in the Final Award. The Motion for Reconsideration also seeks a 
recalculation and adjustment of prejudgment interest on medical expenses, lost income and 
general damages based on information submitted with the Motion. The parties, through their 
respective counsel, submitted memoranda in support of and in opposition to the Motion. 
The Arbitrator has duly considered the authorities and arguments that were submitted by 
the parties and has issued simultaneously with this Amended Final Award, the Arbitrator's Final 
Order No. 12 Re: Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of Prejudgment Interest Award and 
Claimant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Counsel for Respondent. The Final Order No. 12 grants 
in part and denies in part the Motion for Reconsideration. 
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II. AMENDED FINAL AW ARD 
The Final Award that was issued on April 29, 2013 is incorporated herein, except as it is 
revised and amended by this Amended Final Award. 
In the Final Award, Claimant was awarded the sum of $203,468.41 consisting of the 
Adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 plus accrued prejudgment interest of $103,135.46, a 
total of $203,468.41. It was further ordered that prejudgment interest at the rate of twelve 
percent per annum (12%) shall continue to accrue on the Adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 
from the date of the Final Award until the Final Award is confirmed by a judgment of a court or 
paid, whichever sooner occurs. 
Respondent is entitled to a credit on the Final Award of $100,332.96 for the payment on 
March 25, 2013. On March 25, 2013, Respondent's obligation under the Final Award was 
$100,332.95 (the Adjusted Interim Award) plus outstanding accrued prejudgment interest of 
$103,135.46, a total of $203,468.41. The payment was applied to the accmed prejudgment 
interest of $103,135.46, leaving unpaid the award of $100,332.95 plus accmed interest of 
$2,802.51. 
Respondent is also entitled to a credit of $1,187.50 for 36 days of interest at 12% per 
annum on the Adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95. This credit further reduces the amount of 
the accrued unpaid interest to $1,615.01 as of March 25, 2013. Thus, on March 25, 2013, the 
corrected and Amended Final Award is $101,947.96. 
Prejudgment interest at the rate of 12% per annum continues to accrue on the unpaid 
Adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 from March 25, 2013 untii the Amended Final Award is 
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confirmed in a final judgment or paid, whichever sooner occurs. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 24th day of July, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of July, 2013, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing AMENDED FINAL A WARD by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to ea.ch of the following: 
Jon Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
jsteele@rnnftsteele.com 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
jat@elamburke.com 
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FARMERS INSURANCE COMP ANY OF 
IDAHO, 
Res ondent. 
Arbitration Case No. 81700-0040 
APPLICATION TO MODIFY OR 
CORRECT AMENDED FINAL 
A WARD AND/OR MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
The Arbitrator has .rpade an evident miscalculation of figures in the Amended Final 
Award by failing to account for payment of the adjusted Interim Award on March 25, 2013, and 
erroneously calculating prejudgment interest thereon. As described more fully below, the 
Arbitrator erroneously applied Respondent's payment on March 251 2013 in the amount of 
$100,332.95 to the prejudgment interest award instead of the adjusted Interim Award. This 
resulted in art e1Toneous calculation of interest that would continue to accrue from March 25, 
2013, on the already paid in full adjusted Interim Award. 
The·correct calculation of the Amended Final Award is to apply the March 25, 2013, 
payment of $100,332.95 to the adjusted Interim Award leaving a zero balance and subtract the 
P.002 
P.002/023 
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$1,187.50 credit from the prejudgment interest award of $103,135,46, leaving a final 
prejudgment interest award of $101,947.96. By this proper calculation no further prejudgment 
interest accrues because the Interim A ward of damages has been paid in full and prejudgment 




In the Arbitrator's Draft Order No. 12, the Arbitrator found that there was an erroneous 
calculation of prejudgment interest in calculating prejudgment interest on the adjusted Inte1im 
Award through April 30, 2013. (See Proposed Order No. 12, p. 11.) The Arbitrator concluded 
he had the power and that it was appropriate to recalculate prejudgment interest "that accounts 
for payment of$100,332.95 on March 25, 2013." Id. The Arbitrator also recognized that the 
paymen~ on March 25, 2013, was of the "adjusted Interim Award and that the payment stopped 
the accrual of prejudgment interest on that amount." Id. Based on a recalculation of 
prejudgment interest to end as of March 24, 2013, the Arbitrator determined that the Final Award 
of prejudgment interest should be reduced by $1,187.50. Id. 
In the Final Order No. 12 and in the Amended Final Award, the Arbitrator erroneously 
applied the payment of the adjusted Interim Award in the amount of $100,332.95 to the 
prejudgment interest award of $103,135.46, leaving an accrued, unpaid interest amount of 
$1,615.01 "and further leaving unpaid the entire adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95, 
Applying the credit of$ I, 187.50, the Arbitrator erroneously calculated an Amended Final Award 
balance due of$101,947.96 and awarded prejudgment interest on the adjusted Interim Award of 
$100,332.95 from March 25, 2013, until the Amended Final Award is confirmed and a final 
judgment is entered or paid, whichever occurs first. (Amended Final Award, pp. 3-4.) These 
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changes in calculations were done at the urging of Claimant (who had not filed a motion for 
reconsideration or an application to modify or correct the Final Award). 1 
Farmers Paid the Adiusted Interim Award, Not Prejudgment Intet,es.5. 
On March 25, 2013, Farnters tendered to Cedillo the amount of $100,332.95. (Thomson 
Affidavit in Support of Application to Modify or Correct Award, Ex. A.) This payment is in the 




Arbitrator made its prejudgment interest award of $103,135.46. Farmers' tender of this amount 
was made in two checks; one in the amount of $44,638.01 made out to Peggy Cedillo and 
Regence BlueShield; the other in the amount of$55,694.94 made out to Peggy Cedillo and Runft 
& Steele Law Offices. The first check was cashed on April 19, 2013, ten days before the 
Arbitrator awarded prejudgment interest. (Thomson Aff., Ex. B.)2 The second check was 
cashed on March 28, 4013, an entire month before the Arbitrator awarded prejudgment interest. 
(Thomson Aff., Ex. C.) When Farmers made payment there was no prejudgment interest award 
to which the payment could be applied. Frumers paid off the award of damages, not prejudgment 
interest.3 
On April 29, 2013, the Arbitrator issued the Final Award. In that award the Arbitrator 
calculated an adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95. The total amount of prejudgment interest 
1 In other words, Claimant received affinnative relief in the form of an Amended Final Award 
without ever filing a timely (or any) motion for reconsideration or application under the Idaho 
Uniform Arbitration Act. 
z The reason this check included Regence BlueShield was because Regence BlueShield had a 
subrogation interest in Cedillo's recovery. This subrogation interest was based on medical 
expenses it had paid and for which Cedillo was awarded damages. This is further evidence tha~ 
Fanners' payment on March 25, 2013, was of damages, not prejudgment interest. 
3 In other words, Fanners paid off the principal amount owed, not the interest. 
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P.005 
P.005/023 
.in the Final Award was $103,135.46. The Final Award also determined that prejudgment 
interest "shall continue to accrue on the adjustment Interim Award of $100,332.95 until the Final 
Award is affirmed by a Judgment or paid, whichever sooner occurs." It was this part of the Final 
Award that the Arbitrator reconsidered and theoretically corrected in the Amended Final Award. 
If, as Cedillo claims, the early payment was applied to prejudgment interest there would have 
been no need to correct the Final Award. If the early payment on March 25, 2013, paid off 
accrued interest rather than the principal amount of the adjusted Interim Award, prejudgment 
interest would have continued to accrue, unabated. But, as the Arbitrator previously ruled, the 
March 25, 2013, payment was payment of the adjusted Interim Award thereby necessitating a 
correction to the Final Award because the March 25, 2013, payment of the adjusted Interim 
Award stopped the accrual of prejudgment interest on that date. The effect of the new and 
erroneous calculation of prejudgment interest is that payment on March 25, 2013, had no effect 
on the accrual of prejudgment interest, which is entirely contrary to the Arbitrator's Final Award 
and draft Final Order No. 12. 
It caruiot be disputed that Fanners prepaid that portion of the Final Award that was the 
adjusted Interim Award. The Arbitrator previously ruled that to be the case. The amount paid is 
the exact amount, to the penny, of the adjusted Interim Award amount in the Final Award. 
Payment of$100,332.95 on March 25, 2013, was !1Q!; "applied to the outstanding prejudgment 
interest award of$103,335.46" as claimed by the Claimant. When the payment was made there 
was no outstanding prejudgment interest award to which it could apply. Claimant cashed both 
checks before there was a prejudgment interest award and therefore could not have, on her own, 
"applied" that payment to prejudgment interest. 
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Fanners prepaid what it calculated to be the amount owed for damages to Cedillo. 
Fanners' calculation of what would become the adjusted Interim Award was exact. Farmers 
made that payment for the purposes of cutting off the accrual of prejudgment interest. Why else 
would it do that if payment of any other portion of the Final Award would allow interest to 
continue accruing? There was no intent by Farmers to pay an as yet undetermined amount of 
prejudgment interest. There was no prejudgment interest to which Claimant could apply 
payment. Therefore, payment should have been applied to the adjusted Interim Award for 
damage and not to "outstanding" accrued prejudgment interest. 
The Arbitrator has the Power to Correct and Modify the Amended Final Award. 
P.006 
P.006/023 
The Arbitrator has the power to modify or correct the Amended Final Award pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 7-909 and §§ 7-9 l 3(a)(l) and (3) and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 11. The 
application herein has been made within 14 and/or 20 days of the Amended Final Award and is 
. thereby timely. 
The Arbitrator previously determined tpat he could correct and modify the Final Award 
because he e1Toneously calculated prejudgment interest to April 30, 2013, and that the correction 
fits into the first exception to Functus Officio because the calculation of prejudgment interest 
failed to account for payment of$100,332.95 on March 25, 2013. Here, the Amended Final 
Award erroneously fails to properly account for payment of $100,332.95 on March 25, 2013. 
Instead, prejudgment interest is calculated on the adjusted Interim Award despite its full and 
final payment on March 25, 2013. The same type of error in calculations has occurred and 
should be corrected. 
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The Arbitrator's calculations in the Final Amended Award are erroneous for the 
following reasons: (1) the calculations fail to account for the ~11 payment of the adjusted 
Interim Award on March 25, 2013; (2) the Arbitrator erroneously applied that payment to the 
prejudgment interest award; (3) the Arbitrator erroneously calculated that there was an unpaid 
interest amount as of March 25, 2013, of $1,615.01; and (4) the Arbitrator erroneously calculated 
prejudgment interest to continue to accrue on the fully paid, adjusted Interim Award of 
$100,332.95 from March 25, 2013. 
The proper calculations are as follows: (1) application of the payment on March 25, 
2013, of $100,332.95 to the adjusted Interim Award, leaving a balance owed on the adjusted 
Interim Award of $0.00; (2) a reduction of $1,187.50 from the prejudgment interest award of 
$103,13S.46, for an outstanding balance due of prejudgment interest of $101,947.96; and (3) a 
determination th~t, consistent with the Final Award, prejudgment interest does not continue to 
accrue because the adjusted Interim A ward has been fully paid. 
CONCLUSION 
The Arbitrator erroneously abandoned its prior position regarding calculation of 
prejudgment interest at the urging of Cedillo, even though Cedillo never made a timely (or any) 
application to correct or modify the Final Award or motion for reconsideration. The result of 
this erroneous change in calculations is that Frumers was not given credit for payment of the 
adjusted Interim Award on March 25, 2013, which should have terminated the accrnal of 
prejudgment interest. Because the Arbitrator erroneously applied that payment to the 
prejudgment interest award, Fanners must now erroneously pay interest on the adjusted Interim 
Award from the date it was fully paid (March 25, 2013), and continue to pay interest on that 
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amount until Fanners ways the adjusted Interim Award. While it may appear that Farmers is 
arguing over a relatively small amount of money, the impact of the Arbitrator,s enoneous 
calculations could be far reaching in Cedilla's threatened bad faith action. 
Consistent with the Final Award and Draft Final Order No. 12, Fanners respectfully 
requests that the Arbitrator properly calculate the prejudgment interest award as follows: 
$103,135.46 (prejudgment interest award) 
- $ 1,187.50 (prejudgment interest overcharge) 
$101,947.96 (adjusted and correct prejudgment interest award) 
In addition, Farmers requests the Arbitrator recalculate continuing prejudgment interest. The 
adjusted Interim Award has been fully paid and the proper calculations would be zero dollars in 
accruing and continuing prejudgment interest. 
A HEARING ON THIS APPLICATION IS REQUESTED. 
DATED this~ day of July, 2013. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By: ---:::fr;~~~_y__L~~---=---
A. Thomson, Of the firm 
ttomeys for Farmers Insurance Company 
ofldaho 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Zo day of July, 2013, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows: 
Jon M. Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83 702 
U.S. Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
Federal Express 
~ Via Facsimile - 343-3246 
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JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
JOHN L. RUNFI' (ISB # 1059) 
RUNFI' & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-8506 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: JSteele@runftsteele.com 
Attorneys for Claimant 
IN RE: MATTER OF ARBITRATION 
PEGGY B. CEDILLO 
Claimant, 
vs. 





) RESPONSE TO FARMERS' 
) APPLICATION TO MODIFY OR 
) CORRECTAMENDEDFINALAWARD 






Farmers' most recent motion acknowledges its obligation to pay $101,947.96 m 
prejudgment interest. See, Application to Modify or Correct Amended Final Award and/or 
Motion for Reconsideration at pp. 2, 6, and 9 (hereafter "Farmers Application"). Farmers only 
disputes how its payment of March 25, 2013 was applied. Farmers March 25, 2013 payment, as 
previously found by the Arbitrator, was applied to outstanding prejudgment interest. The issue 
presented by Farmers Application raises only whether Farmers will pay accruing interest after 
March 25, 2013. 1 
1 The per diem on the outstanding bahmce as of March 25, 2013 is $32.99. 
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In response to Farmers' Application Cedillo submits the following: 
I. 
THERE Is No "ERRONEOUS CALCULATION" 
Farmers states that in ... "the Arbitrator's Draft Order No. 12, the Arbitrator found that 
there was an erroneous calculation of prejudgment interest." Farmers Application, p. 2. In fact, 
there was no erroneous calculation. Farmers paid what it calculated to be due. Its payment made 
no reference to how the payment was to be applied. The Arbitrator was unaware of this 
payment. Both Cedillo and the Arbitrator agreed that Farmers is entitled to a credit in the 
amount paid. Following submission of her proof of loss Cedillo was entitled to receive the 
amount justly due her. The reasoning of the Court stated in Brinkman v. AID Insurance 
Company, 115, Idaho 346, 350, 766 P.2d 1227, 1231 (1988) is applicable to the issue raised by 
Farmers. In Brinkman, the Court stated the following in regards to an award of attorney fees: 
If the insurance company tenders an amount that is agreeable to the 
plaintiff, the plaintiff will accept and that will be the end of it. The 
question of "what amount is '.just' " only arises when the plaintiff and the 
insurance company cannot agree. If the plaintiff chooses to pursue the 
matter, the matter goes to court. The jury determines what amount is justly 
due. If the insurance company was right, no attorney fees will be charged. 
If the plaintiff was right, attorney fees will be charged. Both sides realize 
this when they go to court. Both sides assume an equal and inevitable risk. 
By its very nature, the question of what amount is justly due can only be 
resolved in retrospect, in a court of law, by the jury. We affirm the 
determination of the trial court that Brinkman is entitled to an award of 
attorney fees under LC.§ 41-1839. 
The Court's reasoning is also applicable to the award of prejudgment interest. Farmers 
never tendered Cedillo the amount that is justly due. 
RESPONSE TO FARMERS' APPLICATION TO MODIFY OR CORRECT AMENDED 
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The Arbitrator has carefully and accurately calculated the accrual of prejudgment interest. 




The Arbitrator found that Farmers' first Motion for Reconsideration was not submitted 
within 14 days from the issuance of the Final Award and that the Arbitrator would not consider 
Farmers' Motion for Reconsideration for that reason. Farmers' Application is Fanners' attempt 
to ignore the Arbitrator's ruling concerning timeliness of its first Motion. Just as Farmers' first 
Motion was late, so too is Farmers' Application, which must be summarily denied. 
III. 
FRIVOLOUS, UNREASONABLE & WITHOUT FOUNDATION 
Farmers' Application is nothing more than a rehash of its prior arguments. Frumers does 
nothing more than ask the Arbitrator to second guess himself on issues which have been 
exhaustingly briefed and previously addressed. Farmers' Application is frivolous, unreasonable 
and without foundation and should be summarily denied. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
In the Arbitrator's Final Award dated April 29, 2013, the Arbitrator carefully and 
accurately calculated the award of prejudgment interest. See, Arbitrator's Final Award, section 
B, Prejudgment Interest, at p. 6. The Arbitrator's Final Award states the following: 
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The amount of prejudgment interest from August 25, 2009 to October 18, 
2012 is $96,707.38. The amount of prejudgment interest from October 18 
2012 to April 30, 2013 is $6,428.08. The total amount of prejudgment 
interest is $103? 13 5 .46. 
Arbitrator's Final Award, dated April 29, 2012, p. 13 
The Arbitrator has carefully and accurately given Fanners credit for each of its payments. 
The only payment Fanners questions is its last payment of $100,332.95 made on March 25, 
2013. 
The Arbitrator's Final Order No. 12, dated July 24, 2013 at p. 19 states the 
"Respondent's March 25, 2013 payment of $100,332.95 was applied to the outstanding 
prejudgment interest of $103,135.46." Farmers' payment of March 25, 2013 was properly 
applied. Farmers Application should be summarily denied. 
Farmers' Application should be summarily denied because (1) it is not timely; (2) it is 
without merit. 
Should Farmers want to stop the accrual of interest all that need be done is that it pay the 
entire Arbitrator's award.1 
r 1·1\ - 1.--
DATED this day of August 2013. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By:_~_/ __ { ;,_7r&;t_--
JON M. STEELE 
Attorney for Claimant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
N\ 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this {2_ day of August 2013, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO FARMERS' APPLICATION TO MODIFY OR 
CORRECT AMENDED FINAL A WARD AND/OR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
was served upon opposing counsel as follows: 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam Burke 
251 E. Front St., Ste 300 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance Company 
Ofldaho 
Merlyn W. Clark 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
877 W. Main St., Ste 1000 
PO Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Arbitrator 
i ,, 
)( Via Facsimile 
Via Personal Delivery 
Via U.S. Mail 
Via E-mail 
.X Via Facsimile 
_· _ Via Personal Delivery 
. Via U.S. Mail 
Via E-mail 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: J4 ~ 
JON M. STEELE 
Attorney for Claimant 
RESPONSE TO FARMERS' APPLICATION TO MODIFY OR CORRECT AMENDED 























Case No. 81700-0040 
FINAL ORDER NO. 13 RE: 
RESPONDENT'S APPLICATION TO 
MODIFY OR CORRECT AMENDED 
FINAL AWARD AND/OR MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Introduction 
Pending before the Arbitrator is Respondent's Application to Modify or Correct 
Amended Final Award and/or Motion for Reconsideration seeking modification of the Amended 
Final Award in this matter. 
Pursuant to Order No. 12 and the Amended Final Award that was issued by the Arbitrator 
on July 24, 2013, the Arbitrator determined that the payment by Farmers on March 25, 2013 in 
the amount of $100,332.95 should be applied first to accrued prejudgment interest rather than the 
principle amount of the adjusted Interim Award. Respondent contends that this will result in an 
erroneous calculation of interest. 
The Application to Modify was received by the Arbitrator on July 30, 2013. A response 
from the Claimant, objecting to the Application, was received by the Arbitrator on August 2, 
2013. No reply memorandum from Respondent has been received by the Arbitrator and the 
matter is deemed ripe for decision. 
FINAL ORDER NO 13 RE: RESPONDENT'S APPLICATION TO MODIFY OR CORRECT 
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II. 
POWER TO CORRECT AND MODIFY THE AMENDED FINAL A WARD 
Respondent contends that the Arbitrator has the power to modify or correct the Amended 
Final Award pursuant to Idaho Code§ 7-909 and§§ 7-913(a)(l) and (3) and Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 11. Respondent asse1ts that the application herein has been made within 14 
and/or 20 days of the Amended Final Award and is thereby timely. 
Section 7-909 authorizes an arbitrator to modify or correct a final award upon the 
grounds stated in LC. § 7-913(a), paragraphs (1) [ evident miscalculation of figures or an evident 
mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award] or (3) [award 
is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the controversy], upon application of 
a party, provided the application is made within twenty (20) days after delivery of the award to 
the applicant. In this case, the Amended Final Award was served on the Parties via email, as 
stipulated by the parties (see Pre-Hearing Order No. 1 Re Scheduling at <JI 20) on July 24, 2013. 
This Application was received by the Arbitrator on July 30, 2013. 
Section 7-909 does not address whether an application to modify or correct an award may 
be made to modify or correct an award that has been once amended to modify or correct the 
initial final award and the Arbitrator has found no case law on the issue. Because the statute 
makes no distinction between a final award and an amended final award, it is the finding and 
conclusion of the Arbitrator that the Arbitrator has the power to modify or correct the Amended 
Final Award, if statutory grounds as provided in Section 7-909, exist to do so. 
Having decided that the Arbitrator has the power to modify or correct the Amended Final 
Award, if statutory grounds exist to do so, the Arbitrator will not consider whether to modify or 
correct .the Amended Final Award under Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for the 
same reasons that this application of Rule 11 was rejected in Final Order No. 12. 
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III. 
ARBITRATOR'S ALLEGED ERRONEOUS CALCULATIONS 
On January 16, 2013, the Arbitrator's Interim Award was issued in this matter. The 
Interim Award of $406,700.12 for econo!nic and noneconomic damages was subject to 
adjustment for payments that had been made to Claimant and for prejudgment interest. On April 
29, 2013, the Arbitrator's Final Award was issued, which adjusted the Interim Award for 
payments that had been received by Claimant and awarded Claimant damages in the principle 
amount of $100,332.95, plus prejudgment interest in the amount of $103,135.46. 
Respondent then submitted a Motion for Reconsideration of Prejudgment Interest 
Award in which Respondent sought adjustment of the amount of prejudgment interest that was 
included in the Final Award to account for a payment by Respondent to Claimant that was made 
after the Interim Award was issued but before the Final Award was issued. The Affidavit of 
Counsel that was submitted in support of Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration and the 
Affidavit of Jeffrey A. Thomson In Support of Application to Modify or Correct Award and/or 
Motion for Reconsideration establish that Respondent paid to Claimant the sum of $100,332.95 
on March 25, 2013, which is the principle amount of the adjusted Interim Award for damages. 
This payment was made thirty-six (36) days before the Final Award was issued. The Arbitrator 
was not informed of this payment and did not consider it in the calculation of prejudgment 
interest that was made by the Arbitrator and awarded in the Final Award. 
In Final Order No. 12 Re: Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of Prejudgment 
Interest Award and the Amended Final Award, which were issued on July 24, 2013, the 
Arbitrator corrected and amended the calculation of prejudgment interest in two ways. First the 
arbitrator recalculated prejudgment interest to account for the payment of $100,332.95 on March 
25, 2013, which stopped the tunning of statutory interest, on the amount paid and reduced the 
Final Award of prejudgment interest by $1,187.50. Second, the Arbitrator applied the payment 
of $100,332.95 on March 25, 2013 to reduce the amount that was owed to Claimant on that date 
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damages of $100,332.95 and interest of $101,947.96. The Arbitrator applied the payment first to 
accmed interest, which left a balance of interest in the amount of $1,615.01 as of March 25, 2013 
and a balance of damages in the amount of $100,332.95, or a total obligation of $101,947.96 as 
of March 25, 2013. The Arbitrator further ordered that prejudgment interest at the rate of 12% 
per annum would continue to accrue on the unpaid Adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 from 
March 25, 2013 until confirmed in a final judgment or paid, whichever sooner occurs. An 
Amended Final Award was issued to conform to Final Order No. 12. 
The Arbitrator is now asked to correct or amend the Amended Final Award to change the 
methodology that was applied by the Arbitrator in reaching the determination to apply the March 
25, 2013 payment first to accmed interest rather thari the unpaid adjusted Interim Award of 
damages of $100,332.95. Respondent argues that the March 25, 2013 payment was made before 
the Arbitrator made its prejudgment interest award of $103,135.46 and there was no prejudgment 
interest award to which the payment could be applied. Respondent contends that it paid off the 
award of damages, not prejudgmept interest. 
The Arbitrator rejects the Respondent's argument that it did not owe pr~judgment interest 
to the Clamant simply because the amount of interest has not been calculated and awarded as of 
the date of Respondent's payment to Claimant. The law of Idaho clearly provides that the 
Claimant is entitled to prejudgment interest on unpaid claims. The fact that the actual amount of 
prejudgment interest that was owed by Respondent to Claimant had not been calculated as of the 
date of Respondent's payment is immaterial. When calculated by the Arbitrator, it was 
accurately determined that the amount of accmed prejudgment interest exceeded the amount of 
the payment by $1,615.01. To follow Respondent's logic and apply the payment to the principle 
balance, rather than the accrued interest, would leave the Claimant with a balance of accrued 
interest owed and no right to collect interests on the money owed. This application of the 
payment would deny Claimant of the right under section 28-22-104 to collect interest at the rate 
of 12% per ammm "on money after the same becomes due." The right to prejudgment interest is 
"money after the same becomes due." Thus, regardless of whether the payment was applied to 
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principle or accrued interest, the Claimant is entitled to collect interest at the rate of 12% per 
annum on the amount that was due her on the date of the payment and thereafter until it is fully 
paid. 
It is also the finding and conclusion of the Arbitrator that the application for modification 
or correction of the Amended Final Award to have the payment applied to the principle balance 
rather than the accrued interest does not constitute a request to correct an evident miscalculation 
of figures or an evident mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in 
the award, nor a request to correct an award that is impe1fect in a matter of form, not affecting 
the merits of the controversy as required under Sections 7-909 and 7-913(1) and(3). 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent's Application to Modify or Correct Amended 
Final Award and/or Motion for Reconsideration is denied. 
DATED this 21st day of August, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21st day of August, 2013, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing ORDER NO. 13 RE: RESPONDENT'S APPLICATION TO MODIFY 
OR CORRECT AMENDED FINAL A WARD AND/OR MOTIONN FOR 
RECONSIDERATINO by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Jon Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 1020 W. Main 
Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
jsteele@runftsteele.com 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
jat@elamburke.com 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
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RUNFT & S;-rEELE 
LA\\1.()FFICES, PLLC 
John L. Runfc I Jon i'vf. Steele 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, PA 
Ad.dress: PO Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
September 18, 2013 
Re: Cedillo v .. Farmers Insurance, Co. - Arbitration 
Dear Jeff: 
Via _Facsimile 
Contrary to your letter of September 11, as you know your client did not pay the Interim 
Award of $100,332.95. Your client's payment of September 11, 2013, as per the Arbitrator's 
decision, ha'l been applied to the outstanding interest of $7,223.31 ($1,615.01 through March 25, 
2013 + $5,608.30 for March 26, 2013 through September 11, 2013). 
Although you challenged the Arbitrators award of prejudgment interest at least three 
times, the Arbitrator denied each of your challenges. Your continued frivolous, unreasonable, 
and unfounded challenge is further evidence of your client's bad faith. 
As stated above, your client's September 11 th payment of $101,947.96 has been applied 
to the outstanding interest of $7,223.31. The balance has been applied to the Interim Award. 
This leaves a balance of $5,608.30 plus interest from September 12, 2013 due. Interest continues 
to accrue at the rate of $1.84 per diem from September 12, 2013 on the outstanding balance. 
Your letter of September 11, 2013 purpo1iedly reserving the right to challenge the 
amount. of prejudgment interest is nothing more than an attempt to intimidate and harass and will 
be used as further evidence of your client's reckless conduct. 
ours, 
: Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
JMS:kra 
Cc: Client 
Peter Johnson ( via facs:Hnrle; 1 . ~ tee-le.com 
Phone: (208) 333-8506 Fax: (208) 343-3246 I Boise, Idaho 83702 
In rhc Alas'ka Center I l 020 W. Main Strecr, Suite 400 i Fourth Floor Exhibit J 
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JOHN L. RUNFT (ISB # 1059) 
JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-9495 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: JSteele@runftsteele.com 
Attorneys for Peggy Cedillo 
NO·----~~t)f:ll......~,--
FILeo (JI..// 
AM. __ ,.,..,..,.,_P.M . - s 
SEP 2 5 2013 
CHRISTOPHEFl O, AIOH, Clark 
By ANNAMAFIIB MEYER 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 










STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
) 
CASE NO. CV OC 1308697 
AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN 
OPPOSITION TO FARMER'S 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES 
COMES NOW, Jon M. Steele, being over the age of eighteen years and competent to 
make this Affidavit, after first being duly sworn, and upon his own personal knowledge, states as 
follows: 
1. That I am an attorney in good standing with the Idaho State Bar and counsel for 
Plaintiff in the above arbitration and confirmation. 
2. That I make this Affidavit in Opposition to Farmer's Motion to Disallow Costs 
and Attorney Fees. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE lN OPPOSITION TO FARMER'S MOTION lO 




3. On February 2, 2012 Mr. Merlyn W. Clark was appointed Arbitrator. The 
Appointment of Arbitrator states the following: 
By executing this Appointment of Arbitrator and agreeing to pay the fees 
and expenses of the arbitration, no party is waiving or releasing its right to 
assert a claim for an award of the attorney fees and costs or the fees and 
costs of the arbitrator in this matter as either part of the arbitration award 
or any proceeding in the District Court. 
See, Exhibit A, Appointment of Arbitrator, attached. 
4. On March 1, 2012, Attorney Steele filed his Notice of Conflict Disclosure in the 
Arbitration ofthis matter. See, Exhibit B attached. 
5. The Arbitrator's Final Award states the following regarding payments purportedly 
made by Mr. Steele: 
5. Payments Purportedly Made by Mr. Steele. 
Some argument has been presented that the Arbitrator should also credit 
Farmers with any payments that were made by Mr. Steele directly to 
Claimant's caregivers. There is no evidence that allows the Arbitrator to 
make this calculation. Moreover, some of the purported payments were 
allegedly made while Mr. Steele and Claimant were married, and thus 
were likely made from community funds, which would entitle her to 
recover such payments or include them in her claim against Farmers. 
See, Exhibit C, Arbitrator's Final Award, p. 5, attached 
6. Affiant has not violated the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct m my 
representation of Cedillo. 
7. Attached as Exhibit Dis a summary of the Plaintiff's costs paid to the Arbitrator 
totaling $18,517.97. 
Further, your affiant sayeth naught. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN OPPOSITION TO FARMER'S MOTION TO 
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES -Page 2 
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DATED this Z~ay of September 2013. 
STATEOFIDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
-41 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this2~ day of September 2013. 
bon S=:>C: )::~J) 
Notary Public for the State of Idaho 
Residing at: Ncrnpc 
My Commission Exp1res: j - (Ci',... [9_ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this zEP day of September 2013, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN OPPOSITION TO 
FARMER'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES was served upon 
opposing counsel as follows: · 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam Burke 
251 E. Front St., Ste 300 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance Company 
Of Idaho 
Peter J. Johnson 
Johnson Law Group 
103 E. Indiana Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance Company 
Of Idaho 
Via Facsimile =x Via Personal Delivery 
' Via U.S. Mail --
ViaE-mail 
Via Facsimile 
Via Personal Delivery =x Via U.S. Mail 
Via E-mail 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: J ~ s-w 
JON M. Sl'EELE 
Attorney for Peggy Cedillo 
AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN OPPOSITION TO FARMER'S MOTION TO 
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IN THE MA TIER OF THE ARBITRATION BETWEEN 
) 




) APPOINTMENT OF AR:BlTRATOR 
vs. ) 
} 






P. 005/0 l 2 
The above named parties, through their tmdersjgned counsel of record, hereby · 
appoint Merlyn W. Clark to serve as the arbitrator to determine the matters in dispute between or 
among the pnrlies to this arbitration pursuant to tlleir agreement to submit the matters to 
arbitration and the Idaho Uniform Arbitratiori Act, Cl1apter 9, Title 7 of the Idaho Code. 
The above named parties agree to-pay the arbitrator's fees and expenses for 
serving as the arbitrator in this matter. Th.e arbitrator's fee shall be based upon the billing rate of 
$250 per hour .(or all time spent on this matter. In addition, lhe aTbitrator will bil) for and be paid 
out-of-pocket expenses, such as long distance telephone charges, photocopies, postage, and other 
reasonable expenses directly related to the arbitration. The statement of the arbitrator will be 
submitted to the parties at the end of each month tmd shall be paid within ten days of the date of 
the statement. A final statement will be submitted prior to release of the decision. The 
arbitrator's fmal statement for services must be paid in ful1 before tho decision will be released. 
It is the arbitrator's position that the attorneys representing tbe parties have arranged for his 
services and are also !esponsible for payment of the billin~ statement. . 
APPOINTMENT OF J\RSl'nU. TOR• l 
FEB 2·7 2012 
BY: A 
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By executing this Appointment of Arbitrator and agreeing to pay the foes and 
expenses of the arbitration, no party is waiving or releasing its right to assert a claim for an 
award of the attorney fees and costs or the fees a:nd costs of the arbitrator in this mutter as either 
part of the arbitration award or any p.roceeding in the District Court. 
DATED TlllS <_0 day of t e,kD,\ IU'l 2012, 
PEGGY CEDILLO, Claimant 
By .Jfijhe~ 
Authorized Cotmsel 
FAruvIBRS 1NSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO, Respondent 
APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATOR • 2 
1117DD,MAIN.3.20084S.1 
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1'~fi'.i\/2Qi2/TJE Oi: 37 FM P. 007/012 
' 
ACCEPTANCE OF A})POINTMl'.lENT AND OATII OF ARBITRATOR. 
I, Merlyn W. Clark do hereby accept the appoir1tment as arbitrator for the above 
entitled matter and do af.finn that I will faithfully and fairly hear and determine the cause and 
controversy which is the subject matter of the above entitled arbitration, according to the 
principals of equity and justice, and make aju~t a true award according to the best ofmy 
understanding and abi1ity. 
APPOINTMEl-fl' 01;· A!U'!J'J'J~'fOR. J 
a1100.MAJN,J2ooe45.1 
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JOHN L. RUNFf (ISB # 1059) 
JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
RUNFf .& STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-8506 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: JSteele@runftsteele.com 
Attorneys for Peggy Cedillo 


















TO: Fanners Insurance Company ofidaho, its attorney of record, and Mr. Merlyn Clark, 
Arbitrator 
Please take notice that it has been previously disclosed to Farmers and to Mr. Clark that 
Claimant Cedillo is now married to the underinsured motorist, Jon M. Steele, and that Claimant 
Cedillo is now represented by her husband, attorney Jon M. Steele. 
In other words: 
- Attorney Jon M. Steele is the underinsured motorist whose negligence caused 
Cedillo's injuries in the Crash of May 25, 2008. 
NOTICE OF CONFLICT DISCLOSURE - Page 1 Bxhibit B 
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( 
- Attorney Jon M. Steele was married to Claimant Cedillo on December 6, 
2008. 
- Attorney Jon M. Steele represents claimant Cedillo in this Arbitration. 
DATED this_(_ day of March 2012. 
NOTICE OF CONFLICT DISCLOSURE - Page 2 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By:_J_~·-f4.-<::J ____ ·~~-----
JON~ 
Attorney for Peggy Cedillo 
Husband of Peggy Cedillo 
Underinsured Motorist 
000607
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this (~ day of March 2012, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CONFLICT DISCLOSURE, was served upon opposing 
counsel as follows: 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam Burke 
251 E. Front St., Ste 300 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance Company 
Of Idaho 
Merlyn W. Clark 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
877 W. Main St., Ste 1000 
PO Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Arbitrator 
~ Via Facsimile 
__ Via Personal Delivery 
Via U.S. Mail 
Via E-mail 
---¼- Via Facsimile 
Via Personal Delivery --
Via U.S. Mail 
Via E-mail 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: Jfijfd; 
JON!{c. ~ 
Attorney for Peggy Cedillo 
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Case No. 81700-0040 
ARBITRATOR'S FINAL AWARD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This arbitration involves claims for damages under the underinsured motorist provisions 
of a policy of insurance that was issued by Respondent, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho 
("Farmers") to Claimant, Peggy B. Cedillo. The claims are disputed by Respondent. The dispute 
has been submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the agreement to arbitrate, which is 
contained in the insurance policy. The agreement to arbitrate, the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act, 
Idaho Code§ 7-901, et seq., the Pre-Hearing Orders that were entered by the arbitrator in this 
matter, and the Stipulations of the Parties dated February 22, 2012 and April 5, 2012 govern 
these proceedings. 
An evidentiary hearing was commenced on November 20, 2012 in Boise, Idaho before 
the duly appointed arbitrator, Merlyn W. Clark. Claimant, Peggy B. Cedillo, appeared in person 
represented by her attorney, Jon M. Steele, Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC. Jeffrey A. 





behalf of Respondent. Oral and documentary evidence was presented by the parties and the 
matter was submitted for a decision and interim award. 
The Arbitrator's Decision and Interim Award was issued January 16, 2013. The Interim 
Award assessed the amount of damages for bodily injury suffered by Claimant in the motorcycle 
accident on May 25, 2008 as follows: 
I. Economic Damages: 
• Medical expenses: 
• Lost income: 
SUBTOTAL ECONOMIC DAMAGES: 
2. Noneconomic Damages: 
Pain and suffering, loss of quality of life, physical limitations, 




Right hand: $150,000.00 
TOT AL INTER™ AW ARD: $406,700.12 
II. ISSUE FOR DECISION 
The parties have agreed "that following issuance of the Interim Award, the arbitrator will 
conduct post Interim Award proceedings to determine what, if any, adjustments would be made 
in the amount of the Interim Award for prejudgment interest, setoffs or collateral sources and 
subrogation issues prior to issuance of the final award by the arbitrator." (Prehearing Order No. 
2.) This is the Final Award that assesses the amounts for adjustments in the amount of the 
Interim A ward. 
The parties, through their respective counsel, submitted memoranda and exhibits stating 
the positions of the parties with respect to adjustments to be made in the Interim Award. A 
hearing was held on February 26, 2013, during which counsel for the parties presented oral 
ARBITRATOR'S FINAL AWARD-2 
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arguments in support of their respective positions. The matter is now fully submitted for entry of 
the Final Award. 
Because the insurance clause in the insurance policy that covers Claimant expressly 
provides that "[t]he expense of the arbitrator and all other expenses of arbitration will be shared 
equally" by the parties and "[a]ttomey's fees and fees paid for the witnesses are not expenses of 
arbitration and will be paid by the pmty incurring them," this Arbitrator has no authority to 
award expenses of arbitration or attorney fees and costs to either party in this proceeding. 
III. FACTS, ANALYSIS AND DECISIONS 
A. Adjustments for Payments Made on Behalf of the Tortfeasor, Mr. Steele. 
· 1. Payments by Progressive Insurance. Progressive paid Claimant $100,000 plus 
medical payment coverage benefits of $5,000 on behalf of its insured, Mr. Steele. Farmers is 
entitled to credit for the amounts paid by Progressive. The Interim Award does not factor in these 
payments and it must be adjusted to do so. 
2. UIM Payments by Farmers. Farmers paid Claimant UIM benefits of $25,000 on 
August 25, 2009 and an additional $155,000 in UIM benefits on October 18, 2012, for which 
Farmers is entitled to credit. The Interim Award does not factor in this payments and it must be 
adjusted to do so. 
3. Adjustment for Contractual Reductions. The medical "cost" summary 
submitted by Claimant wa~ for the amount billed by the caregivers. The evidence establishes that 
the amount billed for some of the medical expenses was reduced prior to payment. To avoid a 
"windfall" Claimant is entitled to recover only the amount of medical expenses actually paid. 
The Inteiim Award disallowed the charges incurred at Boise Physical Medicine and 




Neµrological for C. Mack, (3) Anesthesia Associates and (4) St. Luke's for charges related to the 
February 15, 2012 surgery by 25%. Contractual adjustments for the services provided by these 
entities were reduced proportionately. Respondent has submitted evidence that supports a 
finding that the amount of contractual adjustments made to the amount billed, minus the 25% 
reduction for those charges having contractual adjustments, totals $19,234.81. (See Kathryn 
Brandt Affidavit, 'JI 7 and Ex. A attached thereto.) The Arbitrator finds and concludes that the 
Interim Award should be reduced by this amount. 
4. Adjustment for Further Reductions to Medical Expenses Awarded Due to 
25 % Apportionment for C5-C6 Preexisting Condition. 
' In calculating the Interim A ward, the Arbitrator apportioned 25 % of the cost of the C5-
C6 treatment to Claimant's preexisting condition. (Arbitration Decision and Interim Award, p. 
33.) Based on that finding the Arbitrator reduced by 25% the medical expenses associated with 
treatment of the C5-C6 medical issue. The following medical expenses were not reduced but the 
evidence indicates that they are also related to treatment of Claimant's C5-C6 disk and should be 
reduced by 25%. 
a. February 8, 2012, St. Al's bill in the amount of $1,036.00, portions ofExs.17 and 
40 show that this bill is related to the pre-exiting preparation for C5-C6 surgery. 
25% of the $1,036.00 in medical expenses results in a reduction of $259.00. 
b. Physical Therapy of Idaho. Exhibit 50 shows that the physical therapy was for 
both the C5-C6 and the C7-Tl issue. Attributing 50% of this $2,893.00 bill 
(Exhibit 24)) to C5-C6 and reducing that amount by 25% results in a further 
reduction of $361.63. 
c. Idaho Sports Medicine treatment from April 27, 2010 to November 18, 2011. 
Exhibit 32 shows that part of the treatment given relates to C5-C6, including a 
right C6 nerve block. Apportioning the $3,003.00 bill (Ex. 11) one-half to C5-C6 
and one-half to the shoulder and making a further reduction of 25% equals a 
reduction of $375.38. 
d. Primary Health visit on September 9, 2011. Exhibit 39 shows that this visit was 
for the C5-C6 problem. A reduction of 25% to the $113.00 bill equals $28.25. 
ARBITRATOR'S FINAL AWARD -4 
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e. Intermountain Medical Imaging. Exhibit 12 shows that on October 3, 2011 the 
imaging was related to C5-C6. A 25% reduction of the $1,206.80 bill equals 
$301.70. 
f. St. Luke's visit dated January 11, 2012. Portions of Exhibits 20 and 45 show that 
this visit was for the C6 nerve root block. The $1,221.58 bill should be reduced by 
25% leading to a further reduction of $305.40 . 
. The total reductions due to the application of the 25% apportionment calculated above is _ 
$1,631.36. The Arbitrator finds and concludes that this correction should be made to the Interim 
Award. It reduces the Interim Award $1,631.36. 
5. Payments Purportedly ].\fade by Mr. Steele. 
Some argument has been presented that the Arbitrator should also credit Farmers with 
any payments that were made by Mr. Steele directly to Claimant's caregivers. There is no 
evidence that allows the Arbitrator to make this calculation. Moreover, some of the purported 
payments were allegedly made while Mr. Steele and Claimant were married, and thus were likely 
made from community funds, which would entitle her to recover such payments or include them 
in her claim against Farmers. 
6. Adjustment for Award of "A Caring Hand" Bill. 
The Arbitrator awarded medical expenses in the amount of $668.00 for a bill from "A 
Caring Hand." (See Ex. 21.) The Arbitrator finds that the award of this amount is not supported 
by the evidence and the amount of $668.00 minus the 25% reduction already applied by the 
Arbitrator of $167.00 should be reduced from the Interim Award in the amount of $501.00. 
7. The Regence Blue Shield Subrogation Interest. 
The subrogation claim of Regence Blue Shield is a matter between Regence Blue Shield 
and Claimant. It is not within the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to make any adjustment for this 
ARBITRATOR'S FINALAWARD-5 
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subrogation claim. Moreover, the Arbitrator has no jurisdiction or authority to direct how 
payment of the Regence claim should be made and will not attempt to do so. 
8. Collateral Source Rule. 
Respondent, through its counsel, has informed the Arbitrator that Respondent is not 
seeking an offset under the collateral source rule in this proceeding and it will not be considered 
by the Arbitrator in this Final Award. 
9. The Adjusted Interim Award. 
The Interim Award must be reduced by the amount of payments made by Progressive on 
behalf of Mr. Steele ($105,000.00); the amount of the prior UIM payments made by Farmers 
($180,000.00); the amount of the contractual adjustments made to the medical expenses 
($19,234.81); the amount represented by a uniform application of the 25% apportionment to all 
C5-C6 related medical expenses ($1,631.36); and the amount of the adjustment for the "A Caring 
Hand" bill ($501.00). The Arbitrator finds that after making the adjustments, the adjusted Interim 
Award is $100,332.95 plus the award of prejudgment interest. 
B. Prejudgment Interest. 
1. Commencement of Prejudgment Interest. An award of prejudgment interest 
upon a claim for underinsured motorist ("UIM") benefits is governed by Idaho Code§ 28-22-104 
and Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 
1127 (2006). Section 28-22-104 provides, in relevant part, that when there is no express contract 
in writing fixing a different rate of interest, interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents (12¢) on 
the hundred by the year on money after the same becomes due. 
In Greenough, the Idaho Supreme Court stated_ that under Idaho Code§ 28-22-104, 
prejudgment interest can be awarded as a matter of law from the date the sum became due in 
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cases where the amount claimed, even though not liquidated, is capable of mathematical 
computation. The Court further stated that in insurance cases money becomes due as provided 
under the express terms of the insurance contract; therefore, the insured is not entitled to 
prejudgment interest until he or she complies with the applicable contract provisions. 
Greenough, 142 Idaho at 592, 130 P.3d at 1130. 
The Greenough Court held that prejudgment interest began to accrue sixty days after 
submission of sufficient proof of loss, not on the date of the accident, because the applicable 
insurance policy required payment within 60 days after receipt of a signed, sworn proof of loss. 
The Greenough Court also held that a submitted proof of loss is sufficient when the insured 
provides tl1e insurer with enough infonnation to allow the insurer a reasonable opportunity to 
investigate and determine its liability and that the amount of information that should be provided 
in a proof of loss is proportional to the amount reasonably available to the. insured. When 
enough information is provided in a proof of loss, the insurer is obligated to investigate and/or 
determine its rights and liabilities in a fair and accurate manner. Greenough, 142 Idaho at 593, 
130 P.3d at 1131. 
The policy of insurance that was issued to Claimant contains no provision requiring a 
proof of loss to initiate a claim under the policy. Thus, adopting the rationale of the Greenough 
decision, it is the finding and conclusion of this Arbitrator that prejudgment interest began to 
accrue in this case when Claimant provided the insurer with enough information to allow the 
insurer a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability. 
Claimant notified Farmers of her underinsurance claim on June 5, 2009. On tllat date, 
she advised Farmers that she had made a demand for Mr. Steele's policy limits of $100,000 and 




Fanners acknowledged the receipt of Claimant's demand letter to Mr. Steele's insurer and notice 
that she sought Mr. Steele's policy limits. 
On July 9, 2009, Claimant advised Farmers that she had settled her claim against Mr. 
Steele for his policy limits of $100,000. Claimant, by Farmers' letter dated July 27, 2009, was 
then directed to correspond with Mr. Ron W. Ramsey, Senior General Adjuster for Farmers. On 
July 28, 2009, Claimant by letter addressed to Mr. Ramsey, again advised Farmers that she had 
settled her claim against Mr. Steele for his policy limits of $100,000 and an additional $5,000 in 
medical coverage. She informed Farmers that her medical records and reports which documented 
her injuries had previously been submitted to her local agent, Mr. Jay Reinke. She also enclosed 
a copy of her demand letter to Progressive Northwest Insurance, Mr. Steele's insurer, the Full 
Release of All Claims with Indemnity against Mr. Steele, and her previous letters addressed to 
Farmers Insurance. She also informed Farmers that her medical expenses at that time totaled 
$53,048.62. She stated "[i]n light of my continuing pain, discornfo1t, ongoing medical treatment, 
the effects upon my daily life, and my future life expectancy, I hereby demand that you pay me 
policy limits [$500,000] and medical coverage." She stated that the enclosed documents had all 
been previously delivered to Farmers Insurance, contained a detailed account of her injury, 
medical care, medical expenses, her painful recovery and her damages. She also informed 
Farmers that she and Mr. Steele were then married and that she understood Farmers would 
conduct an investigation of Mr. Steele's financial condition before resolving her claim. She 
asked that the claim be resolved within the next thirty days. (See letter to Mr. Ron Ramsey, 
Farmers Insurance, dated July 28, 2009.) By letter dated July 29, 2009, from Farmers to 




May 25, 2008, while riding as a passenger on a motorcycle driven by Mr. Steele. Her claim for 
medical expenses was denied. 
Subsequently, following further investigation, Farmers sent Claimant a check for $25,000 
with a letter dated August 25, 2009. In the letter, Farmers explained that the check represented 
Farmers' valuation of the amount due Claimant under the Underinsured Motorist coverage of her 
policy based upon her letter dated July 28, 2009 and the information provided. Farmers infonned 
Claimant that she had provided no information about a wage loss claim, so none was included in 
the valuation. Farmers informed Claimant that she could submit additional information for its 
consideration. Farmers also claimed an offset for the settlement funds paid by Progressive 
Insurance Company, Mr. Steele's insurer for Bodily Injury coverage and medical payments of 
$5,000. (See Letter dated August 25, 2009.) 
Claimant asserts that the date for commencement of prejudgment interest on her claim is 
August 25, 2009. Based on the foregoing fact<;, this Arbitrator finds that Claimant provided 
enough information to obligate Farmers to investigate and determine its rights and liabilities in a 
fair and accurate manner prior to and with her letter dated July 28, 2009, and concludes as a 
matter of law that prejudgment interest began to accrue in this case on August 25, 2009, which is 
the date that Farmers provided Claimant with its valuation of the amount due under the 
Underinsured Motorist coverage of her policy. 
Respondent's contention that Claimant should be required to file a new proof of loss for 
each surgery she received is rejected. No such requirement is imposed by law or the insurance 
contract that was issued to Claimant and there is no public policy reason why a new proof of loss 
should be required for each new medical procedure received by Claimant. 
ARBITRATOR'S FINAL AWARD-9 
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2. Methodology for Calculation of Prejudgment Interest. 
This Arbitrator cannot accept Claimant's contention that the award of prejudgment 
interest applies to the damage award of $406,700.12 commencing on the proof of loss date, 
August 25, 2009, because it would not account for payments that were made by Progressive or 
by Fanners. Claimant cites American Foreign Insurance Company v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 
400, 94 P.3d 699, 705 (2204) as authority for her contention. This Arbitrator was the arbitrator in 
the Reichert case. In Richert the arbitrator was restricted under the terms of an agreement 
between the pruties that prevented the arbitrator in Reichert from considering the worker's 
compensation offset and subrogation issues in the calculation of prejudgment interest. In 
Reichert the arbitrator erroneously included the issues in the calculation of the final award. The 
Supreme Court held that the Reichert arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to do so because of the 
restrictive agreement. No such agreement or restriction applies in this case that is now before the 
Arbitrator. In this matter, the pmties have agreed to allow the Arbitrator to consider these issues 
in determining the Final A ward. 
As noted by Respondent in its Response to Claimant's Brief in Support of Final Awru·d, 
Reichert supports Farmers' position that prejudgment interest is calculated on th.e Final Award 
and from a date that avoids a windfall to the Claimant. In Reichert, because the Arbitrator did not 
have jurisdiction over the issues, the district court was tasked with handling the issues of the 
worker's compensation offset and subrogation. 140 Idaho at 404, 94 P.3d at 709. The Supreme 
Court upheld the district court's prejudgment interest calculation, ruling that offsets for money 
already received shall be deducted from the arbitration award and the prejudgment interest shall 
be recalculated based on a reduction to the gross award of the amounts paid by the worker's · 
compensation insurer. 140 Idaho at 402, 94 P.3d at 707. The Supreme Court noted that the 
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purpose of the offset provisions is consistent with the public policy against double recovery and 
these provisions are valid. 140 Idaho at 400, 94 P.3d at 705. The Court concluded that recovery 
of prejudgment interest on amounts paid would result in a windfall to the insured. Id. 
Section 28-22-104 provides that interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents on the 
hundred by the year on "money after the same becomes due." (LC.§ 28-22-104(1)2.). Thus, it is 
incumbent on this Arbitrator to determine when payments were due from Farmers to Claimant 
and the amounts thereof as interest accrued on said amounts. In other words, Claimant was 
entitled to interest on the money that was owed to her by Farmer.s and unpaid from the dates it 
was due and owing, but unpaid, to the extent that said amounts are capable of mathematical 
computation. (See Dillon v. Montgomery, 138 Idaho 614,617, 67 P.3d 93, 96 (2003).) 
The policy of insurance at issue in the setoff clause provides that the amount owed to 
Claimant under the UIM coverage is the amount of damages established but not otherwise 
recovered from the person legally liable for the bodily injury. (See Insurance policy, p. 8, 
Endorsement El 179i.) Thus, logic dictates that the determination of the amounts due and owing 
to Claimant under the UIM coverage for the purpose of computing prejudgment interest, are any 
amounts that accrue over and above the payments of $105,000 that were made by the insurer for 
Mr. Steele. In other words, the payments made by Mr. Steele's insurer mLtst be taken off the 
front end of the Farmer's obligation rather than the back end, i.e., the Final Award, as proposed 
by Claimant. Thus, the obligation of Farmers to pay the medical expenses of Claimant did not 
begin to accrue until the unpaid medical expenses exceeded $105,000. Also, Farmers is entitled 
to credit for payments made by,Farmers as of the date the two payments were actually made. 
Claimant has asserted that this setoff clause is not enforceable and should not be applied 




Fanners, 133 Idaho 428, 987 P.2d 1043 (1999) is applicable in this case because the facts of this 
case are distinguishable from those in Talbot. Moreover, the parties have agreed by stipulation 
that the Arbitrator does not have jurisdiction to determine the validity/enforceability of the setoff 
provision found in Endorsement Ell 79i of the policy at issue. The pmties stipulated to "reserve 
the issue of enforceability of the setoff clause for determination by the District Court should 
Claimc\llt wish to raise that issue .... " The parties further agreed that "the Arbitrator has 
jurisdiction to apply Farmer's setoff clause found in Endorsement Ell 79i in arriving at his Final 
Award. (See Stipulation dated April 5, 2012, pp.2-3.) Thus, the Arbitrator will apply the set off 
provision in determining the Final A ward. 
Because it is not feasible to calculate the accrued amounts due for each and every invoice 
Claimant received as of the date of receipt thereof, the Arbitrator will not attempt to do so. 
Rather, the Arbitrator will calculate the prejudgment interest based on an adjusted amount of the 
final award from the date of the proof of loss less the payments that were received by Claimant 
as of the dates such payments were received by Claimant. 
3. Calculation of Prejudgment Interest. 
The Interim Award after the adjustments are made to reduce the Interim A ward for the 
contractual adjustments made to the medical expenses ($19,234.81); the amount represented by a 
uniform application of the 25% apportionment to all C5-C6 related medical expenses 
($1,631.36); and.the amount of the adjustment for the "A Caring Hand" bill ($501.00) is 
$385,784.01, the "Initial Amount" for calculating prejudgment interest. 
Payments were received from Progress Insurance Company by Claimant in the amount of 




payment of $25,000.00 was received by Claimant from Farmers on August 25, 2009, the date of 
proof of loss, which further reduces the Initial Amount to $255,784.01. 
The Arbitrator finds and concludes that prejudgment interest at the rate of 12% per 
ammm commenced on the Initial Amount of $255,784.01 and accrued at the rate of 12% per 
annum from August 25, 2009 to October 18, 2012 (1,150 days), when Claimant received a UIM 
payment from Farmers of $155,000, which reduced the Initial Amount to $100,784.01. 
Prejudgment interest at the rate of 12% per annum accrued on the reduced Initial Amount of 
$100,784.01 from October 18, 2012 to the date of the Final Award, April 30, 2013 (194 days). 
The amount of prejudgment interest from August 25, 2009 to October 18, 2012 is 
$96,707.38. The amount of prejudgment interest from October 18, 2012 to April 30, 2013 is 
$6,428.08. The total amount of prejudgment interest is $103,135.46. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND FINAL AW ARD 
The Final Award to Claimant against Farmers is TWO HUNDRED THREE 
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT DOLLARS AND FORTY-ONE CENTS 
($203,468.41). 
Prejudgment interest at the rate of twelve percent per annum (12%) shall continue to 
accrue on the adjusted Interim Award of $100,332.95 until the Final Award is affirmed by a 
Judgment or paid, whichever sooner occurs. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 29th day of April, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of April, 2013, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing ARBITRATOR'S FINAL AWARD by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
Jon Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
jsteele@runftsteele.com 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
jat@elamburke.com 
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_·_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_x_E-rnail 
__ Telecopy 




03/06/12 Hawley Troxell 125.00 
05/09/12 Hawley Troxell 368.80 
06/06/12 Hawley Troxell 100.00 
12/05/12 Hawley Troxell 3,612.50 
02/07/13 Hawley Troxell 6847.63 
03/06/13 Hawley Troxell 1312.68 
06/05/13 Hawley Troxell 1416.55 
08/20/13 Hawley Troxell 4,384.81 






JOHN L. RUNFT (ISB # 1059) 
JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Phone: (208) 333-9495 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: jsteele@runftsteele.com 
Attorneys for Peggy Cedillo 
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cierk 
By ANNAMARIE MEYER 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 











CASE NO. CV OC 1308697 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
AMENDED VERIFIED 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS, 
ATTORNEY FEES AND 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
Plaintiff Cedillo respectfully submits the following Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiffs Amended Verified Memorandum of Costs, Attorney Fees and Prejudgment Interest 
and in Response to Defendant's Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 2, 2012, Mr. Merlyn Clark was appointed Arbitrator in this matter. He was 
asked to resolve Plaintiffs underinsurance claim for bodily injury damages suffered by her in a 
motorcycle crash on May 25, 2008. Plaintiff had purchased a policy of insurance from 
Defendant Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho ("Defendant") which included underinsurance 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED VERIFIED MEMORANDUM 
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• 
motorist coverage in the amount of $500,000. The arbitration was binding. 
Plaintiff's injuries were severe. She suffered through two separate neck fusion surgeries 
and a shoulder surgery. She incurred over $130,000 in medical bills and she has yet to recover 
from her injuries. 
Attorney Steele was the owner and driver of the motorcycle and it was attorney Steele's 
negligence that caused the crash. At the time of the crash, Plaintiff and attorney Steele were 
living separately but were dating. In December of 2008, Plaintiff and attorney Steele were 
married. In 2011 Plaintiff signed a contingent fee agreement with attorney Steele's law firm, 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC, concerning her underinsurance claim. 
Plaintiff, as found by the Arbitrator, had provided a "proof of loss" to Defendant on July 
25, 2009. Defendant responded to that proof of loss by sending a $25,000 check to Plaintiff on 
August 28, 2009. Defendant made no further payments to Plaintiff until October 18, 2012 (4 ½ 
years after the crash) when it paid $155,000 to Plaintiff. The arbitration hearing was held on 
November 20 and 21, 2012. 
On March 25, 2013, after the arbitration hearing but prior to the Arbitrator issuing his 
Final Award, Defendant paid the amount of $100,332.95, which was applied to prejudgment 
interest. Defendant twice asked the Arbitrator to have this payment re-designated as a principal 
payment so that it could avoid the payment of prejudgment interest. The Arbitrator properly 
refused Defendant's motions and unequivocally awarded Plaintiff prejudgment interest of over 
$100,000 and affirmed the March 25, 2013 payment received to be designated first to 
prejudgment interest, secondly to the principal debt. 
On September 11, 2013, Defendant paid the additional amount of $101,947.96. See, 
Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in Opposition to Farmers' Motion for Modification and/or Correction 
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of Arbitration Award, Exhibits I and J. Per the Arbitrator's award and orders, Plaintiff applied 
this payment to the remaining interest balance of $7,223.31 and the balance to the Final Award. 
After applying all payments made by Defendant there remains due and owing a principal debt 
balance of $5,608.30 plus interest from September 12, 2013. See, Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in 
Opposition to Farmers' Motion for Modification and/or Correction of Arbitration Award, 
Exhibits J. Plaintiff believes Defendant's continued refusal to accept the Arbitrator's rulings to 
be frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. 
Plaintiff has incurred and paid costs claimed as a matter of right of $14,262.68 and 
discretionary costs of $19,888.94. See, Amended Verified Memorandum of Costs, Attorney 
Fees, and Prejudgment Interest. Additionally, Plaintiff has incurred and paid the Arbitrator 
$18,517.97 for which she does not seek reimbursement. See, Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in 
Opposition to Farmers' Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees, Exhibit D. 
In addition to costs, Plaintiff seeks an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 
41-1839. The total amount sought by Plaintiff is now as follows: 
Total Costs as a Matter of Right $ 14,262.88 
Total Discretionary Costs $ 19,888.94 
Unpaid Principal Amount from Interim Award $ 5,608.30 
Prejudgment Interest from 09/12/13 - 10/15/13 $ 62.56 





Defendant objects to Plaintiffs Amended Memorandum of Costs, Attorney Fees and 
Prejudgment Interest. Defendant's argument is unsupported by Idaho statutes, legal precedent, 
or the facts. There is no doubt that Plaintiff is the prevailing party. All of Plaintiffs expenses 
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were incurred solely because Defendant improperly refused to pay Plaintiffs claim under the 
contract of insurance. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. This Arbitration Was Governed By The Idaho Rules Of Civil Procedure. 
Idaho Code §7-910 of the Uniform Arbitration Act states that "[u]nless otherwise 
provided in the agreement to arbitrate, the arbitrator's expenses and fees, together with other 
expenses, not including counsel fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as 
provided in the award." 
In this arbitration the parties agreed that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure would govern 
the arbitration proceedings. See, Pre-Hearing Order No. 1 RE: Scheduling, 1 10 at p. 2. ("The 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern this arbitration"), attached to First Amended 
Petition, etc. as Exhibit B. 
The parties also agreed that " ... no party is waiving or releasing its right to assert a claim 
for an award of the attorney fees and costs or the fees and costs of the arbitrator in this matter as 
either part of the arbitration award or any proceeding in the District Court." See, Appointment of 
Arbitrator attached to the Affidavit of Steele in Opposition to Farmers' Motion to Disallow Costs 
and Attorney Fees, as Exhibit A. 
B. Farmers' Contention That Cedillo's Request For Attorney's Fees Is Based Upon An 
Unenforceable Contract Is Frivolous, Unreasonable And Without Foundation. 
Whether a contract is illegal is a question of law. KDC Investments, LLC v. Chaklos, 
(Idaho Supreme Court No. 38603, August 15, 2013). Farmers' contentions are meritless. None 
of Farmers' objections were raised in arbitration. Attorney Steele filed his Notice of Conflict 
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Disclosure in the arbitration on March 1, 2012. See, Affidavit of Steele in Opposition to 
Farmers' Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees, Exhibit B. Any objections Farmers may 
have had have been waived. 
None of Farmers' contentions are accurate. Attorney Steele did not " ... acquire a 
personal and proprietary interest in Cedillo-Steele's recovery of damages" as alleged by Farmers. 
Despite marriage to attorney Steele, Cedillo's recovery is her separate property. See, Rogers v. 
Yellowstone Park Company, 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1974). 
The cases relied upon by Farmers are easily distinguishable. For instance, in Anderson v. 
Miller, 559 N.W.2d 29 (1997), the Iowa Supreme Court stated public policy bars recovery of a 
drunk driver in a personal injury case involving negligent entrustment of a pickup to the drunk 
driver. The case of Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 200 P.3d 1153 (2009) relied upon by 
Farmers, is also distinguishable. In Farrell, an unlicensed architect brought suit against his 
client to recover his fee. The Idaho Supreme Court allowed the unlicensed architect to recover 
based upon unjust enrichment for his services provided prior to his license date. 
Plaintiffs claim is a contractual claim. Plaintiffs claim for attorney fees and costs is 
statutory. The Arbitrator addressed payments made by attorney Steele and stated that payments 
were likely made from community funds which would entitle Plaintiff to recover such payments 
from Defendant. See, Affidavit of Steele in Opposition to Farmers' Motion to Disallow Costs 
and Attorney Fees, Exhibit D. 
Defendant does not challenge the time and effort devoted to Plaintiffs case by Runft & 
Steele Law Offices and its staff. Defendant's contentions ignore the fact that "a lawyer's time 
and advice is his stock in trade," as so aptly put by that great lawyer, Abraham Lincoln. 
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C. Plaintiff is the Prevailing Party. 
In this case, Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party or that the 
costs were necessary and reasonable. Rather, Defendant relies upon the arbitration clause 
concerning witness expense. 
The witness fees incurred were exceptional and, in the interests of justice, should be 
awarded against Defendant. Plaintiffs case was not a "routine" personal injury case against a 
tortfeasor. Instead, it was a claim against Defendant for breach of a statutory duty to evaluate 
and pay a claim after receiving a detailed proof of loss. In the interests of justice, Plaintiffs 
costs should be awarded against Defendant. 
The brunt of Plaintiffs costs consists of payments to Plaintiffs expert witnesses 
($10,143.75 as a matter of right and $15,572.00 as a matter of discretion). Plaintiff incurred 
significant expert witness fees in this case because of Defendant's unreasonable denial of 
Plaintiffs underinsured motorist claim. 
Defendant could have avoided the costs of the experts in this case if it had simply paid 
the amount justly due instead of forcing Plaintiff to arbitrate the matter. Under Idaho Code§ 41-
1839, Defendant had a duty to promptly investigate the claim and determine its liability. 
Defendant also had an obligation to its insured, pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-1839, to pay the 
amount justly due Plaintiff within thirty days. Pursuant to Idaho law, the "amount justly due" 
from an insurer is ultimately the amount determined by trial, by arbitration or by settlement, 
before costs, attorney fees and interest. In this case the amount justly due Cedillo from 
Defendant is $382,280.91 1• See, Amended Verified Memorandum of Costs, Attorney Fees, and 
Prejudgment Interest, pp. 15 & 16. 
1 Plaintiff contends Farmers' offset clause is unenforceable. This amount will increase by$ 105,000 should the 
Court agree. 
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In light of the overwhelming evidence of the amount justly due, Defendant paid $0 of the 
$382,280.91 justly due as required by Idaho Code § 41-1839. Defendants' failure to pay the 
amount justly due pursuant to the underinsured motorist contract required Plaintiff to incur the 
costs of litigation to force her own insurance company to pay the amount justly due to her. As a 
result of Defendants unreasonable denial, Plaintiff was required to pay her experts to prepare 
reports, prepare for depositions, respond to Defendant's experts, and testify at arbitration to 
prove Plaintiff's damages. In short, because of Defendant's failure to comply with Idaho Code§ 
41-1839, Plaintiff was forced to retain and pay her own experts to do the job Defendant should 
have done. 
Considering that Defendant has a statutory obligation as an insurer to investigate and pay 
the amount justly due Plaintiff and breached its obligation by not only failing to pay but also 
requiring Plaintiff to hire experts and prove her damages at arbitration, the Court should award 
Plaintiff her witness fee costs as a matter of right of $10,143.75 and discretionary witness costs 
of $15,572.00. 
D. Defendant's Only Objection Is To Witness Fees. 
Defendant's objection to costs is limited to witness fees. Defendant has stated no 
objection to the following costs claimed as a matter of right: 
L Medical Records, IRCP 54(d)(l)(c)(5) & (6) 
Total: $1,251.29 No Objection 
3. Charges for Deposition, Reporting, Transcripts, IRCP 54(d)(l)(c)9 
Total: $1,718.80 No Objection 
4. Charges for Deposition (one copy), IRCP 54(d)(l)(c)l0 
Total: $1,148.84 No Objection 
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Total Costs Claimed as a Matter of Right to which No Objections asserted: 
Total: $4,118.93 
Defendant stated no objection to the following discretionary costs: 
2. Video Depositions, Video Transfers and CD of Surgery 
Total: $1,090.52 No Objection 
3. Photocopies 
Total: $1,717.00 No Objection 
4. Research 
Total: $1,509.42 No Objection 
Total Discretionary Costs Claimed to which No Objections asserted: 
Total: $4,316.94 
Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an award of costs in the amount of $8,435.87 
E. Preiudgment Interest. 
Defendant contends that Plaintiff is not entitled to prejudgment interest. Defendant's 
argument is contrary to Idaho legal precedent awarding prejudgment interest in underinsured 
motorist cases. 
The long-standing rule with respect to prejudgment interest on underinsured motorist 
claims is set forth in Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co, 115 Idaho 346, 349, 766 P.2d 1227, 1230 (1988), 
overruled on other grounds by Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 
589, 130 P.3d 1127 (2006). The Brinkman rule was modified with respect to when prejudgment 
interest begins to accrue, but it has not been modified concerning the amounts upon which 
prejudgment interest is owed. Id 
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In Brinkman, an insured was severely injured in an automobile accident caused by an 
underinsured motorist. Id. at 349, 766 P.2d at 1230. The insurer refused to pay the amount 
demanded in the proof of loss of $300,000, and the insured filed suit. The insured obtained a 
favorable jury award of $156,0186.16. Id. After the trial, the district court awarded prejudgment 
interest pursuant to Idaho Code§ 28-22-104(1) because it was "money due by express contract." 
Id. The district court, however, found that because there were "obvious tort aspects" of the case, 
it would be inequitable to award prejudgment interest for the entire amount due because many of 
the damages were not readily ascertainable and were not "liquidated." Id. The district court 
concluded that the insured should not be entitled to prejudgment interest on non-economic 
damages and should only be entitled to prejudgment interest on the medical bills which became 
due and owing prior to suit being filed. Id. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court overruled the district court's refusal to award 
prejudgment interest on the entire jury verdict. Id. Instead of awarding prejudgment interest 
only on the past medical bills, the Court held that prejudgment interest should be calculated 
based on the amount of the jury verdict, including general damages. See, Id at 353-54, 766 
P.2d at 1234-35. This rule has not been overturned by the Idaho Supreme Court.2 Thus, the 
Brinkman rule is that "the entire verdict is appropriately subject to the accumulation of 
prejudgment interest" in undersinsured motorist cases. Id (Emphasis added.) 
Defendant does not cite any legal authority overruling the Brinkman decision that 
prejudgment interest is based on the entire jury verdict or, in this case, the Arbitration award. 
2 There are multiple cases since Brinkman that have upheld the rule that prejudgment interest should be awarded on 
the entire jury verdict or arbitration award. See, Schilling v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 927, 930, 980 P.2d 1014, 
l O 17 (1999); Emery v. United P. Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 244, 248, 815 P.2d 442, 446 (1991 ); Walton v. Hartford ins. 
Co., 120 Idaho 616,622,818 P.2d 320,326 (1991). These cases were overruled by Greenough v. Farm Bureau 
Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589,592, 130, P.3d 1127, 1130 (2006) concerning only when prejudgment 
interest should begin to accrue. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED VERIFIED MEMORANDUM 
OF COSTS, ATTORNEY FEES AND PREJUDGMENT INTEREST - Page 9 
000634
-
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that the Brinkman rule requiring prejudgment 
interest be awarded on the entire jury verdict or arbitration award does not apply to all tort and 
contract actions. See, Emery v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 244, 248, 815 P.2d 442, 446 
(1991). It makes sense to distinguish insurance actions from other types of actions because of 
the special relationship that exists between an insurer and its insured. The Court explained in 
White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 1014 (1986) that a special relationship 
exists between an insurer and an insured and that the nature of that relationship makes it 
particularly susceptible to public policy considerations: 
The adhesionary aspects of the insurance contract, including the lack of 
bargaining strength of the insured, the contracts standardized terms, the 
motivation of the insured for entering into the transaction and the nature of 
the service for which the contract is executed, distinguish this contract 
[insurance contract] from other non-insurance commercial contracts. 
These features characteristic of the insurance contract make it particularly 
susceptible to public policy considerations. 
White, 112 Idaho at 99, 730 P.2d at 1019 (citations omitted).3 
The quasi-fiduciary relationship between an insurer and its insured gives rise to the 
insurer's duty to pay all amounts justly due under an insurance policy within thirty (30) days of 
receiving a proof of loss. See, Idaho Code § 41-1839. Awarding prejudgment interest on 
amounts owed by an insurer is consistent with this principle. Prejudgment interest serves two 
important purposes. First, it encourages early settlement of claims, and second, it compensates 
an injured plaintiff for delay in receiving compensation to which he or she is entitled. 
Metropolitan Property and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Barry, 892 A.2d 915, 919 (R.I. 2006). In this 
case, the Arbitrator's award of prejudgment interest serves both purposes. 
3 Hill v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 150 Idaho 619, 623,24, 249 P.3d 812, 816-17 (2011), reh'g denied (Apr. 29, 
2011) (finding that because the Legislature began requiring insurers to offer underinsured motorist coverage in 
2008, public policy considerations are now applicable to UIM coverage policies.) 
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There is no excuse for Defendant failing to pay Plaintiff the awarded amount by the 
Arbitrator. The Court's decision in Brinkman implicitly recognizes that people like the Plaintiff 
lack bargaining power when it comes to negotiating with insurers and that the law must take that 
disparity into consideration. By awarding prejudgment interest in this case, it will encourage 
Defendant to pay claims promptly and will compensate the Plaintiff for having to wait from the 
date she submitted her proof of loss to receive payment of the amounts Defendant owed. 
Because the Brinkman rule requiring prejudgment interest be awarded on the entire jury 
verdict or arbitration award is well-justified and is the standing rule in Idaho, the Court should 
confirm the Arbitrator's award of prejudgment interest in the amount of $101,947.96 and the 
application of payments previously received. 
F. Attorney Fees. 
Defendant claims that Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code § 41-
1839. Defendant also argues that if the court disagrees and awards attorney fees that the 
contingent fee amount is unreasonable. Defendant's argument is contrary to legal precedent. 
Defendant's claim that Plaintiff is not entitled to an attorney fee award is unfounded. 
There are only two requirements under Idaho Code § 41-1839 to require an award of attorney 
fees against an insurer: 1) the plaintiff provided a proof of loss to defendant; and 2) defendant 
failed to pay an amount justly due under the policy within thirty days of such proof of loss. See, 
Idaho Code§ 41-1839; see also, Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 152 
P.3d 614, 617-18 (2007); Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244, 61 P.3d 601 
(2002); In re Jones, 401 B.R. 456, 462 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009). 
In this case, the Arbitrator found that Plaintiff provided a proof of loss to Defendant on 
July 28, 2009. Defendant does not dispute that the proof of loss provided adequate information 
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for Defendant to investigate and evaluate the claim. The Arbitrator returned an award and, after 
adjustments, the "amount justly due" to Plaintiff from Defendant is $382,280.91. See, Amended 
Verified Memorandum of Costs, Attorney Fees and Prejudgment Interest, p.16. 
There is also no dispute that Defendant not only failed to pay the amount justly due 
within thirty days, but also paid $0 within the thirty-day time frame. There is also no dispute that 
Defendant failed to pay any amounts prior to initiating arbitration against Defendant. Thus, there 
is no question that Defendant is required to pay attorney fees in this case. 
Plaintiff is also entitled to the amount of attorney fees she is required to pay pursuant to 
the contingent fee agreement. The attorney fee rule under Idaho law is that if the insurance 
company makes no tender within thirty days, "the insurance company is liable for a reasonable 
amount of the insured' s attorney fees, as compensation to make the insured whole." Martin v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244,248, 61 P.3d 601, 605, (2002) citing Halliday v. 
Farmers Ins. Exchange, 89 Idaho 293,404 P.2d 634 (1965). 
There are several reasons why an insured should be entitled to attorney fees under Idaho 
Code § 41-1839 and that the attorney fee award should be based on the contingent fee contract to 
make the insured whole. One of the purposes of the statute is to cause the insurance company to 
timely make a reasonable offer. Id. The insurance company acts at its peril in taking the risk not 
to tender an "amount justly due" and, instead, await the decision of the jury or arbitrator. Id. 
Another purpose of the attorney fee statute is to provide an incentive for insurers to settle just 
claims in order to reduce the cost of litigation and the high costs associated with litigation. Id. 
The statute is also intended to prevent the sum that is due an insured under the policy from being 
diminished by expenditures for services of an attorney. Barber v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 129 Idaho 677, 931 P .2d 1195 (1997). To satisfy these purposes, the Court should award 
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Plaintiff her attorney fees based on the contingent fee amount in her contract with her attorneys. 
Defendant claims that to award Plaintiff her attorney fee on a contingent fee basis would 
be unreasonable. (See, Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow Costs and 
Attorney Fees at p. 8) A similar argument was rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in another 
underinsured motorist case. See, Parsons v. Mut. Of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 748, 
152 P.3d 614,619 (2007). 
In Parsons, an insured submitted a proof of loss for underinsured motorist benefits which 
the insurer failed to pay within thirty days. The insured subsequently filed a lawsuit, and the 
insurance company ultimately agreed to pay $60,000 before the trial took place. The insured 
requested an attorney fee award pursuant to the contingent fee agreement in the amount of 
$20,000 ($60,000 x 1/3). The district court agreed that awarding the fee on a contingency fee 
basis was reasonable. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's determination that the 
on-third contingency fee award was reasonable. The Court explained: "the district court clearly 
understood that this was a matter of discretion, and it reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason." Id The Court, referring to the district court, further explained: "[i]s decision was within 
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to 
specific choices available to it." Id 
Because the Plaintiff is required to be made whole, her Amended Memorandum of Fees 
should be granted awarding her attorney fees at the rate of one-third of the total amount Plaintiff 
is entitled to recover from Defendant. 
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G. The Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Fees Is Not Premature. 
Idaho Code § 41-1839 provides the remedy for the award of statutory attorney fees in 
arbitration between insured and insurers. The only requirements of Idaho Code § 41-1839 are 
(1) the insured must provide a proof of loss as required by the insurance policy and (2) the 
insurer must fail to pay the amount justly due within thirty days after receipt of the proof of loss. 
The statute does not require that a judgment be entered. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that her Amended Verified 
Memorandum of Costs, Attorney Fees and Prejudgment Interest be granted in the amount of 
$167,249.65 and that the arbitration be confirmed. 
t~ 
DATED this 2Sday of September 2013. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: ____ J~. /} __ </]dJ_ 
JON tlsTEELE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-~ 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 2b day of September 2013, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
AMENDED VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS, ATTORNEY FEES AND 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST was served upon opposing counsel as follows: 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam Burke 
251 E. Front St., Ste 300 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance Company 
Ofidaho 
Peter J. Johnson 
Johnson Law Group 
103 E. Indiana Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance Company 
Ofidaho 
Via Facsimile I Via Personal Delivery 
Via U.S. Mail 
Via E-mail 
Via Facsimile 
__ Via Personal Delivery 
~ Via U.S. Mail 
Via E-mail 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By:_J_;J _____ </Ji);_ 
JON M. STEELE 
Attorney for Peggy Cedillo 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED VERIFIED MEMORANDUM 
OF COSTS, ATTORNEY FEES AND PREJUDGMENT INTEREST - Page 15 
000640
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
jat@elamburke.com 
ISB #3380 
Attorneys for Defendant 
NO -------A. M. _ ·----
SEP 3 a 2013 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PEGGY CEDILLO, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 1308697 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
STRIKE EXHIBIT 7 OF THOMSON 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISALLOW COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff seeks to strike Exhibit 7 attached to the Affidavit of Jeffrey A. Thomson in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees. Plaintiff claims the motion 
is supported by a memorandum but none was filed or received. The only grounds proposed for 
striking the Exhibit is that it was previously struck from the record by the Arbitrator. This is an 
insufficient ground to strike the Exhibit. 
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There is no Exhibit 7 to Affidavit of Jeffrey A. Thomson in Support of Defendant's 
Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees. There is, however, an Exhibit 7 to the Affidavit of 
Jeffrey A. Thomson in Support of Defendant's Motion for Modification and/or Correction of 
Arbitration A ward. This Exhibit 7 is a copy of an expert witness report from an economist hired 
by Plaintiff named Dennis Reinstein. Farmers assumes that this is the Exhibit Plaintiff seeks to 
strike. 
The fact that this Exhibit was previously struck by the Arbitrator is not an appropriate 
objection to its use before this court. As discussed in the other reply memoranda, the fact that 
the Arbitrator has previously ruled on an issue is not determinative nor binding on this court. 
The Motion to Modify and/or Correct was filed because Farmers believes that the Arbitrator's 
rulings, in certain respects, are erroneous. Idaho Code § 7-913 allows a party to start afresh in its 
challenges to the arbitration award. Consequently, the fact that the Arbitrator previously struck 
this Exhibit is not sufficient grounds upon which to object and seek a motion to strike. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The single ground upon which Plaintiff seeks to strike Exhibit 7 is insufficient and not a 
proper objection. Because no other grounds or objections were raised, the motion to strike 
should be denied. 
DATED this ,lQ_ day of September, 2013. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the JD day of September, 2013, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows: 
John L. Runft 
Jon M. Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Peter J. Johnson 
Johnson Law Group 
103 E. Indiana Ave., Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207 
__)J.S. Mail 
i/' Hand Delivery 
Federal Express 
Via Facsimile - 343-3246 
/u.S.Mail 
Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
Via Facsimile - (509) 326-7503 
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FILED , 
NQ, __________ Wm 
A.M. ____ P.M. __ _ 
NOV 1 4 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JANINE KORSEN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




FARMERS INSURANCE COMP ANY OF 
IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-OC-2013-8697 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
ON MOTIONS ON ARBITRATION 
AWARD 
These matters came before the court for hearing on October 2, 2013 on Defendants' 
Motion for Modification and/or Correction of Arbitration Award; Plaintiffs Motion to Strike; 
Plaintiffs Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award of Costs, Attorney fees, and Pre-judgment 
Interest; Plaintiffs Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees; and Defendants' Motion to 
Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees. 
Appearances: 
Plaintiff-Jon Steele 
Defendant - Jeffrey Thomson 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS 
On May 25, 2008, the Plaintiff was injured while riding as a passenger on a motorcycle 
being operated by Jon Steele, who is now her husband and counsel in these proceedings. 1 The 
accident occurred on Warm Springs Avenue east of Boise when the cycle drifted toward the right 
1 Plaintiff and Mr. Steele were married on December 8, 2008. 
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side of the road and hit a concrete barrier. The accident was the result of Mr. Steele's failure to 
control the motorcycle. The Plaintiff, seated behind Mr. Steele, suffered physical injuries as a 
result. 
At the time of the accident, there existed an insurance contract between the Defendant 
and Plaintiff which obligated the Defendant to compensate the Plaintiff for damages caused by 
an underinsured motorist ("UIM policy"). On June 5, 2009, the Plaintiff advised the Defendant 
that she had made a demand for Mr: Steele's policy limits of $100,000 and that she would be 
making a claim under her UIM policy. On June 17, 2009, the Defendant acknowledged the 
receipt of the Plaintiffs demand letter to Mr. Steele's insurer and noticed that she sought Mr. 
Steele's policy limits. On July 28, 2009, Plaintiff advised Defendant that she had settled her 
claim against Mr. Steele for his policy limit and an additional $5,000 in medical coverage. She 
also demanded that the Defendant pay her $500,000 policy limit on account of her continuing 
pain, ongoing medical treatment, and the medical expenses she had previously incurred. 
On August 25, 2009, Defendant sent Claimant a check for $25,000 as well as a letter 
stating that the check represented its valuation of her UIM claim. The matter was ultimately 
submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the agreement to arbitrate contained in the insurance 
policy. Mr. Steele and the Plaintiff entered into a written contingent fee agreement on November 
11, 2011. Following the execution of that fee agreement, Mr. Steele represented the Plaintiff 
before the arbitrator. The arbitrator held an evidentiary hearing that started on November 20, 
2012 and ended the next day. 
The arbitrator issued an interim award on January 13, 2013, in which he determined the 
Plaintiff suffered $256,700.12 in economic damages and $150,000.00 in non-economic damages 
as a result of the motorcycle accident, totaling $406,700.12. The parties then submitted 
memoranda and exhibits regarding adjustments to the interim award. On April 29, 2013, the 
arbitrator issued a final award that contained a number of adjustments including: (1) a reduction 
of $105,000.00 on account of payments made by Mr. Steele's insurer; (2) a reduction of 
$180,0QO.OO on account of two payments made by the Defendant;2 and (3) other minor 
reductions for a pre-existing condition, an unsupportable medical expense, and contractual 
adjustments. After making these adjustments, the arbitrator issued an adjusted interim award of 
$100,332.95, which the parties refer to as the "damage award." 
2 One payment on August 25, 2009 for $25,000, and a second on October 18, 2012 for $155,000. 
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Additionally, the arbitrator awarded prejudgment interest in the amount of $103,135.46. 
This award was premised on the arbitrator's determination that by August 25, 2009, the 
Defendant had sufficient information, including medical bills and other supporting 
documentation, from which to investigate and determine its liability in a fair and accurate 
manner. On May 20, 2013, the Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration. In support of its 
motion, the Defendant submitted evidence that it had paid $100,332.95, the amount of the 
damage award, on March 25, 2013. In seeking reconsideration, the Defendant argued that since 
the payment was made before the issuance of the final award the payment should be applied to 
the damage award and no prejudgment interest should be awarded. The Arbitrator denied the 
motion, but issued an amended final award of $101,947.9 to account for the March 25, 2012 
payment.3 
Plaintiff then filed with this Court a Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration A ward and a 
Verified Memorandum of Costs, Attorney Fees, and Interest on May 13, 2013. On August 16, 
2013, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Verified memorandum of attorney fees, costs, and 
prejudgment interest and also a motion to confirm the arbitration award. On September 18, 2013, 
the De(endant filed a Motion for Modification and/or Correction of the Arbitration Award, and a 
Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees. On September 25, 2013, the Plaintiff filed a 
Motion to Strike Exhibit 7 to the Affidavit of Jeffrey Thomson filed in support of Defendant's 
Motion for Modification and/or Correction of the Arbitration Award.4 
II. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION AND/OR 
CORRECTION OF ARBITRATION AWARD 
This Court's review of the arbitrator's decision is limited to a determination of whether 
any grounds for relief stated in Idaho Code §§ 7-912 and 7-913 exist. American Foreign Ins. v. 
Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 398 (2004). "An arbitrator's rulings as to questions oflaw and fact are 
binding unless one of the grounds for relief set forth in LC.§§ 7-912 or 7-913 are present." Id. 
Section 7-913 states that the Court, on motion, shall modify or correct an award that 
contains an "evident miscalculation of figures." An evident miscalculation under § 7-913 is a 
3 This amount is the sum of the $100,332.95 damage award and remaining prejudgment interest of$1,615.01. 
4 Plaintiff's Motion to Strike was titled, "Motion to Strike Exhibit 7 Attached to the Affidavit of Jeffrey Thomson in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees." Based on the memorandum filed in support 
of that motion, it is clear that the Motion referred to Exhibit 7 in Thomson's affidavit filed in support of Defendant's 
Motion for Modification and/or Correction of the Arbitration Award. 
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mathematical error in calculating the amount of an award, as opposed to "a legal error in the 
elements or measure of damages when making the award." Cranney v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. 
Co., 145 Idaho 6, 8 (2007). If there is no error under Section 7-913 or 7-912, the arbitrator's 
decision is binding even if the Court believes that some or the arbitrator's rulings were made in 
error. Id 
A. IN THIS CASE, THE COURT LACKS THE AUTHORITY TO MODIFY THE ARBITRATOR'S 
AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently addressed the trial court's authority to modify an 
arbitration award of prejudgment interest in Cranney v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 146 Idaho 
6 (2007). In Cranney, the arbitrator issued an award which included prejudgment interest of 
$61,262. Id. at 8. The Plaintiffs filed their motion in district court to confirm the award. The 
Defendant objected on grounds that the arbitrator's prejudgment interest award was at odds with 
the Supreme Court's decision in Greenough v. Farm Bureau Insurance Company. Id. The district 
court confirmed the arbitration award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district 
court lacked the authority to modify the arbitrator's award, and therefore, did not err in failing to 
do so. Id at 9. In so holding, the Supreme Court stated that for purposes of Idaho Code §7-
913(a)(l), an evident miscalculation of figures is "a mathematical error in calculating the amount 
of an award, not a legal error in the elements or measure of damages when making the award." 
Id ( emphasis added). 
The Defendant in this case also argues that the Arbitrator's prejudgment interest award 
contained an evident miscalculation stemming from a misapplication of the relevant law. In this 
case the alleged errors are (1) the Arbitrator's dec_ision to treat the $100,332.95 payment as an 
interest payment instead of a payment of the damage award; (2) the Arbitrator's determination 
that there was an unpaid interest amount as of March 25, 2013 of $1,615.01; (3) the Arbitrator's 
determination that prejudgment interest continued to accrue even after the $100.332.95 payment 
was made; and (4) the Arbitrator's decision to award prejudgment interest on amounts not yet 
incurred, liquidated, or capable of mathematical calculation. 
The Defendant's arguments are similar to those made by the insurer in Cranney and are 
similarly unavailing. As set forth in Cranney, legal errors are not evident miscalculations of 
figures for purposes of Section 7-913(a)(l). Since all of the Defendant's allegations of error stem 
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from alleged misinterpretations of the relevant law, as opposed to the type of mathematical error 
discussed in Cranney, this Court lacks the authority to modify the award. 
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Modification is DENIED. 
B. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE IS MOOT 
In light of the Court's finding that it lacks the authority to modify or correct the award, 
the Plaintiffs Motion to Strike material offered in support of that motion is moot. 
C. CONCLUSION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONFIRM AMENDED FINAL A WARD 
Since the Court, in this instance, lacks the authority to modify or correct the award of 
prejudgment interest, and since the Defendant does not dispute the award of damages, the 
Plaintiffs motion to confirm the amended final award under Idaho Code§ 7-911 is GRANTED. 
III. COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
In support of its motion to disallow attorney fees, the Defendant argues the Plaintiffs 
memorandum of costs and attorney fees is premature unless and until the Court confirms the 
arbitration award. Having granted the Plaintiffs Motion to Confirm the arbitration award, the 
Court finds that the Plaintiffs request for attorney fees and costs under Rule 54(d)(5) is now ripe 
for decision. Since both parties have fully briefed the issues, the Court will decide the competing 
motions. 
A. THE PLAINTIFF WAS THE PREVAILING PARTY IN THE ARBITRATION 
As an initial matter, the Court finds that the Plaintiff was the prevailing party in the 
arbitration since the arbitration award was substantially greater than the $25,000 that the 
Defendant initially tendered on August 25, 2009.5 See Ferrell v. United Financial Casualty Co., 
155 Idaho 85, _, 305 P. 3d 529, 533-34 (2013). 
B. COSTS 
The crux of the dispute over costs is the interplay of the arbitration agreement in the 
insurance policy, the arbitrator's pre-hearing scheduling order, and other applicable law. The 
relevant portion of the insurance policy states: 
In [the event of arbitration], an arbitrator will be selected by the insured person 
and us. If agreement on an arbitrator cannot be reached within (30) days, the 
5 The Defendant did not dispute in its motions or briefing that the Plaintiff was the prevailing party. 
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judge of a court having jurisdiction will appoint the arbitrator. The expense of the 
arbitrator and all other expenses of arbitration will be shared equally. Attorney's 
fees and fees paid for the witnesses are not expenses of arbitration and will be 
paid by the party incurring them. 
Idaho Code § 7-910 states, "Unless otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate, the 
arbitrators' expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not including counsel fees, incurred 
in the conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as provided in the award." The Arbitrator's pre-
hearing scheduling order states that the parties agreed that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
would govern the arbitration proceedings. 6 
IRCP 54(d)(l)(A) states that the court shall award certain costs to the prevailing party as 
a matter of right, and under IRCP 54( d)(l )(E) the court may award additional discretionary costs 
upon a showing that such costs were "necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and 
should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." 
The Plaintiff argues that since the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governed the 
arbitration proceedings, Plaintiff is entitled to its witness fees as the prevailing party under IRCP 
54. The Defendant argues th_at Rule 54 does not override the parties' arbitration agreement, 
which states that each side would bear their own witness fees and split the other arbitration costs 
with .the other side. The Defendant argues that, to the extent the arbitration agreement conflicts 
with either Idaho Code § 7-910 or IRCP 54, the agreement controls. In support of its position, 
Defendant cites to Farrell v. United Financial Casualty Company, supra. In that case, the 
Supreme Court held that Rule 54 could not serve as a basis for attorney fees to the prevailing 
party if the arbitration agreement stated that each side would bear their own costs. 305 P. 3d at 
534-535. 
The Court agrees with Defendant's position that Section 7-910 is a default rule that can 
be contracted around. The phrase, "unless otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate" 
gives the parties the freedom to apportion the costs of arbitration and witness fees however they 
choose. In this case, the parties' agreement states that each side will pay their own witness fees 
and split the other costs of arbitration. As such, and consistent with the Supreme Court's holding 
in Farrell, the Court will uphold that provision in the arbitration agreement and deny the 
Plaintiff's motion for costs and witness fees. 
6 Pre-Hearing Order No. 1. RE: Scheduling, ~ 10 at p. 2, attached to First Amended Petition as Exh. 'B.' 
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Given the foregoing, Plaintiff's motion for costs is DENIED in full. 
C. ATTORNEY FEES 
The Plaintiff claims that she is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code § 41-1839(1), 
which states in relevant part: 
Any insurer issuing any policy ... of insurance ... that fails to pay a person entitled 
thereto within ... sixty (60) days if the proof of loss pertains to uninsured motorist 
or underinsured motorist coverage benefits, the amount that person is justly due 
under such policy ... shall in any action thereafter commenced against the insurer 
in any court in this state, or in any arbitration for recovery under the terms of the 
policy ... pay such further amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable as 
attorney's fees in such action or arbitration. 
In support of an award of attorney fees, Plaintiff argues that (1) the motion is not 
premised on an illegal contract, and in any event, Defendant failed to raise any such objection 
during arbitration; and (2) since the Defendant failed to pay the amount justly due under the 
policy within thirty days of receiving Plaintiff's proof of loss, attorney fees are awardable under 
Idaho Code§ 41-1839. 
Defendant argues that attorney fees should be disallowed because (1) the request for fees 
is based on an unenforceable, illegal contract; (2) the arbitration agreement above provides the 
parties would pay their own attorney fees; (3) the fee agreement between the Plaintiff and 
Plaintiff's counsel does not apply to fees incurred in arbitration; and (4) even if Plaintiff is 
entitled to attorney fees, Plaintiff is not entitled to the amount requested. 
1. PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES IS NOT BASED ON AN ILLEGAL 
OR UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACT 
The Court disagrees with Defendant's contention that the Plaintiff is not entitled to 
attorney fees because Plaintiff's counsel's negligence caused the accident. There is no evidence 
in the record to suggest that Plaintiff's counsel, Jon Steele, caused the accident in order to initiate 
a lawsuit against the Defendant. Additionally, there is no evidence that the underlying contract 
for representation itself was illegal. 
The Court also rejects Defendant's argument that Mr. Steele had a personal interest in the 
Plaintiff's claim against the Defendant by virtue of their subsequent marriage. Pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 32-903, the Plaintiff's contractual claim against the Defendant was her separate property. 
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Any proceeds acquired from that separate property after marriage, including the arbitration 
award, are the Plaintiffs separate property as well.7 
2. THE ALLOCATION OF ATTORNEY FEES IN THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS 
UNENFORCEABLE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The Defendant argues that the Arbitration Agreement, wherein the parties agreed to bear 
_ their own attorney fees, precludes the Plaintiff from seeking attorney fees under Idaho Code § 
41-1839(1). The Court disagrees with this contention because unlike Section 7-910 (regarding 
arbitration costs, discussed above), Section 41-1839 is a broad, mandatory rule rather than a 
default rule that can be contracted around. By its own terms, the statute applies to "any insurer 
issuing any policy" who fails to pay the amount justly due within the time provided. Section 41-
1839 does not contain the "unless otherwise provided" proviso that appears in Section 7-910. 
The fact that c?unsel fees are specifically exempted from Section 7-910 further supports the 
interpretation that Section 41-1839 is a broadly applicable, mandatory rule. 
3. THE ATTORNEY FEE AGREEMENT DOES NOT PRECLUDE AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY FEES 
The Defendant argues that attorney fees cannot be awarded because the fee agreement 
does not apply to recovery obtained in arbitration. Rather, the agreement states that "legal fees 
will be paid only when, and if, you recover monetary damages on your claim in this matter, 
whether by settlement or by decision of the district court." The Court does ;not find this argument 
persuasive because in order to obtain recovery from the Defendant, the Plaintiff filed a petition to 
confirm the arbitration award in district court. Thus, any recovery obtained by virtue of this 
confirmation fits within the terms of the fee agreement. 
4. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES FOR AMOUNTS RECEIVED 
BEFORE THE CONTINGENT FEE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED 
Section 41-1839 states that an insurer who fails to pay the amount justly due to the 
insured within sixty days shall pay "such further amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable as 
attorney's fees in such action or arbitration." 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3) states that if the court grants attorney fees to a 
party in a civil action, the court shall consider the following factors to determine the amount of 
such fees: 
7 The Defendant also alleges that Mr. Steele violated the Rules of Professional Conduct at various times during his 
representation of the Plaintiff. This Court is simply not the appropriate forum to address such allegations. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTIONS ON ARBITRATION AW ARD 8 
000651
(A) The time and labor required; 
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions; 
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and 
ability of the attorney in the particular field of law; 
(D) The prevailing charges for like work; 
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case; 
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained; 
(H) The undesirability of the case; 
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
(J) Awards in similar cases; 
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research ... , if the court finds it was 
reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case; and 
(L) Any other factor the court deems appropriate in the particular case. 
While the trial court must consider all of these enumerated factors, the Rule does not require the 
Court to make specific findings in the record, and does not require the Court to demonstrate how 
' 
it employed any of these factors in reaching an award amount. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 
746, 750-51 (2008). 
The calculation of reasonable attorney fees under Rule 54 is vested in the trial court's 
sound discretion. Id. at 7 49. A trial court acts within its discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the 
issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistent with 
applicable legal standards, and (3) reaches its decision through an exercise of reason. Id. 
The Court will explore the Defendant's argument that even if Plaintiff is entitled to 
attorney fees, Plaintiff is not entitled to the amount requested. The Defendant first objects to 
Plaintiff's request for an attorney fee equal to one-third of the $25,000.00 payment made to the 
Plaintiff on August 25th, 2009 on grounds that this payment was received before the contingency 
fee agreement was signed. This objection is valid since the payment was made before the 
representation began and Plaintiff's counsel did not devote any time or labor to obtain this 
payment. IRCP 54(e)(3)(A). 
Second, the Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to one-third of the prejudgment 
interest as an attorney's fee because under Section 41-1839, prejudgment interest is not an 
amount justly due under the insurance policy. This interpretation of the statute is incorrect. 
Section 41-1839 states that if the insurer fails to pay the amount justly due within the prescribed 
time period, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to the insured. It is undisputed that the 
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Defendant tendered an amount less than what the arbitrator determined was ''justly due" under 
the terms of the policy. This entitles the Plaintiff to an award of reasonable attorney fees. 
Seeing no other argument in opposition to the amount of time and the amount of money 
that Plaintiff's counsel billed in this matter, and in consideration of all the factors listed in Rule 
54(e)(3), the Plaintiff's request for attorney fees is GRANTED IN PART excepting the 
Plaintiff's request for one-third of the $25,000.00 payment made on August 25, 2009. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Defendants' Motion for Modification and/or Correction of Arbitration Award is 
DENIED. 
Plaintiff's Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award of Costs, Attorney fees, and Pre-
judgment Interest is GRANTED and amended final award under Idaho Code § 7-911 is 
confirmed. 
Plaintiff's request for costs is DENIED. 
Plaintiff's request for attorney fees is thus GRANTED, except that the request for an 
attorney's fee of one-third of the $25,000 payment made on August 29, 2009 is DENIED. 
AND IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this __g!t; of November, 2013. 
Ly~ 
District Judge 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 
County of Ada ) 
CASE NO. CV OC 1308697 
AFFIDAVIT OF INTEREST AMOUNT 
AND ATTORNEY FEE AMOUNT DUE 
COMES NOW, Jon M. Steele, being over the age of eighteen years and competent to 
make this Affidavit, after first being duly sworn, and upon his own personal knowledge, states as 
follows: 
1. I am the attorney for the Plaintiff and file this Affidavit of Amount Due and 
Interest Calculation in support of the proposed Judgment. 
2. On November 14, 2013 the Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order 
on Motions on Arbitration Award awarding Plaintiff attorney fees as follows: 
Plaintiffs request for attorney fees is thus GRANTED, except that 
the request for an attorney's fee of one-third of the $25,000 
payment made on August 29, 2009 is DENIED. 




See, Memorandum Decision and Order on Motions on Arbitration Award, p. 
10. 
3. That on September 11, 2013, Defendant paid $101,947.96. $7,223.31 of that 
amount was applied to outstanding prejudgment interest and $94,724.65 was 
applied to the Interim Award, leaving a balance owing on the Interim Award of 
$5,608.30 and prejudgment interest accruing at $1.84 per diem from September 
12. See, Exhibit A attached, letter to Jeffrey Thomson dated September 18, 2013. 
4. That prejudgment interest from September 12, 2013 through November 22, 2013 
(72 days) at $1.84 per diem is $132.48. 
5. That Plaintiff is entitled to 1/3 of attorney fees on the outstanding Interim award 
of $5,608.30 and prejudgment interest of $132.48. 
6. The Plaintiff calculates 1/3 of attorney fees as follows: 
1. $155,000 paid by Defendant on October 16, 2012 
2. $100,332.95 paid by Defendant on March 25, 2013 
3. $101,947.96 paid by Defendant on September 11, 2013 
4. $5,608.30 Interim Award to be paid by Defendant 
5. $132.48 Prejudgment Interest to 11/22/13 to be paid by 
Defendant 
Total $363,021.69-:- 3 = $121,007.23 
7. That this calculation conforms with the Court's November 14, 2013 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Motions on Arbitration Award. 




8. Plaintiff requests the Court to enter Judgment confirming the arbitration award 
and awarding attorney fees as follows: 
Unpaid principal on Interim Award 





Total Judgment $126,748.01 
See, Exhibit B attached, Letter to Jeffrey Thomson dated November 18, 2013. 
Further your Affiant sayeth naught 
DATED this \C\f) day of November 2013. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By_~-A-~-TE_~_E __ _ 
~ii 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before this _I_ 1 _day of November 2013. 
l'SWS30 ~ -A-, M-f:) 
Notary Public for Id o 
Residing at: --..\----=',u..i....!...J.lo::=..1:.+---~ ....... 
My commissions expires: -~-....___..~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Toe undersigned hereby certifies that on this l~~ay of November 2013, a true and correct --
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF INTEREST AMOUNT AND ATTORNEY FEE AMOUNT 
DUE was served upon opposing counsel as follows: 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam Burke 
251 E. Front St., Ste 300 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance 
Company 
Ofidaho 
Peter J. Johnson 
Johnson Law Group 
103 E. Indiana Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 




__ Personal Delivery 
4Facsimile 
US Mail 
__ Personal Delivery 
~Facsimile 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By. JJl 5ttL 
JON M.'STEELE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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RUNFT & s·1IELE 
LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
John L. Runfr I Jon M. Steele 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, PA 
Address: PO Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
September 18, 2013 
Re: Cedillo v. Farmers Insurance, Co. -Arbitration 
Dear Jeff: 
Via Facsimile 
Contrary to your letter of September 11, as you know your client did not pay the Interim 
Award of $100,332.95. Your client's payment of September 11, 2013, as per the Arbitrator's 
decision, has been applied to the outstanding interest of$7,223.31 ($1,615.01 through March 25, 
2013 + $5,608.30 for March 26, 2013 through September 11, 2013). 
Although you challenged the ~i\rbitrators award of prejudgment interest at least three 
times, the Arbitrator denied each of your challenges. Your continued frivolous, unreasonable, 
and unfounded challenge is further evidence of your client's bad faith. 
As stated above, your client's September 11 th payment of $101,947.96 has been applied 
to the outstanding interest of $7,223.31. The balance has been applied to the Interim Award. 
This leaves a balance of $5,608.30 plus interest from September 12, 2013 due. Interest continues 
to accrue at the rate of $1.84 per diem from September 12, 2013 on the outstanding balance. 
Your letter of September 11, 2013 purportedly reserving the right to challenge the 
amount of prejudgment interest is nothing more than an attempt to intimidate and harass and will 
be used as further evidence of your client's reckless conduct. 
ours, 
. Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
JMS:kra 
Cc: Client 
Peter Johnson (via facs-ttnfle5 r 5 t c c I e . c O m 
Phone: (208) 333·8506 Fax: (208) 343-3246 I Boise, Idaho 83702 
Tn the Alaska Center I 1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 ! Fourch Floor Exhibit A 
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. R;., · RUNFT & sjlELE 
~ LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
JohnLRunft I JofiM.Steele I NicholasA.Warden 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, PA 
Address: PO Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
Peter J. Johnson 
Johnson Law Group 
103 E. Indiana Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
November 18, 2013 
Via Facsimile 
Re: Cedillo v. Farmers Insurance, Co. 
Dear Mr. Thomson & Mr. Johnson: 
Pursuant to the Court's decision of November 14, 2013, please forward your 
clients check for the amount $126,748.01 calculated to November 22, 2013. I have 
arrived at this amount in the following manner: 
JMS:kra 
Cc: Client 
Attorney Fees (1/3 of $363,021.69) 
($155,000 + $100,332.95 + 101,947.96 + 
$5,608.30 + 132.48 $363,021.69) 
Unpaid Principal Amount from 
Interim Award 
Prejudgment Interest from 




TOTAL DUE $126,748.01 
Very truly yours, 
J;~~4 
JonM.\~ 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
runftsteele.com 
Phone: (208) 333,8506 F:u:: (208.) 343-3246 I Boise, Idiho 83702 
In rhe Alaska Center I 1020 W. Main Streu, Suire 400 Fourth Floor Exhibit a 
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.- NO . ..,._....,,,.....,,.,.._....,,,,.,,,,,.....----
AJIA f O;W Fil~-~-----
JOHN L. RUNFT (ISB # 1059) 
JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
DEC 11 2013 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JANINE KORSEN 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Phone: (208) 333-9495 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: JSteele@runftsteele.com 
Attorneys for Peggy Cedillo 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PEGGY CEDILLO, an individual, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) CASE NO. CV OC 1308697 
) 
vs. ) JUDGMENT 
) 






Plaintiffs Motion for Confirmation of Arbitration Award and Motion for Award of 
Costs, Attorney Fees and Prejudgment Interest and Defendant's Motion for Modification and/or 
Correction of Arbitration Award and Defendant's Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney 
Feeshaving come before this Court, and _the Court having entered its Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Motions on Arbitration Award on November 14, 2013, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED: 
1. That the Arbitrator's Amended Final Award is confirmed. 
2. That Defendant owes $5,608.30 on the unpaid balan:ce oftp.e Interim Award. 
3. That Defendant owes $132.48 in interest through November 22, 2013. 
4. That Plaintiff is awarded attorney fees in the amount of$121,007.23 
JUDGMENT - Page 1 
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Judgment is entered against Defendant Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho for a total 
of $126,748.01 U, 
. :1: ~D-t\tbeV 
DATED this _JC) day of~r 2013. 
District Judge 
RULE 54~) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby CERTIFIED, 
in accordance with Rule 54(e), I.R.C.P., that the court has determined that there is no just reason 
for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and does hereby direct that the 
above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue and 
an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this 
JUDGMENT - Page 2 







CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this~ day o~~Ol3, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT was served upon opposing counsel as follows: 
Jon M. Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main St., Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Attorney for Peggy Cedillo 
J ef:frey A. Thomson 
Elam Burke 
251 E. Front St., Ste 300 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance 
Company Of Idaho 
Peter J. Johnson 
Johnson Law Group 
103 E. Indiana Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance 
Company Of Idaho . 
JUDGMENT - Page 3 
X:.. US Mail 
__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
:i,.__usMail 
__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile --
US Mail 
__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
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, .... -. 
" 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
jat@elamburke.com 
ISB #3380 
Attorneys for Defendant 
:~1\0 \ ,,~~~.----
DEC 11 20\3 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
ey JERI HEATON 
OEPU1Y 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PEGGY CEDILLO, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMP ANY OF 
IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 1308697 
DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF 
APPEAL 
TO: The above named Plaintiff Peggy Cedillo and her attorney ofrecord Jon M. Steele and to 
the Clerk of the above entitled Court: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho, appeals 
against the named Respondent, Peggy Cedillo, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Motions on Arbitration Award, entered in the above 
entitled action on the 14th day ofNovember, 2013, the Honorable Judge Lynn G. Norton 
presiding. 





2. The Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Memorandum Decision and Order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under 
and pursuant to Idaho Code§ 7-919(a)(3) as an Order confirming an arbitration award and Idaho 
Appellate Rule 11 (b )(8) as an Order appealable under the Uniform Arbitration Act, Title 7, 
Chapter 9 of the Idaho Code. 
3. The preliminary statement of the issues on appeal as currently identified and 
which the Appellant intends to assert are: 
(a) Did the District Court err in denying Defendant's Motion for Modification 
and/or Correction of Arbitration Award; 
(b) Did the District Court err in confirming the Amended Final Arbitration 
Award which contained an evident miscalculation and/or mathematical error in calculating the 
amount of the arbitration award; and 
( c) Did the District Court err in granting Plaintiffs request for attorney fees 
incurred in arbitration? 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5(a). Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes 
5(b). The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript via: [ ] hard copy, [ ] electronic copy, [ X ] both: 
(a) Motion hearing held on October 2, 2013 
6. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's 
Record in addition to those automatically included pursuant to Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules: 
(a) Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and for Award of Costs, Attorney 
Fees, and Prejudgment Interest, filed August 16, 2013; 
DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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., 
(b) Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Confirm 
Arbitration Award, Costs, Attorney Fees, and Prejudgment Interest, filed 
September 11, 2013; 
(c) Defendant's Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees, filed September 
18, 2013; 
(d) Affidavit of Jeffrey A. Thomson in Support of Defendant's Motion to 
Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees, filed September 18, 2013; 
(e) Defendant's Motion for Modification and/or Correction of Arbitration 
Award, filed September 18, 2013; 
(f) Affidavit of Jeffrey A. Thomson in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Modification and/or Correction of Arbitration Award, filed September 18, 
2013; 
(g) Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in Opposition to Farmer's Motion to Disallow 
Costs and Attorney Fees, filed September 25, 2013; and 
(h) Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in Opposition to Farmer's Motion for 
Modification and/or Correction of Arbitration Award, filed September 25, 
2013. 
7. The Appellant requests the following documents, charts or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: 
NIA 
8. I certify that: 
(a) A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of whom 




c/o Honorable Lynn G. Norton 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
(b) Counsel for Defendant/ Appellant has contacted the Ms. Tardiff to obtain 
the estimated fee. Multiple messages have been left but no return call has 
DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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·. ._ .. 
been received. Once the estimate is obtained counsel will pay the 
estimated fee; 
(c) The estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's Record has been paid; 
( d) The appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
( e) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20. 
DATED this // day of December, 2013. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
z_ 
By: -fr-/,~,9:--<-=--------
homson, Of the firm 
tto eys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1/ day of December, 2013, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows: 
John L. Runft 
Jon M. Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Peter J. Johnson 
Johnson Law Group 
103 E. Indiana Ave., Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207 
DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
U.S. Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
V Via Facsimile - 343-3246 
U.S. Mail --
--Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
=z-via Facsimile - (509) 326-7503 
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AM 0 M lA.../ 'l .' • , ____ ,r, ·----,-:fl
JAN 2 9 2.014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RIC'4t, Clerk 
By JANINE KORSEN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 








Jon Steele for Plaintiff 
Jeffrey Thomson for Defendant 
Case No. CV-OC-2013-8697 
ORDER STAYING PROCEEDINGS 
This Court entered a Memorandum Decision on the Plaintiffs' Motion to Confirm 
Arbitration Award on November 14, 2013 and a Judgment based on that decision on December 
10, 2013 which was filed December 11, 2013. The Plaintiffs motion to compel came before the 
Court for hearing on December 11, 2013. The Court set a briefing schedule and argument on 
Defendant's request to stay the proceedings because of an appeal as a matter of right under Idaho 
Appellate Rule 1 l(a)(8). 
At the hearing on January 29, 2014, the Court considered the Defendant's Notice of 
Appeal filed December 11, 2013; the Defendant's Memorandum Re: Jurisdiction filed December 
18, 2013; the Response to Defendant's Memorandum Re: Jurisdiction filed January 6, 2014; and 
the Idaho Supreme Court's Order to Withdraw Order Re: Final Judgment which was received by 
this Court on January 2, 2014. 
Any proceeding on the additional claims in the First Amended Petition for Confirmation 
of Arbitration Award, Award of Attorney Fees, Unenforceability of Offset Clause and Bad Faith 
ORDER STAYING PROCEEDINGS 1 
; . \ 
.... . 
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filed on August 16, 2013 is stayed. Any decision on the motion to compel filed November 25, 
2013 is also stayed. 
This case will be moved to this Court's inactive case list until a Remittitur is received 
from the Idaho Supreme Court. 
When a Remittitur is received, a scheduling conference will be set in this case. 
AND IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated January 29, 2014. 
L~ 
District Judge 
ORDER STA YING PROCEEDINGS 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this'=t)-th day of January, 2014, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy 
of the within instrument to: 
Jon M. Steele 
Attorney at Law 
1020 Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise ID 83702 
Peter J Johnson 
Attorney at Law 
103 E Indiana Suite A 
Spokane WA 99207-2317 
Jeffrey A Thomson 
Attorney at Law 
Po Box 1539 
Boise ID 83701 




JAN 3 1 2014 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO CHRISTOPHER D. RICH GI 
By KELLE WEGENER , er 
Docket No. 41683-2013 DEPUTY 
PEGGY CEDILLO, an Individual, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF· IDAHO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 











Notice is hereby given that on January 24th, 
2014, I lodged a transcript, 29 pages in length, for 
the above-referenced appeal with the District Court 
Clerk of Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District. 
Christie Valcich, CSR-RPR 
January 24, 2014 
Hearing Date: October 2, 2013 
* * * 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




FARMERS INSURANCE COMP ANY OF 
IDAHO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 41683 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 31st day of January, 2014. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
IDAHO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 41683 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
JEFFREY A. THOMSON 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
JAN 3 1 2014 
Date of Service: --------
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
JON M. STEELE 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
,,,, ...... ,,,,, 
.... ,, '\ 4TH J ,,,, 
CHRISTOPHER D. ~~~ •• u•••• UIJ/,...',,, 
.. C--'~•• •. \.. ·. , 
Clerk of the Distric~llit" • •• ~ ":;. 
: \..) .. oF THE sr,, • < ,:, 
.. ..... • -..7',-,• -•i:i:::• <:•O-
\ ~=~~: -op. :~§ By ~ • :!:ti: _ _;__ ____ ~lff"'--'-------'-'-'~O • ~ .. 
Deputy Clerk ~ "* •.. • •• • y $ ,., .. . .. . 
,# ,tzi • • • • • • • :\4,. .. . 
,, f:'o '0~ .. .. 
,,, RADA CO , .. .. 
111,, Ill II 1111\I 
000673
. ;. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




FARMERS INSURANCE COMP ANY OF 
IDAHO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 41683 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State ofldaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction as, and is a true and correct record of the 
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
as well as those requested by Counsel. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
11th day of December, 2013 . 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
,,,, ..... ,,,, 
,,, JU ,,, 
CHRISTOPHER D Rir<m>' bi'\\\ DJ ch,,,, . ~~ ....... '7( ,, 
Clerk of the District C~ut:t,~ •• •• •••• a ~ 




~ ~o ·~-• ~ \0 • -Deputy Clerk ~ % •.. ..• ~ $ 
, r:. •• •• -~,:, 
,, V ~ ••eeee•• ~" ~ ,, ".t C ~~ 
,,, _.,ND FOR ~\)~ .. ,,, ,,, ,,. ,,,,,. .. ,,,, 
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-
JOHN L. RUNFT (ISB # 1059) 
JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
- - -~-t::tu7i'C1.or-< NO. FLO .]_ 2 f 
A.M _____ P.M.--'-"'~-
FEB 1 8 201~ 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
CHRISTOPHE(l D. RICH, Clerk 
By DAYSHA O?BORM 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 DS?UT·/ 
Phone:208-333-9495 
Fax: 208- 343-3246 
Email: JSteele@runftsteele.com 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 








) CASE NO. CV OC 1308697 
) 
) MOTION FOR ADDITIONS TO THE 
) CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 






COME NOW Plaintiff-Respondent and moves the Court pursuant to I.A.R. Rule 29 for 
an Order for Additions to the Clerk's Record in the above captioned matter to include the 
documents identified herein below. This motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that 
Defendant-Appellant did not request the documents identified below to be included in the 
Clerk's Record, but are documents that Plaintiff-Respondent believes are important to a 
complete presentation of the issues on appeal, and which counsel for Plaintiff-Respondent 
anticipate relying upon or referring to in written or oral presentations to the Idaho Supreme 
Court. 
MOTION FOR ADDITIONS TO THE CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO 




Requested Additions to the Clerk's Record On Appeal: 
1. Amended Verified Memorandum of Costs, Attorney Fees and Prejudgment Interest, 
filed August 16, 2013; 
2. Motion to Strike Exhibit 7 Attached to the Affidavit of Jeffrey A. Thomson in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees, filed September 
25, 2013; 
3. Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Strike, filed September 
25, 2013; 
4. Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Modification and/or Correction of 
Arbitration Award, filed September 25, 2013; 
5. Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Amended Verified Memorandum of 
Costs, Attorney Fees and Prejudgment Interest, filed September 25, 2013; 
6. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Exhibit 7 of Thomson 
Affidavit in Support of Defendant's Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees, 
filed September 30, 2013; 
7. Affidavit of Interest Amount and Attorney Fee Amount Due, filed November 19, 
2013; and 
8. Order Staying Proceedings, filed January 29, 2014. 
Oral Argument is requested only if this Motion is opposed. 
DATED this lg day of February 2014. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: ,J;r~ 
JONM.TEELE 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
MOTION FOR ADDITIONS TO THE CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO 
I.A.R. 29, Page 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
B 
I hereby certify that on this K of February 2014, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR ADDITIONS TO THE CLERK'S RECORD 
ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO IAR 29 in the above-captioned matter by the method indicated 
below and addressed to the following: 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam Burke 
251 E. Front St., Ste 300 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance Company 
Ofidaho 
Peter J. Johnson 
Johnson Law Group 
103 Indiana Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance Company 
Ofidaho 
__ Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Overnight Mail X Via Facsimile 
Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
. Overnight Mail X Via Facsimile 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: __ J __ '/1---+--~~;,.,...£.-.v:~-=-----
JON*STEELE 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
MOTION FOR ADDITIONS TO THE CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO 
I.A.R. 29, Page 3 
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-
JOHN L. RUNFT (ISB # 1059) 
JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
- NO.------:::Fl::-::L~':':"'.~:::::::;-:d:-:572=---
A.M.----' 
RUNFf & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
MAR O 4 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JANINE KORSEN 
DEPUTY 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Phone:208-333-9495 
Fax: 208- 343-3246 
Email: JSteele@runftsteele.com 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 








) CASE NO. CV OC 1308697 
) 
) ORDER GRANTING ADDITIONS TO 
) THE CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 






The Court having reviewed Plaintiff-Respondent's Motion for Additions to The Clerk's 
Record on Appeal Pursuant to I.A.R. 29 filed on February 18, 2014 and Defendant/Appellant's 
Non-Opposition to Plaintiff/Respondent's Motion for Additions to the Clerk's Record on 
Appeal, and being fully advised and good cause appearing herein, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the following additions be made to the Clerk's 
Record in the appeal of this matter: 
1. Amended Verified Memorandum of Costs, Attorney Fees and Prejudgment Interest, 
filed August 16, 2013; 
ORDER GRANTING ADDITIONS TO THE CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL PURSUANT 
TO I.A.R. 29, Page 1 
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2. Motion to Strike Exhibit 7 Attached to the Affidavit of Jeffrey A. Thomson in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees, filed September 
25, 2013; 
3. Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Strike, filed September 
25, 2013; 
4. Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Modification and/or Correction of 
Arbitration Award, filed September 25, 2013; 
5. Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Amended Verified Memorandum of 
Costs, Attorney Fees and Prejudgment Interest, filed September 25, 2013; 
6. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Exhibit 7 of Thomson 
Affidavit in Support of Defendant's Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees, 
filed September 30, 2013; 
7. Affidavit of Interest Amount and Attorney Fee Amount Due, filed November 19, 
2013; and 
8. Order Staying Proceedings, filed January 29, 2014. 
A~ DATED this~ day of March 2014. 
District Judge 
ORDER GRANTING ADDITIONS TO THE CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL PURSUANT 
TO I.A.R. 29, Page 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this64f7 of March 2014, I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING ADDITIONS TO THE CLERK'S RECORD 
ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO IAR 29 in the above-captioned matter by the method indicated 
below and addressed to the following: 
Jon M. Steele 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main St. Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Attorney for Peggy Cedillo 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam Burke 
251 E. Front St., Ste 300 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Attorney for Farmers Insurance Company 
Of Idaho 
Peter J. Johnson 
Johnson Law Group 
103 E. Indiana Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 














ORDER GRANTING ADDITIONS TO THE CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL PURSUANT 
TO I.A.R. 29, Page 3 
